

When the Defense Production Act was up for renewal in 1966, this committee's report on the bill stated as follows:

The committee wishes to express its concern over the apparent lack of emergency planning activity providing adequate electric power, communications, and transportation systems in emergency situations.

As illustrated in the Northeast power failure in November 1965, our complex economy system is extremely vulnerable to this kind of a breakdown. It is not enough simply to concentrate on providing for adequate stockpiles of materials, we must also have a capacity to produce finished products out of the material on hand and an adequate means of transporting each finished item to wherever they are required.

Now, I just want to ask you this one question.

What has OEP done to correct these situations over the last 2 years?

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Congressman, I have a list here of about two or three pages in reply to that question, if I might insert it in the record. It sets forth what we have done in connection with the Federal Power Commission and—

Mr. BARRETT. If you have outlined the answer to that question, we will ask the chairman—

Chairman PATMAN. Yes; without objection it will be inserted at this point.

(The material referred to follows:)

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

1. Has OEP taken any measures to prevent a recurrence of the Northeast blackout?

Statutory responsibility for electric power system reliability rests with the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Power Act. OEP interest in electric power reliability relates to emergency planning. A strong power network will improve our readiness posture and we have worked closely with the agencies responsible for power growth, reliability and planning matters. Note: Opinion of most experts is that it is impossible to achieve foolproof systems against recurrence of NE blackout. Hope is to reduce possibility and minimize effects.

In the areas where OEP can have a direct impact, we have achieved the following:

(1) Collaborated with FPC in developing an information-gathering system from the utilities for reports to the President through OEP in early stages of power failures. Reports cover cause of trouble, extent of disaster, restoration problems, etc. The procedure was formally announced by FPC Order No. 331 issued December 20, 1966, Docket No. R-302.

(2) Conducted survey with selected industrial facilities, food processors, petroleum and mining operations, to determine effects of N.E. failure on productivity and provide basis for any changes in our planning.

(3) OEP has been working with the Army Provost Marshall, Defense Electric Power Administration in Interior, and FPC, on questions of sabotage and the ability of the power industry to withstand such acts. Also, looking into this question with the Canadian planning officials as part of Joint U.S.-Canada planning for emergency exchange of power.

(4) OEP examining possibility of using new techniques and revised data base to improve ability to assess electric utility industry capability to meet demands of nuclear emergency. Use of network analysis will be emphasized.

(5) Participate in industry meetings conducted by DEPA, underscoring importance of increased reliability to emergency preparedness and urge industry action.

(6) Have revised internal procedures, and arrangements with other agencies, to improve OEP ability to respond to this type of incident by installing phones; automatic staff reporting system; and information receipt and dissemination.