offer cruzeiros, or whatever. I am talking about GAB, and the offers that have been made and accepted.

The United States is under a standing obligation under GAB to provide $2 billion when it is asked for, subject to certain conditions, of course.

GAB is a credit system, and certain countries were asked to contribute to it, because their currencies were deemed worthwhile. That is why they were asked. Nobody asked Brazil to contribute to the GAB, and for the time being nobody will. But it is absolutely clear, in equity, that if you are going to do anything on this, it must be on the basis of the original standby contributions.

I mean you might just as well say that the voting rights in relation to quotas should be proportionate to the country's creditor-debtor position in the last 3 years. You might say, "Well, the United Kingdom is a debtor, and it has therefore lost all its voting power in the Fund because it has been a debtor or that some other temporary creditor country has increased its voting rights."

You could not run a system on the basis of the votes of each country depending on whether it happened to be in credit or in debit. That would be a very unstable system and the same applies to GAB.

Mr. TRIFFIN. I quite recognize that you cannot base the voting power simply on passing, ephemeral, creditor positions in the Fund, and that you have to have a system in which certain countries are assured of a stable minimum bloc of votes simply because of their importance in the world. I quite agree with that.

But even the Fund agreement recognizes that for certain decisions countries which are creditors will see their vote increased by a certain proportion in reaching a voting majority. It is certainly unrealistic and unreasonable in principle to say that the total amount of voting power should be governed by either one of two criteria: how much you are committing yourself to lend and how much you are being given the right to borrow.

You should not reward with the same voting power both the willingness to lend and the right to borrow. Yet, at any point in time the bankers about whom we are talking know very well that an increase in quotas for a certain country means an additional promise to lend, and that for another country at a certain point in time—but which may last for a very long time in the case of some countries—an increase in quota means an additional right to take money out, and you should not have the same voting power rewarding both decisions.

Sir ROY HARROD. I cannot agree with that principle at all.

It seems to me that the Fund is supposed to last maybe for a century, and maybe for many centuries, and to say that the voting powers in the Fund are to depend on whether a nation is in credit or in debit——

Mr. TRIFFIN. I quite agree with that, but it has to be influenced by it.

Sir ROY HARROD. I would not agree with that.

Mr. TRIFFIN. It is already in the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.

Sir ROY HARROD. In what sense?

Mr. TRIFFIN. This is in the Articles of Agreement for a number of decisions where the voting power is augmented by a certain proportion of the creditor position of the country concerned, or decreased by a certain proportion of its net debt to the Fund. It is not a new principle.