

In the case of the Grand Canyon collision the closure rate was on the order of about 40 miles per hour. We think that if there is some kind of device that alerts the pilot that there is some other aircraft in his vicinity—that is, a potential collision, this would go a long way to preventing collisions.

We have recommended to the Administrators of FAA and NASA that they initiate a joint or cooperative project on the development of this warning device. We feel that by pooling the expertise, the manpower, and taking advantage of the research and development authorizations of the two agencies, that they should be able to come up with something in a relatively short period of time that is usable, and that we can carry in the airspace without, you might say, a prohibitive penalty as far as cost, weight, and so on, are concerned.

I would like to make a general comment with respect to the foregoing recommendations: There has been a considerable amount of pressure from some quarters for so-called positive control of all aircraft around major terminals and in the lower airspace along busy airways. This would require the pilot to have an instrument rating, the aircraft to have a transponder and IFR-type equipment.

Positive control is not a guarantee against collision. All the elements of positive control were present in the collision over Staten Island, N.Y., on December 16, 1960, between two airliners in which 134 people were killed.

The FAA currently has proposals outstanding for lowering positive control to 18,000 feet and instituting controlled VFR in such airspace. AOPA is on record as opposing the former and encouraging the latter, although we do not completely agree with the rules proposed by the FAA, particularly with respect to the requirement for a radar transponder in the aircraft.

We also understand, Mr. Chairman, that the FAA has a number of in-house proposals that they are studying at the present time for, you might say, measures to bring forth, as a result of the public furor created by the Asheville and Urbana collisions.

We have had access to some of these proposals. Informally, I might add. We have not yet seen any that would have prevented the Asheville collision, where both aircraft were on IFR flight plans and were under the control of the Asheville ATC facility. I might add that the Asheville tower has neither primary nor secondary radar. A transponder would have done no good there, though primary radar may have helped the controller spot the situation that was developing just prior to the collision.

The current in-house proposals which are being considered by the FAA, among other things, contemplate lowering of positive control down to some fairly low altitudes along the main airways in parts of the country.

These, in effect, would build a series of fences across the country, if you can visualize them as such, and they would impose extremely burdensome restrictions on general aviation aircraft, and I suspect also on some military aircraft, for the use of this airspace, or even to be able to get from one side of the fence to the other.

What is even worse is that proposals of this type would add a great burden of additional traffic and workload on the controllers at a time when testimony before committees of this Congress, by the FAA, has