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comparable size elsewhere in the country have been able to duplicate. X utilizes seven wire services; other newspapers of similar size have from one to three. X publishes seven separate editions each day; Z publishes five; no comparable evening newspaper in the country publishes seven. X's normal subscription rate is \$2 a month; Z's has been forced down to \$2.25; those of newspapers in comparable cities range from \$2.20 to \$3. X recently purchased the only other evening newspaper in the city. Its advertising rates appear to remain substantially lower than those of any similar newspaper in the country.

In addition to having adverse effects upon competitors, foundation involvement in business may occasion other, equally objectionable results. Opportunities for abuses of the kind with which parts II A and B of this report deal specifically are frequently greatest where a foundation conducts or controls a business. Temptation for subtle and varied forms of self-dealing proliferate in such a situation. Remote relatives may be employed in the business; friends may be assisted; business acquaintances may be accommodated. However broadly drawn the restrictions upon self-dealing may be, many of the conflicts of interest arising in this area are likely to be sufficiently obscure or sufficiently beyond the realm of reasonable definition to escape the practical impact of the limitations. Making certain that none of the 800 employees of the F foundation's manufacturing business receive special benefits because of a relationship to one of the foundation's donors, or that none of the D foundation's \$32 million oil refining business involves the transfer or use of money or property to or by parties related to the creator of the foundation, would entail enormous administrative burdens in itself, even if the danger of less definable abuses were not present.

Again, the problem of deferral of charitable benefits has been particularly pronounced in the foundation business setting. We have already noted the competitive advantage which foundation-controlled businesses commonly derive from the willingness of their owners to forego distributions of current profits. That same unconcern with the present realization of business earnings, manifested by many foundations, often delays the progress of funds to charity even when accumulation has no reasonable relation to business needs. The restrictions of existing law upon accumulations of income by businesses become operative only where a corporation is "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders"; where the shareholders of the business are themselves tax exempt, the limitations may not apply. Similarly, the statute which prohibits unreasonable accumulations of income by foundations applies only to accumulations within the foundation itself; it does not prevent retention of earnings in a separate, though controlled, entity.²¹ As a consequence, many foundations have permitted large amounts of income to accumulate in their business subsidiaries.

Example 15.—In 1962 the Y foundation had amassed almost \$9,700,000 of undistributed earnings in one of its business subsidiaries, and more than \$5,800,000 in another.

Example 16.—By the end of 1963 the O foundation had accumulated profits of \$3,808,957 in its department store subsidiary. When these funds will find their way to charity is, at best, a matter of conjecture. The moderate pressure provided by the payout re-

²¹ Even if the accumulation restrictions of existing law were extended to these situations, their enforcement could require an arduous, case-by-case examination of each separate set of facts.