ficient revenue to cover these costs until well into the 1980's, and most of increased traffic until then could be carried by the present bridge even if no parallel span were built. This is so because bridge traffic is far below capacity during 10 months of the year, and could continue to increase in these months even if summer traffic could not. In any case, until 1985, a duplicate span would bring in less extra revenue than it would cost annually—even accepting the construction costs of the State roads commission.

But who guarantees this estimate? The present bridge was first estimated in July 1948, to cost $35 million. Three months later, October 1948, the estimate rose to $36.4 million. By 1953, when it was finished, the bridge cost $45 million. A duplicate bridge could, as a result of Vietnamese war inflation and other factors, cost $90 million or more. If so, annual costs for interest, amortization, operation and maintenance, could be $4½ million or $5 million, and the annual loss through 1985 would be much larger than the current estimate.

Before closing—we have been told to listen to the experts on this who recommended the first priority to a parallel bridge—I would urge this committee to examine the reliability record of Coverdale and Colpitts, the traffic consultants who recommended top priority for the parallel bridge.

I have examined the record of the so-called traffic "experts." I have discovered eight major projects on which this firm made gross exaggerations, or overestimations, in traffic and revenue, including two bridges in Maryland, the Potomac River Bridge and the Susquehanna River Bridge. Coverdale and Colpitts overestimated 1966 traffic by 41 percent on the Potomac River Bridge and by 57 percent on the Susquehanna River Bridge.

The six other blunders include two bridges in Michigan; and toll projects in Illinois, West Virginia, Massachusetts, and Kansas. Three of these projects are in default on interest payments to bondholders. A fourth is paying interest out of borrowed money. On the fifth and sixth projects, tolls had to be raised sharply in an effort to make up for traffic deficiencies. Even with higher tolls, revenue is still below the firm's predictions.

I see one of my distinguished colleagues from Chicago. I want to point out Coverdale and Colpitts recommended the Calumet Skyway, where they estimated traffic would be 19.9 million cars a year, although they knew there would be a freeway, Indianapolis Freeway, competing with it. Actual traffic on that Calumet Skyway is running only 7.7 million, or about one-third, and it is in default on interest and way behind on everything else, with no prospects for the future, because the deficits continue to increase.

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI. Mr. Long, they have been trying to get rid of that for 5 or 6 years. They have tried to sell it for $68 million.

Mr. LONG. I think the gentleman knows what I am talking about.

The truth is all of these "experts" are very, very vulnerable. There was a time when you could predict traffic on almost any of these projects and the results would usually exceed your expectations. But there are so many freeways and tollways all over the country, they are all competing with each other, so a great many of these projections have turned out to be very, very disastrous indeed.

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, the building of a parallel bay bridge would be a tremendous economic and financial