

States east-west policy appear to be somewhat avoiding the implications of success—at least at the economic level. One must, it seems to me, set the economic sights as high as the political—and an early target of \$1 billion annual trade would be more in keeping with a healthy level of economic interchange between these two vast marketing areas.

In other words, we should not expect very substantial and affirmative results from policies which are carried out haltingly and almost grudgingly. If the gains are indeed worth the risks, we should not run the added risk of suffering inadequate results because of halfhearted effort.

It is in this area of expectation and disappointment, too, that another feature of the political argument must be touched upon.

TRADE AS AN "INSTRUMENT OF POLICY"

Already we have found creeping into the debate on future East-West trade policy, a manipulative if not an aggressive overtone which may ill-serve the formulation of policy in this field. In contrast to the "little old ladies in tennis shoes" attitudes of fear and moral outrage which often dominated earlier discussion, we hear increasingly the view advanced that peaceful trade is the next best thing to James Bond for the political subversion of the Soviet bloc and the overthrow of worldwide communism. According to this view, for example, greater U.S. trade and commercial intercourse with Eastern European countries would not only permit the economic benefits of greater access to their markets and greater export earnings for the United States but the new and prolific East-West contacts engendered by this will vigorously fan the latent fires of European nationalism, cause irresistible yearnings for capitalistic affluence, quicken the urges for political freedom by the broad masses behind the Iron Curtain, and subvert and transform the Communist system in short order.

Now, this admitted burlesque of an often sincerely expressed rationale of expanded East-West economic interchange is not to deny or decry some of the expectations of what might ensue from a change of policy—marginal, indirect or remote as these developments may be. The point to be exposed is that—if a straight "win-lose" political calibration is also applied to a change in a trade policy—not only may there be extreme disappointment and disillusionment, but increased East-West trade may be discredited for those purposes it can legitimately serve—whereas the other results it may only incidentally or indirectly promise.

The principal factor to be judged is whether increased East-West trade will contribute to peace—to its development, and to its maintenance.

As an aggressive "instrument of political policy," trade is not a very sharp or lethal weapon. Two-way trade is a channel or conduit of goods, services, knowledge, and personal and official contacts. Expanded trade will serve to increase the plurality of international exchanges—and it is an area where there can be struck a balance of perceived benefit to both parties. In international negotiation it has already been demonstrated that principles of reciprocity are increasingly being perceived as problems of attempting to match demands