the Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that
Headnote 7 legislation was needed to deal with the business of debt adjusting. Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us. We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,"[11] and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
*[372 US 732]
may be unwise, improvident, *or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."[12] Nor are we able or willing to draw lines by
Headnote 8 calling a law "prohibi-
Headnote 9 tory" or "regulatory." Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours.[13] The Kansas debt adjusting statute may be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas.[14]

Nor is the statute's exception of lawyers a denial of equal protection of the laws to nonlaw-
Headnote 10 yers. Statutes create
Headnote 11 many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it is only "invidious discrimination" which offends the Constitution.[15] The business of debt adjusting gives rise to a relationship of trust in which the debt-
Headnote 12 adjuster will, in a situation of insolvency, be marshalling assets in the manner of a proceeding in bankruptcy. The debt adjuster's client may need advice as to the legality of the various claims against him, remedies existing under state laws governing debtor-creditor relationships, or provisions of the Bankruptcy Act—advice which a nonlawyer cannot lawfully give him. If the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers,[16] the Equal Protection
*[372 US 733]
*Clause does not forbid it. We also find no merit in the con-
Headnote 13 tention that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by the failure of the Kansas statute's title to be as specific as appellee thinks it ought to be under the Kansas Constitution.

Reversed.

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85 L ed 1305, 61 S Ct 862, 133 ALR 1500 (1941). Ten years later, in Breard v Alexandria, 341 US 622, 631, 632, 95 L ed 1233, 1242, 71 S Ct 920, 35 ALR2d 335 (1951), this Court again commented on the infirmity of Adams.

11. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v Missouri, 342 US 421, 423, 96 L ed 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405 (1952).

12. Williamson v Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. 348 US 483, 488, 99 L ed 563, 572, 75 S Ct 461 (1955).

13. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 74, 75, 49 L ed 937, 948, 949, 25 S Ct 539 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

14. See Daniel v Family Secur. Life Ins. Co. 336 US 220, 224, 93 L ed 632, 636, 69 S Ct 550, 10 ALR2d 945 (1949); Secretary of Agriculture v Central Roig Refining Co. 338 US 604, 618, 94 L ed 381, 392, 70 S Ct 403 (1950).

15. See Williamson v Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. 348 US 483, 488, 489, 99 L ed 563, 572, 573, 75 S Ct 461 (1955); Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 US 61, 78, 79, 55 L ed 369, 377, 31 S Ct 337 (1911).

16. Massachusetts and Virginia prohibit debt pooling by laymen by declaring it to constitute the practice of law. Mass Gen Laws Ann (1958) c. 221, § 46C; Va Code Ann (1958) § 54-44.1. The Massachusetts statute was upheld in Home Budget Service, Inc. v Boston Bar Asso. 335 Mass 228, 139 NE2d 387 (1957).