

as this Court has declared, "Congress was acting in a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic." Its "dominant characteristic . . . was the rapid pace of its unfolding." *National Broadcasting Co. v. United States*, 319 U.S. 190, 219. Congress "did not frustrate the purposes for which the Communications Act of 1934 was brought into being by attempting an itemized catalogue of the specific manifestations of the general problems for the solution of which it was establishing a regulatory agency." Instead, it defined broad areas for regulation under governing standards (*id.* at 219-220) and, recognizing that the Commission's "authority covers new and rapidly developing fields" (*United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.*, 351 U.S. 192, 203), affirmatively directed the Commission to encourage new uses for radio (47 U.S.C. 303(g)),⁷ and clothed it with wide discretion in choosing among the competing demands for frequencies.

As the court of appeals held upon a careful examination of petitioners' contention, the plain language of the statute places upon the Commission "an af-

581; *Functional Music, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission*, 274 F. 2d 543 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 813.

⁷ Petitioners' reliance (Pet. 20) upon *Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States ex rel. Los Angeles*, 280 U.S. 52, is misplaced. In that case, the statute authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to require a carrier to permit another carrier to use its terminal facilities. This Court refused to extend that power to permit the Commission to compel carriers "to build a union passenger station in a city of the size and extent and the great business requirements of Los Angeles" (280 U.S. at 68).