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OF THE

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NOVEMBER 1967

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

NOVEMBER 17, 1967.

To the Members of the Joint Economic Committee:

I am transmitting herewith for your use, and for the use of other members of the Congress and the interested public, selected background material on economy in Government. These updated data have been compiled especially for the supplementary hearings of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government scheduled for November 27, 28, 29, and 30, 1967.


This study was prepared by Mr. Ray Ward, temporary economic consultant to the subcommittee, and any findings and conclusions herein are the author's and are neither approved nor disapproved

by the subcommittee.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee.

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ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT—1967: UPDATED BACKGROUND MATERIAL

INTRODUCTION

The background material selected herein is intended to indicate the enormity of the Federal Government's property management activities. Previous reports and hearings of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government and those of other committees and qualified sources, especially the General Accounting Office, continue to show that great economies are possible in these areas at a time of critical need.



MAGNITUDE OF DOD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

PROPERTY HOLDINGS

The total of DOD's real and personal property holdings has risen annually from \$129 billion in fiscal year 1955 to \$184 billion at the end of fiscal year 1966.

Real property holdings increased from \$21 to \$38 billion and personal property holdings, including construction in progress,

from \$107 to \$145 billion during the 12-year period.

However, "supply systems" inventories have been reduced by \$13 billion during this period and "stock funds" by \$2 billion. During 1966, there was a small buildup of supply inventories.

TABLE 1.-DOD PROPERTY HOLDINGS AS OF JUNE 30, FISCAL YEARS 1955-66 (1967 FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE) [In millions of dollars]

Total and type of property	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Total	128, 694	134, 082	146, 021	149, 465	150, 660	154, 617
RealPersonal	21, 343 107, 351	22, 918 111, 164	24, 892 121, 129	26, 891 112, 574	29, 689 120, 971	31, 997 122, 620
Supply systems	50, 780	50, 974	53, 799	47,652	44, 467	42,002
Stock funds Appropriated funds	8, 153 42, 627	9,772 41,202	10, 970 42, 829	8, 913 38, 739	8, 162 36, 305	7, 312 34, 690
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Total	158, 508	164, 835	171,364	173, 455	176, 221	183, 570
Real Personal	34, 038 124, 470	35, 378 129, 457	36, 565 134, 799	36, 734 136, 721	37, 557 138, 664	38, 390 145, 180
Supply systems	40, 837	40, 652	40, 096	38, 795	36, 986	37,661
Stock fundsAppropriated funds	6, 413 34, 424	6, 154 34, 498	6, 527 33, 569	5, 749 33, 046	5, 327 31, 659	5, 850 31, 811

¹ Source: "Real and Personal Property of the Department of Defense," an annual report.

Expenditures for DOD military functions as a percentage of the gross national product increased by 5 percent in fiscal 1966 and are estimated to increase more sharply in 1967 and 1968.

TABLE 2.—FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT—COMPARISON WITH NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MILITARY FUNCTIONS EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEARS 1939-68

	Gross	Total, F Govern		National	defense pro	ograms 1		ilitary func military as	
Fiscal year	national product (billions)	Expendi- tures (millions)	Percent GNP	Expendi- tures (millions)	Percent GNP	Percent total Govern- ment	Expendi- tures (millions)	Percent GNP	Percent total Govern- ment
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1939	\$88. 2	\$8, 841	10. 0	\$1,075	1. 2	12. 2	\$1,075	1. 2	12. 2
	95. 0	9, 055	9. 5	1,498	1. 6	16. 5	1,492	1. 6	16. 5
1941	109. 4	13, 255	12. 1	6, 054	5. 5	45. 7	5, 998	5. 5	45. 2
	139. 2	34, 037	24. 5	23, 970	17. 2	70. 4	23, 570	16. 9	69. 2
1943	177. 5	79, 368	44. 7	63, 216	35. 6	79. 6	62, 664	35. 3	79. 0
	201. 9	94, 986	47. 0	76, 757	38. 0	80. 8	75, 797	37. 5	79. 8
1945	216. 8	98, 303	45. 3	81, 277	37. 5	82. 7	80, 048	36. 9	81. 4
	201. 6	60, 326	29. 9	43, 226	21. 4	71. 7	42, 044	20. 9	69. 7
1947	219. 8	38, 923	17. 7	14, 398	6. 6	37. 0	13, 838	6. 3	35. 6
	243. 5	32, 955	13. 5	11, 779	4. 8	35. 7	10, 937	4. 5	33. 2
1949	260. 0	39, 474	15. 2	12, 926	5. 0	32. 7	11,573	4. 5	29. 3
	263. 3	39, 544	15. 0	13, 018	4. 9	32. 9	11,891	4. 5	30. 1
1951	310. 5	43, 970	14. 2	22, 471	7. 2	51. 1	19, 764	6. 4	44. 9
	337. 2	65, 303	19. 4	44, 037	13. 1	67. 4	38, 897	11. 5	59. 6
1953	358. 9	74, 120	20. 7	50, 442	14. 1	68. 1	43, 604	12. 1	58. 8
1954	362. 1	67, 537	18. 7	46, 986	13. 0	69. 6	40, 326	11. 1	59. 7
1955	378. 6	64, 389	17. 0	40, 695	10. 7	63. 2	35, 531	9. 4	55. 2
	409. 4	66, 224	16. 2	40, 723	9. 9	61. 5	35, 792	8. 7	54. 0
1957 1958	431. 3 440. 3	68, 966 71, 369	16. 0 16. 2	43, 368 44, 234	10. 1 10. 0	62. 9 62. 0	38, 436 39, 071	8. 9 8. 9 8. 8	55. 7 54. 7
1959	469. 1 495. 2	80, 342 76, 539	17. 1 15. 5	46, 483 45, 691	9. 9 9. 2	57. 9 59. 7	41,223 41,215	8.3	51. 3 53. 8
1961	506. 5	81, 515	16. 1	47, 494	9. 4	58. 3	43, 227	8. 5	53, 0
	542. 1	87, 787	16. 2	51, 103	9. 4	58. 2	46, 815	8. 6	53, 3
1963	573. 4	92, 642	16. 2	52,755	9. 2	56. 9	48, 252	8. 4	52. 1
1964	612. 0	97, 684	16. 0	54,181	8. 9	55. 5	49, 760	8. 1	50. 9
1965	651. 8	96, 507	14. 8	50, 163	7. 7	52. 0	46, 173	7. 1	47. 8
	712. 0	106, 978	15. 0	57, 718	8. 1	54. 0	54, 409	7. 6	50. 9
1967 (estimate)	762. 5	126, 729	16. 6	70, 222	9. 2	55. 4	66, 950	8. 8	52. 8
1968 (estimate)	814. 0	135, 033	16. 6	75, 487	9. 3	55. 9	72, 300	8. 9	53. 5

¹ Bureau of the Budget "National Defense Programs" include Department of Defense military functions, military assistance, atomic energy activities, stockpiling of strategic and critical materials, defense production expansion, Selective System, and emergency preparedness activities.
² Amounts are adjusted for comparability with current coverage of military functions.

Source: OASD (Comptroller).

Table 3, when compared to table 4, reflects an increase of 32,675 military personnel and 100,533 civilian employees between June 30, 1966, and June 30, 1967.

Table 5, when compared to table 6, reflects an increase of \$1,092 million in military pay costs and \$833 million in civilian employee pay costs between fiscal years 1966 and 1967.

TABLE 3.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1967

	Population, July 1, 1966, census (estimated)	uly 1, 1966, timated)	Department of Defense	Total Department of Defense 1	rtment of se 1	Army	λí	Na	Navy 2	Air Force	ırce
	Number	Percent of United States	as percent of State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States
United States (including Alaska and Hawaii): Military Civilian.			1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1, 864, 722 1, 135, 328	100.0 100.0	790, 258 398, 121	100.0 100.0	434, 656 371, 150	100. 0 100. 0	639, 808 287, 813	100.0 100.0
Total	195, 936, 000	100.0	1.5	3,000,050	100.0	1, 188, 379	100.0	805, 806	100.0	927, 621	100.0
Alabama: Military. Givilian.				31, 142 31, 274	1.7	22, 107 21, 736	2.8	546 56	0.1 ©	8,4898,984	3.1
Total	3, 511, 000	1.8	1.8	62, 416	2.1	43, 843	3.7	602	0.1	17, 473	1.9
Alaska: Military Civilian				31, 641 6, 775	1.7	13, 147 2, 954	1.7	3, 627 517	∞. . .	14, 867 3, 265	2.3
Total	265, 000	0.1	14.5	38,416	1.3	16, 101	1. 4	4, 144	. 5	18, 132	1.9
Arizona: Military Givilian	1			27, 363 9, 162	1.5	7, 371 4, 630	1.2	2,698	.1.	17, 294 4, 004	2.7
Total	1, 603, 000	∞.	2.3	36, 525	1.2	12,001	1.0	3,000	. 4	21, 298	2.3
Arkansas: Military Civilian.		2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1	9, 160 4, 836	5.4.	387 3,760	(6) 6.	108	වඩ	8,665 1,016	1.4
Total	1, 956, 000	1.0	0.7	13,996	. 5	4, 147	. 3	112	(3)	9,681	1.0
California: Military Civilian			1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	251, 232 179, 445	13.5 15.8	49, 483 25, 416	6.3	124, 807 104, 235	28.7	76, 942 41, 064	12.0
Total.	18, 802, 000	9.7	2.3	430, 677	14.4	74, 899	6.3	229, 042	28.4	118, 006	12.7

See footnotes at end of table, p. 11.

TABLE 3.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1967—Continued

	Population, July 1, 1966, census (estimated)	uly 1, 1966, stimated)	Department of Defense	Total Department of Defense 1	rtment of ISE 1	Army	λί	Nav	Navy ²	Air Force	93
	Number	Percent of United States	as percent of State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent Unitedof States
Colorado: Military Civilian				46, 816 17, 360	2.5	25, 830 9, 054	2.3	451	3.5	20, 535 8, 148	23.2
Total	1,955,000	1.0	3.3	64, 176	2.1	34,884	2.9	457	1.	28, 683	3.1
Connecticut: Military Civilian				4, 273 4, 051	2.4.	204 210	© 1.	3,989	5.∞.	80 70	වෙ
Total	2,878,000	1.5	£.	8, 324	.3	414	(E)	6, 999	6.	150	(8)
Delaware: Military Civilian				9, 199 1, 480	.1	111 67	<u>මෙ</u>	145 0	ိေ	8,943 1,397	1.4
Total	513,000	.2	2.1	10,679	.3	178	(E)	145	Θ	10,340	1.1
Florida: Military Civilian				71,807 31,667	3.9	3,668 1,933	2.0	26, 435 18, 750	6.1 5.1	l	3.6
Total	5,895,000	3.0	1.8	103, 474	3.5	5, 601	.5		5.6	1 1	5.6
Georgia: Military Civilian				94,910 44,910	5.1 4.0	79, 738 20, 099	10.1 5.0		1.4		1.5
Total	4,446,000	2.3	3.1	139,820	4.7	99,837	8.4	8,613	1.1	30, 556	3.3
Hawaii: Military Civilian				34, 370 22, 570	1.8	10,697 5,967	1.4	12, 824 13, 065		10,849 3,490	1.7
Total	724, 000	0.4	7.9	56,940	1.9	16, 664	1.4	25, 889	3.2	14, 339	1.5
Idaho: Military Civilian	; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;	1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1	4, 131 580	.12	68 133	<u>ම</u> ෙ	920 3	1.2	3,143	ı.; c.
Total.	697, 000	.3	.7	4, 711	-:	201	(3)	923	ļ	3, 587	.4

Illinois: Military Givilian				55, 929	3.0	6, 821	9.5	30, 005 6, 447	6.9		3.0
Total	10, 785, 000	5.5	∞.	87, 862	2.9	24, 602	2.1	36, 452	4, 5		2.6
Indiana : Military. Civilian.				10, 405 17, 289	1.5	4, 897 7, 351	1.8	613 8, 460	2.3		∞.r.
Total	4, 951, 000	2.5	9.	27, 694	6.	12, 248	1.0	9, 073	1.1		9.
lowa: Military Civilian				1, 570 886		230 536	(9)	185	, මෙ		.12
Total	2, 760, 000	1.4	.1	2, 456	1.	766	l.	189	<u>e</u>		-:
Kansas: Military Civilian				23, 496 5, 973	1.3	11, 888 4, 494	1.5	743 144	(3)		1.7
Total	2, 275, 000	1.2	1.3	29, 469	1.0	16, 382	1.4	887	1.		1.3
Kentucky: Military Civilian				57, 051 18, 137	3.0	56, 254 15, 377	7.1	2,714	.17	582 24	(3)
Total	3, 181, 000	1.6	2. 4	75, 188	2.5	71, 631	6.0	2, 929	4.		1.
Louisiana: Military Civilian			1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	35, 839 8, 497	1.9	24, 827 5, 134	3.2	1, 183 1, 401	e. 4.		1.5
Total	3, 617, 000	1.9	1.2	44, 336	1.5	29, 961	2.5	2, 584	£.		1.2
Maine: Military Civilian				10, 518 2, 176	.2	158 59	වී මෙම	1, 324	.3		1.4
Total	978, 000	.5	1.3	12, 694	. 4	217	ව	2, 102	.3		1.1
Maryland: Military Civilian				44, 225 30, 467	2.4	27, 541 20, 379	3, 5 5, 1	15, 034 9, 562	3.5		(e) 3
Total	2, 609, 000	1.3	2.9	74, 692	2.5	47,920	4.0	24, 596	3.1		1.1

See footnotes at end of table, p. 11.

TABLE 3.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1967—Continued

	Population, July 1, 1966, census (estimated)	uly 1, 1966, timated)	Department of Defense	Total Department of Defense 1	rtment of se 1	Army	ny	Na	Navy ²	Air Force	rce
	Number	Percent of United States	as percent ot State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States
Massachusetts: Military- Civilian				26, 837 24, 131	1.4	9.060 7,170	1.1	3, 111 9, 603	0.7	14, 666 5, 357	2.3 1.9
Total	5, 403, 000	2.8	0.9	50,968	1.7	16, 230	1.4	12, 714	1.6	20,023	2.1
Michigan: Military Civilian				18, 022 13, 946	1.0	1, 785 8, 814	2.2	1,022 183	.1.	15, 215 2, 567	2.4
Total	8, 468, 000	4.4	4.	31,968	1.1	10, 599	6.	1,205	.2	17,782	1.9
Minnesota: Military Civilian				5, 241 2, 532	.23	1, 230 1, 075	.3.5	870 128	; (3)	3, 141 842	33.5
Total	3, 572, 000	1.8	.2	7,773	е.	2, 305	.2	866	1.	3, 983	4.
Mississippi: Military Civilian				22, 247 7, 425	1.2	702 2, 848	.7	2, 181 1, 056	r.c.	19, 364 3, 489	3.0 1.2
Total	2, 337, 000	1.2	1.3	29,672	1.0	3,550	£.	3, 237	. 4	22, 853	2.4
Missouri: Military Civilian				33, 093 23, 863	1.8 2.1	25, 438 17, 134	3.2	931	.1	6, 724 5, 431	1.1
Total	4, 564, 000	2.3	1.2	56, 956	1.9	42, 572	3.6	1, 232	.2	12, 155	1.3
Montana: Military Civilian				9,663 1,467	n, m	88 254	©	45 0	ි විං	9,530 1,210	1.5
Total	702,000	.3	3.6	11, 130	4.	342	©	45	(3)	10,740	1.1
Nebraska: Military Civilian				12, 221 3, 514	7. 8.	219 1, 574	(3)	340	(e):	31,662 1,849	1.8
Total	1, 439, 000	7.	1.1	15, 735	.5	1,793	. 2	417	-:	13, 511	1.4

.3 6,068 1.0 .4 1,188 .4	7,256	3,386	4,055	9, 748 2, 034	11,782	10, 601 4, 290	14, 891	14, 971 7, 502	22, 473	10, 656 1, 220	11,876	(3) 12,281 1.9 0 1,3085	13, 589	17, 092 23, 427	40, 519	12, 378 25, 348	37,726
1, 151 1, 517	2,668	1,871	10, 138	2,529	6, 323	1,016 145	1, 161	6, 008 7, 965	13, 973	41, 465 7, 178	48, 643	18 0	18	780 1,270	2,050	408 3,770	4, 178
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4.6.	.3	ლ∞.	.5	2.5	2.6	1.1	6.	1.7	2.2	5.4	3.8	.7	. 5	3.5	2.0	2.4	2.6
1 1	3.3 10,08		2.2 14,68	1	, ,	i		1			'	12, 373				44, 10	1 11
	0 .2		0	1	l į	1 1	1		1			1 11		1 ' '			0 1.3
	431,000		677, 000		6, 899, 000		1, 002, 000		18, 205, 000		4, 972, 00		643, 000		10, 364, 000		2, 477, 000
Nevada: Military Civilian	Total	New Hampshire: Military Civilian	Total	New Jersey: Military Civilian	Total	New Mexico: Military Civilian	Total	New York: Military Civilian	Total	North Carolina: Miltary Civilian	Total	North Dakota: Military Civilian	Total	Ohio: Military Civilian	Total	Oklahoma: Military Civilian	Total

See footnotes at end of table, p. 11.

TABLE 3.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1967—Continued

10			ŀ	CON	UM	ı IN	GC	OVERN	MU	ENT—	-16	167				
Air Force	Percent of United States	0.5	4.	1.6	4.	වව	(E)	2.6	2.0	9.6.	7.	.9	9.	14.6 15.1	14.8	 6.4 2.3
Air F	Number	3,111	4,012	958 2,708	3,666	51	53	16,685	19,112	5, 818	6, 538	5, 457	6,104	93, 639 43, 542	137, 181	3,474 18,437 21,911
Navy 2	Percent of United States	30.1	(6)	1.7	4.7	1.7	2.1	4.6 3.6	4.1	ි ම	ဨ	e. e.	1.9	2.3	1.5	(3)
Na	Number	330	335	7,360	37, 515	7,350 9,736	17, 086	19, 939 13, 379	33, 318	16	16	14, 438 1, 123	15, 561	9, 907 2, 426	12, 333	134 197 331
, A	Percent of United States	©≈.	.3	7.4	3.0	©	1.	2.5	2.0	(3)		.1.	.2	11.3	10.0	1.9
Army	Number	230 3, 038	3,268	6, 227	35, 813	342 345	687	19, 572 3, 566	23, 138	84 531	615	510 2,388	2,898	88, 916 30, 155	119,071	1, 122 7, 440 8, 562
rtment of	Percent of United States	0.2	.2	6.6	3.0	4.	9.	3.0	2.5	3	.2	1.1	6.	10.3 6.8	9.0	2.8
Total Department of Defense	Number	3, 671 4, 064	7,735	14, 545 75, 027	89, 572	7, 743 10, 165	17, 908	56, 196 19, 411	75,607	5, 918 1, 253	7,171	20, 405 7, 470	27, 875	192, 462 77, 362	269, 824	4, 730 31, 277 36, 007
Department of Defense	as percent of State population		0.4		8.		2.0		2.9		1:1	1 1	7.		2.5	3.6
	Percent of United States		1.0		6.0		4.		1.3		e.		2.0		5.5	. 5
Population, July 1, 1966, census (estimated)	Number		1, 973, 000		11,601,000		896, 000		2, 588, 000		679, 000		3, 866, 000		10,747,000	1, 007, 000
	•	Oregon: Military Civilian.	Total	Pennsylvania: Military Civilian	Total	Rhode Island: Military. Civilian.	Total	South Carolina: Military Civilian	Total	South Dakota: Military Givilian	Total	Tennessee: Military Civilian	Total	Texas: Military. Civilian.	Total	Utah: Military Gwilan Total.

Source: Directorate for Statistical Services, Office of Secretary of Defense, September 26, 1967.

Vermont: Military Civilian		1 1		246 78	<u>ම</u> ෙම	57 32	වව	10	<u></u>		<u>මෙ</u>
CS Total	411,000	0.2	1.	324	(3)	88	(3)	10	(3)		(3)
Solvinginia:4 Military Civilian				75, 279 56, 731	4.0 5.0	35, 798 12, 193	4.5	28, 209 39, 026	6.5 10.5		1.8
-67 Total	3,781,000	1.9	3.5	132,010	4.4	47,991	4.0	67, 235	8.4		1.4
Washington:				51, 130 27, 868	2.7	33, 220 7, 038	4.2	4,519 17,407	1.0		2.1
Total	3,041,000	1.6	2.6	78, 998	2.6	40, 258	3.4	21,926	2.7		1.8
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area:5 Military Civillan				75, 372 94, 621	8.3 3	35, 417 34, 882	4.5 8.8	19, 954 40, 200	4.6 10.8		3.1
Total	2, 496, 000	1.3	6.8	169, 993	5.7	70, 299	5.9	60, 154	7.5		3.2
West Virginia: Military- Civilian				464 1,214	0. 1	190 1, 133	© 0.3	74	©°		ම ෙ
Total	1, 809, 000	0.9	0.1	1,678	0.1	1, 323	0.1	74	(3)		ව
Wisconsin: Military Civilian	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			3,100	0.2	855 1, 493	0.1	289 4	(3)	1,966 591	0.3
Total	4, 167, 000	2.1	0.1	5, 832	0.2	2,348	0.2	293	(3)		0.3
Wyoming: Military Civilian	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			3,799	0.2	26 10	වව	23 1	විව		0.6
Total	319,000	0.1	1.4	4, 551	0.1	36	e	24	(3)		0.5
Undistributed: Military Civilian	2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2			83, 224	4.5 0	52, 143 0	6.6 0	26, 669 0	6.1		0.7
Total.			1	83, 224	2.8	52, 143	4.4	26, 669	3.3	- 1	0.5

4 Excludes personnel in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 5 Consists of the District of Columbia, Montgomery and Prince Georges counties in Maryland; Alexandria, Fairfax and Falls Church cities, and Arlington and Fairfax Counties in Virginia. 1 Includes 78,244 civilians employed by other defense activities such as Defense Supply Agency and Office of the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, total Department of Defense column will not add across in all cases.

2 Includes Marine Corps.

2 Less than .05 percent.

TABLE 4.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1966

	Population, July 1, 1965, census (revised)	uly 1, 1965, evised)	Department of Defense as	Total Department of Defense 1	oartment ense 1	Army	h	Nav	Navy 2	Air	Air Force
	Number	Percent of United States	percent of State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States
United States (including Alaska and Hawaii);											
Military. Civilian.				1,832,047 1,034,795	100. 0 100. 0	715, 251 358, 292	100. 0 100. 0	454, 549 327, 948	100.0	662, 247 280, 549	100.0
Total	193, 795, 000	100.0	1.5	2, 866, 842	100.0	1, 073, 543	100.0	782, 497	100.0	942, 796	100.0
Alabama: Military Civilian				32, 093 33, 211	1.7	22, 655 20, 331	3.2	413	©	9, 025	1.4
Total	3, 486, 000	1.8	1.9	65, 304	2.3	42, 986	4.0	455	1.	21, 408	2.3
Alaska: MilitaryCwilian				29, 216 6, 592	1.6	12, 161 3, 048	1.7	3,001	.7	14, 054 3, 016	2.1
Total	267,000	1.	23. 4	35,808	1.2	15, 209	1.4	3, 495	.5	17,070	1.8
Arizona: Military Civilian				20, 675 7, 953	1.1	4, 822 3, 390	1:0	1, 731	84	14, 122 3, 766	2.1
Total	1,755,000	«.	1.8	28,628	1.0	8,212	∞.	2,307	.3	17,888	1.9
Arkanses: Military Civilian				9, 203 4, 523	5.4.	429	1.0	125	₃₀	8,649	1.3
Total	1,941,000	1.0	7.	13,726	.5	4,094	4.	125	ව	9,470	1.0
California: Military Civilian				246, 610 158, 252	13.5 15.3	45, 256 21, 692	6.3	128, 416 90, 527	38.2 27.6	72, 933 38, 908	11.0
Total	18, 403, 000	9.5	2.2	404, 863	14.1	66,948	6.2	218,943	38.0	2	11.9
Colorado: Militry Civilian				40, 516 15, 578	2.2	17, 833 7, 587	2.5	415	(3)	22, 268 7, 841	3.4
Total	1,949,000	1.0	2.9	56, 094	3.0	25, 420	2.4	417	1.	30, 109	3.2

Connecticut: Military. Civilian			' ' '		. 4.	196 208	© 1.	3,954 2,751	5.8.	76 75	©©
Total	2, 830, 000	1.5	- 13		e.	404	©	6,605	6.		(e)
Delaware: Military Civilian		1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			4.1.	108	<u>ව</u> ෙ	136	€0		1.0
	503,000	.3	1 11		е.	160	(3)	146	©		6.
Florida: Wilitary Civilian					3.8	3, 409 2, 123	£.9.	28, 213 15, 493	6.2		5.7 3.4
	5, 796, 000	3.0	1 11		3.4	5, 532	.5	43, 706	5.6		5.0
Georgia: Military Civilian					6.0 3.9	86, 542 15, 839	12. 1 4. 4	5, 431 2, 493	1.2		2. 6
	4, 391, 000	2.3	, ,		5.2	102, 381	9.5	7,924	1.0		4.1
Hawaii: Military Civilian				28, 695 20, 755	1.6 2.0	6, 827 5, 652	1.6	10, 777 11, 859	2.4		1.7
	710,000	. 4			1.7	12, 479	1.2	22, 636	2.9		1.5
Idaho: Military Civilian					.12	73 98	මම	814 3	(3)		. 1
	693, 000	4.			1.	171	(3)	817	(3)		4.
Illinois: Military Civilian					3.3	6,382 16,233	4.5	34, 453 5, 728	7.6		2.9
	10, 641, 000	5.5			3.1	22, 615	2.1	40, 181	5.1		2.6
Indiana: Military Civilian					1.5	4,386 6,500	1.8	597 7,068	2.2		.3
Total	4, 893, 000	2.5			6.	10,886	1.0	7, 665	1.0		9.

See footnotes at end of table, p. 19.

TABLE 4.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1966—Continued

	Population, July 1, 1965, census (revised)	uly 1, 1965, evised)	Department of Defense as	Total Department of Defense 1	parfment ense 1	Army	ий	Na	Navy 2	Air	Air Force
	Number	Percent of United States	State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States
lowa: Military Civilian				1,555		250 491	(6)	204	ි මෙම	1, 101	0.2
Total	2,758,000	1.4	0.1	2, 336		741	1.	205	(6)	1,225	1:
Kansas: Military Givilian	1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			34, 792 5, 481	1.9	24, 328 4, 053	ı. I	761 133	(3) ²	9,703	1.5
Total	2,248,000	1.2	1.8	40,273	1.4	28, 381	1	894	-:	10,873	1:1
Kentucky: Military Civilian				51, 884 15, 184	2.8	51, 133 12, 852	 H	2, 290	1	523	∄ 1:€
Total	3, 173, 000	1.6	2.1	67,068	2.3	63, 985	6.0	2, 518	.3	546	-:
Louisiana: Military Givilian		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		40,034	2.2	28, 846 4, 805	4.0	1, 323	£.4.	9, 915 1, 454	1.5
Total	3, 560, 000	1.8	1.3	47,745	1 1	33,651	3.1	2, 529	.3	11, 369	1.2
Maine: Military. Civilian.				10,785		221 57	 මෙම	1,248	.23	9, 316 1, 029	1.4
Total	986, 000	.5	1.3	12, 591		278	(2)	1,949	e.	10,345	1.1
Maryland: 4 Military Civilian				47, 463 28, 172		30, 232 18, 951	5.3	15, 034 8, 737	3.3	2,197	E.S
Total	2, 587, 000	1.3	2.9	75, 635		49, 183	4.6	23, 771	3.0	2,302	.2
Massachusetts: Military				28, 222 22, 938		11, 464 7, 960	1.6	2, 798 8, 146	2.5	13,960 5,123	2.1
Total	5, 361, 000	2.8	1.0	51,160	 I II	19, 424	1.8	10,944	1.4	19, 083	2.0
											-

Michigan: Military Civilian		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	18, 265 12, 713	1.0	1,818 8,443	2.4		.12	15, 368 2, 020	2.3
Total	8, 317, 000	4.3	.4	30,978	1.1	10, 261	1.0		.2	17, 388	1.8
Minnesota: Military Civilian				5,141 2,314	8.2.	1, 233 1, 049	5.E.		(3) ²	3,005	ri.u.
Total	3, 562, 000	, ,	.2	7,455	.3	2, 282	. 2		-	3,723	4.
Mississippi: Military Civilian				28,011	1.5	592 2, 800	1.8.		4.6.	25, 499 3, 690	3.9
Total	2, 309, 000		1.5	35, 368	1.2	3, 392	£.		4.	29, 189	3.1
Missouri: Military Civilian				38, 846 20, 601	2.1	31, 561 14, 331	4.4		.2	6, 439 5, 266	1.0
Total	4, 492, 000		1.3	59,447	2.1	45, 892	4.3		1.	11, 705	1.2
Montana: Military Civilian				9,395 1,233	5:-:	95 284	(3) (3)		ි මෙ	9, 265	1.4
Total	703,000	. 1	1.5	10,628	4.	379	0		ව	10, 212	1.1
Nebraska: Military Civilian				12,385 3,678	7.	246 1, 830	(9)		(e)	11, 767	1.8
Total	1, 459, 000	' '	1.1	16,063	9.	2,076	.2		1.	13, 451	1.4
Nevada: Military Civilian				6,329 2,792	w.w.	28 11	 චච		2.	5, 157 1, 268	జ.స.
Total	434,000	, ,	2.1	9, 121	в.	39	©		.3	6, 425	7.
New Hampshire: Military				5, 213 8, 437	ლ.	153 281	(3)	1, 525	2.3	3, 535 540	.25
Total	673,000	1 1	2.0	13,650	.5	434	©		1.2	4,075	4.
See footnotes at end of table n 19		ı									

See footnotes at end of table, p. 19.

TABLE 4.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1966—Continued

	Population, July 1, 1965, census (revised)	uly 1, 1965, evised)	Department of Defense as	Total Department of Defense 1	partment ense 1	Army	ny	Z	Navy ²	Air	Air Force
	Number	Percent of United States	percent of State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United State _S
New Jersey: Military Civilian		1 1		48, 762 28, 327	2.7	36, 721 20, 481	5.1	2, 635 4, 641	0.6 1.4	9, 406 1, 894	1.4
Total	6, 781, 000	3.5	1.1	77,089	 I II	57, 202	5.3	7, 276	6.	11,300	1.2
New Mexico: Military Civilian				18,655 11,892		3, 599 5, 889	1.7	1, 030 123	; (3)	14, 026 4, 490	2.1
Total	1,014,000	.5	3.0	30, 547		9, 488	6.	1,153	l.	18, 516	2.0
New York: Military Civilian				33, 241 35, 357		12, 299 14, 702		6,029 9,715	1.3 3.0	14, 913 7, 453	2.3
Total	18, 106, 000	9.4	4.	68, 598	2.4	27,001	2.5	15,744	2.0	22, 366	2.4
North Carolina: Military Civilian				92, 702 11, 591		35, 191 4, 103		47, 536 6, 304	10.5	9,975	1.5
Total	4, 935, 000	2.5	2.1	104, 293		39, 294		53, 840	6 9	11,022	1.2
North Dakota: Military Civilian				12, 165 1, 227		62 193		15 0		12, 088 1, 033	1.8
Total	652,000	ε.	2.1	13, 392	1 1	255	(6)	15		13, 121	2.4
Ohio: Military Civilian				19, 756 38, 318		2, 256 2, 923	ოდ	812 1,159		16, 688 23, 310	2.5
Total	10, 241, 000	5.3	9.	58,074		5, 177	.5	1,971	3	39, 998	4.2
Oklahoma: Military. Civilian				37, 866 31, 361		25, 768 5, 143	3.6	378 2, 154	.7	11,720 23,878	8.5
Total	2, 448, 000	1.3	2.8	69, 227	2.4	30,911	2.9	2, 532	е.	35, 598	3.8

Oregon: Military Civilian	000			3,528	2.5.	2,675	(6)	348	3.1	3,040	٠٠. ا
l otal Pennsvlvanja:	1, 938, 000	I. 0	4.	7,106	7.	7, 865	£.	349	ତ୍ମ	3,811	4.
Military				14, 878 71, 386	. 8 6.9	5,843	7.6	7,626 25,901	1.7	1, 409 6, 152	2.2
Total	11, 583, 000	6.0	7.	86, 264	3.0	33, 137	3.1	33, 527	4.3	7, 561	∞.
Rhode Island: Military. Civilian.				9,486 9,332		356 345		9, 074 8, 921	2.0	56	<u> </u> මම
Total	891,000	. 5	2.1	18,818	9.	701	1.	17,995	2.3	22	(3)
South Carolina: Military_ Civilian		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		60, 191 17, 689	3.3	25, 200 3, 050	3.5	18, 568 12, 365	3.8	16, 423 2, 213	2.5
Total	2, 550, 000	1.3	3.1	77,800	2.7	28, 250	2.6	30, 933	4.0	18, 636	2.0
South Dakota: Military			# 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	6, 160 1, 348	e:-:	96	(3)	18	<u></u> ⊚-	6,046	.29
Total	686, 000	4.	1.1	7,508	е.	862	-	18	©	6,626	7.
Tennessee: Military Civilian				21,869 6,690	1.2	644 2, 269	.1.9.	15, 583	3.4	5,642	.9
Total	3,850,000	2.0	7.	28, 559	1.0	2, 913	.3	16, 568	2.1	6, 278	7.
Texas: Military Civilian				206, 832 70, 043	11.3	78, 631 25, 209	11. 0 7. 0	9, 712 2, 134	2.1	118, 539 41, 643	17.9 14.9
Total	10, 591, 000	5.5	2.6	276, 925	9.7	103, 840	9.7	11,846	1.5	160, 182	17.0
Utah: Military Civilian	r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r	F F F E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E	f 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	4, 480 27, 005	2.6	902 6, 703	1.9	137 181	(3) 1.	3, 441 16, 689	6.0
Total	994, 000	. 5	3.2	31, 485	1.1	7,608	7.	318	(3)	20, 130	2.1

See footnotes at end of table, p. 19.

TABLE 4.—DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND TOTAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE, AS OF JUNE 30, 1966—Continued

	Population, July 1, 1965, census (revised)	uly 1, 1965, vised)	Department of Defense as	Total Department of Defense ¹	artment ense 1	Army	лу	Na	Navy ²	Air	Air Force
	Number	Percent of United States	State population	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States	Number	Percent of United States
Vermont: Military Civilian		# P		263 63	ම ම	61 28	මම	10 0	: ⊚0	192	<u></u>
Total	404,000	0.2	0.1	326	©	89	(3)	10	(6)	203	(3)
Virginia:4 Military Civilian			1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	66, 253 49, 821	6.4. 8.6	28, 976 10, 837			6.2	8, 892 1, 608	1.4
Total	3, 756, 000	1.9	3.1	116, 074	4.0	39, 813		62, 603	8.0	10, 500	1.1
Washington: Military Civilian				47, 557 24, 534		30, 348 6, 075	4.3		1. 0 4. 6	12, 688 2, 998	1.9
Total	2, 973, 000	1.5	2.4	72, 091		36, 423		19,717	2.5	15, 686	1.7
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area: 5 Military. Civilian.				70, 526 85, 638		33, 723 32, 567		17, 054 35, 354	3.7	19,749 9,210	3.0
Total	2, 413, 000	1.2	6.5	156, 164	1 1	66, 290	6.2	52, 408	6. 7	28,959	3.1
West Virginia: Military. Civilian.				528 1, 125		240 1,052	(B)	76	මං	212	ම ෙ
Total	1,815,000	6.		1,653	1.	1, 292		76	(3)	229	(3)
Wisconsin: Military_ Civilian				3, 401 2, 485		836 1, 360	1.4.	288 0	0.1	2,277	m. 7.
Total	4, 140, 000	2.1		5, 886	1 11	2, 196	.2	288	(8)	2, 826	е.
Wyoming: Military				3, 992 624		30	වඩ	18	<u>ම</u> ෙ	3,944	. 5
Total	330, 000	.2	1.4	4,616	.2	41	(9)	20	©	4, 554	.5

0 0	2,603 .3	a Less than 0.05 percent 4 Excludes personnel in the Washington D.C., metropolitan area 8 Consists of the District of Columbla, Montgomery and Prinee Georges Counties in Maryland; Aexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church Cities, and Arlington and Fairfax Counties in Virginia.
4.7	•	itan area. Id Prince Go and Fairfax
	36, 800	O.C., metropol ontgomery an and Arlington
0	0	(ashington, lashington, lashington), lashington, lashi
00	0	a less than 0.05 percent. • Excludes personnel in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. • Consists of the District of Columbia: Montgomery and Prince exandria, Farifax, and Falls Church cities, and Aflington and Falls
2.2	1.4	³ Less than 0.05 percent. ⁴ Excludes personnel in the Seconsists of the District Alexandria, and Fa
39, 403 0	39, 403	
		Joyed by other defense activities such as Defense Supply Agency dense. Therefore, total Department of Defense column will not add
Military Civilian	Total	I Includes 68,006 civilians employed by other defense and Office of the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, total D across in all cases. 2 Includes Marine Corps.

TABLE 5.—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—ESTIMATED PAYROLLS FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1967

[In thousands of dollars]

	A	Active duty milita	military personnel			Civ	Civilian employees		
	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy and Marine Corps	Air Force	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy and Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense activities
United States (including Alaska and Hawaii)	9, 349, 830	3, 664, 156	1, 650, 257	4, 035, 417	8, 044, 446	2, 614, 457	2, 580, 498	2, 225, 948	623, 543
	138. 138. 138. 138. 138. 138. 138. 138.	1112, 669, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 30	1,17,18, 7,1,17, 4,15,4,8,8,15,17, 8,1,17,18, 7,1,17,18, 1,1,18, 1,18, 1,18,	6.24.24.24.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.25.	233.22 1127.22 1127.22 1127.23 1127.33 1127.33 1137	22,125,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,0	4, 185 5, 652 781, 465 22, 808 114, 726 116, 950 102, 487 103, 888 104, 773 107, 108 108, 888 109, 108 109, 108 1	280,27,27,27,28,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,09,	
North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon	75, 829 135, 453 209, 527 20, 303		60 4,094 1,739 1,383		9, 416 354, 184 226, 097 25, 057		7, 992 12, 760 12		94, 820 1, 308 848

73, 501 679 679 679 21, 199 12, 217 24, 041 106, 878 3, 038 7, 651 7, 651
39, 754 115, 552 4, 904 4, 870 309, 488 132, 057 29, 875 26, 291 109 6, 044 5, 325
218,620 67,274 92,624 16,168 14,381 1,558 262,047 122,811
196, 012 2, 679 21, 517 21, 517 15, 297 178, 436 45, 761 7, 926 9, 294 84
527, 887 70, 632 130, 135 10, 135 48, 534 514, 532 203, 417 622, 809 196, 530 196, 530 23, 170 5, 441
8, 222 98, 207 34, 243 34, 243 34, 243 34, 243 34, 243 34, 243 34, 312 82, 612 11, 264 11, 268 23, 865
37, 258 41, 979 46, 789 52, 269 45, 606 173, 550 20, 157 1, 194 1, 194
31,170 1,752 97,565 605 405,980 4,932 147,324 1,324 1,324 1,324 1,336 3,548
76, 650 44, 077 242, 661 37, 611 89, 682 1, 067, 477 28, 338 1, 392 590, 139 250, 093 250, 093 27, 108
ennsylvania node Island uth Dakota uth Dakota nenssee. xas tan tan tanin trainia sashingion. sashingion.

TABLE 6.—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—ESTIMATED PAYROLLS FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1966

(In thousands of dollars)

	The city of any and a second s							-	man par up van - namenosamos viduales and
	ď	Active duty milit	military personnel			Ġ	Civilian employees		
	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy and Marine Corps	Air Force	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Air Force	Other Defense activities
United States (including Alaska and Hawaii)	8, 257, 497	2, 615, 910	1, 922, 473	3,719,114	7, 211, 331	2, 281, 413	2, 368, 684	2, 070, 957	490, 277
Alabama Alaska Arizaka Arizaka Arizana Arizana Arizana Arizana Arizana Arizana Arizana Arizana Arizana Boistrict of Columbia Boistri	143, 775 193, 255 193, 255 196, 2186 20, 136 20, 136	28,559 68.559 68	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	23.35.00	23.2 23.2 24.5 25.5	1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	297 7 1417 7	83.4 26.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4	5, 083 916 916 916 1, 628 1, 628 1, 465 1, 965 1, 965
OIV60111111111111111111111111111111111111		1, 100	7, 60		, ,	- 20 (21	:	2	

75, 477 529 343	17, 156 8, 567 15, 570	109, 002 2, 003 447	3, 555
70, 485 10 13, 272 3, 729	4, 433 275, 139 110, 857	32, 651 24, 207	
198, 167 61, 351 85, 450	5, 626 12, 973 1, 504	238, 490	246
177, 276 2, 612 18, 263 5, 484	17, 382 147, 105 40, 848	194, 733 36, 390 629	5, 814 122 15, 000
521, 405 64, 502 117, 328 9, 213	44, 597 443, 784 168, 779	574, 876 174, 689 1, 088	15, 398 3, 901 15, 000
11, 804 337 97, 349 35, 789	29,694 504,883 21,315	112, 691 85, 200 1, 136	14, 235 24, 545
39, 883 37, 824 63, 465	60, 943 50, 721 747	167, 533 23, 587 324	
28, 979 1, 775 88, 974 699	1, 937 278, 003 5, 116	172, 305 85, 539 1, 289	4, 073
80, 666 39, 936 249, 788 36, 555	92, 574 833, 607 27, 178	452, 529 452, 529 194, 326 2, 749	•
Pennsylvania Rhode Island. South Carolina South Delivia	Julia Danuse Texas. Utah	Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia	Wisconsin. Wyoming Undistributed 1.

1 Includes classified activities and transients.

SUPPLY SYSTEMS INVENTORIES

As stated in table 1 above, the total of "supply systems" inventories from fiscal year 1955 through fiscal year 1966, was reduced from \$51 to \$38 billion, or \$13 billion. The stratification of such stocks, or breakdown into purpose for which they are held, reflects a distinct change during fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966. In prior years, the strata were peacetime operating stocks, mobilization reserve stock, economic and contingency retention stocks, and excess stock. These are shown in table 7 and are explained in footnotes 2 through 7.

Stratification of supply systems inventories as of June 30, 1964, and June 30, 1965, was in accordance with improved logistics guidance which called for application of assets first against requirements to support (1) approved forces; that is, Active and high-priority Reserve Forces of the 5-year force structure and financial program; and (2)

general forces.

The guidance was again changed so that, as of June 30, 1966, assets are applied to approved forces, either as authorized for acquisition or for retention.

The data for these strata are not comparable with that in prior years, except in a very general way, and, therefore, have not been shown separately in the table (see footnotes) but are included in subtotal and total.

The criteria for the establishment of economic retention and contingency retention strata have not been drastically revised, although the exigencies of world situations may result in somewhat different levels being established under them. The excess strata now represents those stocks that are beyond limits of a particular service and for which screening for utilization by other elements of the Department of Defense is underway but for which final DOD disposal action has not been initiated. They are significantly less in value than those reported in prior years.

TABLE 7.-DOD SUPPLY SYSTEMS INVENTORIES BY INVENTORY STRATAS AS OF JUNE 30,1 fiscal years 1958-66 (DATA NOT AVAILABLE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967)

[In millions of dollars]

Total and inventory strata	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Total	46, 585	44, 203	41,727	40, 537	40, 299	39, 684	38, 383	36, 506	37, 167
Unstratified	2, 440	3, 056	2, 033	1, 819	1, 837	1, 425	2, 582	2, 704	3, 221
	44, 145	41, 147	39, 644	38, 717	38, 462	38, 259	35, 801	33, 802	33, 946
Peacetime operating 2	14, 538	15, 306	15, 657	14, 722	15, 601	15, 379	(3)	(3)	(3)
	12, 134	11, 530	10, 893	11, 030	10, 725	10, 921	(3)	(3)	(3)
	5, 593	4, 703	6, 618	6, 343	5, 454	5, 912	3, 596	3, 629	4, 180
	1, 050	1, 611	1, 361	1, 246	1, 040	636	1, 248	1, 814	1, 865
	10, 418	7, 146	5, 115	5, 377	5, 643	5, 411	5, 528	3, 466	3, 250

action initiated.

Scope of Procurement Activities

The net value of military procurement actions amounted to \$41.8 billion in fiscal year 1967—an increase of \$6.1 billion over fiscal year 1966.

Table 8.—Net value of military procurement actions in the United States and possessions, fiscal years 1951-67

Fiscal year:	illions	Fiscal year—Continued	Billions
1951	\$ 31. 9	1960	\$22. 5
1952	 $42.\ 2$	1961	24. 3
1953	 28. 4	1962	27. 8
1954	 11. 9	1963	28. 1
1955	 15. 5	1964	
1956	 18. 2	1965	
1957	 19. 9	1966	
1958	 22.8	1967	
1959	23. 9		

Source: "Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or Commitments, July 1966-June 1967," Office of the Secretary of Defense.

¹ Total inventories in this table do not include value of Navy shipboard supplies included in table 1.
² Peacetime operating stock is that portion of the total quantity of an item on hand which is required to equip and train the planned peacetime forces and support the scheduled establishment through the normal appropriation and leadtime periods.

³ These strata are not available for 1964, 1965, and 1966 because of changes in logistics guidance. In 1965 their sum was \$24,893,000,000, divided into approved force stocks (\$23,665,000,000) and general force stocks (\$1,228,000,000). The guidance was again revised in 1966 when the sum of these two was \$24,651,000,000 allocated to approved forces as levels of acquisition (\$23,640,000,000) and retention (\$1,011,000,000).

⁴ Mobilization reserve materiel requirement: the quantity of an item required to be in the military supply system on M-day, in addition to quantities for peacetime needs, to support planned mobilization to expand the materiel pipeline and to sustain in training, combat, or noncombat operations prescribed forces until production by industry equals consumption.

consumption.

§ Economic retention stock is that portion of the quantity in long supply which it has been determined will be retained for future peacetime issue of consumption as being more economical than future replenishment by procurement.

§ Contingency retention stock is that portion of the quantity in long supply of an obsolete or nonstandard item for which no programed requirements exist and which normally would be considered as excess stock, but which has been determined will be retained for possible military or defense contingencies for U.S. or allied forces.

§ Excess stock as reported herein is stock which is indicated to be above the sum of footnotes 2, 3, 4, and 5 above and for which specific determination as being within the needs of the Department of Defense has not been made or disposal action initiated.

NET VALUE OF PROCUREMENT ACTIONS BY STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1964-67

(See tables 9 and 9-A)

The percentage breakdown of military procurement actions by States and the District of Columbia shows for fiscal year 1967:

	Number		Number
	♥ of States	Percent of total—Continued	of States
Percent of total:	States		Diane.
15 to 20	1	2 to 3	5
5 to 10	4	1 to 2	9
4 to 5	2	0 to 1	27
3 to 4	3	·	

TABLE 9.—NET VALUE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS BY STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1964, 1965, 1966, AND 1967

[Dollar amounts in thousands]

			=					
	Fiscal yea	r 1964	Fiscal yea	r 1965	Fiscal yea	r 1966	Fiscal yea	r 1967
State	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Total, United States 2	\$27, 470, 379		\$26, 631, 132		\$35,713,061		\$41, 817, 093	
Not distributed by State 3 State total 4	3, 053, 272 24, 417, 107	100.0	3, 363, 052 23, 268, 080	100.0	3,999,758 31,713,303	100.0	4, 435, 384 37, 381, 709	100.0
	24, 417, 107 190, 681 101, 545 173, 825 29, 731 5, 100, 651 389, 511 1, 126, 054 30, 424 222, 947 782, 591 520, 169 52, 112 7, 804 429, 201 537, 940 103, 392 289, 045 40, 476 181, 427 31, 531 547, 936 1, 032, 082 591, 290 217, 941 155, 191 1, 349, 071 1, 349, 349 1, 34	100.0 .8 .4 .7 .1 .10.0 1.66 4.61 .9 3.2 2.1 2.1 .2 .3 1.8 2.2 .4 1.2 2.3 4 1.2 2.4 .9 6 5.5 .1 .1 (5) 3.88 3.88 3.0.2 1.1 8.8 4.5	165, 176 74, 175 176, 857 39, 284 5, 153, 639 247, 576 633, 332 247, 576 633, 332 662, 417 72, 213 11, 724 421, 899 604, 925 133, 951 229, 051 528, 731 584, 333 1, 178, 729 558, 334 1, 178, 729 152, 188 1, 060, 781 69, 375 42, 708 19, 142 52, 400 820, 309 84, 137 2, 229, 473 288, 408 48, 997 863, 113 119, 803	.73 .82 .22.11 .1.5.12 .1.27 .2.83 .1.84 .2.66 .1.02 .1.13 .2.51 .2.51 .2.51 .2.51 .2.66 .3.25 .1.17 .3.35 .1.17 .3.35 .1.17 .3.35 .1.17 .3.35 .1.17 .3.35	281, 549 71, 666 248, 228 95, 701 5, 813, 708 2, 051, 550 372, 455 328, 111 766, 955 799, 362 64, 170 20, 004 919, 779 1, 068, 259 70, 057 302, 906 51, 340 842, 527 1, 335, 952 1, 112, 665 13, 709 1, 112, 665 11, 112, 665 11, 112, 665 11, 112, 665 12, 109, 591 1, 090, 122 86, 230 2, 819, 153 449, 331 1, 588, 955	.92.8338.86.51.002.454.22.29.3.488.1.002.274.29.21.655.35.33.43.89.94.33.5.55.55	297, 065 85, 648 249, 559 127, 180 6, 688, 812 210, 409 1, 935, 895 51, 672 357, 666 71, 98, 257 1, 063, 776 68, 472 1, 063, 776 898, 247 279, 328 398, 918 124, 294 656, 031 56, 558 868, 396 1, 422, 272 1, 033, 706 650, 584 114, 800 2, 277, 597 78, 452 103, 522 29, 315 11, 234, 768 11, 234, 768 11, 234, 768 1602, 593 1, 602, 593 1, 750 1, 75	.82
Oregon	29, 104 883, 065 38, 173 51, 621 23, 308 193, 564 1, 294, 431 340, 040 14, 012	3.6 .2 .2 .1 .8 5.3 1.4	39,624 988,811 86,323 81,580 21,062 197,283 1,446,769 191,713 32,202	4.2 4.4 .4 .1 .8 6.2 .8	89,983 1,665,087 131,722 176,424 23,315 502,168 2,291,454 169,681 81,066	.3 5.3 .4 .6 .1 1.6 7.2 .5 .3	99, 319 1, 649, 091 198, 030 180, 777 9, 486 538, 225 3, 546, 978 178, 850 100, 157	.3 4.4 .5 .5 .5 (5) 1.5 9.5 .5

See footnotes at end of table, p. 27.

TABLE 9.—NET VALUE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS BY STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1964, 1965, 1966, AND 1967—Continued

[Dollar amounts in thousands)

State	Fiscal yea	r 1964	Fiscal yea	r 1965	Fiscal yea	r 1966	Fiscal year	r 3967
State	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	\$690, 852 1, 085, 696 87, 327 177, 217 49, 408	2. 8 4. 5 . 4 . 7 . 2	\$469, 097 545, 607 90, 312 203, 003 7, 867	2. 0 2. 3 . 4 . 9	\$425, 487 444, 368 149, 300 364, 684 11, 112	1. 3 1. 4 . 5 1. 1	\$665, 376 606, 114 141, 736 383, 602 32, 868	1. 8 1. 6 . 4 1. 0

¹ Notes on coverage: It is emphasized that data on prime contracts by State do not provide any direct indication as to the State in which the actual production work is done. For the majority of contracts with manufacturers, the data reflect the location of the plant where the product will be finally processed and assembled. If processing or assembly is to be performed in more than 1 plant of a prime contractor, the location shown is the plant where the largest dollar amount of work will take place. Construction contracts are shown for the State where the contractor, the location shown is the plant where the largest dollar amount of work will take place. Construction contracts are shown for the State where the contractor to be performed. For purchases from wholesale or other distribution firms, the location is the address of the contractor's place of business. For service contracts, the location is generally the place where the service is performed, but for transportation and communications services the home office address is frequently used.

munications services the nome onice address is frequently used.

More important is the fact that the reports refer to prime contracts only, and cannot in any way reflect the distribution
of the very substantial amount of material and component fabrication and other subcontract work that may be done

of the very substantial amount of material and component fabrication and other subcontract work that may be done outside the State where final assembly or delivery takes place.

The report includes definitive contracts, and funded portions of letter contracts and letters of intent, job orders, task orders, and purchase orders on industrial firms, and also includes interdepartmental purchases, made from or through other governmental agencies, such as those made through the General Services Administration. The State data include upward or downward revisions and adjustments of \$10,000 or more, such as cancellations, price changes, supplemental

agreements, etc.

The estimated amounts of indefinite delivery, open end, or call-type contracts for petroleum are included in the report The estimated amounts of indefinite delivery, open end, or call-type contracts for petroleum are included in the report Except for petroleum contracts, the report does not include indefinite delivery, open end, or call-type contracts as such but does include specific purchase or delivery orders of \$10,000 or more which are placed against these contracts. Also excluded from the report are project orders; that is, production orders; issued to Government owned and operated facilities such as Navy shipyards. However, the report includes the contracts placed with industry by the Government operated facility to complete the production order.

Includes all contracts awarded for work performance in the United States, includes the 50 States, the District of Collumbia, U.S. possessions, the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and other areas subject to the complete sovereignty of the United States, but does not include occupied Japanese islands and trust territories.

Includes contracts of less than \$10,000, all contracts awarded for work performance in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Rico, U.S. possessions, and other areas subject to the complete sovereignty of the United States, contracts which are in a classified location, and any intragovernmental contracts entered into overseas.

4 Net value of contracts of \$10,000 or more for work in each State and the District of Columbia.

5 Less than 0.05 percent.

TABLE 9-A.—NET VALUE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT BY STATES. BY PERCENT OF TOTAL, FISCAL YEAR 1967

Inverse rank	State	Percent	Total	Inverse rank	State	Percent	Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	South Dakota Idaho North Dakota North Dakota Nevada Wyoming Delaware Maine Hawaii Montana New Mexico Alaska Oregon Vermont Nebraska	(1) (1) (1) (1) 0.1 1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .3 .3	0.1 .2 .3 .5 .7 .9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9	27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38	Alabama Distric: of Columbia Wisconsin. Kansas. North Carolina Tennessee Washington. Min nesota Louisiana Virginia Florida Maryland Indiana Michigan	0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.3	8. 7 9. 7 10. 7 11. 8 13. 0 14. 4 16. 0 17. 7 19. 3 23. 4 25. 7 28. 1 30. 9
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Mississippi Kentucky Arkansas West Virginia Oklahoma New Hampshire Utah South Carolina Rhode Island Colorado Arizona Iowa	.33.33.4444.55.5566.78	2. 5 2. 8 3. 1 3. 5 3. 9 4. 3 4. 3 5. 3 6. 4 7. 1	41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50	Illinois Georgia New Jersey Massachusetts Ohio Pennsylvania Connecticut Missouri New York Texas California	2.8 3.1 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.4 5.2 6.1 8.7 9.5	33. 7 36. 8 40. 1 43. 9 48. 2 52. 6 57. 8 63. 9 72. 6 82. 1 100. 0

¹ Less than 0.05 percent.

AWARDS TO 100 LARGEST MILITARY CONTRACTORS, FISCAL YEAR 1966—(JULY 1965-JUNE 1966 (DATA NOT AVAILABLE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967)

The 100 companies which together with their subsidiaries received the largest dollar volume of military prime contracts of \$10,000 or more in fiscal year 1966 accounted for 63.8 percent of the U.S. total. This was 5.1 percentage points below the 68.9 percent obtained by the top 100 companies in fiscal year 1965, and was the lowest percentage for the 100 top companies since reporting was initiated in fiscal year 1957. The table below shows that the first 25 companies received 5.2 percent less than in fiscal year 1965 with a decrease of 4.4 percent occurring in the first five companies.

IIn percent of U.S. totall

Companies	Fiscal year						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
std dd ththth	6. 0 5. 1 4. 8 4. 6 4. 3	6. 5 5. 2 5. 2 4. 1 3. 8	5. 6 4. 7 4. 4 4. 0 3. 8	5. 9 5. 2 4. 1 4. 0 4. 0	5. 8 5. 4 4. 6 4. 1 3. 9	7. 1 4. 9 3. 5 3. 4 3. 1	4. 6 3. 5 3. 4 3. 4 2. 7
1 to 5	24. 8	24. 8	22. 5	23. 2	23. 8	22. 0	17. 6
6 to 10	11. 3	11. 8	11. 1	10. 9	12. 0	10. 2	9. 0
11 to 25	17. 4	18. 2	17. 2	17. 8	17. 1	16. 0	16. 4
1 to 25	53. 5	54. 8	50. 8	51. 9	52. 9	48. 2	43. 0
26 to 50	11. 3	11. 0	12. 6	13. 7	12. 9	13. 0	12. 1
51 to 75	5. 4	5. 5	6. 0	5. 5	5. 1	5. 2	5. 4
76 to 100	3. 2	2. 9	2. 9	2. 8	2. 5	2. 5	3. 3
1 to 100	73. 4	74. 2	72.3	73. 9	73. 4	68. 9	63. 8

NEGOTIATED AND ADVERTISED PROCUREMENT ACTIONS

Negotiated procurements for fiscal year 1967 were 86 percent of total awards with business firms in the United States, up 1 percent from the previous year.

TABLE 10.—NET VALUE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS, WITH BUSINESS FIRMS FOR WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, CLASSIFIED BY METHOD OF PROCUREMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1951-67

[Dollar amounts in millions]

Fiscal year	Total net value	Formally a procure		Negotiated p	rocurement
	net value	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
951	\$30, 823 41, 482 27, 822 11, 448 14, 930 17, 750 19, 133 21, 827 22, 744 21, 302 22, 992 26, 147 27, 143 26, 221 25, 281 34, 026	\$3,720 4,479 3,089 1,789 2,386 2,815 3,321 3,115 3,089 2,978 2,770 3,412 3,538 3,889 4,660 5,147	12. 1 10. 8 11. 1 15. 6 16. 0 17. 4 14. 3 13. 6 14. 0 13. 1 14. 0 14. 8 18. 4 15. 1	\$27, 103 37, 003 24, 733 24, 733 24, 733 12, 544 14, 935 15, 812 18, 712 19, 655 18, 324 20, 222 22, 735 23, 605 22, 332 20, 621 28, 879	87. 9 89. 2 88. 9 84. 4 84. 1 82. 6 85. 7 86. 0 86. 0 86. 0 87. 0 87. 0 88. 9
Total, 1951–67	39, 809 430, 880	59, 817	13.9	34, 188	85. 9 86. 1

Source: "Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or Commitments, July 1966–June 1967," Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Three types of negotiation authority account for 44 percent of all procurement in fiscal 1967, the same as in fiscal 1966. The results for fiscal years 1965, 1966, and 1967 follow:

CONTRACT AWARDS BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY

[Excerpt from table 11]

		Percent	
	1965	1966	1967
mpracticable to secure competition by formal advertisingxperimental, developmental, test, or researchechnical or specialized supplies requiring substantial initial investment or	14. 4 16. 6	15. 5 12. 1	17. 3 11. 2
extended period of preparation for manufacture	23. 0	16. 2	15. 0
Total	54. 0	43. 8	43. 5

TABLE 11.—AWARDS BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY

[Dollar amounts in thousands] JULY 1964–JUNE 1965

	Total		Army amount	Navy amount	Air Force	Defense Supply Agency amount
Statutory authority (10 U.S.C. 2304(a))	Amount	Percent	and the same			
	\$27,997,037		\$6,327,460	\$8, 968, 550	\$9,658,648	\$3,042,379
lotal. Intragoyernmental.	612, 470 27, 384, 567	100.0	111,620	278, 303 8, 690, 247	199, 478 9, 459, 170	23,069 3,019,310
lotal, except intragovernmental. Formally advertised	4, 817, 214 22, 567, 353	17.6	1, 563, 378	1, 709, 438 6, 980, 809	431, 132 9, 028, 038	1, 113, 266 1, 906, 044
Uner authority (subtoral)	1, 638, 930	6.0	512, 500	332, 857	306, 864	486, 709
(1) National effect general versions (1) Labor surjuga area and industry set-asides (2) Conditions contacting (entitional)	158, 166 1, 464, 146	5.3	36, 110 471, 778	26, 127 306, 626	24, 595 273, 780	71, 334 411, 962
(u) Silian basiness see concerning.	62,215	5.1	30, 351 441, 427	24, 479 282, 147	6,053	1,332
Z. Julil	16,618	 -:	4,612	104	8, 489	3, 413
Public exigency	1, 104, 298 1, 392, 953	4.0 5.1	415, 316 378, 499 35, 023	238, 673 443, 970 31, 051	364, 870 344, 145 12, 746	85, 439 226, 339 0
	78, 820 431, 284 1, 03 <u>6, 916</u>	: .0%	99, 178	150, 391 104, 293 1, 556	181, 715 185, 474 1 836	162, 063 62, 847
(7) Medicines or medical supplies. (8) Supt lies purchased for authorized resule. (9) Perishable or nonportishable subsistance. (10) Impractical to secure competition by formal advertising.	67, 353 170, 674 801, 857 3, 929, 339	. 6 2.9 14.4	41, 114 49, 795 56, 464 729, 401	25, 662 25, 662 50, 759 1, 470, 132	76, 879 141, 305 1, 552, 010	18, 338 553, 329 177, 796
JULY 1965-JUNE 1966	INE 1966					
(1) Experimental, developmental test, or research. (2) Classified burchases. (3) Technical equipment requiring standardization and interchangeability of parts. (4) Technical properation for manufacturing. (15) Negotiation after advertising. (16) Purchases to keep facilities available in the interest of national defense or industrial mobilization (15) Otherwise suthorized by law.	\$4, 556, 792 115, 000 15, 000 6, 284, 334 1, 616 337, 241 567, 546	16.6 ;2 ;23.0 (3) 1,2 2,1	\$932, 697 78, 409 6, 109 672, 178 0 47, 430 152, 263	\$834,971 35,801 30,315 2,977,359 56,301 195,925	\$2, 789, 104 190 15, 976 2, 634, 797 233, 494 185, 227	\$20 0 0 0 0 1 17 34,131

JULY 1965-JUNE 1966

(0131)	\$38, 243, 107		\$11, 298, 202	\$10, 464, 257	\$10,740,754	\$5, 739, 894
Intragovernmental Total, except intragovernmental	1, 014, 603 37, 228, 504	100.0	158, 799 11, 139, 403	448, 909 10, 015, 348	363, 531 10, 377, 223	43, 364 5, 696, 530
Formally advertised Other authority (subtotal)	5, 283, 158 31, 945, 346	14. 2 85. 8	1, 792, 440 9, 346, 963	1, 417, 196 8, 598, 152	455, 292 9, 921, 931	1, 618, 230 4, 078, 300
(1) National emergency (subtotal).	1, 856, 600	5.0	484, 759	328, 946	255, 909	786, 986
(a) Labor surplus area and industry set-asides. (b) Small business set-asides (subtotal).	156, 672 1, 594, 571	4.3	37, 375 444, 897	23, 264 304, 912	7,690 240,938	88, 343 603, 824
1. Unilateral 2. Joint.	1, 398, 904 4 195, 667	3.8	406, 559 38, 338	273, 285 31, 627	142, 737 98, 201	576, 323 27, 501
	105, 357	e.	2, 487	770	7, 281	94, 819
3 Purchases not more that \$2.500 1,	1, 704, 868 92, 431 92, 431 1, 934, 316 1, 934, 316 1, 088, 222 5, 749, 569 122, 571 122, 571 6, 039, 207 6, 039, 207 754, 753	2.5	7,461,560 34,843 107,819 107,819 56,487 61,865 1,865,531 1,984,911 74,284 2,464 831,676 6,725 1,455,618	5.33, 610 6.34, 610 6.94, 779 6.94, 779 6.94, 789 7.95, 613, 892 7.95, 789 7.95, 789 7	378 775 378 776 378 776 115 629 116 403 102 541 1102 541 135 207 2, 449 149 3, 551 5, 553 639 2, 553 639 2, 553 639 198, 338	, 250, 925 350, 925 120, 657 120, 657 121, 150 132, 150 132, 150 134, 134 135,
Total	\$44, 632, 600		\$12, 390, 578	\$13, 998, 335	\$12, 065, 423	\$6,178,264
Intragovernmental Total, except intragovernmental	1, 251, 540 43, 381, 060	100.0	227, 387 12, 163, 191	667, 771	315, 786 11, 749, 637	40, 596 6, 137, 668
Formally advertised. Other authority (subtotal).	5, 791, 979 37, 589, 081	13. 4 86. 6	1, 588, 342 10, 574, 849	2, 112, 261 11, 218, 303	409, 701 11, 339, 936	1, 681, 675 4, 455, 993
See footnotes at end of table, p. 32.						

TABLE 11.—AWARDS BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY—Continued

[Dollar amounts in thousands] JULY 1966–JUNE 1967 t

Statutory authority (10 11 S 2007/cv)	Total		Army amount	Navy amount	Air Force	Defense Supply
סופותות) מתווחנות (בס סיפים)	Amount	Percent	Alliny amount	Mayy amount	allogile	Agency amount
(1) National emergency (subtotal)	\$2, 113, 651	4.9	\$514, 494	\$375, 061	\$251, 232	\$972, 864
(a) Labor surplus area and industry set-asides. (b) Small business set-asides (subtotal)	108,025 1,827,987	4.2	4, 835 506, 969	17, 109 357, 565	8, 409 239, 875	77, 672 723, 578
1. Unitateral. 2. Joint	1,800,371	4.1	496, 784 10, 185	355, 860 1, 705	224, 084 15, 791	723, 643 —65
(c) Balance-of-payments program	177, 639	4	2, 690	387	2,948	171,614
	6, 028, 574 1, 841, 300	13.9	2, 319, 437		1, 052, 505	1, 016, 363
(4) Petsonal of professional services. (5) Services of educational institutions. (6) Purchases outside United States	90, 249 453, 955 2, 263, 460	1.1 5.2	21, 139 102, 660 798, 833		11, 344 162, 842 253, 345	0 1 405, 420
(7) Medicines or medical supplies. (8) Supplies purchased for authorized resale.	218, 741		3,476 68,559		1,384	138, 404
(9) Perishable or nonperishable subsistence. (10) Impractical to secure competition by formal advertising. (11) Experimental, developmental, test, or research.	1, 1/8, 015 7, 521, 549 4, 848, 162	2. / 17. 3 11. 2	80, 241 1, 564, 265 1, 080, 291	2, 147, 709 1, 292, 607	3, 253, 154 2, 475, 246	8//, 214 556, 421 18
	129, 148 132, 084	w.w.	106, 378 22, 997		2, 839 65, 062	12,236
equiling substantial initial investment of extended period	6, 500, 576	15.0	976, 180	3, 189, 760	2, 334, 636	0
(16) Regulation late abelianing. (16) Purchases to Keep facilities available in the interest of national defense or industrial mobilization. (17) Otherwise authorized by law.	3, 292, 966 829, 557	7.6	2, 184, 424 206, 877	455, 979 364, 480	650, 227 172, 974	2,336

1 Less than 0.05 percent.

FIXED PRICE VERSUS COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS

Fixed price contracts decreased slightly to 78.9 percent in fiscal year 1967. Notable progress has been made in the use of fixed price contracts during the past several fiscal years. Since fiscal year 1961 the increase has been 21 percent.

TABLE 12.—NET VALUE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS, BY TYPE OF CONTRACT PRICING PROVISIONS, 1 FISCAL YEARS 1952-67

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	Total net		Type of c	ontract	
Fiscal year	value of actions	Fixed	price	Cost reim!	oursement
	actions	Dollars	Percent of total	Dollars	Percent of total
1952 1953 1954 1955 1955 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1964 1965 1965 1966	\$34, 028 29, 285 10, 942 13, 661 16, 101 17, 997 22, 162 22, 873 21, 182 22, 873 21, 182 22, 873 21, 225 26, 225 26, 225 24, 331 33, 515 39, 249	\$27, 954 23, 358 7, 708 10, 366 11, 221 11, 995 13, 520 12, 160 13, 243 15, 667 17, 013 18, 029 18, 619 26, 551 30, 974	81 1 79. 8 70. 4 75. 9 69. 7 66. 6 60. 4 59. 1 57. 4 57. 9 60. 8 64. 9 71. 2 76. 5 79. 2 78. 9	\$6, 074 5, 927 3, 234 3, 295 4, 881 6, 002 8, 773 9, 353 9, 022 9, 614 10, 113 9, 212 7, 299 5, 711 6, 964 8, 275	17. 9 20. 2 29. 6 24. 1 30. 3 33. 4 39. 6 40. 9 42. 6 42. 1 39. 2 35. 1 28. 8 23. 5 20. 8 21. 1

¹ Includes Army, Navy, and Air Force, but excludes Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency. Beginning Jan. 1, 1957, data for the Military Petroleum Supply Agency, the successor to ASPPA, are included. Includes oversea procurement except for Army prior to fiscal year 1958. Excludes intragovernmental procurement. Excludes procurement actions less than \$10,000 in value. Also excludes some Navy letters of intent (on which pricing provisions had not been determined) during fiscal year 1952.

UTILIZATION OF MILITARY STOCKS

From fiscal year 1958 through fiscal year 1966 the amount of intraservice and interservice utilization rose steadily from \$213 to \$1,859 million. During fiscal year 1967, the total was \$1,540 million, a reduction of approximately \$300 million, which is attributed to the fiscal year 1966 reutilization of spares from the Air Force missile phaseout programs.

TABLE 13.—UTILIZATION OF DOD ASSETS, FISCAL YEARS 1958-67
[In millions]

Utilization of DOD assets					F	iscal yea	r			
Othization of DOD assets	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
OOD interservice supply support pro- gram (wholesale) ntraservice utilization of military serv-	\$32	\$119	\$141	\$228	\$353	\$420	\$396	\$357	\$231	\$348
ice declared excess propertynterservice utilization of military serv-	117	232	408	616	637	626	769	1 799	1 1, 240	812
ice declared excess property	64	134	117	131	122	111	160	304	388	380
Total	213	485	666	975	1, 112	1, 157	1,325	1,460	1, 859	1,540

¹ Includes reutilization of supply system inventories.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Source: "Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or Commitments, July 1966-June 1967," Office of the Secretary of Defense.

DISPOSITION OF DOD SURPLUS STOCKS

The volume of disposal of surplus DOD personal property has declined about 32 percent from fiscal year 1958 to fiscal year 1967 (table 14) while the percent of total gross proceeds to the total acquisition cost has declined from 3.38 to 2.88 percent and the percent of proceeds to acquisition cost (other than scrap and salvage) has increased almost 1¼ percent (table 15). Meanwhile the cost of sales have more than trebled as a percent of gross proceeds from fiscal year 1958 to fiscal year 1967 (table 16).

TABLE 14.—TOTAL DISPOSITIONS: (AT ACQUISITION COST) OF DOD SURPLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY, FISCAL YEARS 1958-67

[In	mill	ions	of	dol	lars	
-----	------	------	----	-----	------	--

					Fiscal yea	r				
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Utilized by other Govern- ment agencies and MAP- Abandoned or destroyed Authorized donations	168. 0 62. 0 221. 0	361. 0 99. 0 314. 0	141. 0 118. 0 347. 0	349. 0 44. 0 275. 0	271. 0 50. 0 258. 0	188. 0 74. 0 233. 0	194 117 273	395 129 282	604 114 285	628 64 231
Sales (other than scrap and salvage)Expended to scrap	2, 465. 8 2, 993. 7	2, 789. 2 4, 576. 8	2, 356. 4 3, 626. 7	1,771.3 4,331.8	1, 236. 2 2, 233. 1	891.6 2,537.8	980 3,818	975 2, 983	² 804 2, 614	³ 917 2, 146
Total dispositions	5, 911. 0	8, 141. 0	6, 589. 0	6, 791. 0	4,061.0	3, 941. 0	5, 399	4, 769	4, 421	3,986

[In millions]

					Fisca	l year				
Proceeds from disposal	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
From sale (other than scrap and salvage)From sale of other property	\$128 55	\$140 72	\$124 70	\$106 61	\$87 48	\$59 40	\$61 42	\$55 53	\$47 1 52	\$34 1 54
Total Acquisition cost (total)	183 5, 460	7,366	194 5, 983	167 6, 123	135 3, 482	99 3, 446	103 4, 815	108 3,958	99 3, 418	3, 063
Percent of total gross proceeds to total acquisition costPercent of proceeds to acquisition cost (other than scrap and salvage)	3. 38 5. 18	2. 88 5. 2	3. 24 5. 25	2.71 5.98	3. 87 7. 02	2. 87 6. 66	2. 14 6. 22	2. 72 5. 64	2. 90 6. 52	2. 88 5. 42

¹ Includes proceeds realized from sale of missile phaseout property.

TABLE 16.—COSTS OF DISPOSAL SALES OF SURPLUS PROPERTY BY THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, FISCAL YEARS 1958-67

[In millions]

					Fisca	year				
Costs of disposal sales of surplus property	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Cost for demilitarizationCosts for preparation and selling	\$24. 0 18. 5	\$20. 5 37. 8	\$26. 6 51. 8	\$19. 1 65. 5	\$9.1 69.0	\$9. 5 62. 6	\$12. 7 64. 6	\$13. 2 65. 1	\$13.5 62.9	\$8. 9 60. 7
TotalGross proceeds	42. 5 183. 0	58. 3 212. 0	78. 4 194. 0	84. 6 167. 0	78. 1 135. 0	71. 8 90. 0	77. 3 103. 0	78. 3 108. 0	76. 4 99. 0	69. 6 88. 0
Percent of sales costs to gross proceeds	23.0	27.5	40. 4	50.6	58.0	75. 2	75. 0	72. 5	77. 2	79.0

Exclusive of DOD interservice transfers.
 Includes sale of \$86,000,000 of missile phaseout property.
 Includes sale of \$290,000,000 of missile phaseout property.

TABLE 15.-PROCEEDS FROM DISPOSAL SALES OF SURPLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY BY THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, FISCAL YEARS 1958-67

APPENDIX 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—YEAREND

FISCAL YEAR 1967 REPORT

[Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense]

Washington, D.C., October 11, 1967.

Subject: DOD cost reduction program, fiscal year 1967 yearend status report.

The DOD cost reduction program entered a new phase in fiscal year 1967. Upon completion of the intially established 5-year cost reduction program at the end of fiscal year 1966, the program was revised to report and measure the effects of new, improved, or intensified management actions on an annual basis. This change resulted in the establishment of new criteria for determining what type of actions qualify for reporting and in the decision to measure all savings on the basis of a "before" and "after" cost comparison of the effect of an individual management improvement action. Although these decisions simplified the basic system they have placed added emphasis on the importance of having good cost data available at the level where an action is initiated. The ability to react quickly to these and other changes have proven to be true tests of the substance of the program.

As in the past years, yearend results have exceeded original expectations. Savings realized in fiscal year 1967 exceeded the goal of \$872 million by \$180 million for a total of \$1,052 million. The 3-year effects of fiscal year 1967 actions amount to \$2,059 million, well in excess of the goal of \$1,502 million. In view of the revised system and the expected learning curve associated with its implementation

these results are indeed surprising.

It is apparent that the DOD cost reduction program remains a live, dynamic influence on the management practices utilized in the Department of Defense today.

Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).



Department of Defense-Cest Reduction Program: Yearend

CONTENTS



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—SUMMARY OF SAVINGS FROM FISCAL YEAR 1967 ACTIONS

[In millions]

		lized ings	Estin savi	nated ings	Tot savir	
	Goal	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967–69	Goal
SUMMARY BY AREA						
I. Buying only what we need:						
A. Refining requirements calculations: 1. Major items of equipment	\$110	\$136	650	60	#100	6000
2. Initial provisioning	20	31	\$58 21	\$2 9	\$196 61	\$203 40
3. Secondary Items	45	110	7	6	123	56
4. Technical manuals 5. Technical data and reports	4 7	2 10	<u>ż</u>	1		.6
6. Industrial production base	4	4	2	3	15	10 4
B. Utilization of long supply and excess inventory: 1. Equipment and supplies.	-	7			4	4
1. Equipment and supplies	37	49	11	2	62	51
2. Idle production plant equipment.	1 2					1
S. Excess contractor inventory C. Eliminating goldplating	300	339	161	109	609	419
D. Inventory item reduction	4	3			3	4
Total, buying only what we need	534	685	260	132	1,077	796
II. Buying at the lowest sound price:						
A. Shift from noncompetitive to competitive procure-						
ment	54	30	21	28	79	130
B. Direct purchase breakout C. Multiyear procurement	10 40	11 29	4 20	4 14	19 63	15 100
Total, buying at lowest sound price	104	70	45	46	161	245
III. Reducing operating costs:				===		====
A. Terminating unnecessary operations	1 49	7	23	34	64	49
B. Reducing operating expense C. Increasing efficiency of operations:	63	135	117	108	360	147
C. Increasing efficiency of operations: 1. Improving telecommunication management	13	11	15	14	40	
2. Improving transportation and traffic manage-	13	11	15	14	40	31
ment	39	53	57	30	140	73
3. Improving equipment maintenance manage-	25	32	34	27	00	
4. Improving noncombat vehicle management	23	2		4	93 8	64
5. Decreasing use of contractor services 6. Improving military housing management	3 1	4	2 2	1	7	6 5
6. Improving military housing management	. 5	.5	3	2	10	11
7. Improving real property management 8. Packaging, preserving, and packing	17 9	14 18	9 10	8 9	31 37	42 18
Total, reducing operating costs	224	281	272	237	790	446
IV. Military assistance program (MAP):						
ISA	9	15	6	8	29 2	14
Air Force	1	1	1		2	1
Total, military assistance program	10	16	7	8	31	15
Total program	872	1 052	E04	400	0.000	1.500
Total program	6/2	1,052	584	423	2,059	1, 502
SUMMARY BY MAJOR CATEGORY						
I. Buying only what we need	534	685	260	132	1,077	796
II. Buying at the lowest sound price	104	70	45	46	161	245
II. Buying at the lowest sound price	224	281	272	237	790	446
iv. Military assistance program	10	16	7	8	31	15
Total program	872	1, 052	584	423	2, 059	1, 502
SUMMARY BY DEPARTMENT/AGENCY						
Army	224	221	136	105	462	374
Navy Nir Force SA	272 332	318 464	158 267	101 192	577 923	474
ΝΑ	332	33	14	192	61	583 51
		ĩ	, 3	3	7	6
JCA	4					
CASA	9	15	6	8	29	14

¹ Represents the annual rate of savings expected to be realized from fiscal year 1967 decisions to consolidate, reduce, or close Defense installations and activities.

I. BUYING ONLY WHAT WE NEED

I.A.1. MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

I. Scope and objective

A. Major items of equipment encompass end items such as ships, aircraft, missiles, ammunition, tactical vehicles, noncombat vehicles, and other items which are controlled on a line item basis by the

headquarters level of DOD components.

B. The primary objective of this area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce the amount of appropriated or revolving funds expended for major items of equipment. This objective can be achieved by taking actions which: (1) decrease the quantity of major items procured; or (2) reduce the cost of major items procured even though the quantity purchased is not reduced.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In	milli	ons]
-----	-------	------

	Fiscal y	ear 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal years	1967–69
	Goal	Realized	Estimated	Estimated	Total	Goal
ArmyNavyAir Force	\$17 58 35	\$1 76 59	\$2 37 19	\$2	\$3 113 80	\$33 105 65
Total	110	136	58	2	196	203

B. Achievements in this area substantially exceeded expectations during fiscal year 1967, particularly for Navy and Air Force. Army savings were disappointing, whereas Navy achieved realized savings of 131 percent and Air Force 170 percent of their respective goals. Overall DOD achievements amounted to 120 percent of the fiscal year 1967 goal.

III. Examples

There were more than 40 significant actions taken in this area during

fiscal year 1967. The following examples are typical:

A. Cancellation of Little John warhead procurement.—The Army canceled procurement of 146 Little John warheads, FL/Smoke M8A1, based upon a special review conducted by the Army Materiel Com-

mand. This action saved \$353,000 in fiscal year 1967.

B. Reduction in Polaris A-3 missile procurement.—The Navy, in conjunction with the development contractor, conducted intensive studies and reviews of progress during the development of the Poseidon missile. As a result, a decision was made to reduce the number of pilot test missiles and advance the operational availability date of the Poseidon missile system by 1 year. This action produced two benefits. It saved \$46 million in Poseidon missile development and testing costs (reported in Area I.C. Value Engineering) and \$43.9 million in major item procurement of the Polaris A-3 missile. The fiscal year

1967 programed procurement of the Polaris A-3 was canceled as a result of the advance in the operational availability date of the

Poseidon missile system scheduled to replace the Polaris.

C. Reduction in T-28 trainer aircraft procurement.—A Navy internal audit report disclosed low utilization of T-28 aircraft assigned for proficiency flying at some installations. This report triggered a Navy-wide review of aircraft requirements for proficiency flying. The Navy-wide review disclosed that a quantity of the T-28 aircraft being used for proficiency flying could be transferred to the Basic Training Command and used to satisfy a procurement requirement for pilot training aircraft. Planned procurement of T-28 prop trainers in the amount of \$18.2 million was canceled as a result of this action.

D. Reduction in procurement of BLU-32/B and Napalm B (fire bombs).—The Air Force, through an intensive review of requirements, asset positions and use data, was able to cancel a programed fiscal year 1967 procurement of 29,400 fire bombs and 11,300,200 pounds of Napalm B. This action produced savings of \$5.2 million in fiscal

year 1967.

E. Termination of contract for power sharing gear box.—The Air Force conducted a complete reanalysis and cost-effectiveness reevaluation of the requirement for a power sharing gear box which had been contracted for a cost of \$1,500,000. As a result, the Air Force concluded that the benefits to be gained did not warrant the expenditure of \$1.5 million. The contract was terminated at a cost of \$54,126 and funds amounting to \$1,350,373 were released for use on higher priority requirements.

I.A.2. INITIAL PROVISIONING

I. Scope and objective

A. Initial provisioning is the process of determining the range and quantity of items required to support and maintain end items of equipment for an initial period of time. Follow-on provisioning (a subsequent provisioning of the same equipment from the same contractor) and reprovisioning (a subsequent provisioning of the same equipment from a different contractor) are refinements of initial

provisioning which are included in the scope of this area.

B. The primary objective of this area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce the amount of appropriated or revolving funds required during the initial provisioning phase. This objective can be achieved from two types of actions: (1) Those which decrease the quantity or range of items procured during initial provisioning phases; and (2) those which reduce the cost of items procured during initial provisioning even though no reductions are made in the quantities procured.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In millions]

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967-69	
	Goal	Realized	Estimated	Estimated	Total	Goal
Army	\$10 10	\$16 15	\$16	<u>\$</u> 7	\$39 22	\$20 20
NavýAir Force	10	15	5	2	22	20
Total	20	31	21	9	61	4(

B. Savings reported by the Navy and Air Force exceeded their fiscal year 1967 goal by more than 50 percent. However, as in past years, the Army failed to achieve significant savings in this area.

III. Examples

There were more than 30 actions reported in this area during fiscal year 1967, 13 of which produced savings of over \$100,000 each. A few

representative examples follow:

A. Fleet logistics support improvement program (FLSIP).—Savings of \$13.3 million were achieved in fiscal year 1967 by a change in the method of calculating initial on-board ship requirements for ships scheduled for conversion. The change, effective in August 1966, resulted from studies and analysis made under the FLSIP.

B. Phased provisioning.—Savings of more than \$3.4 million in initial provisioning were achieved by the Air Force through the application of phased provisioning on the C-141 aircraft program. Reductions of varying quantities on 27 selected high-cost items were made without

adverse effect on mission support.

C. Reduction in aircraft engine procurement.—The Air Force reevaluated the methodology for computing spare engine requirements. As a result, selected factors were changed and a reduction of 11 TF 33-P9 engines, costing approximately \$2.7 million, was made in fiscal year 1967.

I.A.3. SECONDARY ITEMS

I. Scope and objective

A. Secondary items consist of equipment and material not included in the scope of area I.A.1. major items of equipment. Secondary items include: (1) Spare components, subsystems and assemblies; (2) repair parts; (3) bulk items and material such as sheet aluminum, welding rods, gasket material, etc.; and (4) minor end items such as furniture, office equipment, shop equipment, etc.

B. The primary objective of this area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce the amount of appropriated or revolving funds expended for secondary items. To achieve this objective, actions must be taken to: (1) Decrease the quantity of items

procured; or (2) reduce their cost.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

11	n	m	111	lin	ne	1

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal Fiscal year year 1968 1969		Fiscal years 1967-6	
	Goal	Realized	Estimated	Estimated	Total	Goal
Army	\$11 11 20 3	\$67 11 29 3	\$1 2 4	\$1 1 4	\$69 14 37 3	\$14 13 25 4
Total	45	110	7	6	123	56

B. In view of the increasing requirement (both dollars and items) for secondary items this area will continue to receive top management attention at all levels of the DOD. Each DOD component was able to achieve savings equal to or greater than their fiscal year 1967 goal. A substantial portion (\$45.4 million) of the savings resulted from a change by Army in the supply pipeline from the continental United States to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

III. Examples

A. Cancellation of excessive quantity requisitions.—A special program to validate back orders and requisitions was initiated by the Army Tank Automotive Center. Items managers were directed to contact requisitioners and reconfirm requirements prior to procurement. While the original program involved only SEA, the program was subsequently expanded to include all customer requisitions. Customer requisitions totaling more than \$30 million were canceled during fiscal year 1967. Savings of more than \$18 million were reported from this action.

B. Repair of center wing units of F-4 aircraft.—Prior to development and implementation of this repair technique the center section wing units with damaged skins were surveyed. No Navy or commercial procedure existed for the repair of these wing units. The repair is now accomplished by removing the damaged skin and replacing it with new "Chem-Mill" machined torque box skins obtained from the manufacturer. The skins are individually form fitted to the wing section. All special tooling, support equipment, and procedures for reskinning were designed by the Navy. Savings of almost \$0.4 million were realized in fiscal year 1967; fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 savings are estimated at \$1 million for each year.

C. Reduced stock levels for tenders and repar ships.—New tender and repair shipload lists were developed and placed in effect during fiscal year 1967. The range and depth of stock was reduced from a 1-year requirement to a 90-percent availability level for a 90-day period. Savings of \$7.3 million were realized from this action in

fiscal year 1967.

D. Intensified review of TAC requirements.—As a result of the Presidential memo of September 16, 1966, directing improved procurement and management of property, the Tactical Air Command directed each TAC to conduct a special step-by-step review of local funded requirements. Savings of \$1.2 million in fiscal year 1967 resulted from this special review.

I.A.4. TECHNICAL MANUALS

I. Scope and objective

A. This area deals with requirements for new technical manuals and revision to existing manuals, whether procured commercially or

prepared in-house.

B. The area objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will (1) reduce quantitative requirements or (2) lower qualitative requirements without adversely affecting mission accomplishments.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In	millions]
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	Fiscal	year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal yea	r 1967-69
Army	Goal \$1	Realized	Estimated	Estimated	Total	Goal \$1
NavýAir Force	1 2	\$2		\$1	\$3	2 3
Total	4	2		1	3	6

B. The Army and Navy achievements (\$0.3 million each) for fiscal year 1967 are disappointing. These results tend to indicate a lessening of emphasis when compared to accomplishments of prior years.

III. Examples

The following two Air Force examples are indicative of the actions

which are possible in this area:

A. Reduction in manuals for C-141 aircraft.—Representatives of the Air Force, the prime contractor and various subcontractors cooperated in an intensive review of manual requirements for the C-141 aircraft. As a result, some manuals were combined and others were deleted upon disclosure that existing manuals for similar systems could be adapted for use in the C-141 program. This action reduced the cost of manuals by more than \$0.7 million.

B. Air Force ground wire communications requirements.—In the past the Air Force has procured technical manuals from the equipment prime contractor in sets configured for each individual system; i.e., 500 line system, 1,000 line system, 2,500 line system, etc. During fiscal year 1967, communications equipment specialists and technical data control officers explored the advantages of buying basic manuals on a typical XY telephone central office system which contained data applicable to all varying line system configurations. It was concluded that this approach would eliminate duplications of basic common data contained in individual system technical manuals and would reduce the cost of revisions to upgrade for future system configurations. Application of this new approach produced savings of over \$0.2 million in fiscal year 1967.

I.A.5. TECHNICAL DATA AND REPORTS

I. Scope and objective

This area deals with the determination of technical data and report requirements, and the acquisition and distribution of technical data and reports. Savings result from new, improved, or intensified management actions that eliminate or reduce requirements, reduce the scope of content, reduce the frequency of submissions, or otherwise produce economies without adversely affecting mission objectives.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1967 Goal Realized estimated Fiscal year 1969 Goal Realized estimated		Fiscal year	s 1967–69
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
Army	\$1 2	\$2 1	\$1	\$1 1	\$4 2	\$1 3
NavýAir Force	4	7	i	Ī	9	ě
Total	7	10	2	3	15	10

B. Total savings for fiscal year 1967 exceeded expectations by approximately \$3 million, or 40 percent. The Air Force achievements are particularly noteworthy since they represented 70 percent of the total savings reported for fiscal year 1967.

III. Examples

There were more than 800 validated actions reported during fiscal year 1967, of which 19 produced savings of more than \$100,000 each. The following two examples set forth the types of actions reported in this area:

A. Utilization of contractor format and deletion of data requirements.— The cost of technical data requirements on an Army contract for the T64-GE-16 engine was estimated at \$1,141,750. Through an intensified review of the Army requirements, which required conformance to specific format and content, this cost was reduced by \$583,000 by accepting certain data in contractor format and deletion of some data items of questionable necessity.

B. Deletion of equipment failure reports.—An average of 30 unit failure reports were being prepared weekly under an Air Force contract at a cost of \$250 each. A subsequent review of this report requirement revealed that unit failure information was being recorded by the contractor for his own use and could be used in lieu of the unit failure reports. The unit failure reporting requirement was deleted from the contract with a net savings of \$0.2 million accruing to the Government.

I.A.6. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BASE

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses the acquisition, construction, expansion, replacment, modernization, and utilization of industrial facilities and equipment. It includes facilities and equipment made available to

both commercial contractors and Government-owned plants. The primary objective of this area is to encourage the initiation of management improvement actions which will decrease the amount of funds required for acquisition, expansion, or modernization of industrial facilities and production equipment.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In millions]							
	Fiscal y	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal	Fisca I yea	ear 1967-69	
	Goa I	Realized	year 1968 estimated	estimated	Total	Goal	
Army	\$1 3				 \$4	\$1 3	
Total	4	4			4	4	

B. The Air Force was the only DOD component which realized savings of any significance in this area. All but a few thousand dollars of the Air Force saving resulted from the combined management efforts of many parties on the CBU-24/29 munitions program. As a result of these efforts, a reduction of over \$3.7 million in projected facilities expansion was achieved.

I.B.1. UTILIZATION OF LONG SUPPLY AND EXCESS INVENTORY— EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses long supply, excess and surplus equipment and supplies. It includes all types of end items (aircraft, ships, missiles, etc.), spares and repair parts, and other items of equipment and supplies which are stratified as long supply, excess, or surplus within the Department of Defense. The primary objective is to initiate management mprovement actions which will result in the utilization of this material in lieu of new procurement.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal years 1967-69	
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
Army Navy Air Force	\$17 4 12	\$11 7 28	\$2 5 4	\$2	\$13 14 32	\$22 5 18
OSA	. 4	3			3 .	6
Total	37	49	11	2	62	51

B. The criteria for reporting savings in this area were changed significantly commencing with fiscal year 1967 reporting. In prior years savings were reported to the extent that the gross utilization of long supply and excess inventory in the current year exceeded the gross utilization in the base year. Beginning in fiscal year 1967, savings are reported only when it can be demonstrated that the utilization occurred as a result of a new, improved, or intensified management action taken in the current year. The actual utilization of long supply and excess stocks within the DOD in fiscal year 1967 was over \$1.5 billion. This is approximately the same level of gross utilization achieved in fiscal year 1966.

III. Examples

The following examples are typical of the innovations reported in this area:

A. Rebuild/retrofit of carburetor- to fuel injection-type engines.—The Army satisfied a fiscal year 1967 requirement for 700 each 895–5 fuel injection engines by instituting a program involving the rebuild/retrofit of a like number of 895–3 carburetor-type engines which were in an excess status. This action resulted in a saving of \$1,292,611 after deducting the costs of the rebuild/retrofit program and the salvage value which would have been realized from the sale of the excess 895–3 engines. It is estimated that an additional 150 carburetor-type engines will be rebuilt/retrofited during fiscal year 1968 and during fiscal year 1969, with an additional savings of \$276,897 in each year.

B. Use of excess axle assemblies.—After extensive field tests, the Army determined that 1,950 excess axle assemblies used on gasoline trucks could be used, after modification, on multifuel trucks. This action saved \$378,605 in fiscal year 1967 and will save another \$567,906

in fiscal year 1968.

C. Modification of excess MK-52 mod. 0 detonating fuses.—The Navy satisfied a requirement for MK-52 mod. 3 auxiliary detonating fuses (ADF) and saved \$974,842 in fiscal year 1967 by devising a way of modifying excess MK-52 mod. O detonating fuses. Previously, the excess fuses had limited usage as point detonating fuses with projectiles of 8 inches or more.

D. Replacement of an obsolete powerplant.—A requirement at Pearl Harbor for replacing an obsolete battery powerplant was satisfied by the Navy through the use of an excess modern diesel generator plant scheduled for disposal from an offshore location of the Naval Mine Defense Laboratory, Panama City, Fla. This action resulted in a net saving of \$884,000 after deduction of the cost of removal, estimated salvage value of the equipment, and the estimated cost of alterations.

E. Use of Navy surplus aircraft engines.—The Air Force realized a net saving of \$777,500 through the modification and use of Navy surplus aircraft engines. These engines, originally procured for use on Navy SP-5B aircraft, will support, after modification, the Air Force

AT-37 aircraft.

F. Use of Navy excess fuel tanks.—The Air Force canceled the procurement of 337 new auxiliary fuel tanks for A-1E aircraft by modifying and using Navy excess MK-VII tanks. This action resulted in a fiscal year 1967 saving of \$306,100 and an estimated saving in fiscal year 1968 of \$465,900.

G. Use of excess large sizes of Army overcoats.—The Defense Supply Agency modified 77,802 excess large sizes of CG-107 Army overcoats

to regular and medium sizes, thus precluding size shortage buys for this overcoat which was being phased out and replaced by the new AG-44 overcoat. The modification resulted in a net saving of \$1,074,000.

I.B.2. UTILIZATION OF IDLE INDUSTRIAL PLANT EQUIPMENT

I. Scope and objective

This area relates to the utilization of industrial plant equipment. The basic objective of the area is to initiate management improvement actions which will result in the use of idle industrial plant equipment.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of results follow:

		[In millions]				
	Fiscal year 1967		ear 1967 Fiscal year F		Fiscal yea	rs 1967–69
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
Army	\$1					\$1
Total	1					1

B. Extensive procedures have been implemented in prior years to control, account for, and insure maximum utilization of industrial plant equipment under the central control of the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC). This area is, therefore, being dropped as a separate area in the cost reduction program in fiscal year 1968. Identifiable savings which result from new, improved and intensified management actions will be reportable in area III.B.1. General Management Improvements.

I.B.3. UTILIZATION OF EXCESS CONTRACTOR INVENTORY

I. Scope of objective

A. This area applies to Government-owned personal property in the hands of commercial contractors (raw material, parts, supplies, and plant equipment, special tooling and test equipment which is not centrally reportable to the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center).

B. The basic objective of this area is to initiate management improvement actions that will permit the use of Government-owned personal property which becomes excess to the requirements of current contracts or which is residual to terminated or completed Government contracts with commercial contractors.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In millions]

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal er 1967 year		Fiscal year	rs 1967–69	
	Goal	Realized	year 1968, 1 Esti- I mated m	year 1969, Esti- mated	Total	Goal	
ArmyNavy	\$1	\$1			\$1	\$1	
Air Force	2	1			1		

B. The total savings for fiscal year 1967 resulted from 11 actions, 10 of which amounted to less than \$100,000 each. The other action produced a saving of \$165,000, and it involved the acquisition by the Navy Underwater Sound Laboratory (USL) of RCA long-range ocean surveillance equipment residual to the terminated "Project Trident" contract. This equipment was refurbished and modified by RCA, under contract to USL, to provide USL with optical beam forming and frequency analyzing equipment.

C. Effective with fiscal year 1968 reporting, this area will be dropped as a separate cost reduction area. Savings resulting from future actions will be reportable in area I.B., Use of Long Supply, Excess and Surplus

Inventory.

I.C. VALUE ENGINEERING

I. Scope and objective

Value engineering (VE) is a systematic effort directed at analyzing the functions of Defense systems, equipment, facilities, procedures, methods and supplies to achieve necessary functions at the lowest overall cost, consistent with requirements for performance, reliability, quality and maintainability. All savings to the DOD which result from VE actions taken by DOD personnel and certain VE actions taken by Defense contractors are reportable in this area.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In millions]

	Fiscal ye	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1969,	Fiscal year	r 1967–69	
	Goal	Realized	year 1968, esti- mated	esti- mated	Total	Goal	
Army	\$120 69 117 12	\$78 113 134 14	\$68 24 60 9	\$36 14 51 8	\$182 151 245 31	\$142 97 164 16	
Total	300	339	161	109	609	419	

B. This area continues to be one of the most fruitful areas in the cost reduction program. Although Army failed to achieve their goal for fiscal year 1967, the total DOD goal was exceeded by more than 10 percent.

III. Examples

During fiscal year 1967 there were approximately 550 individual VE actions which produced savings of more than \$100,000 each. There were several thousand actions of lesser amounts with the Air Force reporting about 800 in the fourth quarter. The following examples are set forth to illustrate the actions which are being taken in the area of value engineering:

A. Aircraft acceptance tests.—A saving of \$226,000 was achieved by a VE review which recommended elimination of certain acceptance test requirements for the CH-47 aircraft. Two major tests were found unnecessary based upon the electronic configuration of the delivered

model. (Army.)

B. Missile support.—The support plan for the Pershing guidance and control section was subjected to a VE study team analysis. Implementation of the team recommendations for reduction of lifetime buys on select high dollar spare parts, increased general support capability for rework, reduced maintenance turnaround, and produced savings of \$5.98 million. (Army.)

C. Barracks.—A VE review of engineering plans for new living quarters at a training station indicated that a reduction of overhead space was feasible without sacrifice of function. The final design reflected a reduction of 2 feet 8½ inches in the height of the building which cut construction costs by \$141,000 in fiscal year 1967. (Navy.)

D. Bomb fuse.—Through a VE analysis on the EX 332 fuse, alternate manufacturing methods were suggested. Design changes were made which decreased production costs and saved \$152,000. (Navv.)

E. Strike cameras.—Over \$2.1 million was saved as the result of a VE design review of the KA-71A low-altitude aircraft panoramic camera. The required functions in the redesigned camera, designated KB-18A, were maintained, performance improved, and unit cost

reduced by about 40 percent. (Air Force.)

F. Minuteman test procedures.—Methods, procedures, and test data from the service test laboratory responsible for LGM-30 propulsion subsystem certification, was subjected to a VE study. Results indicated that contractor performance of a similar test for comparative analysis was an unnecessary duplication of test effort. Dual conduct of non-ballistic tests was eliminated, cutting costs by \$250,000. (Air Force.)

G. Oil drum adapter.—Revision of detail drawings for the hose connection adapter to fuel drums was approved based upon a VE

study. This change produced a saving of \$139,000. (DSA.)

I.D. INVENTORY ITEM REDUCTION

I. Scope and objective

A. This area applies to the total number of items in the DOD supply system. It includes all types, kinds, and sizes of items managed by the military departments, the Defense Supply Agency, and other

DOD components.

B. The basic objective of the area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce the number of items carried in the DOD supply system. This objective can be achieved by: (1) identifying interchangeable and substitute items; (2) improving and developing more complete item identification data; and (3) applying standardization studies to additional classes of items.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal Fiscal year year 1968 1939		Fiscal years 1967-69	
	Goal	Realized	estimated		Total	Goal
ArmyNavy	\$1				\$3	\$1
Air Force DSA	1 2					2
Total	4	3			3	

B. Savings occur in this area when an item of supply is eliminated from the Federal catalog as the result of a new, improved, or intensified management action. Unfortunately, the actual elimination of the item usually occurs some years after the action is taken and the decision is made to eliminate the item. This is because it is prudent to keep most items in the system as either substitutes for standard items or, in some cases, to fill MAP or other non-DOD requirements, until stocks are depleted. This necessary delay between the decision to eliminate and the actual elimination results in very few item reduction actions which qualify for reporting in an annual-type program. Also, due to the character of the system for funding for the operation of the overall departmental/agency supply systems, of which item reduction is one of many parts, it is very difficult to establish the realized savings effects of qualifying item reduction actions and provide the required documentation. For these reasons, inventory item reduction will not be included as an area for reporting dollar savings in the cost reduction program in fiscal year 1968.

II. BUYING AT THE LOWEST SOUND PRICE

II.A. SHIFT FROM NONCOMPETITIVE TO COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT

I. Scope and objective

Significant reductions are usually achieved in the cost of end items, spares, and services when they are procured competitively. Therefore, the objective of this area is to encourage maximum competition in procurement of end items, spares, and services.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	[In million	ns]				
	Fiscal y	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal years 1967-6	
	Goal	Realized	year 1968 estimated	estimated	Total	Goal ,
Army	\$10 25 15 4	\$10 3 16 1	\$11 2 7 1	\$17 3 7 1	\$38 8 30 3	\$25 60 35 10
Total	54	30	21	28	79	130

B. During fiscal year 1967, 42.9 percent of the total procurement dollars was awarded on a price competitive basis. This is an outstanding achievement in view of the increased procurement volume and the urgency associated with many procurements as a result of Southeast Asia activity.

III. Examples

A few examples of the savings achieved from price competition are as follows:

Items	Noncompeti- tive unit price	Competitive unit price	Percent reduction	Savings
Electron tube Radio set Night vision sight Cluster bomb dispenser and container Multiplexer equipment Energy absorbers	\$2,538	\$1,745	31. 25	\$396, 400
	15,123	7,260	52. 00	3, 985, 162
	1,573	984	37. 45	884, 130
	710	310	56. 34	7, 276, 056
	4,806	2,808	41. 58	272, 700
	24,557	9,926	59. 58	1, 020, 459

II.B. DIRECT PURCHASE BREAKOUT

I. Scope and objective

Spare parts or components of major end items and systems can often be purchased at substantial savings direct from item manufacturers rather than from prime contractors for major equipments and systems in which the spares or components are used. The objective of this area is to encourage direct purchase from the item manufacturer when appropriate.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	[In million	ns]				
	Fisca 19	l year 67	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal 1967	years -69
	Goal	Realized	Estimated	Estimated	Total	Goal
Army	\$1 6 3	\$1 6 4	\$4	\$ 4	\$1 6 12	\$1 6 8
Total	10	11	4	4	. 19	15

$III.\ Examples$

The following examples are illustrative of the savings realized from direct purchase breakout:

Items	Prime's price	Manufacturers' price	Percent reduction	Savings
90 spare parts	\$8, 500, 000	\$5, 000, 000	41	\$3, 500, 000
Compensator, machine trim	2, 500	1, 801	28	244, 500
Modification kit, radar scope	624	177	72	116, 900

II.C. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT

I. Scope and objective

Multiyear procurement is the awarding of a contract which covers two or more program years' requirements in lieu of awarding a separate contract each year. Experience has shown that lower contract prices can be obtained by awarding contracts on a competitive multiyear basis versus repetitive single-year contracts. The basic objective of this area is to insure maximum utilization of the multiyear technique in the procurement of DOD material.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	[In millio	ns]				
	Fiscal y	ear 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year	· 1967–69
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
Army	\$10 20 10	\$4 23 2	\$9 6 5	\$9 3 2	\$22 32 9	\$25 50 25
Total	40	29	20	14	63	100

B. Significant actions have been taken to increase the use of the multiyear procurement procedure (MYP): (1) the criteria for use of the MYP was broadened in October 1966 to cover a wider range of procurement circumstances and (2) legislation is now pending in Congress to permit the use of 1-year funds.

III. Examples

More than 60 multiyear contracts awarded in fiscal year 1967 produced reportable cost reduction savings in fiscal year 1967. The following examples are indicative of the potential for savings which can be realized by using the multiyear procurement technique:

Unit price		Fiscal - vear 1967	
Single year	Multiyear	net savings	
		\$795,000	
		258, 336 166, 955	
1, 755. 00	1, 703. 00	113, 672	
		287,000	
		1, 808, 416 262, 970	
		1, 393, 600	
354, 090. 00	342, 904. 00	973, 182	
	\$2,060.00 985.00 7,119.46 1,755.00 6,531.00 1,415,029.00 31.31 8,696,800.00	\$2,060.00 \$1,795.00 937.16 7,119.46 6,897.00 1,755.00 1,703.00 1,415,029.00 1,183,977.00 31.31 3.001 8,698,800.00 8,000,000.00	

III. REDUCING OPERATING COSTS

III.A. TERMINATING UNNECESSARY OPERATIONS

I. Scope and objective

All military installations and bases throughout the world are included in the scope of this area. The primary objective is to close completely or partially, by excessing, inactivating, or placing in a standby status, all facilities not required by the Department of Defense.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. During fiscal year 1967 a total of 48 decisions was made to close or reduce the operations of military installations and bases. These actions are expected to produce annual savings of approximately \$48 million upon final completion of the actions. A summary of savings already achieved and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969, as a result of the decisions made in fiscal year 1967, is as follows:

ions

	Fiscal year 1967 realized	Fiscal year 1963 estimated	Fiscal year 1969 estimated	Fiscal year 1967–69 total
Army	\$6 1	\$1 20 2	\$7 21 5 1	\$8 47 8 1
Total	7	23	34	64

B. Some effects of the fiscal year 1967 decision are as follows:

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	Army	Navy	Air Force	DSA	Total
(1) Number of actions(2) Acres released (thousands)(3) Acquisition cost	29 57 \$18	10 2 \$6	7 7 \$9	2	4 66 \$33
(4) Personnel space reduction: (a) Military	683 1,789 2,472 \$14	297 587 884 \$28	689 113 802 \$5	17 46 63 \$1	1,686 2,535 4,221 \$48

III.B. REDUCING OPERATING EXPENSES

I. Scope and objective

Savings from all valid actions which do not fall within the scope of any other area are reportable in this area of the cost reduction program. The primary objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce operating expenses throughout the Department of Defense.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

lin	mil	lions

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967-69		
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total Goal	Goal	
Army	\$15 14	\$22 34	\$20 18	\$20 24	\$62 76	\$35 32 70	
Air Force	14 30 4	69 10	75 4	61	205 17	70 10	
Total	63	135	117	108	360	147	

(In addition to the above savings, the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) took actions in fiscal year 1967 which produced savings of \$156,109 in this area DASA also reported savings totalling approximately \$92,000 in several of the other cost reduction program areas.)

B. The fiscal year 1967 goal of \$63 milion was exceeded by more than 100 percent. This high rate of achievement is indicative of the aggressive actions taken in the field to produce savings in a broad range of areas. It also appears to indicate a need for a more realistic goal in this

area for fiscal year 1968.

C. Operating expense savings achieved by the Defense Supply Agency are now reported in this area. Prior to fiscal year 1967 they were reported as a separate area of the cost reduction program. DSA has been most successful in handling a tremendous increase in workload with a relatively small increase in personnel. Such accomplishments have been possible only through the continuing aggressive management actions taken by DSA personnel.

III. Examples

More than 3,000 individual cost reduction actions were validated in this area during fiscal year 1967. Approximately 125 of these produced savings of over \$100,000 each. Examples of some of the actions taken in this area follow:

A. Purchase of ADP equipment.—Over \$2.2 million will be saved by the Army during the period fiscal year 1967–69 through the purchase of eight pieces of ADP equipment which was previously rented.

B. Change in school courses.—The Army eliminated duplicate instruction, nonessential and nice to know information and consolidated several blocks of instruction. As a result of these actions, a well-balanced training program and necessary instruction is provided in a 2-week course which previously required 6 weeks. Savings of \$13.8 million will be realized over the next 3 years.

C. Ship construction economies.—A longstanding Navy practice on ship construction was changed with resulting savings of more than \$40 million. In the past large ship construction programs have been spread among several of the lowest competitive bidders. This practice was changed and the Navy awarded a single contract to the lowest compet-

itive bidder on tank landing ships and destroyer escorts.

D. Change in practice for repair of damaged cowls.—In the past damaged magnesium cowls on Navy TALOS missiles were shipped to a contractor for repair and then returned to the Navy. During fiscal year 1967, the Navy developed a new repair procedure which permits the repair of damaged cowls on the spot at naval weapons stations. Savings of approximately \$177,000 are estimated for the next 3 years.

E. Consolidation of salvage operations.—The Air Force Redistribution and Marketing Section responsible for salvage operations in the Washington area assumed responsibility for Navy salvage in the area while consolidating its own operations at one location. A reduction in Air Force personnel was achieved by this action with savings estimated at \$229.000 for the next 3 years.

F. Increasing capacity of recording devices.—The Air Force uses continuous film recorders to obtain data on satellites passing through its radar sensor coverage. An investigation into the use of these film recorders revealed that the film could be run at half the former speed and still obtain the same data. Costs will be reduced by approximately

\$0.8 million as a result of this change.

G. Increased pilot training productivity.—Savings of more than \$17 million were realized in fiscal year 1967 through management improvements in the undergraduate pilot training program of the Air Force. Development of a maximum capability study which (1) disclosed maximum limits of pilot training possible at each base; (2) maximum sortie saturation limits; (3) maximum airspace saturation limits; and (4) sorties losses caused by inclement weather, was a major contributing action to this saving. Other changes such as (1) introduction of new instructional material to supplement classroom instruction; (2) expanded use of radar for monitoring, controlling, and providing aircraft separation; (3) redivision of training airspace to provide optimum use of available working areas; and (4) reduction in the mission abort rate through intensified surveillance, are typical of the actions which made this saving possible.

III.C.1. IMPROVING TELECOMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT

I. Scope and objective

All telecommunication systems, networks, facilities, and equipments fall within the scope of this area. The cost reduction program objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce communication operating costs and funds required for capital investment items.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year - 1968	Fiscal year 1969 –	Fiscal years 1967-69		
Goal Realized estimated	realized	Total	Goal			
Army	\$2	\$1	\$2	\$2	\$5	\$8
Navý Air Force DCA	5 4	9 1	10 3	9 3	28 7	12 6
Total	13	11	15	14	40	31

B. The overall DOD goal for this area was not achieved primarily because of shortfalls in the Navy and the Defense Communications Agency. Based upon the lack of current achievements and similar experience in past years there appears to be a basic telecommunication

management problem within the Navy. This situation has been brought to the attention of Navy telecommunication personnel on numerous occasions.

III. Examples

During fiscal year 1967 there were more than 3,000 individual management actions reported in this area. However, only 10 of these actions resulted in savings of more than \$100,000 each. A few examples follow:

A. Consolidation of communications facilities.—Two physically separated communication centers were consolidated during fiscal year 1967. A reduction in space, equipment, and manpower resulted from this action. Savings of \$342,200 have been realized by the Air Force.

B. Discontinuance of leased teletype circuits.—Cancellation of the SAC teletype net was made possible a year earlier than planned as a result of intensified management reviews. Savings of \$0.6 million were

realized in fiscal year 1967.

C. Reduction in operating costs of the DEW line and the TVOR-Barter Island and NARS-Thule C-E complex.—Savings of \$3.9 million a year will be realized in the 3-year period, fiscal years 1967-69, as a result of innovations which permitted competitive bidding on a contract awarded for operation of the DEW line, TVOR, and NARS complexes. Previously the contract has been awarded on a noncompetitive basis.

III.C.2. TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses the movement of persons and things by inhouse or commercial land, sea, and air resources. It also includes the operational aspects of transportation systems and facilities throughout the DOD. The primary objective of the area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce transportation costs.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

Fiscal year 1968 Fiscal year 1969 Fiscal year Fiscal year 1967-69 Realized estimated Total Goal estimated Goal \$5 5 43 \$10 \$8 5 Army.... Navý______Air Force_____ 30 48 24 115 60 57 30 140 73 Total_____

B. The results for fiscal year 1967 have been most encouraging. In view of the ever increasing transportation requirements, continued emphasis will be necessary to insure that transportation costs are kept at a minimum consistent with DOD requirements.

III. Examples

Over 700 validated actions were reported in fiscal year 1967. All except 45 produced savings of less than \$100,000 each. This is not

surprising since most actions are taken by personnel located at field installations and activities. The following examples are representa-

tive of the many actions reported:

A. Napalm bombs.—The Army obtained permission to insert the explosive components in the bombs after they had been placed aboard ship. This permitted the loading of bombs over general cargo facilities at Long Beach, Calif., rather than at ammunition terminals. Lower ocean terminals costs and reduced ship loading time resulted. Fiscal year 1967 savings of \$207,243 were realized.

B. Stevedoring rates.—Lower rates were obtained at NSD, Seattle, through use of a 2-year negotiated contract. Previously stevedoring was obtained on a "spot bid" vessel-by-vessel method under terms and conditions of the master agreement. This action saved \$185,223

in fiscal year 1967.

C. Change in negotiating technique.—Savings of \$3.7 million were realized on four routes as a result of Military Sea Transportation Service negotiations of ocean cargo rates with individual ocean carriers instead of negotiating with ocean carrier associations as was the previous practice.

D. QUICKTRANS.—Institution of exclusive use truck service between Quonset Point and the Boston Naval Shipyard permitted elimination of QUICKTRANS flights into Boston's Logan International Airport and NAS, Quonset Point. Savings totaling \$97,674

were realized in fiscal year 1967 from this action.

E. Reduction in airlift costs.—Commercial airlift costs for fiscal year 1967 were reduced approximately \$24 million as a result of an intensified management action by the Military Airlift Command pricing team. Based upon a comprehensive cost analysis, significant turbojet rate reductions were obtained for commercial airlift procured by the DOD.

III.C.3. EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT

I. Scope and objective

This area includes the maintenance of all types of end items of equipment except noncombat vehicles which are included in area III.C.4. The primary objective of the area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce the cost of maintenance performed on equipment and items owned by the DOD.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year - 1968	Fiscal year 1969 —	Fiscal year 1967-69		
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal	
Army Navy Air Force	\$10 7 8	\$6 11 15	\$7 17 10	\$5 15 7	\$18 43 32	\$25 25 14	
Total	25	32	34	27	93	64	

B. This area should receive increased emphasis in fiscal year 1968. Although the total DOD goal for fiscal year 1967 was exceeded by approximately 28 percent, the Army goal was not achieved. Also, the fiscal year 1967 goals for Navy and Air Force were of a minimum nature. In view of the total dollars expended on equipment maintenance throughout the DOD each year, it appears that more substantive objectives should be established for fiscal year 1968.

III. Examples

Many hundreds of individual actions were reported in this area during fiscal year 1967. Several produced significant savings. Most actions, however, produced savings of less than \$100,000 each A few

examples follow:

A. Improved methods procedures and work flow.—Many improvements and reductions in costs are being achieved at Army depots, naval air rework facilities, and Air Force depots through changes resulting from the defense integrated management engineering system (DIMES). Costs of individual jobs are reduced in practically every instance when realistic engineered standards are established. In addition, bottlenecks are eliminated, smoother workflow is achieved, and improved parts supply is accomplished through the DIMES program. However, until more uniform measurement, documentation, and reporting techniques are prescribed for the DIMES program, a large portion of the resultant savings will be lost to cost reduction program. More than \$3 million was saved during fiscal year 1967 at two Navy activities.

B. B-58 aircraft pods.—The Air Force saved over \$0.9 million in fiscal year 1967 by a change in the method of contracting for overhaul of B-58 aircraft pods. The pods were previously overhauled (at a cost of \$8,000 each) by the contractor performing the IRAN (inspect and repair as necessary) of the B-58 weapons systems. Based upon a special study, the Air Force concluded that the IRAN of pods could possibly be performed by a different contractor. The breakout was accomplished and a contract awarded for the IRAN of pods separate from the IRAN of the B-58 aircraft. The average cost of the pod IRAN

was \$1,955 each under the new contract.

C. Maintenance of rigid and air-supported radomes.—For the past several years the maintenance and overhaul of all radomes has been contracted for by general categories of work such as refurbishing of air-supported radomes, reconditioning of rigid radomes, etc. In fiscal year 1967, the Air Force requested price quotations by size within each general category of work to be accomplished. As a result of this breakout by size, the Air Force reduced costs by \$144,000 in fiscal

year 1967.

D. Maintenance of O-1 aircraft.—The Air Force saved about \$2 million in fiscal year 1967 by a change in maintenance concept for the O-1 aircraft. Previously each airbase was manned to be self-sufficient in organization/field maintenance for all O-1 aircraft operating from each base. Early in fiscal year 1967 a delayed operating concept was implemented. Under this method, maintenance support was provided from central support locations.

III.C.4. NONCOMBAT VEHICLES MANAGEMENT

I. Scope and objective

This area includes the maintenance and operational function of vehicles and mobile equipment used in administrative and logistic support of military installations. The major objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce maintenance, administrative, and operational costs of noncombat vehicles.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal		Fiscal years	i 1967–69
	Goal	Realized	year 1968 estimated	estimated	Total	Goal		
ArmyNavy	\$1 1	\$1	\$1	\$1 1	\$3 1	\$2		
Air Force	ĩ	i	1	Ž	4	ž		
Total	3	2	2	4	8	6		

III. Examples

Most savings in this area resulted from actions which produced savings of less than \$100,000. Two of the larger savings actions follow:

A. Consolidation of motor pools.—The Army saved \$112,000 in fiscal

year 1967 by consolidating two motor pools.

B. Installation of hard rubber tires.—Savings of over \$300,000 are expected to be realized during fiscal years 1967-69 by using hard rubber tires in lieu of pneumatic tires on forklifts.

III.C.5. DECREASING USE OF CONTRACTOR SERVICES

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses all Contract Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) personnel provided to DOD components either by specific contractual agreements or as a part of the overhead or percentage of end item cost in a procurement contract. The objective of this area is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce the number of CETS personnel or otherwise reduce CETS personnel costs.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[in millions]								
	Fiscal y	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal	Fiscal yea	rs 1967–69		
A A	Goal	Realized	Fiscal year 1968 estimated	estimated	Total	Goal		
ArmyNavy		<u>\$1</u>	\$2	\$1		••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••		
Air Force	\$1	*3	Ψ2- 	φ1	3	4		
Total	1	4	2	1	7	5		

B. The potential for savings in this area has been greatly reduced during the past several years as a result of the program to replace contract personnel with civil service or military personnel. All savings resulted from the elimination of individual CETS position and the establishment of civil service or military positions at a lower overall cost to the Government.

III.C.6. MILITARY HOUSING MANAGEMENT

I. Scope and objective

All aspects of the military family housing program including administration, maintenance, and repair of buildings and furnishings, and alterations and improvements to housing units are within the scope of this cost reduction area. The primary objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will lower family housing costs within the Department of Defense.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year Fiscal year - 1968 1969		Fiscal years 1967-69	
· · ·	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
Army Navy Air Force	\$1 1	\$1 1	\$1	\$1	\$2	\$3 2
Air Force	3	3	2	1	6	6
Total	5	5	3	2	10	11

[In millions]

B. Savings in this area were achieved from many actions taken at installation level. Ninety percent of these actions were in the less than \$5,000 category and resulted in two-thirds of the total savings. One significant action, implementation of a major command civil engineer evaluation system, produced saving of \$166,400 in fiscal year 1967. This system is designed to measure the performance and progress of major command civil engineer mission effectiveness. It provides a uniform method of evaluating performance in the management of civil engineering resources, and serves as a basis for isolating problem areas.

III.C.7. REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses the maintenance and repair aspects of all real property except that included in the military family housing program. The objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will lower maintenance and repair costs of real property owned or maintained by the DOD.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In millions]

	Fiscal year 1967		7 Fiscal year Fiscal year — 1968 1969		Fiscal years	1967-69	
·	Goal	Realized	estimated	lized estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
ArmyNavy	\$5 3	\$3 2	\$2 3	\$2 2	\$7 7	\$12 7	
Air Force	17	14	9	8	31	23 42	

III. Examples

There were more than 1,000 individual actions reported in this area during fiscal year 1967. Eight of the actions produced savings of more than \$100,000 each. A few of the actions were as follows:

A. The Army saved approximately \$135,000 based on an action mitiated by a post engineer. The action resulted in the shipment of repair and utilities type items (for use in Okinawa) in level "C" pack instead of a level "A" pack. The GSA surcharge on the level "C" pack is only 7 percent whereas a 25-percent surcharge was being paid on the level "A" pack.

B. The Navy saved \$63,000 in the second half of fiscal year 1967 through intensified management in negotiating rates for water and sewage at one location. The lower rates were obtained by a study which showed that some rates were discriminatory against large water

C. The Air Force saved \$604,200 by redesigning approved plans and specifications for the repair of steam heat mains at one Air Force installation. The original plans had been developed by a local architectengineer and were approved by the Headquarters USAF. A subsequent review by Air Force civil engineering staff personnel disclosed that a significant reduction in cost could be achieved by changes to the plans and specification.

III.C.8. PACKAGING, PRESERVING, AND PACKING

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses the various methods and techniques used to protect equipment and supplies during shipment, handling, and storage. The area objective is to initiate management improvement actions which will reduce packaging, preserving and packing costs.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

(In millions

	Fiscal year 1967		.967 Fiscal year Fis 1968		Fiscal years 1967-69	
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
ArmyNavy	\$1	\$5 1	\$4 1	\$3	\$12	\$2
Air Force	6 1	10 2	5	5 1	20 3	12
Total	9	18	10	9	37	18

III. Examples

More than 600 actions were reported during fiscal year 1967, 23 of which produced savings of more than \$100,000 each. A few of the significant actions follow:

A. Containers for engines.—The Army saved \$308,000 in fiscal year 1967 by using plastic bags and wooden boxes in lieu of metal con-

tainers for shipping engines.

B. Improved procedure.—The Navy saved \$260,000 in fiscal year 1967 by developing an improved procedure for packing and loading

500 pound low-drag bombs on railroad cars.

C. Change in shipment of 2.75 rocket motors and warheads.—Previously, rocket motors and warheads were shipped separately in wooden boxes; six motors to a box and four warheads to a box. Now four unassembled motors and four warheads are shipped together in the same wooden box. This change produced savings of \$260,900 in fiscal year 1967.

IV. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP)

I. Scope and objective

This area encompasses the military assistance grant aid program. The primary objective is to initiate management improvement actions in its administration and operation.

II. Goals and accomplishments

A. A summary of savings already realized and those expected to be realized during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 from actions taken during fiscal year 1967 is as follows:

[In millions]

	Fiscal	ear 1967/	Fiscal year	Fiscal year Fiscal year		1967-69
	Goal	Realized	estimated	estimated	Total	Goal
ISAAir Force	\$9 1	\$15 1	\$6 1	\$8	\$29 2	\$1 4
Total	10	16	7	8	31	15

B. Effective with fiscal year 1968, the Laos and Thailand program will be transferred to the military departments appropriations. Also, Congress is currently considering the transfer of the infrastructure program to the Army military construction appropriation. These actions will decrease the potential for cost reduction savings in future years.

III. Examples

Approximately 90 individual actions were reported in fiscal year

1967. Some examples follow:

A. The 1967 military assistance program for Thailand included 32 PRC 65 radios to provide the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) with sufficient VHF/AM radio backup. Based on an in-depth review by personnel of the communications and electronics division of the Air Force Advisory Group, it was determined that the RTAF had improved their in-country maintenance capacity to the point where the PRC 65 radios were no longer needed. Planned procurement was cancelled for a total saving of \$161,200. (CINCPAC)

B. Savings of \$125,136 resulted from a change in the single sideband radio configurations programed for the Brazilian Army's use at brigade and division level. Each set, as originally programed, consisted of a truck, trailer, shelter, and power unit. The reconfiguration consisted only of a truck with appropriate alternator as an integral part.

(SOUTHCOM)

C. Headquarters USAF approved, funded, and directed implementation to provide two F-104 flight simulators and necessary logistic support for two MAP countries under grant aid. The original support package included land mass plates and slides for each supporting country at two different geographical areas. A subsequent study disclosed that a saving of \$264,500 could be realized and that the requirements of both countries could be satisfied by utilizing one common geographical area.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—SUMMARY OF SAVINGS FROM FISCAL YEAR 1967 ACTIONS BY DOD COMPONENT

IIn Millionsl

		Realized	savings	Estimated	savings	Total savings	
	The following section of the section	Goal	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967–69	Goal
	SUMMARY BY AREA	·					
1. Buying	only what we need:						
Ã.	Refining requirements calculations: 1. Major items of equipment:						
	Army	\$17	SI	\$2		\$3	\$3
	Navy	58	76	\$2 37		\$3 113	10
	Air Force	35	59	19	\$2	80	6
						196	20
	Total	110	136	58		190	
	2. Initial provisioning:						
	Army						
	Navy	10	16	16	7	39 22	2
	Air Force	10	15	5	2		
	Total	20	31	21	9	61	- 4
	3. Secondary items:					69	1
	Army	11 11	67 11	1 2	i	14	i
	NavyAir Force	20	29	4	4	37	Ž
	DSA	ž	-3			3	
						100	
	Total	45	110			123	
	4. Technical manuals:						
	Army	1					
	Navý	1			;		
	Air Force	2	2		1	3	
	Total	A	2		1	3	
	I U(41						

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—SUMMARY OF SAVINGS FROM FISCAL YEAR 1967 ACTIONS BY DOD COMPONENT—Continued

[In Millions]

	ii iiiiiioiisi					
	Realized	l savings	Estimated	1 savings	Total sa	vings
	Goal	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967–69	Goal
SUMMARY BY AREA—Continued						
Buying only what we need—Continued A. Refining requirements calculations— Continued						
5. Technical data and reports: Army	\$1	\$2	\$1	\$1	\$4	12
Navy	\$1 2	Ϋ́1 7	i	1	\$4 2 9	\$1 3
Air Force	4			1	9	6
Total	7	10	2	3	15	10
6. Industrial production base: Army						
Navý	1					1
Air Force	3	4			4	3
Total	4	4			4	4
B. Utilization of long supply and excess inventory:						
1. Equipment and supplies:						
Army Navy	17 4	11 7	2 5	2	13 14	22 5
Air Force	12	28	4		. 32	18
DSA	4	3			3	6
Total	37	49	11	2	62	51
2. Redistribution of idle production equipment:						
Army Navy	<u>ī</u>					
Air Force						
Total	1					
3. Excess contractor inventory:	-			====		
Army						
Navy Air Force	1	1			1	1
Total	2	1			1	2
C. Eliminating goldplating:	100	70	-	00	100	***
ArmyNavy	102 69	78 113	68 24	36 14	182 151	142 97
Air Force	117	134	60	51	245	164
DSA	12	14	9	8	31	16
Total	300	339	161	109	609	419
D. Inventory item reduction:	1	3			3	
Army Navy	1	3			3	1
Air Force	1					1
DSA	2					2
Total	4	3		<u></u>	3	4
Total, buying only what we need	534	685	260	132	1077	796
41. Buying at the lowest sound price: A. Shift from noncompetitive to competitive procurement:						
Army	10	10	- 11	17	38	25
Navy	25 15	3 16	2 7	3 7	8 30	60
Air ForceDSA.	4	16	í	í	30	35 10
Total	54	30	21	28	79	130
B. Direct purchase breakout:						
Army Navy	1 6	1 6			1 6	1 6
Air Force	3	4	4	4	12	8
Total	10	11	4	4	19	15

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—SUMMARY OF SAVINGS FROM FISCAL YEAR 1967 ACTIONS BY DOD COMPONENT—Continued

[In Millions]

	[In Millions]							
	Realized	savings	Estimated	savings	Total sa	avings		
	Goal	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967-69	Goal		
SUMMARY BY AREA—Continued								
II. Buying at the lowest sound price—Continued C. Multiyear procurement: Army	\$10	\$4	\$9	\$9	\$22	\$2		
Navy Air Force	20 10	\$4 23 2	6 5	3 2	32 9	2		
Total	40	29	20	14	63	10		
Total, buying at lowest sound prices	104	70	45	46	161	24		
II. Reducing operating costs: A. Terminating unnecessary operations: Army	14		1 20	7 21	8 47	1		
Navy	29 5 1	6 1	20 2	5 1	8 1	Ž		
Total B. Reducing operating expense:	1 49	7	23	34	64	4		
Army Navy Air Force DSA	15 14 30 4	22 34 69 10	20 18 75 4	20 24 61 3	62 76 205 17	3 7 1		
Total	63	135	117	108	360	14		
C. Increasing efficiency of operation: 1. Improving telecommunication management:								
Army Navy	2 2 5	1 9	2 <u>î</u> ō		5 <u>2</u> 8			
Air Force DCA	4	1	- 3	3	7			
Total	13		15	14	40			
Improving transportation and traffic management: Army	4	5 5	4	1	10			
Navy Air Force	5 30	43	5 48	5 24	15 115			
Total	39	53	57	30	140			
3. Improving equipment maintenance management: Army	10	6	7	5	18			
Navy Air Force	7 8	11 15	17 10	5 15 7	43 32			
Total	25	32	34	27	93			
4. Improving noncombat vehicle management:	1	1	1	1	3			
Army Navy Air Force	1	<u>1</u>	<u>i</u>	1 2	1 4			
Total	3	2	2	4	8			
5. Decreasing use of contractor services:								
Army Navy Air Force	i	1 3	2		4			
Total	1	4	2	1	7			

¹ Represents the annual rate of savings expected to be realized from fiscal year 1967 decisions to consolidate close Defense installations and activities.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—SUMMARY OF SAVINGS FROM FISCAL YEAR 1967 ACTIONS BY DOD COMPONENT—Continued

[In Millions]

	in willions					
	Realized	savings	Estimated	savings	Total sa	vings
	Goal	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1967–69	Goal
SUMMARY BY AREA—Continued						
III. Reducing operating costs—Continued C. Increasing efficiency of operation—Con. 6. Improving military housing management:						
Army Navy Air Force	\$1 1 3	\$1 1 3	\$1 <u>2</u>	\$1 1	\$2 2 6	\$3 2 6
Total		5	3	2	10	11
7. Improving real property manage- ment:						
Army Army Navy Air Force	5 3 9	3 2 9	2 3 4	2 2 4	7 7 17	12 7 23
Total	17	14	9	8	31	42
Packaging, preservation and pack- ing:						
Army Navy Air Force DSA	1 1 6 1	5 1 10 2	4 1 5	3 5 1	12 2 20 3	2 2 12 2
Total	9	18	10	9	37	18
Total, reducing operating costs	224	281	272	237	790	446
IV. Military assistance program (MAP): ISA Air Force	9 1	15 1	6 1	8	29 2	14
Total MAP	10	16	7	8	31	15
Total program	872	1,052	584	423	2,059	1,502
SUMMARY BY MAJOR CATEGORY						
Buying only what we need Buying at the lowest sound price Buying at the lowest sound price Buying operating costs Wilitary assistance program	534 104 224 10	685 70 281 16	260 45 272 7	132 46 237 8	1,077 161 790 31	796 245 446 15
Total program	872	1,052	584	423	2,059	1,502
SUMMARY BY DEPARTMENT/AGENCY Army	224 272 332 31 4 9	221 318 464 33 1 15	136 158 267 14 3 6	105 101 192 14 3 8	462 577 923 61 7 29	374 474 583 51 6
Total program	872	1,052	584	423	2, 059	1,502

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM

Summary of realized savings by appropriation for fiscal year 1967

[In millions of dollars]	Realized savings
Procurement:	
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army	74
Procurement aircraft and missiles, Navy	54
Ship construction, Navy	44
Other procurement, Navy and Marine Corps	45
Aircraft procurement, Air Force	121

Summary of realized savings by appropriation for fiscal year 1967—Continued

[In millions of dollars]	n
Appropriation Procurement—Continued Missile procurement, Air Force Other procurement, Air Force	
Total, procurement	466
Operations and maintenance (O. & M.): Army	$\begin{array}{c} 21 \\ 70 \end{array}$
Total, O. & M	141
Military personnel (MPA): Army	4
Total, MPA	41
Research, development, test, and evaluation (R.D.T. & E.): Army	6
Total, R.D.T. & E	83
Military construction (MC): Army	9 7 13
Total, MC	29
Industrial fund (IF): Army	5 28 27 1
Total, IF	61
Stock funds (SF) and management funds (MF): Army Navy and Marine Corps Air Force Defense Supply Agency	$73 \\ 108 \\ 6 \\ 24$
Total, SF and MF	211
Family housing: Army	1 1 2
Total, family housing	4
Military assistance program (MAP): ISAAir Force	15 1
Total, MAP	16
Total, program	1,052

Disposition of realized savings for fiscal year 1967

In millions of dollars

Department or agency Military Civilian Total	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—SUMMARY OF AUTHORIZED MANPOWER ELIMINATED/TRANSFERRED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1967	SPARES
Total, program	1, 052
Total	21
ArmyAir Force	15 6
Other:	
Reprogramed to another appropriation to finance increased costs, apply to production of more items or units of work, or to increase service: Army (total) Returned to OSD for disposition: Air Force (total)	11 1
Total	86
NavyAir Force	78 7
Transferred to another budget activity within the same appropriation to finance increased costs, apply to production of more items or units of work, or to increase service: Army	1
Total	933
MAP.	15
DSA	33 1
NavyAir Force	240 450
increase service: Army	Amount 194
Used within the same appropriation and budget activity to finance increased costs, apply to production of more items or units of work, or to	
Type of disposition	

Department or agency	Military	Civilian	Total
Army	288 750 4, 423 15	843 411 1,003 141	1, 131 1, 161 5, 426 156
Total	5, 476	2,398	7, 874

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST REDUCTION PROGRAM—YEAREND FISCAL YEAR 1967 STATUS REPORT

AUDIT OPINION

We have reviewed the Cost Reduction Program Status Report for fiscal year 1967, under the provisions of DOD Directive 5010.6, February 17, 1967; DOD Instruction 7720.6, November 2, 1966; and, where applicable, DOD Instruction 7720.6, May 19, 1967. Our review included selective evaluation of pertinent documents, records, and data and such other auditing procedures deemed appropriate and took into consideration the cost reduction program audits made by the Defense audit organizations. We did not make a detailed examination of all savings actions reported.

Based on this examination, it is our opinion that the realized and estimated savings reported are reasonable in amount and result from management actions which meet the criteria of the cost reduction

program.

K. K. Kilgore, Deputy Comptroller for Audit Systems.

APPENDIX 2

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE*

THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY

The Defense Supply Agency has been in operation since January 1962 and is performing effectively all assigned missions and functions. As a major element of the Defense logistics establishment, the Agency provides responsive and efficient supply support and logistics services to its customers at less cost and thereby has fully justified its establishment.


HISTORY, MISSION, AND ORGANIZATION

PRE-DSA ORGANIZATION

Prior to the establishment of the Defense Supply Agency, the Secretaries of the military departments were designated single managers of selected supply and service activities for all components of the Department of Defense (fig. 1). Their responsibilities were carried out by separately organized operating agencies within their respective military departments. These agencies achieved an enviable record of effective support to the military services with significant reductions in operating costs and inventories. Their experience demonstrated the merits of a single agency furnishing common supplies and services to all military departments.

^{*}Material in this report was prepared Apr. 5, 1967, for the Subcommittee on Economy in Government; however, all tables and figures 3, 4, and 5, reprinted herein have been updated to Oct. 20, 1967.

Figure 1
SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM



Prior to the time DSA was organized, three commodity managers were assigned to the Navy, of which one, industrial, was still in the process of assuming management of assigned commodity classes. Five commodity managers and one service manager were assigned to the Army. Two of these commodity managers, automotive and construction, were still in the early phases of activation. Electronics management is shown in dashed lines under the Secretary of the Air Force because this commodity had already been studied and recommended for integrated management; and the present DSA electronics center, developed from the Air Force control center for electronics materiel, was turned over to DSA at the time of DSA's establishment. The Armed Forces Supply Support Center (AFSSC) administered the Defense-wide cataloging, standardization, and materiel utilization programs and conducted integrated management studies. Also transferred to the Defense Supply Agency, but not shown in figure (1), are the surplus property sales activities of the military departments. The Military Air and Military Sea Transport Services, shown in figure (1) as single-manager agencies, have remained in the departments of the Air Force and Navy.

Mission

The DSA mission consists basically of three major elements:

Providing wholesale supply support to the military services and other Defense activities with assigned supply commodities.


Administering logistics services and programs.


Providing field contract administration services to the Defense Establishment and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

DSA ORGANIZATION

Figure (2) depicts the changes in the Defense supply and logistics service organization, authorized by the end of 1962. The departmental single managers were taken over in place, as field activities of the Defense Supply Agency, with assigned personnel, funds, equipment, and facilities. Their operations continued without interruption under a new and shortened chain of command. This was also true of the operational elements of the former Armed Forces Supply Support Center and the military surplus property sales activities, which were assigned to the Defense Logistics Services Center, a DSA field activity. Figure (3) depicts the DSA organization today and reflects the assignment in June 1964 of contract administration functions previously performed by some 165 contract management offices of the military services and DSA.

FIGURE 2
DoD LOGISTICAL SYSTEM · 1962





During the first 3 months of the Defense Supply Agency's existence, the headquarters staff consisted of a planning group, most of whom were on loan from the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Selection and assembly of a permanent staff began after the initial organization and staffing plan was approved in December 1962. The present headquarters staff, as depicted in figure (4), assists the Director in the direction and control of the Agency and is concerned with broad planning and management of the total DSA mission and the establishment of long- and short-range objectives and standards of performance. Its key personnel exemplify the joint military staffing principle, with each of the military services represented at the Directorate or immediately subordinate level. The Assistant Director, Plans, Programs, and Systems, is principal staff adviser and assistant to the Director for development and application of policies, plans, programs, and systems affecting multiple DSA functional activities. The Comptroller assists the Director as principal financial management and manpower staff adviser. The Deputy Director for Contract Administration Services acts for the Director, DSA, in exercising management and operating control over CAS missions, operating programs and supporting field activities; he is assisted by Executive Directors for Contract Administration, Quality Assurance, Production, and by the Chief of Industrial Security. The Executive Directors for Supply Operations, Procurement and Production, and Technical and Logistics Services are principal staff advisers and assistants to the Director, DSA, in the development and application of policies, plans, programs, and systems for their respective functional areas. The Counsel, the Inspector General, the Special Assistant for Public Affairs, and the Staff Directors for Installations and Services, Administration, Military Personnel, and Civilian Personnel perform staff support functions of a major headquarters.




FIGURE 5

Major Field Activities and Commanders

Defense Construction Supply Center: Maj. Gen. Emmett M. Tally, m Jr..~USAF.Defense Electronics Supply Center: Brig. Gen. Glen J. McClernon,

Defense Fuel Supply Center: R. Adm. Fowler W. Martin, SC, USN. Defense General Supply Center: Brig. Gen. John D. Hines, USA. Defense Industrial Supply Center: R. Adm. Grover C. Heffner, SC,

 ${
m USN}.$

Defense Logistics Services Center: Capt. Ross A. Porter, SC, USN. Defense Personnel Support Center: Brig. Gen. John M. Kenderdine, USA.

Defense Documentation Center: Dr. Robert B. Stegmaier, Jr. Defense Depot, Mechanicsburg: Col. William H. Herndon, USA. Defense Depot, Memphis: Col. T. I. Martin, USA.

Defense Depot, Ogden: Col. Robert B. Ladd, USAF. Defense Depot, Tracy: Capt. Robert C. Dexter, Jr., SC, USN.

Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center: Col. Fred H. Sitler, USAF

DSA Administrative Support Center: Col. Stuart A. MacKenzie,

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Atlanta: Col. Loren P. Murray, Jr., USAF.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Boston: Col. Frank A. Bogart, USA.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Chicago: Col. J. P. Gibbons, USAF.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Cleveland: Col. Norman T. Dennis, USA.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Dallas: Capt. Walter G. Normile, SC, USN.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Detroit: Col. Kenneth R. Johnson, USA.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Los Angeles: Brig. Gen. Arthur E. Exon, USAF.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, New York: Brig. Gen. Walter M. Vann, USA.


Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Philadelphia: Col. Gerald Johnson, Jr., USA.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, San Francisco: Col. William K. Ashby USAF.

Defense Contract Administration Services Region, St. Louis: Capt. Raymond S. Sullivan, SC, USN. [as of 20 October 1967]

The field establishment is comprised of 25 major activities, identified in figure (5) by name and activity head. The military command positions are staffed on the basis of balanced military representation and are rotated among the military services. The geographical locations of the 25 major DSA field activities are depicted in figure (6).

DSA MAJOR FIELD ACTIVITIES



DSA OBJECTIVES

When Secretary McNamara established the Defense Supply Agency.

he established two primary objectives for the Agency:

First, to insure effective and timely support of the military services in the event of mobilization, war, or other national emergency, as well as in peacetime.

Second, to furnish this support at the lowest feasible cost.

The order in which these objectives are stated is not accidental; it reflects the priority which governs all DSA programs. This priority and these objectives also govern the criteria against which DSA's achievements will be measured

GROWTH OF DSA

DSA made rapid progress in the assumption of assigned functions. as indicated in table below In January 1962, DSA took over wholesale management of 87,000 items with an inventory value of more than \$1.58 billion. By the end of fiscal year 1966, the number of items centrally managed (excluding items designated for local purchase) exceeded 1.33 million, with a value of over \$1.99 billion, and will approximate 1.51 million items by the end of fiscal year 1967. At that time, the inventory value is expected to be over \$2.27 billion, and the annual rate of procurement will increase to over \$6.25 billion.

INDICATORS OF DSA GROWTH

	End of January 1962	End of fiscal year 1963	End of fiscal year 1964	End of fiscal year 1965	End of fiscal year 1966	End of fiscal year 1967	End of fiscal year 1968 plan
Items centrally managed_thousands_ Inventorymillions Procurementdo Personnel	\$1, 588 9, 500	1,029 \$2,412 \$2,670 25,970	1,328 \$2,232 \$2,701 31,141	1, 369 \$1, 977 \$3, 042 34, 128	1, 335 \$1, 994 \$5, 740 1 53, 554	1, 538 \$2, 896 \$6, 178 2 62, 063	1,729 \$2,613 \$5,403 \$58,369

The increase of personnel, both headquarters and field, has proceeded in phase with the assumption of management tasks and the increased workload as a result of Vietnam. As of the end of January 1962, over 9,500 military and civilian personnel nad been transferred to DSA. At the end of fiscal year 1965, full-time DSA personnel numbered 34,128. By the end of fiscal year 1966, DSA personnel had increased to 53,554, principally due to assumption of contract administration services functions; and based on OSD allocation, full-time personnel can reach 56,683 by the end of fiscal year 1967. (End fiscal year 1967 data shown in Fig. 7 above.)

By the end of fiscal year 1965, DSA had taken over management of all assigned commodities and services, except for 45 selected Federal supply classes. Items in these 45 classes, along with service-retained items in other DSA classes, are being reviewed against DOD-approved item management coding criteria. This review will be completed in

December 1967.

Excludes 3,426 temporary civilian personnel.
 Excludes 3,510 temporary civilian personnel.
 Current OSD Allocation (June 30, 1958) full-time permanent civilian and military personnel.

SUPPLY SUPPORT

INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS

DSA manages six Supply Centers (fig. 6) as follows:

Defense Construction Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio. Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, Ohio. Defense Fuel Supply Center, Alexandria, Va. Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Va. Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pa. Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Fuel Supply Center procures bulk and solid fuels but does not control inventories. Management of DSA inventories is currently distributed among the remaining five inventory control points, which compute replenishment requirements for assigned items, maintain inventory and transaction records, receive and edit requisitions, procure materiel, and direct shipment or procurement action, as appropriate. More than 8,000 personnel are employed in these functions. Other Center personnel are engaged in related activities, such as cataloging, standardization, and installation management. Assignments of commodities to Centers were determined through separate commodity studies conducted over a 6-year period. Among Centers, wide variations existed in the numbers of items managed and in the mix of technical, personnel-related, and bulk materiel items. Functional and commodity assignments, as well as location of Centers at specified military installations, have been influenced by the availability of space and facilities and by considerations of improved customer service and reductions in operating costs. During 1965, DSA consolidated the functions of the Medical Supply Center, Brooklyn, the Subsistence Supply Center, Chicago, and the Clothing and Textile Supply Center, Philadelphia, into the Defense Personnel Support Center at Philadelphia.

Early in 1966, the Supply Centers assumed the purchasing responsibilities for decentralized and nonstandard items in DSA-managed classes of materiel required for support of Army and Air Force activities overseas; except for support of Air Force activities

in the Pacific area which was assumed in January 1967.

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

For assigned commodities, the Defense Supply Agency determines requirements for wholesale storage space; manages, controls, and operates assigned warehouses and depots; and arranges for the use of storage space and related services and facilities of the Department of Defense, other Government agencies, and commercial warehouses as required. The Defense Supply Agency also arranges transportation for initial distribution of stocks from supplier to point of storage, from point of wholesale storage or the supplier direct to the customer, and for redistribution as required between wholesale storage points.

On January 1, 1962, items assigned to DSA or to be assigned to DSA were stored in 77 locations. On January 1, 1963, the DSA distribution system was implemented with 11 of the 77 becoming permanent DSA distribution activities and 18 becoming direct supply

support points for support of the Navy.

The objectives of the distribution system were—

The establishment of a storage pattern based on the concept of positioning stocks close to the concentrations of military posts and ports of embarkation in the United States:

Centralization of all requisitioning procedures and stock control functions in the Defense Supply Centers, effective July 1.

1963.

The DSA distribution system consists of seven principal depots and four specialized support depots (fig. 8).

FIGURE 8 DSA DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM



Principal depots.—These depots are responsible for the receipt, storage, stock readiness, inventory, and issue of DSA items of supply, including general mobilization reserve stocks for the support of specific areas, activities, and/or forces designated by Headquarters, Defense Supply Agency. These depots are—

Defense Construction Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio

Defense Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pa.

Defense Depot, Tracy, Calif. Defense Depot, Ogden, Utah. Defense Depot, Memphis, Tenn.

Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Va. Atlanta Army Depot, Forest Park, Ga.

Specialized support depots.—These depots have functions similar to those of the principal depots, except that their missions are specialized as to type of materiel or scope of support. The specialized support depots are-

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, Ohio. Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pa. Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va. Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Calif.

The two Navy-operated specialized support depots support the fleet, Navy overseas activities, and selected Navy activities within a 25-mile radius. In addition, they support all military service requirements in emergency situations (priorities 1-8) when such support

is not available elsewhere in the DSA system.

Direct supply support points.—The DSA distribution system also includes 10 direct supply support points (not included in fig. 8) which have been established in support of large volume users, such as Navy shipyards, repair facilities, and recruit training centers These points are under military service management. The supply mission for DSA commodities at these points is restricted to the stocking of FSG 95 (metals, bars, and shapes) for the support of on-base industrial and maintenance requirements and clothing for recruit training centers.

Attrition sites.—As of December 31, 1966, DSA materiel was stored at 20 temporary storage locations, or attrition sites However, the number of attrition sites at any given time will fluctuate because of continuous capitalization of items as a result of item management coding and DSA assumption of new missions and item assignments. Until supply missions become stabilized, and until the current critical shortage of DSA-managed storage space is alleviated, a target date for complete elimination of attrition sites cannot be projected. DSA policy for evacuation of stocks from attrition sites is disposition in place of excesses, redistribution of replenishment stocks from attrition sites into permanent depots in lieu of replenishment from procurement, attrition to satisfy customer demands, and bulk relocation into permanent depots when economically justified.

PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION

DSA's procurement program objectives are generally being met as indicated below:

SMALL BUSINESS

Awards to small business during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1967 amounted to \$1.37 billion or 43.5 percent of total awards to U.S. firms. This is 2.8 percent below the goal of 46.3 percent, however, it exceeds the accomplishment for the same period in fiscal year 1966 by \$388 million or 0.8 percent. It is expected that the yearend goal will be met.

LABOR SURPLUS AREA AWARDS

Awards (\$10,000 and above) to labor surplus areas during the first 6-month period of fiscal year 1967 amounted to \$343 million—12.6 percent of total dollar awards within the United States and possessions. This is 1.6 percent in excess of the established fiscal year 1967 goal of 11 percent.

COMPETITIVE AWARDS

Competition remained at a high level of 93.1 percent of total awards subject to competition during the first 6-month period of fiscal year 1967. This is 1 percent above the established goal.

FORMAL ADVERTISING

Formal advertising has suffered somewhat due to the necessity to meet high-priority requirements from Southeast Asia by negotiated

procurements. The percentage of the value of all DSA procurements made through formal advertising was 27.4 percent in the first 8 months of fiscal year 1967, compared to 31.9 percent during a corresponding period in fiscal year 1966. However, since there has been a 33-percent increase in the value of total procurements during the same period, the value of the formally advertised portion actually increased by \$153.3 million. It should be noted that although the formal advertising rate declined, the percentage of competition was actually higher. During the first 8 months of fiscal year 1967, our competitive rate was 92.8 percent compared to 92.6 percent for the same period in fiscal year 1966. In some commodity areas, the more attractive civilian demand during the past year has made it difficult to attract suppliers with sufficient productive capacity to meet defense needs, and the Agency has had to resort to "rated" orders to obtain supplies. Any improvement in the formal advertising rate is believed to be contingent on changes in the Southeast Asia situation and a softening of the civilian economy.1

The Southeast Asia situation has had significant impact on procurement and production activity. During the first 6 months of fiscal year 1967, 447,000 contracts, aggregating \$3.6 billion, were awarded. This represents an increase of 65,000 awards and \$1 billion over the comparable period of fiscal year 1966. It is anticipated that procurement volume for fiscal year 1967 will exceed \$6.2 billion compared with actual fiscal year 1966 volume of \$5.74 billion and fiscal year

1965 volume of \$3.04 billion.

To obtain military supplies for Vietnam in the quantities reflected by this increased procurement volume in the face of heavy civilian demand, special measures had to be taken. Included among these measures were-

(a) Changing, with service concurrence, Government specifications to permit procurement of acceptable commercial products.

wherever possible, to broaden the production base.

(b) Procuring substitutes on an interim basis to meet urgent requirements when specification changes were inappropriate. (c) Increasing production of short supply items at Govern-

ment-operated facilities.

(d) Furnishing industry advance information of anticipated quantitative and delivery requirements.

(e) Limiting accelerated delivery procurement to immediate

operational support needs.

(f) Avoiding payment of premium prices for accelerated deliveries wherever possible by reevaluation of such requirements with the services.

(g) Giving increased management attention to using more realistic production leadtimes and scheduling deliveries in con-

sonance with industry conditions.

(h) Securing assistance of the Business and Defense Services Administration (BDSA) of the Commerce Department in invoking mandatory production provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. A total of 581 rated orders were issued by DSA from mid-December 1965 to 30 January 1967, and as of 30 January, no rated orders were pending.

¹ For end fiscal year 1967 data see table "Procurement and Production," following.

PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION

	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 196
Small business:		,
Awards (in billions)	. \$2.44 . 46.3	\$2, 59 45, 8
Percent total awards	46.3	45, 8
Competitive procurement:		
Awards (in billions)	\$5, 25	\$5.62 91.5
Percent total awards	. \$5. 25 92. 1	91.5
abor surplus area:		
Awards (in millions)	\$709.1	\$587.4
Percent total awards	15.8	12.3
ormal advertising:		
Awards (in billions)	\$1,62	\$1,68
Percent total awards	\$1.62 28.4	\$1.68 27.4

¹ Actions valued at \$10,000 or more

SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

In November 1962, DSA implemented a uniform system for the measurement of supply effectiveness. This system employs standardized reporting by all supply centers and uses two key indicators

to measure effectiveness.

The first indicator, stock availability, measures the performance of centers as inventory managers by the percentage of requisitioned items supplied from available stocks. The number of requisitions received in the period July-December 1966 rose to 10.38 million, 10 percent over the number received during the same period in 1965. Overall availability for the DSA system averaged 84.2 percent for the period July-December 1966 compared to 88.2 percent for the comparable period in 1965. This drop is attributed to the surge in demands from Vietnam, exhausting available supplies, and our inability to obtain replenishment from industry in time to meet required delivery dates. (For end fiscal year 1967 data see table "Supply Effectiveness" following.)

The second indicator of system effectiveness, on-time fill, measures supply system effectiveness by the percentage of items processed for shipment by the DSA supply system within the time frames specified in the DOD Uniform Materiel Movement Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). On-time fill during the period July-December 1966 averaged 73.7 percent compared to the 80.9 percent for the same period in 1965. This decrease in on-time fill was due in part to the large number of backorders released when materiel was received from producers plus the effect of heavy depot-level workload stem-

ming from the increase in requisition volume, noted above.

SUPPLY FFFFCTIVENESS

	Fiscal year 1965	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967
Requisitions processed (in thousands) Stock availability (percent) Systemwide shipments (thousand line Items) On-time shipments (percent) High-priority shipments 1 (percent)	15, 357	19, 360	19, 696
	91. 4	87. 8	86, 5
	15, 081	18, 774	19, 339
	85. 7	80. 2	75, 3
	81. 6	78. 2	73, 6

¹ Priority issue groups I and II.

TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICS SERVICES AND PROGRAMS

ITEM ENTRY CONTROL

The expanded defense item entry control technical review program is being implemented in accordance with the planned schedule. This expanded program has absorbed Project Shakedown and has assigned to all of the defense technical review activities (DTRAs) additional responsibilities for catalog purification and item reduction studies for all assigned Federal supply classes. As of December 31, 1966, 54 Federal supply classes, accounting for approximately 63 percent of all new item growth, have been brought under the program. Nine military department and four Defense Supply Agency field activities have been designated as DTRAs. Full implementation of 67 Federal supply classes, accounting for approximately 75 percent of all new item entry into the DOD supply system, is scheduled for completion by July 1, 1967.

Through December 31, 1966, DTRAs have reviewed 282,089 proposed new items of which 95,586, or 33.8 percent, were determined to be exact duplicates or possible duplicates of items already in the DOD supply system. An additional 25,414, or 9 percent, were returned

for various errors in item identifications.

Item entry control embraces a composite of many separate management programs and projects aimed at reducing item proliferation during the complete life cycle of an equipment or weapon system. The development of an optimum IEC system must assure the required compatibility between projects being developed by separate functional managers, and provide the means for their assimilation and integration into an overall DOD IEC system. This system development is being pursued in close coordination with the military departments, Defense agencies, and staff elements within OSD, and is under continuous refinement and revision as individual elements of the overall system progress. In this connection, emphasis is being placed on acceleration of the DOD standardization program. Supply standardization policies and procedures governing item reduction studies are being revised to provide more comprehensive and effective DODwide supply standardization. Increased emphasis is also being directed to the attainment of optimum military standard coverage for FSG-53 (hardware) and FSG-59 (electronics) during the next 3-year period and coverage for other high growth Federal supply classes within 5 years.

DSA, at its Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC), continues to provide a mechanical screen of manufacturers' part numbers. This service is made available to all DOD provisioning activities to ascertain whether an item has previously been assigned a Federal stock

number.

STANDARDIZATION AND CATALOGING

The Defense Supply Agency now has standardization management responsibility for approximately 2.4 million items or 62 percent of the 3.9 million DOD items in the Federal supply system.


DSA is continuing to give major attention to the reduction in the number of items in assigned commodity classes. In fiscal year 1966, as a result of identification of duplicate or similar items and of standard-

ization actions, decisions were made and concurred in by the military departments to eliminate 116,274 items. (Fig. 9.) These decisions were based on a review of 283,445 items during the 12-month period. The goal for fiscal year 1967 is a total of 96,500 decisions, to be based on a review of approximately 328,000 items. At the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 1967, DSA had completed review and coordination of 118,587 items, and the military services had concurred in the elimination of 50,793 items from the supply system. This represented 36 percent of the fiscal year 1967 item review goal of 328,000 items and 53 percent of the reduction decision goal of 96,500 items. (For end fiscal year 1967 data see table "Standardization" following.)

STANDARDIZATION

	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967	Percent of fiscal year 1967 goal
Items reviewed	283, 445	290, 703	88
	116, 274	97, 015	101

FIGURE 9



A net increase of 128,377 DOD items was recorded in the Federal catalog during calendar year 1966. This increase reflects a significant reversal of the reduction reported for calendar year 1965. In the first half of 1966, 199,631 items were added to the Defense catalog and 132,871 items deleted—a net increase of 66,760 items. This trend continued during the second half of the year. In the period July–December 1966, 175,019 items were added and 113,402 items deleted—an increase of 61,617 items. As of December 31, 1966, there were 3,907,703 DOD items in the Federal catalog, as compared to 3,779,326 on December 31, 1965. (For end fiscal year 1967 data see table "DOD Portion of Federal Catalog" following.)

DOD PORTION OF FEDERAL CATALOG

	Fiscal year	Fiscal year	Fiscal year
	1965	1966	1967
Cataloged items (beginning fiscal year) Net change Cataloged items (end fiscal year)	3, 950, 651	3,838,767	3, 846, 086
	—111, 884	+7,319	+117, 602
	3, 838, 767	3,846,086	3, 963, 699

The net increase in catalog items can be attributed in part to the introduction of repair parts for new major end items, and fewer deletions due to retention of older equipments for possible use in Southeast Asia. Extended use of these older equipments in the unfavorable terrain of Southeast Asia has created repair parts demands not previously experienced.

MATERIEL UTILIZATION

Efforts are continuing toward improvement and refinement of mechanized procedures for screening releasable assets of military service inventory control points against military service inventory control point requirements. Interservice and intraservice reutilization resulting from this process, conducted centrally at the Defense Logistics Service Center, and from direct interrogations between inventory control points, totaled \$403 million for fiscal year 1966 (\$231 million interservice reutilization and \$172 million intraservice reutilization). (For end fiscal year 1967 data see table "Materiel Utilization" following.)

Utilization of military service declared excess, which is screened primarily through manual rather than mechanized procedures, amounted to \$1.456 billion in fiscal year 1966. However, progress has been made in the establishment of mechanized procedures to the extent that the need for detailed description by reporting activities of items having a Federal stock number has, to a considerable extent, been eliminated. Mechanized processes now provide the means for the Defense Logistics Services Center to develop descriptions of the property for utilization screening within DOD, as well as for screen-

ing by the General Services Administration.

A program providing for special handling of excess and potential excess items of comparatively high value (exceeding \$10,000) was fully operational in fiscal year 1966. The program centers around the publication of special utilization "flyers" containing full data on an item, including photographs, tailoring the description of these "flyers" to selected potential users, and making a special effort toward utilization through telephone contact, as well as through research, to determine substitute and interchangeable uses for an item. In fiscal year 1966, \$57.4 million in utilization was realized from this program. (See tables.)

MATERIEL UTILIZATION [In millions]

	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967
DOD reutilization of releasable assets	\$403	\$434 (348) (86)
Intraservice reutilization	(231)	(86)

WEAPON SYSTEMS MATERIEL UTILIZATION PROGRAM

Administered by the Defense Supply Agency in cooperation with the military services, the weapon systems material utilization program promotes defensewide redistribution and utilization of military weapon systems assets and other large aggregations of special highcost material generating from phaseouts, tactical withdrawals, and program terminations.

The major objective of this DOD program is the achievement of maximum reutilization of materiel by the military services and other Federal agencies through: close working relationships and liaison between DSA and all echelons of the military, defense agencies, and other Federal agencies; the development of early planning intelligence regarding military systems to be phased out or otherwise discontinued; the development of new or alternate uses and applications of the materiel; the distribution of illustrated brochures; and other promotional efforts by DSA personnel.

DOD reutilization of phased out weapon systems assets through intraservice and interservice transfers has been substantially improved under the weapon systems utilization program. Total utilization during fiscal year 1966 from the publication of brochures on the

missile phaseout program amounted to \$127 million.

INDUSTRIAL PLANT EQUIPMENT (IPE)

As a follow-on action to a 1961 GAO review of the management of idle production equipment within the Department of Defense, OSD approved a joint study project, chaired by DSA, which resulted in the 1962 Report on the Management of Capital Plant Equipment. OSD approval of this report early in 1963 led directly to the establishment of the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC). DIPEC maintains a comprehensive record of service-owned, high-value items of plant equipment and provides a variety of reports to meet service needs such as equipment by type, who made it, and when it was made, its present location by military or contractor activity, and other details necessary to such functions as production planning. As of December 31, 1966, 365,729 units of equipment with an acquisition cost of \$3.68 billion were recorded in the central inventory. The Center also receives reports on idle equipment which it may allocate to fill an immediate need in lieu of new procurement; it may direct the equipment to be held in storage against an anticipated need; or it may direct disposal if the equipment does not warrant retention. In fiscal year 1966, equipment with an acquisition cost of \$185.8 million was allocated to meet defense needs. During the first half of fiscal year 1967, this effort amounted to \$94.8 million, with the largest part going to defense contractors in support of high urgency Southeast Asia requirements. Substantial improvement has been made in IPE management since DIPEC was established and progress is being made toward accomplishment of the actions required by the 1966 GAO survey on the adequacy of controls over Government-owned property in possession of contractors. (See table following.)

INDUSTRIAL PLANT EQUIPMENT (IPE)

[Dollar amounts in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967
tems of IPE in DIPEC inventory	347, 125	394, 140
Value of IPE in DIPEC inventory Value of IPE reutilized for defense needs	\$3, 560, 000 185, 800	\$4, 030, 000 192, 700

SUBSIDIARY PROGRAMS

Subsidiary materiel utilization programs, operated in addition to the basic mechanized and manual screening programs, include:

A final asset screening of surplus items immediately prior to these items being offered for final disposal by sale. \$3.2 million of utilization was realized from this effort in fiscal year 1966.

The identification of interchangeable and substitutable items to permit use of materiel for other than the purpose originally intended. An additional quantity of items worth \$143.5 million were offered as a result of this procedure.

A program to mechanically screen releasable assets and requirements of conventional ammunition throughout the Department of Defense. The program became operational July 1, 1966, providing asset availability listings for review by requiring departments.

Retail interservice logistic support to promote greater exchange of supplies and services at the local level through development of interservice support agreements. Growth of the program is reflected in the reported dollar value of retail interservicing on a worldwide DOD basis which increased from \$229 million in fiscal year 1965 to \$335 million in fiscal year 1966. In the same period, support agreements increased some 200 to 3,199.

SUBSIDIARY MATERIEL UTILIZATION PROGRAMS

	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967
Final asset screening	\$3, 200, 000	\$8,700,000

MATERIEL DISPOSAL

DSA is responsible for the administration of the DOD disposal program worldwide. This responsibility includes the development of systems, techniques, and procedures for disposable personal property in accordance with OSD policy guidance, supervision of resource programs for DOD disposal activities, elimination of disposal holding activities when practical and economical, and operation of Defense surplus sales offices in Conus. The disposal program involves several subprograms, i.e., utilization of DOD excess, donation, sales, demilitarization, and scrap preparation. Under authority of the annual Department of Defense Appropriations Act, the costs incurred by all DOD elements engaged in the disposal of excess, surplus, and foreign excess personal property are reimbursed from the proceeds derived from the sale of surplus and foreign excess personal property. The remainder is transferred to the U.S. Treasury.

The dollar value of property processed for disposal during fiscal year 1966 totaled \$6.035 billion, of which \$2.345 billion was reutilized

within DOD, transferred to other Federal agencies and MAP, or donated to authorized recipients. Value of property sold, scrapped, abandoned or destroyed during fiscal year 1966 was \$3.690 billion. Gross proceeds received from sales during fiscal year 1966 were \$118.5 million. A return of 6.5 percent of acquisition value was realized for property sold, other than scrap. Disposal expenses for fiscal year 1966 were \$80.2 million. Expenses include costs incurred in excess and surplus inventory accountability, utilization screening of DOD excess, handling of excess and surplus property at holding activities, preparation of sales descriptions and displays, demilitarization, reclamation, scrap preparation, lumber and timber operations, and support costs related thereto. (See table following.)

MATERIEL DISPOSAL [Dollar amounts in millions]

	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967
Property processed for disposal	\$6,035.0	\$5, 745. 0
Property processed for disposal leutilized within Department of Defense, transferred to other Federal agencies or donated loid, scrapped, abandoned, or destroyed loross proceeds from sales Percent return on sales (excluding scrap) Disposal expenses	\$2, 345. 0 \$3, 690. 0 \$118. 5 6. 5 \$80. 2	\$2, 168. 0 \$3, 577. 0 \$101. 2 5. 4 \$72. 4

Efforts toward improvement of the management and operation of the DOD disposal program are continuing. Some of the major im-

provements completed or in process are as follows:

(a) When DSA was established, the 34 consolidated surplus sales offices (CSSO's) of the military departments and four regional sales offices became field elements of the Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC). The CSSO's were redesignated as defense surplus sales offices (DSSO's). On January 29, 1965, the four DLSC regional sales offices were eliminated; and the number of DSSO's has been progressively reduced from the original 34 to 12. Annual recurring savings from these reduction actions are \$2.7 million.

(b) DSA, in coordination with the military services, has been engaged in a program to eliminate holding activities of DOD wherever practical and economical. As of January 1, 1967, decisions were made to consolidate disposal functions at 79 holding activities. Sixty-five consolidations have been completed with a resultant savings of \$2.6 million. Four planned consolidations were canceled due to announced base closure actions (three) and redetermination that consolidation was not practical

(one). The remaining 10 consolidations are in process.

(c) A program to reduce costs incident to printing and distribution of sales catalogs. This has resulted in savings of \$5.9

million through fiscal year 1966.

(d) Programs have been developed for conservation or sale of special materials; e.g., silver recovery, special processes for handling copper and copper-base alloy scrap, centralization of certain commodity sales such as jeeps and bearings, and segregation of high-temperature alloy scrap.

(e) DSA has developed a proposed program system which will provide meaningful and uniform operational data for managing

and controlling the disposal program. The proposed system prescribes development and use of time standards, valid workload data, a uniform cost accounting structure and a selective cost and performance reporting system.

Warehousing Gross Performance Measurement System

On February 1, 1965, DSA was assigned responsibility for managing the warehousing gross performance measurement system, in coordination with the military departments and in accordance with instructions provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics). The Department of Defense Warehousing Gross Performance Measurement Office has been established within DSA to develop, monitor, analyze, and maintain the system. The objective of the system is to provide a uniform method of evaluating the effectiveness of warehouse operations and resource utilization in DOD storage activities.

VALUE ENGINEERING

Elimination of "goldplating" in specifications for commodities managed by DSA continues to make progress. The fiscal year 1967 goal for cost reductions from value engineering analysis actions has been established at \$12 million; and \$16 million from fiscal year 1967 actions for the period fiscal years 1967–69. While additional opportunities are presented as new commodities are assigned, a plateau is being reached as more and more of the assigned commodities have been subjected to value analysis. However, value engineering analysis actions taken during the first half of fiscal year 1967 are expected to result in validated savings of \$6.5 million in the fiscal years 1967–69 period. It is anticipated that actions in the second half of the fiscal year will result in additional savings of \$9 million in fiscal years 1967–69 for a total of approximately \$15.5 million for the 3-year period.

Defense Documentation

In November 1963 DSA assumed, from the Air Force, operational control of the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) which had replaced the Armed Services Technical Information Agency. Policy guidance for DDC is exercised by the Director of Technical Information, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. DDC provides classified and unclassified management information services, without charge, to Government organizations and contractors engaged in Government research and development programs.

DDC maintains and operates the research and technology work unit data bank and related banks of management information; acquires technical reports, announces them, and furnishes copies to authorized users; makes technical report searches for DDC users; maintains a centralized system for registration and certification for access to DOD scientific and technical information; maintains the DOD Thesaurus of Technical Terminology; provides primary distribution of technical reports obtained from selected foreign countries and the NATO advisory group for aerospace research and development; and provides referral service to additional DOD sources of specialized scientific and technical information.

The DDC mission includes development of new and improved concepts, processes, techniques, services, products, and integrated systems for management information and technical documentation in support of the DOD scientific and technical information program.

As continuing additional requirements have been imposed for services to the research and development and logistics communities, DDC has developed from an R. & D. document supply activity to a major repository and retrieval activity for technical management information.

DOD/GSA SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS—CIVIL AGENCY SUPPORT

Under terms of the DOD/GSA agreement reached at the end of 1964, a joint DSA/Federal supply service Materiel Management Review Committee was formed in 1965 to determine appropriate supply management assignments to DSA and GSA of Federal supply class (FSC) groups, classes and items under DOD integrated management. Agency heads have approved initial management assignments of 99 FSC's to DSA and 52 to the General Services Administration. Transfer to GSA of items in these 52 "Primary Federal Supply Service Classes" is scheduled for July 1967. An additional FSC has been assigned to GSA but has not yet been scheduled for transfer.

The DOD/GSA agreement further provided for DSA to consider support of all civil agencies for the commodities of fuel, electronics, clothing and textiles, medical and subsistence supplies, provided conditions of economies and support effectiveness are met. A DSA/GSA committee has completed its evaluation of the feasibility and economy of DSA support of all Federal civil agencies for fuel, elec-

tronics, and clothing and textiles and determined that:

Support for fuels involving procurement, but little workload impact on inventory management and distribution, will produce cost savings of approximately \$2.5 million annually and will not

adversely affect military service support.

There is a high degree of commonality in electronics supplies used by civil agencies and DSA. DSA already supports approximately one-half of the civil agencies' annual \$10 million electronics requirement. Savings from expansion of DSA support for all civil agency common item electronics requirements will approximate \$0.6 million, in addition to the \$0.6 million now being saved under current DSA

support.

In the clothing and textiles area, there is substantially less commonality of civil agency and DSA items; therefore, savings are less significant and workload impact greater. In view of already heavy commitments, DSA has proposed, and the Secretary of Defense has approved, limiting expansion of civil agency support to those specific instances where clear savings can be made without degrading military support capability. The clothing and textile area will be reexamined from time to time to identify any support which DSA might provide to civil agencies on a case-by-case basis; but at this time there is no plan for DSA to assume overall support.

The Secretary of Defense has approved the DSA proposal to support civil agencies for fuel and electronics. Phase-in of fuel support over a 10-month period is scheduled to begin 6 months from the final Bureau of the Budget decision authorizing such support. The tentative scheduling for support of civil agencies for electronics provides for

phase-in over a 12-month period, beginning July 1, 1968, to assure civil agency support without adverse impact on DSA present heavy

workload in the electronics area.

Studies of medical and nonperishable subsistence are in process. While final conclusions and recommendations have not been developed, the relatively heavy workload involved, without evidence of substantial economy, indicates that DSA support should be limited, similar to that approved for clothing and textiles, with provisions for future reconsideration.

Progress is being made in perishable subsistence support of Veterans' Administration and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare hospitals by the regional subsistence offices of DSA. Sales have totaled

\$654,000 for the period April-December 1966.

In conjunction with the Department of the Interior, consideration is being given to the extension of perishable subsistence support to the \$2 million school program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Support of the Post Office Department for electronics, general and industrial supplies is also under review. Annual sales of these commodities to the Post Office Department would approximate \$2 million.

Under separate interagency arrangements currently in effect, DSA supports the Coast Guard with a full range of materiel; Veterans' Administration and Public Health Service with selected medical items; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Agency with electronics materiel; the Maritime Administration with fuel, and clothing and textiles; and the Office of Economic Opportunity with clothing and textiles and subsistence items.

CIVIL DEFENSE LOGISTICS

DSA is responsible for logistics support of the national civil defense program under the policy control and direction of the Office of Civil

Defense, Office of the Secretary of the Army.

In providing civil defense logistics support, DSA operates a national distribution system which issues survival supplies for the stocking of public fallout shelters. During the past fiscal year, supplies for 7.5 million persons were issued. The total supplies issued since the program began in fiscal year 1962 are sufficient for 45.8 million

persons in more than 81,000 shelter facilities.

DSA has begun evaluation of the condition of survival supplies in shelters by utilizing the Veterinary Services of the Army and Air Force to inspect supplies on a scientific sampling basis. Certain samples will also be subjected to laboratory analysis. A pilot inspection has been successfully conducted to test basic procedures and inspection techniques. Through a phased program, the condition and readiness of survival supplies at military installations, in Federal buildings, and in public fallout shelters everywhere will be evaluated.

Since the establishment of the DSA civil defense materiel distribution system, 54 percent of the warehouses initially participating in the storage and issue of survival supplies have been consolidated.

During fiscal year 1966 civil defense-owned engineering equipment, which is managed by DSA, was loaned to State governments to alleviate local community suffering and hardships from drought and flood damage. This included the loan of approximately 114 miles of pipe, 158 pumps and related items to 24 States for use in 91 communities.

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES

The Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) mission was assigned to DSA after extensive study and represents one of the most significant efforts of the Defense Department to improve logistics management. The consolidation does not embrace, or affect, the procurement function itself, but rather the administration of contracts in the field after they have been executed by the contracting offices of the military departments and DSA. A prime objective of the merger was to provide a "single face to industry."


During 1962 and part of 1963, a study known as Project 60 was conducted under the policy guidance of high level Department of Defense military and civilian personnel. The study indicated the existence of considerable overlap and duplication in contract administration services functions among the military services under the Army Materiel Command, the Office of Naval Material, and the Air Force Systems Command; and further indicated the feasibility of consolidating the functions for centralized management. A pilot test region established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in April 1964, demonstrated the feasibility and potential advantages of consolidating contract administration services functions on a nationwide basis. On the basis of the success of the pilot test, the Secretary of Defense, on June 4, 1964, assigned responsibility for these functions to DSA.

A national planning group, composed of temporary duty personnel from the military services and DSA, developed a national implementation plan (NIP) which was approved by the Secretary on December 28, 1964. The planning group formed the nucleus of the headquarters element of the DCAS organization. During the development of the NIP, a memorandum of understanding was developed with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration concerning CAS

performance on NASA contracts.

The NIP provided for gradual permanent staffing of the DCAS headquarters element and for a time-phased schedule for consolidating and merging the contract administration services components of the military services and DSA into 11 Defense Contract Administration Services regions (DCASR's), responsible for administering contracts under the centralized management concept. The headquarters element was established on a permanent basis on February 1, 1965, and is now staffed with the 329 military and civilian personnel authorized. The current organizational structure of the headquarters element of DCAS is shown in figure (3). Provision was made for required augmentation of the DSA common staff in areas where support services are furnished to DCAS. Conversion and organization of the DCAS field structure was completed on December 1, 1965, with the activation of the last two of the DCASR's at Los Angeles and San Francisco. The geographical alinement of the Defense Contract Administration Services regions is depicted in figure 10, which also shows the districts and service offices within each region. The directors of the regions are identified in figure 5.





Consolidation of contract administration services functions within DSA involved the merging of 165 military service and DSA contract management offices into approximately 100 offices. Despite the many problems associated with a conversion effort of such magnitude, the transition was made with full consideration of the functional transfer rights and interests of the approximately 20,000 employees identified by the military services and DSA as performing contract administration services functions. During this period, contract administration functions and operations were continued without interruption or

impairment of the Government's interest. DCAS is responsible for providing a wide variety of support services to the purchasing offices of the military services, NASA, and other Federal agencies and certain foreign governments. These services include preaward surveys, review of contractor purchasing systems, quality assurance and inspection, property administration, production surveillance and reporting, transportation, payments to contractors, industrial security and other functions required in connection with industry performance on defense contracts. Responsibility for initial award of contracts and for all decisions with respect to the nature and quantity of items and services to be purchased remains with the military service, DSA and NASA buying offices; DCAS performs those contract administration functions that can best be handled at or in close proximity to the contractor's plant. In addition to retaining responsibility for contract awards, the military services are responsible for the administration of those categories of contracts not included in the mission assignment to DCAS; for example, contracts involving perishable subsistence items, basic research studies, military and civilian construction, repair, and overhaul of naval vessels. Military services are also responsible for administration of those contracts in specific plants assigned by DOD under the plant cognizance program.

The defense industrial security program is unique in the field of contract administration services in that its responsibility includes not only those facilities in which DCAS has contract administration responsibility, but also all facilities where the military departments have retained plant cognizance responsibility. In addition to having responsibility for security administration of all DoD classified contracts, the Defense industrial security program provides the same service for classified contracts awarded by eight other departments and agencies of the government; namely, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Federal Aviation Agency, General Services Administration, Small Business Administration, and the National Science

Foundation.

In the consolidation of the Defense industrial security program, procedures for processing personnel security clearances were centralized from approximately 110 cognizant security offices into the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO). Centralization of the personnel clearance function has resulted in improved management efficiency and the ability to insure greater uniformity in clearance determinations. Moreover, the centralized operation lends itself to future adaptation to automatic data processing.

In consolidating CAS functions, it was anticipated that savings would accrue from three factors: (1) the merging of offices, (2) the

use of computers, and (3) increased standardization and uniformity of operation. Realization of savings was to be achieved by a time-phased reduction in personnel over a 5-year period. Utilizing preconsolidation workload and manpower as a base, the objective was a reduction of approximately 10 percent in personnel by fiscal year 1968 to reflect a recurring reduction in personnel costs of \$19 million by fiscal year 1969.

In December 1965, the first month of full DCAS nationwide operation, the level of workload had already increased 20 percent above the level prevailing when the savings estimates were made, when, for example, the number of primary and secondary contracts being administered was 138,000. By December 1966, the number was 219,000, an increase of 60 percent. A further increase to 220,000 is expected by June 30, 1967. During the same period the number of invoices completed had changed from an annual rate of 1.07 to 1.71 million, also an increase of 60 percent. By June 30, 1967, the annual rate is expected to reach 1.96 million. Still another example is the dollar value of material inspected and released for shipment, which rose from an annual rate of \$13.729 billion in December 1965 to \$16.672 billion in December 1966, a 20 percent increase. The projected annual rate as of June 30, 1967, is \$17.726 billion. (See table following.)

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES WORKLOAD

[In thousands]

	Fiscal year	Fiscal year	Fiscal year	Fiscal year
	1965	1966	1967	1968 estimate
Contracts administered	114 825 84	195 1,109 112	272 1, 945 198 \$19, 352,000	276 2,311 229 \$21,781,000

These examples, together with other primary workload indicators, show an overall workload increase ranging from 37 to 63 percent during the past year. To accomplish this increased workload, manpower was increased by 20 percent. These increases are for the most part attributed to the impact of the SEA buildup, added NASA requirements, and the transfer to DCAS of the administration of some contracts previously assigned to the military departments under

the DOD plant cognizance program.

The workload increase compared with the work force increase demonstrates a reduction in cost per work unit performed. Accordingly, the original estimate of anticipated savings appears to have been exceeded. However, a more precise computation of savings for comparison with the original estimate is not feasible because of the significant but immeasurable influence of several factors. These include changes that have occurred in the contract administration mission where the net effects on workload and resources are not clearly identifiable; the impact of SEA requirements which, on a postfacto basis, are not fully separable from the otherwise normal workload; and the effects of the learning curve on operation during the first year. These factors notwithstanding, current workload and resource data indicate that the full savings originally anticipated were being realized earlier than scheduled and will continue to recur through fiscal years 1967 and 1968.

Beginning with fiscal year 1967, DSA budgeted and funded for CAS functions. During fiscal year 1965, DCAS operations were financed through reimbursement to DSA from military appropriations. Fiscal year 1966 financing was accomplished through transfers of funds from the military departments. Support of NASA and other non-DOD agencies will continue to be financed through reimbursement.

Some of the areas of major effort during the first year of operations

were as follows:

(a) Quality assurance.—The SEA build up created a significant workload in suppliers' plants, particularly in the ammunition, weapons, clothing, and medical commodities. Through extensive training and some recruitment, the challenge has been successfully met. To meet changing industrial and defense technologies, and other factors impinging upon readiness to perform, DSA CAS is pursuing a quality assurance skills acquisition program. DSA CAS is currently training approximately 1,000 quality assurance personnel who are performing on NASA contracts. In addition, quality assurance personnel are attending service schools, non-Government schools, and colleges to

become better equipped to accomplish the assigned mission.

(b) Plant safety.—Included in the initial CAS functional assignment from the military departments was responsibility for monitoring safety in contractors' facilities pertaining to nonhazardous materials and processes involved in Government contracts. Early in 1966 DCAS was assigned, for contracts administered, the additional responsibility for maintaining surveillance of flight safety and safety matters on hazardous and dangerous materials and processes. Since assignment of the function, a DSA representative has chaired a DOD committee to develop ASPR guidance on hazardous and otherwise dangerous material safety, uniform contract safety clauses, and a Department of Defense manual prescribing standards to be followed by manufacturers of hazardous and dangerous materials.

(c) Delinquent contracts.—Due to the urgency of the Southeast Asia situation, special management attention had to be given to the problem of reducing the number of contracts in a delinquent delivery status. Increased leadtimes for materials and overloaded plant conditions contributed to a rising trend in contract delinquencies. Top management personnel of selected delinquent contractors were visited by DCASR personnel to emphasize the importance of timely deliveries and to assist the contractors in attempting to reduce their delin-

quencies.

(d) Defense materials and priorities assistance.—Special emphasis was placed on accomplishment of the objectives of the Defense materials and priorities assistance program, which necessitated the reorienting, training, and indoctrination of Government employees and Defense contractors. DCAS participated with the Business Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce, in nationwide briefings attended by approximately 25,000 Defense contractor representatives in 30 U.S. cities. Additionally, vigorous in-house training was conducted and a continuing program was developed for providing technical assistance to both Government and contractor personnel.

(e) Industrial security.—Immediately following consolidation of the industrial security function, action was taken to identify cleared facilities which had not been engaged in classified procurement for 18 or more months. Administrative termination of these "dormant"

facilities resulted in a reduction of cleared facilities from approximately 22,000 to approximately 15,000. This has contributed to the efficiency of the program in that resources can be expended at facilities

actually engaged in classified procurement.

(f) Small business.—A vigorous small business and economic utilization program was pursued; 1,378 small business/labor surplus area subcontracting programs have been established in prime contractor plants and are being revised quarterly by CAS field force of 48 small business/labor surplus area specialists located in 11 regions and in 15 of the 26 district offices.

(g) Management of property.—Significant improvements have been made in the management of property. New programs provide for more thorough analyses and qualitative evaluations, better identifications of conditions, and sounder bases for conclusions and actions.

(1) Contractor property control systems: Provided for greater depth and scope of reviews and evaluations of each system periodically, established minimum frequency of surveillance visits, and provided a statistical sampling technique with guidance for the sizes of samples and the limits of acceptability.

(2) Contractor use of industrial plant equipment: Fixed initial responsibility for performance of usage analysis by the best qualified DCAS specialist available during production; established firm requirements for timely reviews; provided improved criteria for determining when equipment may be considered idle by equating with procuring activity plans, programs, and intentions, respecting original authorization for acquisition and use; and specified a reporting procedure to support decisionmaking and necessary action.

(3) Centralized management of functions, skills, and reports: Identified other specific functions within the overall management of government property for performance by quality assurance, industrial specialist, transportation, and safety personnel in such areas as condition, maintenance, shipping, and loss or damage, with reports to the property administrator making the total story on the quality of the contractor's management, and es-

tablishing bases for compliance actions.

(4) Revised job standards for property administrators: Undertook a study which disclosed the need to revise antiquated and obsolete notions of property administration. These standards are now being rewritten to more closely approximate a manager of assets in the light of prevailing industrial and economic conditions and designed to attract higher caliber personnel by creating a career progression as a recruiting incentive, all to the end of upgrading the quality of performance.

(5) Training: Conducted seminars in the 11 DCASR's, bringing to property administrators and their supervisors current doctrine, such as emphasis on proper utilization of equipment by contractors and timely and accurate preparation of records and

reporting.

(6) Regulatory coverage: Participated in distinguishing reponsibilities of the contractor and the Government; eliminating nonessential reporting; standardizing required reports as management tools and for other governmental purposes; developing contract provisions requiring maintenance of utilization records:

and furnishing new guidance in disposition of inventory and prompt plant clearance, preparation of inventory schedules, reporting for screening, and responsibilities of the plant clearance

officer.

(7) Reconciliation of industrial plant equipment records: Recognized the need for purification of the system from an economic and practical viewpoint and arranged for a 2-year program of reconciliation of the records of the national inventory of industrial plant equipment with the property in possession of contractors by an orderly, no-additional cost operation during

the contractor's normal inventory taking.

To summarize, the Defense Contract Administration Services mission has been implemented and successfully incorporated into the DSA organization. Contract administration services functions are being performed effectively and efficiently, and with savings in costs over the previous methods. More significant benefits and improved performance are expected to be achieved as the DCAS organization stabilizes and gains additional experience and performance data in operations under the Project 60 concept. Conversion to the current DCAS organization was achieved without any significant adverse impact upon the Government organizations and personnel involved.

DSA ACHIEVEMENTS IN REDUCING COSTS OF OPERATIONS

The Defense Supply Agency has continued support to the military services without interruption or impairment, during major organizational change. This has involved the extension of central control over a group of heterogeneous agencies and the development of uniform policy, standards, and procedures with a view toward providing the

military services with better support at less cost.

The President's budget for fiscal year 1963 was based on the expectation that the functions transferred to DSA would be performed at a cost of \$27.7 million less than the budgeted cost of performing the same functions within the military departments. The Congress assessed an additional reduction of \$2.7 million, making a total budget cut of \$30.4 million, related principally to a reduction of 3,329 civilian personnel spaces. Consolidation of the Army and Marine clothing factories produced an additional saving of \$0.9 million, resulting from a reduction of 146 personnel spaces, for a total fiscal year 1963 operating expense saving of \$31.3 million. During fiscal year 1964, this \$31.3 million was augmented by additional savings, realized from reorganization of the distribution system, improved use of automatic data processing equipment, consolidation of the Defense Automotive and Construction Supply Centers, and closing of certain Defense Surplus Sales Offices, for a total of \$39.6 million. Consolidation of the Medical, Subsistence, and Clothing and Textile Supply Centers into the Defense Personnel Support Center resulted in a reduction of 483 civilian and 38 military spaces, with a net saving during fiscal year 1966 of approximately \$4.2 million exclusive of one-time costs. By the end of fiscal year 1966 total savings from reduced cost of operations had reached \$58.3 million.

SUMMARY

In the 5 years since its establishment, it has become apparent that DSA has not, and will not, solve all military supply and logistics services problems. Some of these are bound up in the complex relationships of military strategy and national economics and the rapid obsolescence of military materiel caused by the forward sweep of technology. DSA has in this 5-year period, however, demonstrated that it can support the military services effectively and efficiently in the major military commitment in Vietnam. In so doing, the Agency has proven the soundness of the concept of integrated management of common supplies and logistics services in Defense and that it can be made to work in time of war, mobilization, or peace.

APPENDIX 3

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE INDEX OF SELECTED REPORTS ISSUED TO THE CONGRESS DURING THE PERIOD MAR. 8, 1967, THROUGH OCT. 12, 1967

Index No.	Report file No.	Date	Title of report	Department
1	B-158712	Mar. 8, 1967	Potential Savings Obtainable Through Increased Use of the Government's Interagency Motor Pool System, Department of Defense.	Defense.
2	B-133386	Mar. 17, 1967	System, Department of Defense. Review of Costs of Bidding and Related Technical Efforts Charged to Government Contracts, Depart- ment of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration.	Defense and NASA.
3	B-160581	Mar. 28, 1967	Management of Hi-Valu Aeronautical Parts by Pacific Air Forces Bases. Department of the Air Force.	Air Force.
4	B-160632	Apr. 10, 1967	Review of Availability of Selected Stocks of the U.S. Army in Europe for Requirements of Other Commands, Department of the Army.	Army.
5	B-160781	Apr. 17, 1967	Savings Available to the Government through revision of the method of supplying Commercial Pental Cars—General Services Administration.	GSA.
6	B-157445	Apr. 24, 1967	Procurement of Critically Needed Missile Fuel Under Adverse Conditions from a Sole-Source Supplier, Department of the Air Force.	Air Force.
7	B-157373	Apr. 25, 1967	Review of the Management of Alteralt Repair Parts Reserved for Maintenance Activities at Depots in the Continental United States, Department of the Army.	Army.
8	B-160417	Apr. 28, 1967	Review of the Acquisition and Installation of Com- puters by the U.S. Army, Pacific, Department of the Army.	Do.
9	Ľ B−160900	do	tising in Contracting for Automotive Tires and Tubes General Services Administration.	GSA.
10	B-114836	do		HEW.
11	B-161319	May 8, 1967	Examination Into the Transfer of Handtool and Paint Stocks From the Department of Defense to the GSA.	Defense and GSA.
12	B-161027	May 25, 1967	Review of Inspection Controls Over Concrete Place- ments in Building Construction Projects—Public Buildings Service, GSA.	GSA.
13	B-161027	do	Review of Subsurface Exploration for and Design and Construction of Foundations of Public Buildings—	GSA.
14	B-156010	May 31, 1967	Public Buildings Service, GSA. Savings Possible by Consolidating Mamagement of Acquired Residential Properties, Department of Housing and Urban Development and Veterans' Administration.	VA and HUD.
15	B-152600	June 5, 1967	Need for Improvements in Supply and Maintenance Support for F-4 Aircraft, Department of the Navy.	Navy.
16	B-133394	June 9, 1967	Service Rather Than Contractor-Furnished Employees for Certain Support Services, National Agrangatics and Space Administration.	NASA.
17	B-39995	June 19, 1957	Need for Compliance With the Truth-in-Negotiations Act of 1962 in Award of Construction Contracts, Department of Defense.	
18	B-152598	July 18, 1967	New Procedures Adopted To Improve Management of Contractor-Operated Messing and Merchandis- ing Services at Kwajalein Missile Test Site,	Do.
19	B-118779	July 27, 1967	ment-Owned Vessels Supporting Military Activities in Southeast Asia, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce.	
20	B-161415	July 31, 1967	Review of Policies and Procedures for Reputating Used Motor Vehicle Tires by Selected Civil Agencies.	Selected civil agencies.
21	B-146772	July 31,1967		Navy.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE INDEX OF SELECTED REPORTS ISSUED TO THE CONGRESS DURING THE PERIOD MAR 8, 1967, THROUGH OCT. 12, 1967—Continued]

Index No.	Report file No.	Date	Title of report	Department
22	B-118634	Aug. 3, 1967	Prepared by Architect-Engineers for Solicitation	Army.
23	B-161330	Aug. 7,1967	of Construction Bids Corps of Engineers (Civil Functions) Department of the Army Need for Improving Policies and Procedures for Estimating Costs, Evaluating Bids, and Awarding Contracts for Dredging, Corps of Engineers (Civil	Do.
24	B-139011	Aug. 30, 1967	Functions), Department of the Army. Savings From More Economical Use of Communica- tion Facilities Between Alaska and the U.S. Mainland, Department of the Air Force, Alaska	Air Force.
25	B-156313	Aug. 31, 1967	Communication System. Procurement of Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Equipment Under Public Law 87-653, Department of the Navy.	Navy.
26	B-114824	Sept. 21, 1967		Agriculture.
. 27	B-161992	Sept. 22, 1967		Defense.
28	B-133118	Sept. 29, 1967	Review of Inventory Accounting Systems for Aero-	Navy.
29	B-162106	do	nautical Equipment, Department of the Navy. Need for Procedures to Preclude More Than Just Compensation in Acquiring Oil Interest, Corps of Engineers (Civil Functions), Department of the Army.	Army.
30	B-161340	Oct. 12, 1967	Anny. Opportunity for Savings by Adopting Manufacturers' Recommended Preventive Maintenance Programs for Interagency Motor Pool Vehicles—General Services Administration.	GSA.

APPENDIX 4

DIGESTS OF SELECTED U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS ISSUED TO THE CONGRESS DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 8, 1967, THROUGH OCTOBER 12, 1967

[Index No. 1-B-158712, March 8, 1967]

POTENTIAL SAVINGS OBTAINABLE THROUGH INCREASED USE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERAGENCY MOTOR POOL SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

During our review at six military installations in the Washington, D.C., area, we found that employees who required automobiles in connection with travel while on temporary duty assignments customarily rented automobiles from commercial firms even though vehicles were generally available from the Government's interagency motor pool system at a 10- to 50-percent reduction in cost and at

little inconvenience to the traveler.

The use of the interagency motor pool system, whenever feasible, is a stated policy of the Department of Defense. We found, however, that although the military services have issued instructions which call attention to the existence of the interagency motor pool and provide pool locations, addresses, and telephone numbers, the regulations did not specifically require personnel to use the motor pool system. Consequently, we found that travelers needing vehicles generally did not attempt to obtain them from the motor pool system, but, instead, rented cars from commercial car rental firms.

From our review, we estimated that the annual cost of car rentals at the six military activities included in our review amounted to approximately \$214,000. Assuming these activities to be typical, it appeared that substantial savings could be achieved each year by the Department of Defense if greater use was made of the existing

services of the interagency motor pool system.

The Director, Transportation and Warehousing Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) advised us in a letter dated September 28, 1966, that the Department of Defense concurred in our findings and conclusions. He stated that the military services have been requested to review and modify pertinent directives or regulations as necessary to ensure that the requirement for the use of interagency motor pool facilities is explicitly stated. In addition, we have been advised by the Administrator, General

In addition, we have been advised by the Administrator, General Services Administration that agreement has been reached with the Department of Defense whereby the General Services Administration will (1) increase the size of the motor pool fleet if necessary at locations designated by the Department of Defense where vehicle requirements of department personnel are relatively stable, and (2) assist in the development of internal regulations and publicity to insure the effective implementation of such regulations by personnel authorizing and performing travel.

[Index No. 2—B-133386, Mar. 17, 1967]

REVIEW OF COSTS OF BIDDING AND RELATED TECHNICAL EFFORTS CHARGED TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

The General Accounting Office made a review of the costs of bidding and related technical efforts charged to Department of Defense and

National Aeronautics and Space Administration contracts.

We found a need for improved control over the costs of contractors' bidding and other related technical efforts absorbed by the Government. Our findings were based on our review at Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Division of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Sunnyvale, Calif. However, auditors of the Departments of the Army and Air Force have noted similar problems during their audits of numerous other Government contractors.

In our opinion, the need for improved control resulted principally because the armed services procurement regulation, which provides the basis for limiting charges to contracts for contractors' bidding costs and other technical effort costs, was not sufficiently clear and was subject to varying interpretations. We, as well as agency auditors, had noted that, where the procurement regulations do not clearly define the types of costs allowable under Government contracts or do not clearly establish the extent of allowability, the interpretations made

by contractors most often prevail.

This situation is best illustrated where contractors, such as Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., are engaged simultaneously in the preparation of bids and proposals and the conduct of independent research and development. These two activities involve similar technical efforts. For the larger contractors, including Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., agreements are negotiated in advance covering the extent of the contractors' independent research and development programs that will be absorbed by the Government but advance agreements generally are not made limiting the amount of bid and proposal expenses to be absorbed by Government contracts.

Thus, technical effort designated by the contractor as pertaining to its independent research and development program is subject to reduced reimbursement by the Government, whereas similar effort designated as bid and proposal expense may be accepted without

limitation.

Our review indicated that at least half of the \$3.8 million of bidding and related costs claimed by Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. for 1962 either were similar to independent research and development costs or were not, in our opinion, clearly necessary to support the contractor's bids and proposals. The items in question were costs incurred (1) after the Government indicated that it was not interested in a proposal, (2) before the time a request for proposal was received, (3) after a bid or proposal had been presented to the potential customer, and (4) to develop capability to respond to future anticipated requests for proposals.

The Lockheed Aircraft Corp., in commenting on our draft report.

disagreed with our position with respect to these items.

The Department of Defense and other Government agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, have

recognized the problem of determining allowability of bidding and related costs when such determination is based on a subjective review of the reasonableness of the contractor's classification of the technical effort for which he is claiming reimbursement. For the past several years, the Department of Defense had been in the process of amending the procurement regulations to deal with all types of contractor's independent technical efforts as a package and to provide certain limitations on the charging of such costs to Government contracts.

The Department of Defense informed us that a study would be made to develop an appropriate remedy for effective management of bid and proposal costs charged to Government contracts. Both the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration stated that it would not be feasible to issue interim guidance, as we had proposed, with respect to allowability of bid and

proposal costs.

We recognize that the many facets of the bid and proposal problem deserve intensive consideration before revised procedures are established. However, we are concerned that, in the meantime, contracting and auditing officials will continue to be faced with the need to interpret the procurement regulations in the areas covered by this report. In our opinion, the planned study should be expedited.

We therefore recommended that the Secretary of Defense give the proposed study of bidding and related costs a high priority and that he establish goals to insure the earliest possible completion of required

revisions to the procurement regulations.

[Index No. 3.—B-160581, March 28, 1967]

Management of Hi-Valu Aeronautical Parts by Pacific Air Forces Bases, Department of the Air Force

The General Accounting Office has made a review of the management by Pacific Air Forces bases of certain high-cost aeronautical parts included in the Air Force hi-valu program, a program which provides close control over significant items through selective manage-

ment techniques.

We found that the five Pacific Air Forces bases covered by our review had accumulated hi-valu aeronautical parts and components valued at about \$16 million, which were excess to the bases' requirements. Additional unneeded hi-valu parts valued at about \$19.9 million were on order from depots in the United States. For a selected number of the excess items on hand, we estimated that transportation costs of about \$381,000 were incurred to ship the unneeded materiel to Pacific bases. Also, much of this unneeded materiel was shipped by air transportation at a time when there was a shortage of such transportation to handle high-priority cargo shipments to the Pacific.

The excess parts and components were accumulated or ordered because base supply personnel did not effectively implement or follow established Department of the Air Force supply-management procedures. We found that these personnel (1) circumvented the controls that had been established to prevent ordering unneeded parts, (2) did not follow prescribed Air Force supply procedures that had been designed to identify unneeded orders which should be canceled, (3)

did not identify all interchangeable items on hand in base stocks, and (4) in some instances, did not adequately consider the need for establishment or continuance of special stock levels. Also, base supply personnel did not report excess assets on hand to inventory managers and thus precluded the effective redistribution of such assets to bases

which might have had a need for them.

We brought our findings to the attention of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force on October 6, 1966. The Deputy for Supply and Maintenance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations and Logistics), in commenting on our draft report, stated that the Air Force, in general, agreed with our findings and recommendations. He pointed out, however, that, at the time of our review, the five bases we visited were supporting forward bases in Southeast Asia where operations were rapidly expanding and that difficulties experienced as a result of this rapid expansion, coupled with eagerness of supply-management personnel to support the war effort, undoubtedly contributed to the temporary overstockage of hi-valu items.

The Deputy for Supply and Maintenance stated that, as a result of our review, the five bases have, as of October 15, 1966, taken action to cancel unneeded hi-valu items on order valued at about \$8 million and to redistribute unneeded hi-valu items on hand valued at over \$5 million. He said that, in accordance with our recommendation that increased surveillance over base activities be exercised by Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, a new supply improvement program had been initiated for the purpose of ensuring that base supply problems were brought to the attention of the appropriate level of command and that projects had been established to review major areas of supply

operations.

We believe that the actions taken by Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, if effectively pursued on a continuing basis, should help prevent recurrence of the deficiencies.

[Index No. 4—B-160632, Apr. 10, 1967]

REVIEW OF AVAILABILITY OF SELECTED STOCKS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN EUROPE FOR REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER COMMANDS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The General Accounting Office has made a review of the availability of selected stocks in Europe to meet the requirements of other com-

mands within the Department of the Army.

Repair parts and electronic components which exceeded requirements in Europe were not redistributed to meet urgent needs in other areas because of weaknesses in the Army's inventory reporting procedures and practices. Our limited review identified combat vehicle repair parts and electronic components, valued at about \$3.2 million, that could have been used to satisfy urgent requirements in the United States and in the Pacific area. The availability of these items, however, had not been reported to the appropriate national inventory control points in the United States, and, in the absence of such information, procurements and repair programs were initiated to meet known requirements.

After these items were called to the attention of management officials, assets valued at about \$2.1 million were transferred to other commands, programs for repairs costing about \$100,000 were canceled, and procurements valued at about \$180,000 were deferred. The remaining assets, valued at about \$1.1 million, were scheduled for redistributions and the context of the context of

tribution subsequent to the completion of our review.

We found that the Army Tank-Automotive Center did not consider the stocks in Europe available for redistribution because (1) contrary to Army regulations, the various commands in Europe had not reported certain excess stocks to the Center, (2) those commands had not included the inventory of the 7th Army in computations to determine the inventory quantities and excesses to be reported to the Center, and (3) the Center had not required the overseas commands to submit depot asset reports for high-dollar-value items and secondary end-items during the fiscal year 1965.

The Army Electronics Command could not consider certain excess

The Army Electronics Command could not consider certain excess radio components in Europe available for redistribution to satisfy urgent requirements for these items in the continental United States because the various commands in Europe had not reviewed and evaluated their requirements for these components and therefore did

not report the excess stocks to the electronics command.

The Department of the Army concurred in our findings but did not concur that certain inventories, referred to as permissive overstockage inventories, should be reported to inventory control points in the United States. Permissive overstockage inventories exceed operating and reserve needs but can be retained by the overseas commands for contingencies. We believe, however, that all existing items considered to be in short supply by the inventory control point, which exceed current operating and reserve requirements of the overseas command should be routinely reported to such inventory control points. Thus, the inventory control point would have current and complete data on extra stockage of items and would be in a position to consider such items in filling urgent requirements of other commands.

We recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Army's existing system for reporting stock status be revised to include a requirement for reporting to national inventory control points of all stocks of items considered to be in short supply by such inventory control points, which exceed operating and reserve requirements of the overseas commands, including those stocks in the permissive overstockage inventories. Although our review was related to procedures and management controls for selected items being procured by the Army Tank-Automotive Center and the Army Electronics Command, the same procedures and management controls generally apply on an Army-wide basis. Therefore, our observations may be equally applicable to other items in the Army supply system.

[Index No. 5-B-160781, Apr. 17, 1967]

SAVINGS AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH REVISION OF THE METHOD OF SUPPLYING COMMERCIAL RENTAL CARS—GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

The Government incurs an estimated \$1.9 million in costs each year for short-term rental of cars under informal arrangements made

by Government agencies and their contractors with commercial rental firms. Similar cars are rented by the Government under contracts entered into by the General Services Administration to supple-

ment the cars in its motor pools.

Our review showed that rental rates under the General Services Administration contracts are substantially lower than the rental rates obtained under informal arrangements. It appears that more favorable rates are obtained under the General Services Administration contracts primarily because such contracts are usually awarded through formal advertising and provide for a larger volume of potential rental business. We estimate that a savings of as much as \$350,000 annually could be realized if cars being rented under informal arrangements were rented, by the using agencies and contractors, directly from the commercial firms at General Services Administration contract rates.

The Deputy Administrator of General Services, in commenting on our draft report, stated that the General Services Administration

concurred with our proposals to—

1. Reexamine, in consultation with major using agencies, its present role in the rental of commercial cars for Government use, with a view to making a better response to agency needs.

2. Increase the relative share of such rentals made under its

contracts

The Deputy Administrator advised us also that, although the General Services Administration had some reservation with respect to our proposal that rentals be made directly from commercial firms, this matter would be included in a full-scale in-depth study that would be made of ways and means to achieve greater economy and efficiency in supplying rental cars to Government agencies.

He advised us also that the General Services Administration is in agreement with our proposal that it expand its present contracting for car rentals to cover all areas where such action would result in

savings or benefits to the Government.

[Index No. 6—B-157445, April 24, 1967]

PROCUREMENT OF CRITICALLY NEEDED MISSILE FUEL UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS FROM A SOLE-SOURCE SUPPLIER, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

We made a review of contracts for the procurement of critically needed missile fuel under adverse conditions from a sole-source

supplier—Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.

The Air Force acquired a \$15.6 million production plant that is completely surrounded by Olin property on which the Government has certain easement rights for access roads, utilities, and disposal facilities. Although this location of the fuel production plant resulted in economies in initial construction costs, it also strengthened the contractor's position as the sole-source supplier.

Because certain supporting facilities for the plant were integrated with those of the contractor, the Air Force recognized that it would be impractical for any contractor other than Olin to operate the plant. Moreover, should it become appropriate for the Government

to dispose of this plant; under the terms of the deed, all easement rights and privileges except the easement covering the access road to a public highway would then terminate. This would adversely affect the value of the property to anyone other than Olin and,under the terms of the agreement, in the event of disposition of the property Olin has the option to purchase the property at the highest price offered by any other prospective buyer.

The contractor requested a fee of \$720,000 for the production process "know-how" and experience which it, in effect, was giving to the Air Force in constructing the plant. The Air Force did not permit this fee under the facility construction contract but included it in the

price for the production contract.

Olin would not accept a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for the production of fuel, but stated that it would accept a fixed-price redeterminable contract subject to certain conditions, the principal condition being the explicit provisions for a 20-percent profit on selling price. The Air Force would not agree to the inclusion of such a provision in the contract. In our opinion, the form of contract proposed would not

have been acceptable from a legal standpoint.

A fixed-price production contract was negotiated. However, we found that certain of the contractor's costs were estimated primarily on its production experience at another Olin plant where only limited quantities of the fuel were produced. Other costs were estimated on the basis of anticipated performance at the new Government plant even though Olin had no prior experience with the new production processes or the equipment to be used. Thus, in our opinion, there was no sound basis at the time for establishing a fixed price and the Air Force had no assurance that the price proposed was reasonable.

Officials of the Air Force agreed to this arrangement because they considered it imperative to establish promptly a source for volume production of this fuel and because they believed Olin to be the only contractor capable of satisfying the requirements in the time available. In the performance of this production contract which eventually totaled \$28 million during 1961, 1962, and 1963, Olin realized a profit of \$9.2 million, or the equivalent of about 49 percent on the total costs of \$19 million. This profit does not include an additional profit of \$1.8 million which, we estimate, the contractor realized in the price of raw materials supplied by its own chemical plant.

In our opinion, the lower costs incurred and the resulting substantial increase in profit beyond the rate estimated stemmed, in part, from (1) the uncertainty as to the costs that would be incurred and (2) the contractor's refusal to accept a form of contract more appro-

priate to the circumstances.

Olin's contribution to the timely success of the missile program must be acknowleded. The contractor performed creditably and, in so doing, successfully met the Air Force's required delivery schedule even though no missile fuel plant of this size had ever been build and this fuel had never been produced in such large quantities before.

In view of the important considerations of national security and urgency that were involved in negotiating the facility and production contracts covered by this report, it appears that the Air Force could not have taken an alternative action and met its critical requirements.

[Index No. 7—B-157373, Apr. 25, 1967]

REVIEW OF THE MANAGEMENT OF AIRCRAFT REPAIR PARTS RESERVED FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES AT DEPOTS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Our review at Department of the Army depots in the continental United States showed that more effective management of inventories maintained for aircraft overhaul could result in savings through the reduction of investment in inventories and the prevention of premature or unnecessary procurements. At four maintenance activities, we found that those activities were not complying with then current Army regulations relating to the establishment of stock levels for direct exchange and mission essential items. As a result, the value of inventories was about \$1.5 million in excess of the value of quantities authorized and additional procurement of identical parts had been made in the amount of \$447,000.

Utilizing the criteria outlined in Army regulations, we reviewed the computation of stock levels for items maintained for the direct exchange programs and the justification for retention of stocks designated as mission essential and found that, of total inventories valued at over \$3 million, \$1.5 million worth were excess. In general, the excess inventories had been accumulated because (1) officials of the maintenance activities were not aware of the provisions of Army regulations, (2) shortages of personnel precluded computations of stock levels as prescribed by the regulations, and (3) justifications for retention of mission essential stocks were not periodically reviewed.

In commenting on our report in a letter dated July 21, 1966, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) agreed with our proposal that local controls be provided to ensure that direct exchange stock levels are established on the basis of anticipated issues, based on past experience and experienced repair times, and that mission essential stock is held to a minimum as

required by Army regulations.

The Army did not agree that significant savings in the procurement of repair parts could have been realized, because the involved excess parts were subsequently returned to the supply system and were used to satisfy other requirements. We believe, however, that the premature procurement of parts in excess of prescribed stock levels is not an economical practice. In this instance, the excess repair parts were used; but premature buying results in unnecessary storage, handling, and preservation costs. In addition, there is always the possibility that parts purchased prematurely will not be used because technological changes occur frequently in military equipment and parts become obsolete.

[Index No. 8—B-160417, Apr. 28, 1967]

REVIEW OF THE ACQUISITION AND INSTALLATION OF COMPUTERS BY THE U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The General Accounting Office has made a review of the acquisition and use of computers in supply operation by the U.S. Army, Pacific, a subject of special interest to the Congress.

The situation may be summarized as follows:

During 1965 and 1966, the U.S. Army, Pacific, replaced data processing equipment used in supply and related transactions at important command depots with large-scale computer systems. Benefits expected to be derived from these computers could not be fully realized, we concluded, because improvements and corrections of supply management problems had not been completed prior to their installation.

Because of many continuing problems, a large percentage of U.S. Army, Pacific, supply transactions cannot be processed routinely by the computers. Transactions must be manually researched, edited, and reprocessed as in the past. The volume of manual handling of supply documents by the Army slows the processing and limits significantly the advantages of a computer system.

These difficulties are due primarily to longstanding problems disclosed in numerous previous reports by this Office. In general, we

reported that-

1. Inventory procedures were not adequate to insure accuracy of inventory and warehouse location records.

2. Management practices led to excesses of some supply items and critical shortages of others.

On April 14, 1966, we brought the findings contained in this report to the attention of the Secretary of Defense. We proposed that implementation of the plan to install large-scale computers at command depots be delayed until an effective program had been instituted to correct problems inherent in the supply system.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics). commenting on our draft report, stated on July 7, 1966, that the Army concurred in the findings generally but disagreed with our recommendation. He said that a standard supply system, supported

by computers, was essential to correct the problems identified.

The Assistant Secretary has stated also that the Army's objective is to achieve an efficient and automated supply system in the Pacific and that, since the equipment has been installed, withdrawal would be retrogressive, costly, and disruptive of supply operations during a critical period. He advised that the results presently achieved at subordinate command depots indicate that substantial improvement has been made.

On completion of planned improvements, the Assistant Secretary added, inventory control activities and installations in the four Pacific commands will be reassessed and necessary additional improvements

initiated.

We agree that computer equipment is essential for effective management of large inventories and great numbers of supply transactions; however, we do not believe that the full benefits of this costly equipment can be realized until the underlying system and data are

improved.

Current information shows that Pacific theater supply operations under the new automated system are characterized by problems similar to those discussed in this report: Out-of-stock positions have substantially increased; stock balances and related records are inaccurate; requisition processing is delayed; and numerous errors in customer requisitions continue.

In view of the problems that would accompany withdrawal of the computers, we did not recommend that course of action. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense bring our report to the attention of all military agencies to illustrate the need for correcting basic weaknesses in operating systems if the most effective utilization of automatic data processing equipment is to be realized.

[Index No. 9—B-160900, Apr. 28, 1967]

SAVINGS AVAILABLE THROUGH THE USE OF FORMAL ADVERTISING IN CONTRACTING FOR AUTOMOTIVE TIRES AND TUBES—GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Schedule contracts for automobile tire and tube items are let by GSA on a multiple-award basis; that is, contracts are generally awarded to more than one supplier for the same or comparable item. In establishing the schedule contracts, GSA first obtains price offers for each tire and tube item from suppliers. The requests for price offers provide that the items will be ordered by Federal agencies from

time to time in such quantities as needed.

After the receipt of the price offers, GSA compares the prices on an item-by-item basis and generally accepts the lowest price offered. The suppliers which have submitted higher priced offers are then afforded an opportunity to meet the lowest price accepted by GSA for those items for which they had originally submitted offers. If the suppliers agree to meet the lowest price, they are then included on the schedule. Thereafter, agencies may procure their requirements for an item at the same cost from any supplier of that item listed in the schedule.

Under the above method of establishing contract prices for automotive tires and tubes, there is no real incentive for a supplier to initially submit the lowest price at which he is willing to sell because making the lowest offer will not assure him of a certain amount of sales or a favorable position over other suppliers. When GSA gives the suppliers a second opportunity to submit price offers, a supplier is asked only to match the lowest price offer in order to participate under the schedule. Hence, the second solicitation of offers results only in additional suppliers and not in more favorable prices to the Government.

Our review has shown that the use of the negotiated contracting for the Government's tire and tube requirements is not necessary since the essential elements for advertised contracts exist—Federal specifications have been established, items meeting such specifications are widely sold on the commercial market, and there are a sufficient number of supplies to permit effective competition for the bulk of the

Government's requirements.

We compared the prices obtained by four State and two city governments through formally advertised contracts with the prices obtained by GSA through the negotiated method of contracting. On the basis of the price comparisons we estimated that the Government may realize annual savings in excess of \$1 million through use of formal advertising.

We suggested to the General Services Administration that it give consideration to adopting the formal advertising method of contracting

for the bulk of the Government's tire and tube requirements.

The Administrator of General Services, in commenting on the matters discussed in this report, has advised that the administration plans to procure through formal advertising 87 high-volume tire and tube items to be stocked and to give continuing attention to the use of formal advertising where that method is determined to be feasible. We believe that these proposed actions constitute essential agreement with our suggestions.

[Index No. 10—B-114836, Apr. 28, 1967]

REVIEW OF THE PRICING METHODS USED BY THE VARIOUS STATES IN THE PURCHASE OF PRESCRIBED DRUGS UNDER FEDERALLY AIDED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

On the basis of our review, we concluded that, if the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would provide the States with appropriate guidance and requirements pertaining to the establishment or revision of the pricing methods for drugs purchased for use by welfare recipients, the drug programs in many States would be significantly improved with resulting economies to both the States and the Federal Government.

Although prescription drug programs under which payments are made directly to vendors have been in existence in many States for several years, the Department has not provided the States with guidance in the establishment or revision of pricing methods for welfare prescriptions. In fiscal year 1966 these programs involved expenditures of about \$144 million of which the Federal share was estimated at

about \$81 million.

We believe that this lack of guidance has been a significant factor contributing to a diversity of welfare prescription drug pricing methods in use and to the use in many States of pricing methods which do not result in equitable prescription drug pricing. Also, many of the pricing methods are not conducive to economical prescription drug procurement because they include features which provide an incentive to pharmacies to dispense higher cost drug products where suitable lower cost products meeting the prescription requirements are available.

We proposed that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare establish a policy governing methods of pricing welfare prescription drugs, which would prohibit the use of methods based on cost plus a percentage of cost or methods otherwise providing an incentive for the dispensing of higher cost products where suitable lower cost products meeting the prescription requirements are available. We proposed also that the Department's policy encourage the use of methods based on the cost of the product dispensed plus a fixed professional fee.

Concerning these proposals, the Department stated that it was in general agreement that it should develop a policy for pricing pharmaceutical products obtained under prescription, which would prohibit a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis of reimbursement but which, in contrast to our view that the use of a cost-plus-a-fixed-

professional-fee method should be encouraged, would incorporate encouragement to the States to move toward a cost-plus-a-flexible-professional-fee basis. A cost-plus-a-flexible-fee pricing method provides a fee, increasing with the cost of the product, for each of two or more defined ranges of drug cost—for example, a 50-cent fee for a drug which cost the pharmacy less than \$1, a 75-cent fee for a drug which cost from \$1 to \$2, and so on.

The Department acknowledged that, under the flexible-fee pricing method, pharmacies would still have some incentive to stock and dispense higher cost products but expressed the view that such incentive would be less than that under a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost method. The Department also described certain considerations which it believed warranted the encouragement of a flexible-fee rather than a fixed-fee

pricing method.

The Department stated further that, because of the need to establish certain related controls in consonance with the policy statement to be developed and because of the need to further define and explore certain questions concerning the proper composition of a professional fee, it believed that the development of any policy should be deferred for a reasonable period of time.

We believe that the Department's principal reason for proposing to encourage the use of a flexible-fee pricing method is the effect of the fixed fee on low-cost prescription items. However, we believe that, because the fixed-fee method will remove an incentive to dispense higher cost products, it will tend to reduce the overall cost of drugs

to the program.

We therefore recommended in a report issued to the Congress on April 28, 1967, that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare take action as early as practicable to establish a policy governing methods of pricing welfare prescription drugs under federally aided public assistance programs, which would be acceptable for the purposes of Federal financial participation. We recommended also that such a policy prohibit not only the use of methods of welfare prescription drug pricing based on cost plus a percentage of cost but also the use of any methods which provide an incentive to dispense higher cost products where suitable lower cost products meeting the prescription requirements are available. We recommended further that the policy urge the use of methods based on the cost of the product dispensed plus a fixed professional fee.

By letter dated August 16, 1967, the Assistant Secretary, Comptroller, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare furnished us with a copy of the Department's statement to the chairman of the House Committee on Government Operations pertaining to this matter. The Department expressed the view that sufficient information does not exist to determine the full effects of a cost-plus-fixed-fee method or a cost-plus-a-flexible-fee method and proposed the establishment of a policy which will allow the States the option to select either method. The policy would include a requirement for the Department to periodically evaluate and make adjustments as appro-

priate regardless of the method employed.

[Index No. 11—B-161319, May 8, 1967]

Examination Into the Transfer of Handtool and Paint Stocks From the Department of Defense to the General Services ADMINISTRATION

An important step toward the development of a national supply system was taken with the transfer of about \$65 million worth of handtool and paint stocks from the Department of Defense (DOD) to the General Services Administration (GSA). The transfer was

substantially completed in 1966.

The General Accounting Office reviewed handtool and paint inventories at the Department's supply depots after management responsibility had been assumed by GSA and found that there were significant quantities of GSA-owned stocks on hand which were not recorded on the administration's inventory records. Consequently,

these stocks were "lost" to the supply system.

After we brought this situation to the attention of Department and administration officials, complete physical inventories were taken at the Department's depots and about \$4 million worth of stocks were found which were not recorded, but which should have been recorded, on the Administration's inventory records. During the period when the stocks were "lost," the Administration purchased about \$1.1 million worth of stocks that were identical to the unrecorded stocks.

In our opinion, the transfer difficulties would have been largely avoided if—

1. DOD inventory records had been accurate when the stocks were transferred.

2. Effective controls had been maintained over GSA-owned

stocks in DOD depots after the transfers.

3. GSA and DOD had cooperated more closely in solving

their mutual problems.

In January 1967, we proposed to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services that certain steps be taken in future stock transfers to eliminate these difficulties. We proposed to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services that detailed physical inventories be taken of all stocks to be transferred, inventory records be reconciled to the physical counts, and warehouse stock locator records be updated. We proposed also that prior to the transfer of management responsibility, a joint committee be made responsible for providing operating procedures to carry out the transfers, acting as liaison and coordinators, and settling promptly any problems relating to inventory shortages during the transfers.

The Department and the Administration have indicated agreement

with our proposals.

[Index No. 12—B-161027, May 25, 1967]

REVIEW OF INSPECTION CONTROLS OVER CONCRETE PLACEMENTS IN Building Construction Projects—Public Buildings Serv-ICES ADMINISTRATION

During the period June 1965 to February 1966, we reviewed inspection controls over concrete placements for three projects consisting of four buildings being constructed in Washington. Contracts for the three projects totaled about \$75.7 million including about

\$20.3 million for concrete placements at the sites.

The review disclosed that inspection procedures of the General Services Administration did not insure compliance with contract specifications in regard to water content of concrete delivered to one of the construction sites. Yet, the water content of concrete has been shown by authorities cited in our report to be one of the most critical factors in obtaining quality concrete. Our report recognizes that, although the concrete placed met strength requirements, the quality of concrete included but was not limited to characteristics of strength. The review at this site disclosed also discrepancies in the use of curing compound and in the preformance of concrete testing.

Inspectors at the other two building construction sites appeared to be exercising reasonable inspection practices to help insure that the delivery and placement of concrete in the basement slab and founda-

tion footings met contract specifications.

We informed the Administrator of General Services that, on the basis of our review, we believed that the quality of on-site inspection varied between construction sites. We advised him of our belief that the inspection weaknesses discussed in this report could have been avoided had the agency's regional headquarters officials exercised greater supervision over inspectors at the site. We presented certain policy and procedure matters which we believed would have applicability to agency construction in general.

The Deputy Administrator agreed that vigorous and continual onsite inspection is the primary means of control to help insure that concrete in public buildings complies with prescribed design for all of its qualities. He observed, however, that ordinary observance and the use of the tests provided for in the specifications normally are adequate.

The Deputy Administrator concurred in our porposals that frequent, systematic reviews and evaluations of on-site construction inspection should be made and recorded standards for on-site construction inspectors should be improved. He advised that a project had been started to improve recording standards and that greater emphasis was being placed on evaluation of on-site construction inspection by the regional and central office inspection and engineer groups.

The Deputy Administrator also concurred in our proposal that laboratories engaged in testing concrete should be directly responsible to the Government rather than to the contractor. He advised that

the requirements were being changed to provide for this.

[Index No. 13—B-161027, May 25, 1967]

REVIEW OF SUBSURFACE EXPLORATION FOR AND DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS—PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

In a review of contracts awarded under provisions of the Public Buildings Act of 1959 in amounts in excess of \$2 million each for buildings under construction on June 30, 1963, we found that, in 15 out of 28 buildings, the Government had encountered construction difficulties

because of foundation design problems and unanticipated soils

conditions.

Settlements of contractors' claims in these cases ranged from a low of \$2,500 to a high of \$4,100,000. The foundation problem which resulted in settlement of a contractor's claim for \$4.1 million resulted in additional unexpected costs when its resolution eventually required the purchase of adjoining lands at a cost of about \$4 million.

In reviewing the present capability in soils and foundation matters within the Public Buildings Service, we found that its staff of professional engineers did not include specialists in soil mechanics and foundation engineering. We believe that, had such staff specialists been available, certain of the soils and foundation difficulties experienced by the Service could have been avoided and the costly effects of others minimized.

We proposed to the Administrator of General Services that soil mechanics and foundation engineering capability be developed within the Public Buildings Service. The Administrator advised by letter of January 18, 1967, that the Administration's in-house capability would be expanded and certain other measures would be taken, to minimize soils and foundation problems in the construction of public buildings.

[Index No. 14—B-156010, May 31, 1967]

SAVINGS POSSIBLE BY CONSOLIDATING MANAGEMENT OF ACQUIRED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION

In a report to the Congress in May 1967, we noted the possible benefits of consolidating within one agency the management and disposition of all single-family residential properties acquired as a result of default of loans under home financing programs of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Veterans' Administration (VA).

We expressed the belief that the property management functions are essentially the same in both agencies and that consolidation of these functions was feasible and would provide a basis for lower costs through a reduction in the overall size of the staffs performing these functions separately. We stated further that consolidation would provide opportunities for additional benefits, such as savings through volume contracting for broker services, and for simpler and more uniform procedures and terms in dealings with brokers and potential buyers.

Officials of HUD, VA, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) commented on our proposal. Although the VA believed that it was not desirable to separate its home financing functions from its associated property management functions, the other two agencies were of the

opinion that a study was warranted.

Subsequently, we were advised by the Assistant Secretary for Administration, HUD, that a management consulting firm would be engaged by BOB to make a study to determine what, if any, organizational and and other actions should be taken. We were informed that the consulting firm has subsequently completed its study and is in the process of preparing a report on their study.

[Index No. 15—B-152600, June 5, 1967]

NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR F-4 AIRCRAFT, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The General Accounting Office estimated, on the basis of review work performed in 1965, that the Department of the Navy could have maintained the equivalent of 23 additional F-4 aircraft in serviceable condition during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1964, if certain improvements had been effected in supply and maintenance support. We so advised the Navy.

During 1966 we made a limited followup review of these matters and found that many of the same management problems affecting the readiness position of F-4 aircraft continued to exist, although air-

craft availability had increased.

We identified the following problems in the management of supplies by the Navy's Aviation Supply Office, which led to shortages of spare parts and components for F-4 aircraft.

1. Loss of control over inventory of certain parts.

2. Failure to promptly purchase needed parts.

3. Lack of prompt repositioning of stocks to areas where needed.

4. Lack of timely repair of unserviceable components.

We identified also some administrative problems in scheduling F-4

aircraft for repair and rework.

We brought these matters to the attention of the Department of Defense by letter dated July 13, 1966, proposing that the Navy establish a weapons system management team for each type of first-line aircraft for as long as the aircraft is so classified.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management), in his reply dated December 7, 1966, stated that the Navy agreed there should be a weapons system management team as long as would be necessary to cope with major difficulties in research, design, develop-

ment, production, and logistics support peculiar to the system.

It was stated, however, that such a team for every first-line aircraft would require a substantial organization of technical, maintenance, and supply personnel. The Navy stated also that the establishment of a weapons system management team would not, in itself, insure improvement of the conditions which our review noted. The Navy advised that, to insure improvement, the aircraft supply support structure had been reorganized and several new management disciplines had been instituted.

We believe that these actions will contribute to improved maintenance and supply support for all weapons systems and, therefore, should improve the readiness posture of the F-4 aircraft. We plan to evaluate the implementation and adequacy of the Navy's actions in our continuing reviews of its supply and maintenance activities.

[Index No. 16—B-133394, June 9, 1967]

POTENTIAL SAVINGS AVAILABLE THROUGH USE OF CIVIL SERVICE RATHER THAN CONTRACTOR-FURNISHED EMPLOYEES FOR CERTAIN SUPPORT SERVICES, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

In a report to the Congress, issued in June 1967, we stated that our review of the relative costs of using civil service personnel or contractor-furnished personnel to perform engineering and related technical support services at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Goddard and Marshall Space Flight Centers showed that estimated annual savings of as much as \$5.3 million could be achieved with respect to nine contracts we reviewed, on which annual support service costs of about \$31 million were incurred, if these services were to be performed by civil service employees.

We pointed out that the indicated savings were attributable, for the most part, to the elimination of many contractor supervisory and administrative personnel, which would result from a conversion to civil service staffing and the elimination of the fees paid to the

contractors.

We expressed the view that the Space Administration's policies relating to the use of support service contracts were not sufficiently clear as to the consideration which should have been accorded to relative costs in determining whether contractor-furnished or civil service personnel should be used. In this regard, we were advised that the Space Administration, while believing that contracting for the services involved had been in the best interests of the Government, recognized the need for more specific guidance on cost considerations than had been provided and that such guidance would be part of any redefinition of policy resulting from a current review of agency experience in the use of support service contracts.

Because the action to fully correct the situation discussed in our report would require a significant change in the Space Administration's policy relating to the use of support service contracts and because of the potential effect that a significant change may have on its civil service personnel requirements, we stated that the Congress may wish to consider the policy aspects of this matter in further detail with

agency officials.

In addition, we pointed out that the Congress may also wish to explore with the Space Administration the impact that cost considerations should have in determining whether to use contractor or civil service personnel in those cases where either contractor or civil service personnel could equally carry out the operation.

[Index No. 17—B-39995, June 19, 1967]

NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TRUTH-IN-NEGOTIATIONS ACT OF 1962 IN AWARD OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The General Accounting Office has made an examination into the practices of the construction agencies of the Department of Defense in the negotiation of military construction contracts and modifications

over \$100,000 awarded during the period November 1964 through June 1966 under the requirements of Public Law 87-653, the Truth-in-Negotiations Act of 1962, and the implementing Armed Services

Procurement Regulation.

We found a need for the construction agencies—the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command—to improve compliance with the cost or pricing data requirements of Public Law 87–653 and the implementing Armed Services Procurement Regulation in negotiating construction contracts and modifications.

We found generally that, in the negotiation of prices of construction contracts and modifications, (1) sufficient cost or pricing data supporting the contractors' proposals, as required by the law, were not obtained, (2) cost analyses of contractors' proposals to determine that the prices were fair and reasonable, as required by the regulation, were not made, and (3) related prescribed procedures for utilizing advisory audits were not followed.

Instead, the construction agencies placed primary reliance on comparisons of the contractors' proposals with their own cost esti-

mates as a means of evaluating the reasonableness of prices.

A primary reason for the construction agencies' not complying with Public Law 87-653 and the Armed Services Procurement Regulation appeared to be their belief that the law (and regulation) was not applicable to construction contracts since contractors' proposals were evaluated on the basis of comparisons with Government estimates.

Comparing a proposal with an estimate serves a useful purpose, but such comparison is not an acceptable substitute for obtaining and analyzing current and complete cost or pricing data of the—contractor

as required by law and regulation.

We brought these findings to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and proposed that he emphasize to the Departments of the Army and Navy the need for improvement of the construction agencies' compliance with the requirements of Public Law 87-653 in the negotiation of construction contracts and modifications.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement) in letters dated February 1 and March 9, 1967, agreed in substance with

our proposals.

[Index No. 18—B-152598, July 18, 1967]

NEW PROCEDURES ADOPTED TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTOR-OPERATED MESSING AND MERCHANDISING SERVICES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE TEST SITE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The General Accounting Office has reviewed records relating to contractor-operated messing and merchandising activities at the Army's missile test site at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. The review disclosed a loss of about \$1.6 million during a 2-year period ended in February 1966, chiefly because prices charged to customers were too low.

The contractor operated, in addition to the messing facilities, a commissary, retail store, laundry, barber shop, beauty shop, snack bar, and liquor store and clubs at Kwajalein. Under the contract

terms, costs to the contractor—Global Associates of Oakland, Calif.—in operating these facilities were to be reimbursed by the Government. The Government would subsequently recover its cost through revenues

derived from charges to consumers.

The Department of Defense concurred with our findings and advised us that the Army agreed that the contractor should take steps to insure that losses in messing and merchandising would be recovered by revised pricing; that the contractor should establish in its accounting records a reserve for losses on disposition of obsolete, damaged, or spoiled merchandise; and that the Army should review the contractor's buying and storage records to reduce future losses on merchandise.

In addition, the Department of Defense stated that our findings would be furnished to the military departments calling attention to the need for reviewing messing and merchandising at other similarly

remote locations.

We believe that the corrective actions taken or proposed by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army should, if properly implemented, help to insure that costs incurred in this and similar contractor operations of messing and merchandising activities will be recovered in charges to customers.

[Index No. 19—B-118779, July 27, 1967]

POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN FINANCING OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED VESSELS SUPPORTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Our review of the policies and procedures followed by the Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce, relating to the advancing of funds to general agents for the operation of Government-owned vessels used in support of military operations in Southeast Asia, indicated that annual savings in interest cost of about \$239,000 could be realized if the Maritime Administration would time its cash advances to meet the general agents anticipated current requirements rather than to have the general agents continue to maintain prescribed cash balances.

The Maritime Administration generally followed the practice of advancing funds to its general agents on the basis of their maintaining a cash balance not in excess of \$100,000 for each vessel assigned, subject to a maximum of \$500,000 per agent. It is established Government policy to avoid premature advances of funds and thereby preclude unnecessary borrowings and the related interest cost. Treasury Department Circular 1075 provides that cash advances should be timed in accordance with the actual cash requirements of the recipient in

carrying out the purposes of the program.

In a letter dated February 8, 1967, we proposed that Maritime modify its procedures in a manner that would result in submission and approval of general agents' requests for advances on the basis of anticipated current operating requirements in order to avoid the premature advancing of Government funds and to help prevent unnecessary interest costs. The Acting Maritime Administrator informed us by letter dated March 6, 1967, that in keeping with our proposal and the announced policy of the Treasury Department, general agents

were being instructed that funds would be made available only on the basis of current cash needs.

In our opinion, the new procedures initiated by Maritime to make funds available to the general agents only on the basis of adequately supported current needs after agency review and approval, if properly implemented, should achieve the objective of Treasury Department Circular 1075 and result in significant savings in Government interest costs.

[Index No. 20—B-161415, July 31, 1967]

REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR REBUILDING USED MOTOR VEHICLE TIRES BY SELECTED CIVIL AGENCIES

In July 1967, we reported to the Congress on our findings on the policies and practices for rebuilding used motor vehicle tires by the Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture; the National Park Service, Department of the Interior; the Post Office Department; and the General Services Administration. We estimated that savings of about \$500,000 would have been realized by these four agencies during fiscal year 1965 through more extensive rebuilding of used tires.

We found that the tire-rebuilding policies and practices of the four agencies varied among the agencies and among installations within certain of these agencies and that, with the exception of the Post Office Department, these inconsistencies existed because of the lack of specific tire removal and rebuilding criteria and of conclusive determinations as to the reliability of rebuilt tires. GSA is responsible for prescribing policies and procedures, in respect of rebuilt tires, for implementation by the executive agencies.

Information obtained from tire manufacturers, tire rebuilders, users of rebuilt tires, and various organizations representing the tire industry indicated that, when tires are rebuilt according to recommended criteria, they are safe, serviceable, and more economical than new tires. Our review disclosed, however, that no adequate tests or studies had been made and that available evidence was not sufficiently decisive to permit a conclusive judgment as to the reliability or rebuilt tires

under all driving conditions.

We believe that, if rebuilt motor vehicle tires are considered unsafe under certain specified conditions, they should not be used under such conditions by any agency but that, to the extent that they are safe, they should be used by all agencies to achieve maximum savings.

We proposed that GSA keep in close touch with the program of the National Traffic Safety Agency for tire research, testing, and development so that it may be in a position to promulgate standards for the use of rebuilt tires on Government vehicles on the basis of the standards established for the driving public, pursuant to the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Public Law 89–562). We proposed also that GSA provide specific guidance for the removal and processing of used tires to prevent excessive wear and damage that would make them unsuitable for rebuilding.

GSA agreed with our proposal to keep in close touch with the National Traffic Safety Agency's program for tire research, testing, and development and advised us of its own plans for testing rebuilt tires and for issuing revised specifications for new tires, which will preclude

carcass damage from excess tread wear.

We believe that the actions taken and proposed by GSA are adequate, pending developments from the tire research, testing, and

development program of the National Traffic Safety Agency.

The Post Office Department, whose practice is to rebuild all tires that have sound casings, agreed with our proposals. The Soil Conservation Service and the National Park Service, however, indicated that they would continue to discourage the use of rebuilt tires.

[Index No. 21—B-146772, July 31, 1967]

TRANSFER OF EXCESS MATERIALS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS EXPEDITED BY IMPROVED PROCEDURES

The General Accounting Office has made a review of Army and Marine Corps procedures for the transfer of excess material.

We found a need for improvement in the procedures of the Army and the Marine Corps, relating to the exchange and use of information

on stocks of excess material available for redistribution.

Our review showed that, during 1964 and 1965, the Marine Corps had on hand significant quantities of excess tank-automotive repair parts and other material which could have been used by the Army for high-priority requirements, such as those in Vietnam. Because there were no procedures for the regular exchange of information on such excesses, notification by the Marine Corps that it had \$9 million worth of excess material available for transfer received no review by the Army, and notification by the Army of its critical need for certain items received no review by the Marine Corps.

When we brought these matters to the attention of Marine Corps and Army officials, the Marine Corps transferred about \$1.9 million worth of excess material to the Army for use in meeting urgent require-

ments.

Commenting on our findings and proposals, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Services) informed us that closer logistical coordination had been established between the Army and Marine Corps through a realinement of responsibilities within the Marine Corps supply system and that audit coverage of the supply system would be increased. Also, he advised us that the Marine Corps was now operating under new guidelines which had resulted in large quantities of excess material being transferred to the Department of the Army. In future audit work, we will inquire into the effectiveness and adequacy of the corrective actions taken.

[Index No. 22—B-118634, Aug. 3, 1967]

NEED FOR IMPROVED REVIEWS OF QUANTITY ESTIMATES PREPARED BY ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS FOR SOLICITATION OF CONSTRUCTION BIDS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS (CIVIL FUNCTIONS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ABMY

In August 1967, we pointed out to the Congress that although the importance of accuracy in estimating quantities is stressed by the Corps of Engineers (Civil Functions), Department of the Army, in

their regulations, the Chief of Engineers had not, at the time of our review, established corpswide procedures for the review of work performed by architect-engineers. Consequently, we found that the contract price of \$15.4 million for the construction of the Summersville dam, dikes, and spillway was substantially increased primarily because the quantity estimate prepared by an architect-engineer firm was inaccurate and did not show the full scope and magnitude of the work to be performed.

As a result, the Corps increased the contract price by \$8.2 million through negotiation, rather than through competitive bidding, and thereby lost the benefits normally attained through formal advertising. We estimate that about \$5.3 million of this increase in costs could have been subjected to competitive bidding. This portion of the increase was directly associated with increased work which could have been foreseen prior to contract award. An adequate review of the quantity estimate, in our opinion, would have disclosed (1) a substantial underestimate of the quantity of materials to be excavated for the dam foundation, a substantial overestimate of the available rock in designated sources, and (3) the need to locate sources of rock.

In addition to the loss of the benefit of full and free competition from procurement through formal advertising, costs of about \$348,500 were incurred which could have been avoided. These costs consisted of about \$276,000 for equipment which was idle because it could not be used for some of the additional work and about \$72,500 for addi-

tional administrative expenses.

In order to minimize the necessity for negotiated contract modifications, we proposed that the Chief of Engineers issue guidelines requiring the districts to review the work of architect engineers. We further proposed that a statement of the nature and extent of the review be made a part of the official files. The Department of the Army concurred in our report, in general and advised us that the Chief of Engineers was preparing instructions to the field offices in accordance with our proposals. These instructions were issued on February 17, 1967, and, if effectively implemented, they should reduce the necessity for negotiated contract modifications.

[Index No. 23—B-161330, Aug. 7, 1967]

NEED FOR IMPROVING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ESTIMATING COSTS, EVALUATING BIDS, AND AWARDING CONTRACTS FOR DREDGING, CORPS OF ENGINEERS (CIVIL FUNCTIONS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

In August 1967, we reported to the Congress that the Corps of Engineers needed to improve its policies and procedures for estimating contract costs, evaluating contract bids, and awarding contracts for

dredging.

Our review indicated that some corps dredging was not accomplished as economically as possible and, in our opinion, the corps' practices in awarding contracts for dredging did not comply with the law and have resulted in some contracts being awarded at prices in excess of statutory limitations. The law under which the corps awards contracts for dredging stipulates that appropriated funds shall not be used to pay for any work done by contract if the contract price is more than 25 percent in excess of the estimated cost of the Government's doing the work with its own equipment and crews (in-house). Our review disclosed that the corps generally does not prepare in-house estimates, but rather awards contracts for dredging to the contractor whose bid price is low and is not more than 25 percent in excess of the corps' estimate of fair and reasonable cost to a contractor, exclusive of profit.

We examined dredging costs incurred under 32 contracts for one large dredging project and compared these with our estimates of the costs that the corps would have incurred if it had done the same work in-house. We believe that 11 of the contracts were awarded at prices which were about \$2.1 million in excess of the statutory limitation. We believe also that these contract prices were about \$4.4 million in excess of the costs that would have been incurred if the work had

been done by the corps itself.

We recommended that the Secretary of the Army direct the Chief of Engineers to revise the corps' regulations to require that the corps

award future dredging contracts in compliance with the law.

The Department of the Army has disagreed with our findings and stated that present policies and practices of the corps are in accordance with the policies and intentions of both the Congress and the administration, that civil works projects are being conducted in a manner most economical and advantageous to the Government, and that the longstanding practical interpretation and application by the corps of the law should not now be overturned.

We brought our finding to the attention of the Congress in the event that it wished to express its views regarding present policies followed by the corps in awarding contracts for dredging. If the Congress should determine that the corps' present policies and procedures applicable to its dredging operations are to be continued, we suggest that consideration be given to revising or repealing section 624 of title 33, United States Code.

[Index No. 24—B-139011, Aug. 30, 1967]

SAVINGS FROM MORE ECONOMICAL USE OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES BETWEEN ALASKA AND THE U.S. MAINLAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ALASKA COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

The General Accounting Office has made a review of the use of submarine cable and microwave communication facilities leased by the Alaska Communication System—a unit of the U.S. Air Force—to provide public and private telephone service between Alaska and the 48 States on the mainland.

Our review indicated that, as early as January 1961, the Alaska Communication System was aware that a microwave facility, which served Alaska, was more economical to use than the cable facility. Savings could have been attained by using the cable facility in a different manner and, at the same time, by making greater use of the microwave facility.

It was not until mid-1965, after we discussed this matter with Alaska Communication System officials, that the necessary actions were taken

to attain these savings.

Our review indicated that savings of about \$3.9 million could have been realized had the Alaska Communication System taken action in a more timely manner after it first became aware that the microwave

was less expensive than the cable.

We attempted to determine from officials of the Department of the Air Force why the longstanding question on the use of communication facilities serving Alaska was not resolved more promptly. They were unable to provide us with any record to show why any decisive action had not been taken to resolve this question prior to our review.

We brought our findings to the attention of the Secretary of Defense in a draft report. We proposed that examinations be made into the management of the Alaska Communication System with a view to making changes needed to insure that, if similar situations should arise, they be brought to the attention of appropriate officials for timely action.

On March 28, 1967, the Department of the Air Force, commenting for the Secretary of Defense, stated that it generally concurred with

the facts stated in our report.

The Air Force said that it plans to convert the Alaska Communication System operation to industrial funding. Also the Air Force will monitor the cable contract at the highest possible level to insure the most satisfactory combination of price and service for both the

Government and the Alaskan public.

Since the Alaska Communication System operation has not yet been converted to industrial funding, action should be taken now to strengthen management controls so that situations similar to that discussed in our report are promptly brought to the attention of appropriate management officials and resolved. With regard to the cable contract, we are in full accord that continued monitoring of the contract is essential and in the best interest of the Government.

[Index No. 25-B-156313, Aug. 31, 1967]

PROCUREMENT OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROPULSION EQUIPMENT UNDER PUBLIC LAW 87-653, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The General Accounting Office has examined into the pricing of propulsion equipment for use in a nuclear submarine, which is being purchased under a fixed-price subcontract from General Electric Co. Our findings clearly show the additional costs which the Government can incur when significant cost or pricing data is not disclosed during contract price negotiations. They emphasize the need for full disclosure of all data pertinent to price negotiations, as required by Public Law 87-653.

A significant portion of the cost data which General Electric furnished to the Navy and certified as being accurate, complete, and current was based on the cost of processing certain castings in its own plant. We noted, however, that, prior to the date the negotiations were concluded, the Medium Steam Turbine, Generator, and Gear Department of General Electric had requested and received from suppliers price quotations for fully processed castings. These quotations were not disclosed to the Navy during price negotiations, even though the amounts quoted were substantially less than the

amounts which the contractor had included for fully processed castings

in its price proposals.

Thus, in our opinion, the Government did not have an opportunity to negotiate a reduction, which we estimate would have been about \$564,000. This amount represents about half of that portion of the negotiated price related to the castings. Shortly after price negotiations were concluded, the contractor purchased fully processed castings from the suppliers at essentially the same prices as those quoted to it earlier.

We brought this matter to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and proposed that he consider having the contracting officer take appropriate action under the defective pricing clause included in

the subcontract.

The Navy, replying on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, stated that General Electric's estimates for castings had been questioned at great length during price negotiations and that the company apparently had in its possession quotations which bore directly on the reasonableness of these estimates but were not revealed. In view of this fact, the Navy agreed that the quotations from suppliers for processed castings were significant pricing data which should have been submitted to the Navy for consideration in price negotiations. The Navy stated that action would be taken for recovery of an appropriate amount.

The Department of Defense has initiated a study of our reports in order to improve its administration of the cost or pricing data requirements of Public Law 87–653 and has developed a program for scheduling postaward audits by the Defense Contract Audit

Agency.

We plan to work closely with the Department in determining what action should be taken to properly implement the law and to prevent recurrence of this and other cases disclosed by postaward reviews.

[Index No. 26—B-114824, Sept. 21, 1967]

SAVINGS AVAILABLE IF THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION RECOVERS INTEREST COSTS ON REPAID PRICE-SUPPORT LOANS AND ON STORAGE FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT LOANS, COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

In a report submitted to the Congress in September 1967, we expressed the belief that the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) should revise its policies regarding the rates of interest to be charged producers on repayments of price-support loans and on storage facility and equipment loans to provide for recovery of CCC's cost

of financing the loans.

The price-support loan is one of the methods used by the CCC to support the prices of agricultural commodities produced in the United States. Price-support loans are nonrecourse. Under this type of loan, producers are not obligated to make good any decline in the market price of the commodities put up as collateral. If market prices rise above the price-support loan level plus interest, producers generally repay their loans, with interest, and market their commodities.

If market prices fail to rise above the loan level, producers generally deliver the commodity to CCC and discharge their obligation. No

interest is charged on the loans that are not repaid.

Under the farm storage facility loan program, CCC makes loans to eligible producers to finance the purchase of drying equipment for the conditioning of farm-stored commodities, and to finance the purchase or construction of farm storage facilities. The loans are made in amounts of up to 85 percent of the net cost of the facilities, and are repayable in not more than four equal annual installments over a period of 5 years or less.

At December 31, 1966, the total amount outstanding on storage facility and equipment loans was about \$32.5 million. As of March 31, 1967, price-support loans totaling \$1.3 billion had been made on 1966

crops.

On the basis of our review of these loan programs, we estimated that the Corporation could incur interest costs on repaid price-support loans for the 1966 crops amounting to about \$7.6 million more than it will collect from producers. We also estimated that CCC could incur interest costs on storage facility and equipment loans during 1966 amounting to about \$154,000 more than it will recover from the producers. Such losses will result from the Corporation's policy of charging producers interest on loans at a rate less than that which the Corporation paid to obtain the loan funds from the U. S. Treasury and from private lending institutions.

When the Corporation charges producers interest at a rate substantially less than its cost of financing the loans, the Corporation is, in effect, granting the producers a subsidy in addition to price

support.

In commenting on our findings, the President, CCC, advised us that the Department of Agriculture had studied the matter and concluded that the Corporation's present policy was the best, considering the objectives of the price-support program and the farm storage facility loan program. He stated, however, that the Department would again study the matter of interest rates before the new crops were harvested.

We recommended that the CCC Board of Directors revise the Corporation's policy on interest rates to require producers to pay interest on future price-support loans which are repaid and on future storage facility and equipment loans at a rate not less than that

which the Corporation must pay to finance the loans.

[Index No. 27—B-161992, Sept. 22, 1967]

OPPORTUNITIES FOR SAVINGS THROUGH USE OF SPARE GOVERNMENT-OWNED COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS IN EUROPE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

We examined into the use made of 228 communications circuits leased from commercial carriers in and between Germany and the United Kingdom. In our opinion, the traffic carried by 64 of these leased circuits could have been routed over spare, and available, U.S. Government-owned circuits at substantial savings.

We found that the failure of the Department to so route this traffic had resulted from its policy of ascertaining the availability of Government-owned circuits only before a commercial circuit was to be leased. No reviews were made thereafter to periodically assess the availability of Government-owned circuits. The potential for these savings may have been revealed had periodic reviews been made.

In commenting on our findings, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Services) agreed that the Department's controls over the use of communications circuits in Europe had not been adequate and that leasing costs might have been reduced if the identified

circuits had been canceled and the traffic otherwise routed.

We have been advised that a program has been initiated for annual reviews of communications systems in Europe. Such reviews are to be performed in all overseas areas where leased and Government-owned

We believe that the corrective actions planned by the Department of Defense will, if properly implemented, improve its management of communications in Europe. We plan, as part of our continuing review of Department of Defense activities, to follow the actions taken.

Ten of the 64 circuits were canceled following discussion of our finding with Department officials. The Department did not consider it prudent to cancel the remaining 54 circuits until the circuit requirements of its planned worldwide Automatic Voice Network became

known

Since the first Automatic Voice Network switching centers are scheduled for activation no earlier than November 1968, significant savings can be realized by canceling, where possible, those leased circuits whose traffic can now be accommodated on the Governmentowned circuits. We recommended that the Department of Defense study the remaining 54 circuits to determine which circuits can be canceled rather than reserved for future possible use in the Automatic Voice Network.

[Index No. 28—B-133118, Sept. 29, 1967]

REVIEW OF INVENTORY ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS FOR AERONAUTICAL EQUIPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The General Accounting Office has reviewed the Navy's inventory accounting systems for approximately \$2.2 billion worth of aeronautical spare parts and equipment. We found that the systems did not provide management with the information necessary for efficient and economical operations and management of its resources. The Navy is implementing an immediate and comprehensive plan for effecting necessary improvements in the inventory accounting systems. Generally, the causes of the conditions which we found were-

The failure of operating personnel to follow written instructions

The lack of necessary internal controls in the systems.

The lack of effective identification and reporting to top manage-

ment of those matters requiring attention.

The Navy concurred, in general, with the results of our review and acknowledged the need for improvement in the accuracy of inventory data. The Navy stated that the General Accounting Office would be kept fully informed of its progress in making improvements.

We believe that the Navy's plans, if properly carried out, should benefit the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of inventory data and, consequently, its usefulness to management.

[Index No. 29—B-162106, Sept. 29, 1967]

NEED FOR PROCEDURES TO PRECLUDE MORE THAN JUST COMPEN-SATION IN ACQUIRING OIL INTERESTS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS (CIVIL FUNCTIONS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

In September 1967, we reported to the Congress that the Corps of Engineers (Civil Functions), Department of the Army, in acquiring land for two reservoir projects near Carlyle, Ill., and Tulsa, Okla., made payments of about \$28 million to the land and mineral owners. About \$7.2 million of that amount represented the estimated cost

to the Government for acquiring the mineral interests.

Agreements entered into by the Corps provided for payment to the owners for the full amount of the estimated oil reserves. Subsequent to appraisal of the estimated oil reserves, the owners were permitted under the agreements to extract oil having a fair market in-ground value of about \$1.6 million, without an appropriate adjustment in the cost to the Government for acquiring the mineral

We suggested to the Secretary of the Army that the Corps' policies and procedures be revised to prevent the owners of mineral interests from receiving more than just compensation. We were advised that the Corps would prepare and modify instructions which would be designed to preclude owners from receiving windfall benefits.

[Index No. 30—B-161340, Oct. 12, 1967]

Opportunity for Savings by Adopting Manufacturers' Recom-MENDED PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS FOR INTERAGENCY Motor Pool Vehicles—General Services Administration

Our review showed that savings could be obtained by adopting specific programs of preventive maintenance developed by automobile manufacturers for their vehicles as a means of achieving the best performance, long life, and trouble-free operations in place of the uniform General Services Administration requirements which provide generally for more frequent preventive maintenance.

Our review covered the costs of certain usual preventive maintenance jobs at three interagency motor pools in one of the 10 General Services Administration regions. We estimate that the General Services Administration could have saved about \$26,600 during the year ended June 30, 1966, in the cost of preventive maintenance in this region by adopting the manufacturers' programs for 1963 through 1965 models of vehicles.

We estimate that, if these potential savings were typical of the savings that may have been available in the agency's other nine regions, about \$250,000 could have been saved by the Government during the year ended June 30, 1966.

An opportunity for savings by adopting the manufacturers' recommended preventive maintenance programs may be available to other

agencies of the Government.

We brought our findings to the attention of the General Services Administration and proposed that it adopt the manufacturers' recommended programs. In a letter dated August 30, 1966, the Deputy Administrator advised us that his agency had been working with manufacturers to revise the current guide for preventive maintenance.

A revised guide was issued in April 1967. However, because it retains uniform service intervals for some preventive maintenance items, it must provide for overmaintenance of some vehicle makes and models in order to provide adequate maintenance for all vehicle makes and models. Also, there has been—and we believe that there will continue to be—a considerable lag in time before General Services Administration adopts the manufacturers' program revisions made possible by technological improvements.

Further, the revised guide is applicable only to 1966 and later models of vehicles. We estimate that, if the manufacturers' recommended programs for 1963 through 1965 vehicle models are adopted promptly, savings of about \$350,000 can still be realized on these

vehicles while they remain in inventory.

We therefore recommended that the Administrator of General Services implement our proposals as specified in detail in our report.

APPENDIX 5

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,

Washington, D.C., August 30, 1967.

CIRCULAR NO. A-II, REVISED-TRANSMITTAL MEMORANDUM NO. I

To: The heads of executive departments and establishments.
Subject: Policies for acquiring commercial or industrial products and services for Government use.

Transmitted herewith is a revision of Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76 dated March 3, 1966. It is issued to clarify some provisions of the earlier circular and to lessen the burden of work by the agencies in implementing its provisions. A brief summary of the changes is attached.

There is no change in the Government's general policy of relying upon the private enterprise system to supply its needs, except where it is in the national interest for the Government to provide directly

the products and services its uses.

We intend to keep the provisions of the circular under continuing review. We anticipate that further changes will be desirable in light of experience gained from implementing the circular's provisions, including the required reviews of existing Government commercial or industrial activities to be completed by June 30, 1968. We intend to give special attention to the adequacy of the guidelines contained in the circular for such matters as comparative cost analyses; the circumstances under which cost differentials in favor of private enterprise are appropriate; and the use of contracts involving support services that require minimal capital investment.

We welcome your suggestions.

PHILLIP S. Hughes, Acting Director.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., August 30, 1967.

CIRCULAR NO. A-76-REVISED

To: The heads of executive departments and establishments.

Subject: Policies for acquiring commercial or industrial products and services for Government use.

1. Purpose

This circular replaces Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76 issued March 3, 1966. It is issued to clarify some provisions of the earlier circular and to lessen the burden of work by the agencies in implementing its provisions. The basic policies to be applied by executive

agencies in determining whether commercial and industrial products and services used by the Government are to be provided by private suppliers or by the Government itself are the same as those contained in Circular A–76 dated March 3, 1966.

2. Policy

The guidelines in this circular are in furtherance of the Government's general policy of relying on the private enterprise system to supply its needs.

In some instances, however, it is in the national interest for the Government to provide directly the products and services it uses. These circumstances are set forth in paragraph 5 of this circular. No executive agency will initiate a "new start" or continue the op-

No executive agency will initiate a "new start" or continue the operation of an existing "Government commercial or industrial activity" except as specifically required by law or as provided in this circular.

3. Definitions

For purposes of this circular:

a. A "new start" is a newly established Government commercial or industrial activity involving additional capital investment of \$25,000 or more or additional annual costs of production of \$50,000 or more. A reactivation, expansion, modernization, or replacement of an activity involving additional capital investment of \$50,000 or more or additional annual costs of production of \$100,000 or more are, for purposes of this circular, also regarded as "new starts." Consolidation of two or more activities without increasing the overall total amount of products or services provided is not a "new start."

b. A "Government commercial or industrial activity" is one which is operated and managed by an executive agency and which provides for the Government's own use a product or service that is obtainable from a private source. The term does not include a Government-

owned contractor-operated activity.

c. A "private commercial source" is a private business concern which provides a commercial or industrial product or service required by agencies and which is located in the United States, its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

4. Scope

This circular is applicable to commercial and industrial products

and services used by executive agencies, except that it:

(a) Will not be used as authority to enter into contracts if such authority does not otherwise exist nor will it be used to justify departure from any law or regulation, including regulations of the Civil Service Commission or other appropriate authority, nor will it be used for the purpose of avoiding established salary or personnel limitations.

(b) Does not alter the existing requirement that executive agencies will perform for themselves those basic functions of management which they must perform in order to retain essential control over the conduct of their programs. These functions include selection and direction of Government employees, assignment of organizational responsibilities, planning of programs, establishment of performance goals and priorities, and evaluation of performance.

(c) Does not apply to managerial advisory services such as those normally provided by an office of general counsel, a management and

organization staff, or a systems analysis unit. Advisory assistance in areas such as these may be provided either by Government staff organizations or from private sources as deemed appropriate by

executive agencies.

(d) Does not apply to products or services which are provided to the public. (But an executive agency which provides a product or service to the public should apply the provisions of this circular with respect to any commercial or industrial products or services which it uses.)

(e) Does not apply to products or services obtained from other Federal agencies which are authorized or required by law to furnish

them

- (f) Should not be applied when its application would be inconsistent with the terms of any treaty or international agreement.
- 5. Circumstances under which the Government may provide a commercial or industrial product or service for its own use

A Government commercial or industrial activity may be authorized

only under one or more of the following conditions:

(a) Procurement of a product or service from a commercial source would disrupt or materially delay an agency's program. The fact that a commercial or industrial activity is classified or is related to an agency's basic program is not an adequate reason for starting or continuing a Government activity, but a Government agency may provide a product or service for its own use if a review conducted and documented as provided in paragraph 7 establishes that reliance upon a commercial source will disrupt or materially delay the successful accomplishment of its program.

(b) It is necessary for the Government to conduct a commercial or industrial activity for purposes of combat support or for individual and unit retraining of military personnel or to maintain or strengthen

mobilization readiness.

(c) A satisfactory commercial source is not available and cannot be developed in time to provide a product or service when it is needed. Agencies' efforts to find satisfactory commercial sources should be supplemented as appropriate by obtaining assistance from the General Services and Small Business Administrations or the Business and Defense Services Administration. Urgency of a requirement is not an adequate reason for starting or continuing a Government commercial or industrial activity unless there is evidence that commercial sources are not able and the Government is able to provide a product or service when needed.

(d) The product or service is available from another Federal agency. Excess property available from other Federal agencies should be used in preference to new procurement as provided by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and related regulations.

Property which has not been reported excess also may be provided by other Federal agencies and unused plant and production capacity of other agencies may be utilized. In such instances, the agency supplying a product or service to another agency is responsible for compliance with this circular. The fact that a product or service is being provided to another agency does not by itself justify a Government commercial or industrial activity.

(e) Procurement of the product or service from a commercial source will result in higher cost to the Government. A Government

commercial activity may be authorized if a comparative cost analysis prepared as provided in this circular indicates that the Government can provide or is providing a product or service at a cost lower than if the product or service were obtained from commercial sources.

However, disadvantages of starting or continuing Government activities must be carefully weighed. Government ownership and operation of facilities usually involve removal or withholding of property from tax rolls, reduction of revenues from income and other taxes, and diversion of management attention from the Government's primary program objectives. Losses also may occur due to such factors as obsolescence of plant and equipment and unanticipated reductions in the Government's requirements for a product or service. Government commercial activities should not be started or continued for reasons involving comparative costs unless savings are sufficient to justify the assumption of these and similar risks and uncertainties.

6. Cost comparisons

A decision to rely upon a Government activity for reasons involving relative costs must be supported by a comparative cost analysis which will disclose as accurately as possible the difference between the cost which the Government is incurring or will incur under each alternative.

Commercial sources should be relied upon without incurring the delay and expense of conducting cost comparison studies for products or services estimated to cost the Government less than \$50,000 per year. However, if there is reason to believe that inadequate competition or other factors are causing commercial prices to be unreasonable, a cost comparison study will be directed by the agency head or by his designee even if it is estimated that the Government will spend less than \$50,000 per year for the product or service. A Government activity should not be authorized on the basis of such a comparison study, however, unless reasonable efforts to obtain satisfactory prices from existing commercial sources or to develop other commercial sources are unsuccessful.

Cost comparison studies also should be made before deciding to rely upon a commercial source when terms of contracts will cause the Government to finance directly or indirectly more than \$50,000 for cost of facilities and equipment to be constructed to Government specifications. Cost comparison studies should also be made in other cases if there is reason to believe that savings can be realized by the Government providing for its own needs. Such studies wil not be made, however, if in-house provision of the product or service, or commercia procurement thereof, is clearly justified in accordance with other provisions of this circular.

The determination as to whether to purchase or to lease equipment or to construct buildings or acquire their use under lease-construction arrangements involves a determination of the difference in costs under the alternatives, and the principles set forth in this circular should be applied to the extent relevant in making such determinations.

(a.) Costs of obtaining products or services from commercial sources should include amounts paid directly to suppliers, transportation charges, and expenses of preparing bid invitations, evaluating bids, and negotiating, awarding, and managing contracts. Costs of materials furnished by the Government to contractors, appropriate charges for Government-owned equipment and facilities used by contractors and

costs due to incentive or premium provisions in contracts also should be included. If discontinuance of a Government commercial or industrial activity will cause a facility being retained by the Government for mobilization or other reasons to be placed in a standby status, the costs of preparing and maintaining the facility as standby also should be included. Similarly, if such a discontinuance is expected to result in premature retirement of Government employees which will cause a significant increase in retirement costs to the Government, such increased cost should be added to the cost of procurement from commercial sources. Costs of obtaining products or services from commercial sources should be documented and organized for comparison with costs of obtaining the product or service from a Government activity.

(b.) For purposes of economy and simplicity in making cost comparison studies, generally agreed costs that would tend to be the same under either alternative need not be measured and included (for example, bid and award costs and operating costs under lease-purchase

alternatives).

(c) Costs of obtaining products or services from Government activities should include all costs which would be incurred if a product or service were provided by the Government and which would not be incurred if the product or service were obtained from a commercial source. The objectives should be to compute, as realistically as possible, the incremental or additional cost that would be incurred by the Government under the alternatives under consideration. In making such determinations it is important that recognition be given to the full amount of additional or incremental direct and indirect cost to be incurred in providing the products or services required. Under this general principle, the following costs should be included, considering the circumstances of each case:

(1) Personal services and benefits.—Include costs of all elements of compensation and allowances for both military and civilian personnel, including the full cost to the Government of retirement systems, calculated on a normal cost basis, social security taxes where applicable, employees' insurance, health, and medical plans (including services available from Government military or civilian medical facilities), living allowances, uniforms, leave, termination and separation allowances, travel and moving expenses, and claims paid through the Bureau of Employees' Compensation.

(2) Materials, supplies, and utilities services.—Include costs of supplies and materials used in providing a product or service and costs of transportation, storage, handling, custody, and protection of property, and costs of electric power, gas, water, and communications

services.

(3) Maintenance and repair.—Include costs of maintaining and repairing structures and equipment which are used in providing a product or service.

(4) Damage or loss of property.—Include costs of uninsured losses due to fire or other hazard, costs of insurance premiums, and costs of

settling loss and damage claims.

(5) Federal taxes.—Include income and other Federal tax revenues (except social security taxes) received from corporations or other business entities (but not from individual stockholders) if a product or service is obtained through commercial channels. Estimates of corporate incomes for these purposes should be based upon the earnings

experience of the industry, if available, but if such data are not available, "The Quarterly Financial Report of Manufacturing Corporations," published by the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, may be consulted. Assistance of the appropriate Government regulatory agencies may be obtained in

estimating taxes for regulated industries.

(6) Depreciation.—Compute depreciation as a cost for any new or additional facilities or equipment which will be required if a Government activity is started or continued. Depreciation will not be allocated for facilities and equipment acquired by the Government before the cost comparison study is started. However, if reliance upon a commercial source will cause Government-owned equipment or facilities to become available for other Federal use or for disposal as surplus, the cost comparison analysis should include as a cost of the Government activity, an appropriate amount based upon the estimated current market value of such equipment or facilities. The Internal Revenue Service publication, "Depreciation Guidelines and Rules," may be used in computing depreciation. However, rates contained in this publication are maximums to be used only for reference purposes and only when more specific depreciation data are not available. Accelerated depreciation rates permitted in some instances by the Internal Revenue Service will not be used. In computing the depreciation cost of new or additional facilities or equipment to be acquired if a Government activity is started or continued and in determining comparative costs under lease-purchase alternatives, appropriate recognition should be given to estimated residual or salvage values of the facilities or equipment.

(7) Interest.—Compute interest for any new or additional capital to be invested based upon the average rate of yield for long-term Treasury bonds as shown in the current monthly Treasury Bulletin. The method of computation should provide for reduction in the capital investment to which interest is applied over the useful life of the asset

on a straight line basis.

(8) Indirect costs.—Include any additional indirect costs incurred resulting from a Government activity for such activities as management and supervision, budgeting, accounting, personnel, legal, and other applicable services.

7. Administering the policy

(a) Inventory.—Each agency will compile and maintain an inventory of its commercial or industrial activities having an annual output of products or services costing \$50,000 or more or a capital investment of \$25,000 or more. In addition to such general descriptive information as may be appropriate, the inventory should include for each activity the amount of the Government's capital investment, the amount paid annually for the products or services involved, and the basis upon which the activity is being continued under the provisions of this circular. The general descriptive information needed for identifying each activity should have been included in the inventory by June 30, 1966. Other information needed to complete the inventory should be added as reviews required in paragraphs 7 (b) and (c) are completed.

(b) "New starts."—

(1) A "new start" should not be initiated until possibilities of obtaining the product or service from commercial sources have been

explored and not until it is approved by the agency head or by an Assistant Secretary or official of equivalent rank, on the basis of factual justification for establishing the activity under the provisions of this

circular.

(2) If statutory authority and funds for construction are required before a "new start" can be initiated, the actions to be taken under this circular should be completed before the agency's budget request is submitted to the Bureau of the Budget. Instructions concerning data to be submitted in support of such budget requests will be included in annual revisions of Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-11.

(3) A "new start" should not be proposed for reasons involving comparative costs unless savings are sufficient to outweight uncertainties and risks of unanticipated losses involved in Government

activities.

The amount of savings required as justification for a "new start" will vary depending on individual circumstances. Substantial savings should be required as justification if a large new or additional capital investment is involved or if there are possibilities of early obsolescence or uncertainties regarding maintenance and production costs, prices and future Government requirements. Justification may be based on smaller anticipated savings if little or no capital investment is involved, if chances for obsolescence are minimal, and if reliable information is available concerning production costs, commercial prices and Government requirements. While no precise standard is prescribed in view of these varying circumstances a "new start" ordinarily should not be approved unless costs of a Government activity will be at least 10 percent less than costs of obtaining the product or service from commercial sources. It is emphasized that 10 percent is not intended to be a fixed figure.

A decision to reject a proposed "new start" for comparative cost reasons should be reconsidered if actual bids or proposals indicate that commercial prices will be higher than were estimated in the cost

comparison study.

(4) When a "new start" begins to operate it should be included in an agency's inventory of commercial and industrial activities.

c. Existing Government activities.—

(1) A systematic review of existing commercial or industrial activities (including previously approved "new starts" which have been in operation for at least 18 months) should be maintained in each agency under the direction of the agency head or the person designated by him as provided in paragraph 8. The agency head or his designee may exempt designated activities if he decides that such reviews are not warranted in specific instances, Activities not so exempted should be reviewed at least once before June 30, 1968. More frequent reviews of selected activities should be scheduled as deemed advisable. Activities remaining in the inventory after June 30, 1968, should be scheduled for at least one additional followup review during each 3-year period but this requirement may be waived by the agency head or his designee if he concludes that such further review is not warranted.

(2) Reviews should be organized in such a manner as to ascertain whether continued operation of Government commercial activities is in accordance with the provisions of this circular. Reviews should include information concerning availability from commercial sources

of products or services involved and feasibility of using commercial

sources in lieu of existing Government activities.

(3) An activity should be continued for reasons of comparative costs only if a comparative cost analysis indicates that savings resulting from continuation of the activity are at least sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of Government commercial and industrial activities. No specific standard or guideline is prescribed for deciding whether savings are sufficient to justify continuation of an existing Government commercial activity and each activity should be evaluated on the basis of the applicable circumstances.

(4) A report of each review should be prepared. A decision to continue an activity should be approved by an assistant secretary or official of equivalent rank and the basis for the decision should appear in the inventory record for the activity. Activities not so approved should be discontinued. Reasonable adjustments in the timing of such actions may be made, however, in order to alleviate economic dis-

locations and personal hardships to affected career personnel.

8. Implementation

Each agency is responsible for making the provisions of this circular effective by issuing appropriate implementing instructions and by providing adequate management support and procedures for review and followup to assure that the instructions are placed in effect. A copy of the implementing instructions issued by each agency will be furnished to the Bureau of the Budget.

If overall responsibility for these actions is delegated by the agency head, it should be assigned to a senior official reporting directly to the

agency head.

If legislation is needed in order to carry out the purposes of this circular, agencies should prepare necessary legislative proposals for review in accordance with Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-19.

9. Effective date

This circular is effective on October 2, 1967.

PHILLIP S. Hughes, Acting Director.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN BUREAU OF THE BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. A-76 AS REVISED AUGUST 1967

PARAGRAPH 3—DEFINITIONS

3.a. The definition for a "new start" has been split as between (a) a newly established Government commercial or industrial activity and (b) a reactivation, expansion, modernization, or replacement of an activity. These separate definitions have been provided so that different dollar limitations on capital investment and annual cost of production may be applied. There is no change in the dollar limitations applicable to newly established Government commercial or industrial activities. But the dollar limitations have been doubled for the category of "new starts" that are a reactivation, expansion, modernization, or replacement of an activity. The change is necessary in order to avoid applying the "new start" procedures to routine adjustments for handling existing workload. For example, the replacement of a single machine tool at a shipyard may easily add capital

cost of more than \$25,000, or the addition of only 10 employees at relatively low grades would add more than \$50,000 per year to production cost. This type of change occurs several times a year at a large facility and, under the terms of the earlier Circular A-76, each such change would have to be treated as a "new start" with a detailed

cost study and a special approval.

3.b. The definition of a Government commercial or industrial activity has been clarified. The earlier circular, by definition, excluded a Government-owned, contractor-operated activity but the wording was not entirely clear. The change made clarifies the fact that a Government-owned, contractor-operated activity is not to be regarded as a Government commercial or industrial activity for purposes of the circular.

PARAGRAPH 4—Scope

4.c. The words "professional staff" that were contained in the earlier circular have been eliminated. Paragraph 4.c. is intended to exempt various kinds of staff advisory services which are so intimately related to the processes of top management and control of Government programs that the general provisions of A-76 favoring reliance upon commercial sources should not be applicable. The term "professional staff" was so broad that it could be interpreted to apply to a large variety of services which are commercially available and which are not necessarily related intimately to top management and control of Government programs. The change will clarify the meaning of this subparagraph.

Paragraph 6—Cost Comparisons

A change is made in the third unnumbered paragraph to make clear that if there is reason to believe savings can be realized by the Government providing for its own needs, cost comparison studies should be made before deciding to rely upon a commercial source. However, the changed wording also makes it clear that cost studies will not be required if in-house provision of the product or service, or commercial procurement thereof, is clearly justified in accordance with other provisions of the circular.

A new numbered paragraph has been added to provide guidelines for applying provisions of the circular to purchase versus lease of equipment, and to construction of buildings versus acquisition under lease-construction arrangements. The paragraph requires a determination of the difference in costs under the alternatives, and application of the principles set forth in the circular in making judgments in

these areas.

6.a. A sentence has been added providing that if discontinuance of a Government commercial or industrial activity will result in premature retirement of Government employees, and will cause a significant increase in retirement costs to the Government, such increased costs should be added to the cost of procurement from commercial sources.

6.b. This is a new subparagraph. It provides that costs which would tend to be the same for both Government and industry need not be measured and included in comparative cost analyses (for example, bid and award costs and operating costs under lease-purchase

alternatives). The change is made in the interest of economy and

simplicity in making cost comparisons.

6.c. (Paragraph 6.b. in the earlier circular). A sentence has been added to clarify the fact that the incremental method of costing is to be employed and to emphasize the importance of a realistic recognition of all such additional or incremental costs.

6.c.(1). (Paragraph 6.b.(1) in the earlier circular). Some additional wording has been added to clarify, in connection with personal services and benefits, that the full cost to the Government of retirement

systems should be included.

6.c.(6). (Paragraph 6.b.(6) in the earlier circular). A sentence has been added to make clear that appropriate recognition should be given to estimated residual or salvage value of facilities or equipment

in computing depreciation.

6.c.(7). (Paragraph 6.b.(7) in the earlier circular.) This paragraph has been rewritten to provide that the computation of interest for any new or additional capital to be invested will be based upon the average rate of yield for long-term Treasury bonds as shown in the current monthly Treasury Bulletin. Also, the method of computation suggested would provide for reduction in the capital investment to which interest is applied as the asset is depreciated. The purpose of the change is to clarify the rate and source of interest to be charged and to provide guidance as to the principal to which it is to be applied. The suggested rate is a readily available measure of the current cost of money to the Government and the provision for reducing the balance to which interest is applied is considered reasonable because the interest cost should not go on indefinitely.

6.c.(8). (Paragraph 6.b.(8) in the earlier circular.) A change in wording has been made to clarify that Government costs should include any additional indirect costs incurred for such activities as management and supervision, budgeting, accounting, personnel, legal, and

other applicable services.

PARAGRAPH 7—ADMINISTERING THE POLICY

7.b.(3). In the past there has been some misunderstanding about the cost differential in favor of private enterprise due to uncertainties relating to Government production costs, equipment obsolescence, and other factors, including the amount of capital investment involved. A sentence has been added to clarify the fact that the 10-percent cost differential in favor of private enterprise, mentioned in this subparagraph, is not intended to be a fixed figure. The differential may be more or less than 10 percent, depending upon the circumstances in each individual case.

PARAGRAPH 8-IMPLEMENTATION

A sentence has been added requiring agencies to furnish the Bureau of the Budget with a copy of their implementing instructions.

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