Now, the reason that we did not send up, did not want to send up—and I fully agree with Secretary McNamara in not sending up—a

supplemental request at the time, hinges on two major points.

First, one of the most important tools that a Secretary of Defense has in trying to provide efficient budgeting in the Pentagon is not to ask for a dime that is not associated with specific requirements. Once you break that rule, which has been painfully built up over the years, I personally believe that the control and the effectiveness of these programs in military budgeting would just go out of the window. I sincerely believe that it would have been a major mistake to come up with a supplemental not based on specific requirements, because in doing so you would be breaking a rule with a lot of psychological impact in terms of effective military budgeting that has taken years to get established and made effective. And for the sake of argument, if we could have come up with an estimate, it would have been a wideranging one, and it would not have been based on specific requirements in terms of specific attrition, specific amounts of ammunition required, specific numbers of bombs needed. It would have been a guess.

That money would have been appropriated, as sure as I am sitting here, and would have been available in a lump sum, and the Secretary's ability to limit spending to specific requirements would have been substantially weaker. So I feel it was a correct decision to wait until the specific requirements were known, although it was a politi-

cally unpopular one, and has caused us a lot of trouble.

Chairman Proxmire. It was just plain wrong. He was off 100 percent. He said \$10 billion and it was \$20 billion. He never corrected it. All this talk about how it is more efficient to make an estimate, based on an assumption which is a ridiculous assumption, is just completely beyond me.

I just cannot understand how in the world you can say it was right, or that it was courageous, or that it was unpopular. It was completely wrong. It destroyed all of our economic policy for that whole

year.

Mr. Schultze. May I come back to that? I would like to, very

much.

Chairman Proxmire. I want to apologize for the fact that I have gone over my time, and also, that I must leave, because I have to attend the meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee. I will be back. I want to pursue this. You are an excellent witness and you can give us good answers in this area, but I am just going to leave now and yield to Congressman Reuss, who will chair the meeting when I am gone.

Mr. Schultze. Senator, I would like, sometime when you come

back, to make a particular point in the record.

Representative Reuss (presiding). I will see to it, if Chairman Proxmire does not come back, that you will be given an opportunity to be heard on that.

Mr. Rumsfeld, you are recognized.

Representative RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Schultze, I have been very interested in the discussion you have had with Senator Proxmire. I am curious to know, exactly how you, as you suggest, share the responsibility for the decisions that were