

Those are five points in my opinion where there has been a great advance.

Then, of course, I am very worried that the great central shortcoming is, as we have been discussing, no activation date, nor any statement of the amount for the first 5 years.

It seems to me those two things are linked because an activation date would be meaningless if the amount in the first 5 years was only, say, \$100 million a year or some trivial sum. So we want an activation date and the amount. Now, these are not yet in.

There could be a very long delay. Now, I want to concentrate rather on this activation date.

We have talked about what Monsieur Debré has said, but I brought the text in here, and what he said was rather stiffer than what has been said in dialog here.

He said the plan is subject to three conditions, all of which are difficult. The first condition is that the mechanism cannot come into play until a worldwide shortage has been collectively recognized to exist. Those words "collectively recognized" are rather formidable.

Secondly, it cannot come into play until there is more satisfactory operation of the adjustment process. That is just a point on which people have very widely differing opinions—about what the adjustment process should be in the case of this country, for instance.

And then, thirdly, the crucial point, the mechanism cannot come into play until the balance-of-payments deficits affecting the countries whose currencies are designated as "reserve currency" have disappeared.

He does not say "diminished," he says "disappeared." Well, that is a very strong condition.

The German Finance Minister—I have his statement here—was more moderate. He did not talk about disappearance but diminution. But I think the German point of view—I do not think we should feel that the French would be the only ones to take this point of view—the Germans are, basically, very near the French.

I cannot talk—Mr. Bernstein is a great authority—on the probabilities of what may happen. I just want to address myself to one point, and that is, I suggest, that activation should be embedded in the amendment before the legislatures are asked to ratify—embedded in the amendment.

Now, I am told there is no possibility of renegotiating that now. The various people, the people who wanted a progressive solution, have gone as far as they can, and there is no possibility of renegotiation by which you could get that activation date embedded.

Well, I accept that from those who know, I accept that that is so. But I do not think it is germane because given the existing attitudes, there is going to be a considerable delay anyhow.

A refusal to ratify until an activation can be embedded need not prolong the delay at all. A procedure is laid down in section III.3 whereby the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund shall take the initiative in ascertaining whether there is a broad support for activation.

Well, he is presumably going to be vigilant—on the lookout. The moment he sees there is a broad support for activation, he will report it. He won't be laggard in trying to find out whether there is a broad support or not.