

made with respect to estimates of the Department of Defense. What has been done since that time to see that your joint capability to accurately forecast or even reasonably accurately forecast will be improved in the coming year?

I sense from your statement that you share my concern about the credibility of the U.S. Government, about the accuracy of your previous budget estimates and about the believability of statements concerning these difficult and technical matters, which I grant are difficult to predict and are subject to change.

I am pleased to see there is going to be a study made to see how the budget can as accurately as possible reflect what is in fact going on in this country, but I would like to hear what steps, specifically with respect to DOD, have been taken.

I asked Mr. Ackley yesterday if DOD was being pulled into this working group, and he indicated not.

Mr. SCHULTZE. May I respond?

Let me make a couple of points. First, I want to make it very clear for the record that I do not and should not share responsibility for the determination of how many men we need in Vietnam, nor how many planes. That is not my responsibility. In translating those determinations into the budgetary impact, of course I do have a role. I want to make it clear that the Budget Director is not deciding what General Westmoreland needs. That is obvious.

On the next point—I do not know whether you are aware of it, but you know you cannot fight a war without supplementals. There were seven of them during the Korean war. Nobody can predict how these things are going to come out and—

Representative RUMSFELD. You say nobody can do it. There were people in Congress doing it over and over again. When the original request came out, three or four Members of the House and Senate took the floor and pointed out that it was outdated then.

The construction activity that was programed to sustain a troop commitment that was considerably in excess of that for which funds were being requested.

I knew that, and I am not on the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. SCHULTZE. As I indicated earlier, Secretary McNamara said time after time that if we were going to finance the long leadtime procurement we would need if the war were to continue past June 1967, "I am going to have to have more money and I am going to come back in for it." He said it time after time. And he also said, "When our commitments are rising at a 60° slope, I can't predict where they are going to level off."

Now, where are we now compared to a year ago? Unlike a year ago, the rate of our planned buildup is moving up much more gradually. It is now possible, with 18 months of combat experience behind us, to assess somewhat better what the requirements are, barring a massive change in the conditions of the war. It is also possible to make a much better set of assumptions with respect to combat attrition, and the like.

As a consequence, the 1968 budget request of the Department of Defense, unlike the 1967 request, provides all of the funds necessary to procure the long leadtime items which will be necessary should the war continue.