These funds may come from congressional appropriations, from industry, or both—but in any case only in amounts that will depend on what importance is given the matter by the Government.

In the energy field, in 1965 the Government spent $11 million on coal research, $40 million on oil and gas, $210 million on nuclear (not including military and space oriented appropriations). Industry spent the same amount on coal, nine times as much on oil and gas, and less than half as much on nuclear. Thus there is great disparity in the R. & D. efforts in the different segments of the energy sector. This means some segments will progress more rapidly than others. It evidences a national policy decision to develop certain types of resources in preference to others. This will determine to a large extent the mix from which we will get our total British thermal units in 1980—coal, oil, gas, nuclear, solar, et cetera, all of which are competing for a share of this market.

At the same time, the Government is making important policy decisions as to where geographically we will obtain our energy. Onshore, offshore, the North or South American continents, Africa, the Middle East, et cetera, all again vigorously competing for a share of this market.

The Secretary of Interior's five-point-shale program is designed to give shale at least a starting position in this race between energy sources. This is most welcome.

The announcement of the program refers to the report of the Oil Shale Advisory Board dated February 1965, and part of the program stems from the alternative courses suggested by that Board.

In the two intervening years events have occurred which we believe must affect some of the conclusions and recommendations of that Board. The Board agreed that "oil shale development is not urgent to provide supplies of liquid fuel for the immediate future."

I would like to add here parenthetically that we do not agree with that. Since that statement the American oil industry has suffered many reversals in its relationship with the foreign countries in which it operates.

Our oil companies have been subjected to the following types of unilateral actions—specific examples can be furnished:

1. Abrogation of existing contracts;
2. Revision of tax rates for future;
3. Revision of tax rates retroactively;
4. Unilateral decision on the price of the commodity to be used for tax base, regardless of actual market price;
5. Increase in transit charges;
6. Unilateral decision as to the amount of commodity to be sold, regardless of condition of the market;
7. Seizure of local bank deposits of any company not complying with these decisions;
8. Seizure of all facilities of a foreign company;
9. Termination of concession and all contractual obligations;
10. Imposition of fines greater than the value of the company's property in the country;
11. Use of discrimination to place some companies at a competitive disadvantage; and