tions, averaging siigntly more than one-third

of all such excess property;

(ii) The Vietnam Mission (one of 80 such AID missions) has also increased its utilization of excess property, from a low of 17 percent to a high of 40 percent of all Bureau of the Far East utilizations, averaging, again, more than one-third of all such excess property utilized;

(iii) The Vietnam Mission has likewise increased its utilizations of property via the Advance Acquisition (608) program, from a low of less than

AID'S MISMANAGEMENT OF THE EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM

figures, of the \$919,000 of foreign excess obtained under the Direct Acquisition program during FY66, all but \$89,000 was situs country excess, (and of the \$89,000, \$83,000 was for two items, a rug and the Butler Building), while all Vietnam's 607 (only \$24,135) was situs country excess turned over to voluntary agencies operating in Vietnam.

E. Sustem dynamics

To this point in the report, discussion has centered on the flow of domestic and foreign excess property into AID, and on the size of this flow, measured in dollars. It remains to this section to discuss the inner workings of the AID excess property system and to analyze the regulations, constrains, procedures, and attitudes which impinge on this flow and materially affect the use of excess property by the Bureau of the Far East. Since the GSA, MR/GPR, and the Bureau of the Far East all interact to generate (and solve) the many problems relative to the use of excess property, the inputs of each these organizations are analyzed herein, together with a discussion of the general and resisformation watual; Chapter 2, Paragraph 35, directs its regional utilization officers to consider "national defense requirements, emergency needs, equitable distribution and transportation costs," in making its excess property transfers. Expressly subordinated to those four factors, a further order of precedence is then laid

"(1) Transfers which will preclude current procurement.

(2) Transfers for immediate use . . ."

The next three priorities are of exceedingly narrow applicability. The sixth

priority is "transfers for international economic aid programs."

The GSA Manual then goes on to sanction "first come, first served" approvals, if none of the four listed factor or the six priorities subordinate are applicable.

In theory, the application of these regulations by the GSA regional office to available excess might best wait until the automatic release date (ARD). At that point in time it would be possible to determine which claim among several competing claims rates the highest priority, and the transfer (or award) could be made accordingly. In practice, that is almost never done. Rather, the preponderance—of transfers is effected on a "first come, first served" basis. Moreover, the first served is often the only claimant served, the beneficiary of preferential notification of the item's availability. Usually the advance notification is by telephone, "Would you like . . .?", the items having just come in; that is, the GSA regional office had just received its 120 Forms.

By no means is AID always the preferred claimant, but at least one GSA region makes copies of major 120's available to the AID EPRO's for immediate prescreening.

In such an atmosphere, freezes against available excess property are not to be taken lightly by the agencies which have placed them which he