ent, quite different interests of very high national policy that come into some conflict. I am referring to the delay in making public decisions that were made with regard to defense procurement in 1965.

Speaking purely hypothetically and without direct reference to that incident, it seems to me that there might arise an occasion when national security considerations gave rise to a decision on the part of the President that he would not feel it wise to reveal and make known immediately the total defense outlays that were actually being built up by the day-to-day procurement decisions that were being taken. I do not know whether this consideration was operative last year. However, I think we must recognize that occasionally there may be national security situations where you have a real conflict here between the desirability of making information available promptly to the public, and national security.

The fact that the Fed, as Mr. Stein suggested, may not have had information for some period could have affected their action, and if so, this was unfortunate. Perhaps a case could be made that overriding national security interests which might have guided a decision to delay release of precise information on defense activity was correct, despite the difficulties that were created.

Representative RUMSFELD. My time is up. I hear you. I understand what you are saying. I am aware of the fact forecasting is an art and not a science. But in my opinion, you are skating on very thin ice when you suggest that the Constitution priovdes that the executive branch should treat the Congress like an idiot cousin——

Mr. CAPRON. I certainly did *not* mean to suggest that.

Representative RUMSFELD (continuing). And pat them on the head with just that much information that they should have and no more.

No one is arguing the day-to-day administrative decisions belong where they are. My point was beyond that, that the Congress plays a role under the Constitution, and that to play the role it must have access to the best information. The Congress is perfectly capable of understanding that forecasting is an art and not a science and taking the forecasts, understanding them, and dealing with them just as the executive branch does.

I am not talking day to day. I am talking about quarter to quarter.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Mrs. Griffiths?

Representative GRIFFITHS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to compliment you both on the debt limit. A debt ceiling is the most difficult bill in this Congress to pass, and it has the most remarkable group of opposition. The biggest spenders and the most conservative people oppose it: the biggest spenders on the theory that this is their one economy vote, and the conservative—I asked one conservative one day on our side why he was not really willing to pay the bills, and he said, "Well, if they had just taken my votes and added them to the other, we would't have had this bill."

I would like to ask you, what do you think would happen if Congress failed to pass the increase in the debt limit?

Mr. CAPRON. Well, let me emphasize that I am an economist and not a constitutional lawyer. I confess that from time to time in the wee small hours when I was in the Budget Bureau, when this debate was going on up here about the debt limit, we used to speculate as to just what we would do if the ceiling were exceeded. There were jokes about, first of all, Douglas Dillon and then Henry Fowler, suggesting we would be visiting them in Fort Leavenworth.