viously reassuring to the viewpoint here expounded—that the trend toward a monitored economy should be moderated and should also be influenced in favor of the personalistic values still generally prized. Sources of uneasiness, however, remain.

On the positive side, the guideline discussion of 1967 affirms the 1962 objective of education, rather than prescription; reflects a sensitivity to charges, made especially in business circles, of high-handedness and *hubris*; and avoids setting out a new numerical productivity beacon to replace the light that failed. The role of a Greek chorus, rather than economic scene-stealer, is reassumed, at least temporarily. A tactic of didactic is adopted—with homely homily, pedestrian pedantry, and even two quotations from the Eisenhower *Reports*.

The major remaining sources of concern can always be reduced to the single one of uncertainty as to which values will be subordinated, denigrated, or jeopardized when the mandate of the Employment Act is vigorously interpreted. The tortured sentence comprising Section 2 of the Act gives a sufficient hint that national objectives may conflict and that the assignment of priorities may properly differ or change. The rules of the economic game no longer seem fixed to the private players once the precedent of strong, but selective, Executive intervention is established.

Equally or more pertinent for the reader of this JOURNAL are the ambiguity of the current position of the professional adviser, the Delphic qualities of the advice he can give in public to his principal, and the indefiniteness of his message to eager readers. The 1967 *Report*, like those for 1962–1966 and unlike those of the early Truman and Eisenhower eras, separately identifies the contribution of the Council from the President's own statement to the Congress. The guideline talk in the professional contribution is discursive, metes out praise and blame in a manner more appropriate to the President himself, is susceptible of excerpting in defense of "irresponsible" behavior, and courts charges of "political" involvement and disingenuousness. Prudence, after all, does temper an adviser's choice of what to talk about in public, how to say it in the presence of millions of listeners, and what to ignore. Could not professional assistance on behalf of informal price-wage stabilization be rendered best if the President's "consultative and advisory body"[16] serves as his "spooksman" rather than spokesman?

[16] This term was used by the first triumvirate in describing itself in the *First Annual Report by the Council of Economic Advisers* (*not* the first of the President's annual reports to the Congress), December, 1946, pp. 7–8.