

are not going to reveal their research secrets; those secrets are part of their assets. Companies may be reluctant to go into a research program where the results go out into the public domain and everyone can start at the same time. They may be willing to cooperate on research but they would not like to be held back in its application until everyone else is equally ready.

The other overgeneralizations that crept in are illustrated by the continued emphasis of the Piceance Basin as though it were typical of all the oil shale reserves. This was not intended but the impression, nevertheless, prevailed. There was no true distinction between deposits that were shallow and deep; between those that are thick or thin; the beautiful areas and waste areas; the solidly blocked ownership patterns and the scattered patterns; the federally dominated areas and the fee or state dominated areas; the presence of water and numerous other matters infinite in their variety.

At this point it should be pointed out that the first preliminary draft of our report was dated November 11 and was received by the Board members prior to their holding the hearing in Washington for the presentation by non-federal parties. Some of us treated this as the format with which we would try to live; others thought that it was subject to a complete revision. At least two of us took the draft and interlined our comments as a complete rewrite without changing the format. Others wrote complete revisions of portions as a suggestion. This was done after we had held our November-December meeting in Washington. At the January meeting it had become clear that we were not going to get a consensus. In order to complete the report our chairman, Joseph Fisher, had come up with the agreement that we would have a consensus and each would have a chance to make his pointed comments or exceptions to that in a footnote if he wished and also each would present his own personal views in a separate statement that would be attached *in toto*.

By the time the report came out it seemed to me that we had resolved two questions. First, there was no public interest that justified holding up an oil shale industry. As a consequence thereof there was no public interest that necessitated indefinite delay of lifting the withdrawal on the federal oil shale lands. The second conclusion was that there were definite public benefits to be achieved from opening the oil shale reserves. Specifically, a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy presented to us by Captain Lovell stated that the Navy felt it was of extreme urgency to know whether oil shale could be developed for use as a reserve by the Navy in time of need. It was obvious that pure research was not enough and that applied research had to be perfected before that question could be answered. We had to have an active oil shale industry before we could know the answers. Apparently we had reached a pretty full agreement on those two points.

The question of method, however, was another problem. We clearly did not approve an uncontrolled release of the federal oil shale reserves; nor did the group approve a government-operated oil shale industry. Some commented that no one had ever proposed a government operation, but in the discussions the point was brought out that just before the 1920 period the Department of Navy had specifically proposed to work and operate the oil reserves at Elk Hills and Buena Vista, California, and Teapot Dome in Wyoming as a government operation. Some felt that there had been recent suggestions in Washington, based on the false premise that the federal government owned all the oil shale reserves, that there be a government corporation patterned after the Satellite Corporation to handle the oil shale reserves. These points are incidental but had to be faced in the process of our consideration.

The method to be used resolved on what was the optimum return to the public interest. Rather naturally this came down to dollars. How could the federal government get the maximum dollar return? The other side of that question is, how could private individuals be prevented from unjust enrichment? We all had the same objective—get the optimum return to the nation—as the Government and as the landlord, both from rental and royalty revenue and from taxes. We shared a common belief that no special favorites should be benefited in the Government's administration of the oil shale reserves. This may have led some to the belief that the oil shale reserves could not be opened up because some might get special benefits. It led others to believe that only by opening them up on a competitive system could special benefits be denied. This deep concern for the