

I think it claimed everything in the beginning because it was negotiating it against State people who would not yield anything. About the best way to negotiate with somebody is to start out claiming it all for you, and then if you negotiate to some settlement midway between that point, he is likely to be happy and satisfied. He will be completely dissatisfied if you don't yield at all, so if you start out claiming the whole thing, and then you wind up letting him have 37½ percent, he feels as though he has at least made some headway, and he has saved face to some extent. Whereas, if you conceded he has the 37½ percent to begin with, and that is all he wound up getting, he would not be happy at all. I suspect that that was the basis upon which the Federal Government, at least as far as its policy for the record was concerned, under the Truman administration, was claiming all of this for the Federal Government.

I think Oscar Chapman will tell you—he has certainly told me many times—that he felt the States should have had 37½ percent, and I believe that if Tom Clark, former Supreme Court Justice, would testify to it, he would say that he felt that the same equity which allowed the inland States a share pertains also to the coastal States.

Now we submit that with regard to the other 62½ percent, or whatever that share may be, that there is a more productive use that can be made of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead—well, Senator Anderson has a question.

Senator ANDERSON. I merely want to say that you didn't claim 37½ percent all the way out at that time. Oscar Chapman never supported 37½ percent all the way. He wanted to raise a little higher figure inside, and a lower figure outside, and the result must have been about the same.

Senator LONG. Well, now, Senator Anderson, for your benefit as well as for mine, I would like for you to make it a part of the record what kind of compromise Oscar Chapman really was willing to recommend and what sort of compromise he thought would have been fair for both the State and the Federal Government. May I say that I think the State was very foolish to turn down that proposed settlement, and I think in justice to all it ought to be a part of the record because I sometimes find myself politically trying to explain to people that the Truman administration really wanted to do a lot better by us than Harry Truman did, and if our people had let them, they would have, and that frankly, there is some politics involved.

There was an election coming up within a year, and if I do say it. I was one of those from Louisiana who took the attitude that Harry Truman didn't dare go before the people in an election with that issue pending in Louisiana, Texas, and California.

Well, he did, and he carried Texas, and I believe he carried California, too, notwithstanding that. He didn't carry Louisiana, but that wasn't my fault, may I say.

But that matter was very poorly handled from the State's point of view. It is not on the record here, and you won't find it in the hearings of this committee, but it ought to be there, because that is a great portion of the history of it, and how it came to pass. Men of good will should have worked this thing out in the very beginning.

And may I say, Senator Anderson, I was not a part of those suggestions that occurred at that time. Our friend, Price Daniel was, and