programs in terms of cutting off the inflationary pressure in the economy.

If you look at what happened to highway prices, after an increase in construction bid prices of about 13 percent in the period of 2 years before the deferrals, they went down and stayed down. I think this was a very valid part of the 1967 cutback exercises.

I don't see why we have any argument about that. I don't understand that.

Mr. CURTIS. The reason we have an argument is that I have been trying to fight the battle for the administrative budget cuts because we are concerned about general revenues here. The Ways and Means Committee has just put aside what we are going to do about the highway trust fund.

We have a serious imbalance there. We have been spending 5 to 6 months this year on the social security trust fund which has plenty of problems itself. But this exercise and the debt ceiling and the investment credit has to do with our general revenues.

Mr. SCHULTZE. I fully agree and that is what we are talking about this year, the administrative budget. I was simply trying to set the record straight on last year's exercise.

Mr. CURTIS. The rhetoric of this administration is we have exercised expenditure restraint and you say you are doing it, but notably this is in context of an expenditure level of $77 billion as recently as 1960, and here we are to a projected possible $144.2 billion in fiscal 1968.

The figures go: 1961, went up to $82 billion, 1962, $87 billion; 1963, $92.6 billion; very interesting, $5 billion increase; 1964, $97.7 billion and then we had, thank goodness, a classical theory of taxes and economics prevailed and the expenditures for fiscal 1965 were $96.5 billion, but then all our efforts went in vain because in fiscal 1966 we went up to $107 billion.

In other words, you took the $10 billion jump in 1 year instead of taking it $5 billion and $5 billion.

Mr. SCHULTZE. There was a war, Mr. Curtis.

Mr. CURTIS. Oh, go on. Wait a minute. You talked about the war as costing a smaller percentage of GNP in the area before and this is a fair statement, but then when you ever get into one of these things you want to talk the other. I am simply saying these are the figures.

Then the next year it went up $20 billion just about, to $125.7 billion. Now this is in context of the language that you used of expenditure reform or restraint and, frankly——

Mr. SCHULTZE. Let's take a look at this.

Mr. CURTIS. The figures are there.

Secretary FOWLER. We never use expenditure restraint in terms of the cost of Vietnam.

Mr. CURTIS. Oh, I didn't say you did and I have been one who, incidentally, feels we well might take a look at that. That shouldn't be a sacred cow, by the way, but certainly we can talk in terms of defense; namely, Western Europe, and why in the name of heaven we don't revise our policy there, but the administration won't even discuss these items with the Congress. They just go ahead and say that they want more money and that they are exercising expenditure restraints and we are supposed to take your language, not your figures.