

Mr. CRAMER. I understand that. But how are you going to run your shop without qualified, experienced people?

Mr. PRISK. I think the answer is obvious.

Mr. CRAMER. You are going to have a lot of trouble, are you not? This is one aspect of these hearings I was hoping we would get into, the question of what this reorganization has done as it relates to dismantling the Bureau of Public Roads. I think this is one of the clearest examples.

That is all I have.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. McCarthy of New York.

Mr. McCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Carrying on the theme in a slightly different tack than that presented by the distinguished gentleman from Florida, I would like to go back to Mr. Prisk's observation that these conditions were permitted to develop because of "lack of appreciation for or identification of the problem."

For the record, I would most like to make a couple of observations from my own experience in industry. The company I worked for for 13 years before coming here found itself in a similar situation. We had 58 plants all over the United States, and found our accident rates increasing, death rates, in our mines. And conditions were allowed to develop the same way, lack of appreciation for and identification of the problem. It was not any deliberate action on the part of management, priorities were in a different direction. But they inaugurated a safety program with safety director at the corporate level and safety supervisor at every plant, who fine-tooth-combed the whole plant to find hazards and install guardrails, bridges over machinery, and so forth. I think the analogy is very close.

When new plants were built, new mines developed, the safety director was part of the planning process, so safety was built into the new facility. Then they inaugurated a campaign to educate the workers. There were signs in every plant on safety all the time. Every employee had to wear safety glasses. They were, of course, competing for the Department of Interior's Mine and Safety Award, which was an annual event. We won those several years in a row. It was made a management responsibility; supervisor of safety overlooked these conditions in the plants and the mines, but the manager was responsible for any deaths, or accidents. And the result of this over a several year period, when they showed on a graph, it was just like this: precipitous decline in accidents throughout the whole organization, 58 plants, all over the United States.

It was simply a change from lack of appreciation, as you put it, and identification of the problem, to safety consciousness. And pinpointing the responsibility, building safety into the facility. And my distinguished friend from Florida, I think, misses a point here, that safety is not an extra frill.

I think safety is something that should be in every dollar that is invested in these roadways, so that when you are building these roads, you are building safety into the road, not something which you take on as a 10-percent extra.

So I just would like the record to show this experience of which I had firsthand knowledge. I think the analogy is apt—and I don't think there is any room here for recrimination. If there are going to be