

APPENDIX C—ADDITIONAL AIRPORTS EXPECTED TO HAVE AIRLINE JET SERVICE
BY 1972—Continued

Pierre, South Dakota	Stanton, Virginia
Presque Isle, Maine	Sterling/Rock Falls, Illinois
Rapid City, South Dakota	Tacoma, (Industrial), Washington
Redding, California	Tempe, Texas
Riverside, California	Texarkana, Arkansas
Riverton, Wyoming	Traverse City, Michigan
Roanoke, Virginia	Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Rocky Mount, North Carolina	Tucson, Arizona
Saginaw, Michigan	Twin Falls, Idaho
Santa Ana, California	Walla-Walla, Washington
Santa Fe, New Mexico	Watertown, New York
Santa Maria, California	Watertown, South Dakota
Santa Rosa, California	Waycross, Georgia
Saranac Lake, New York	Valdosta, Georgia
Sarasota, Florida	Vero Beach, Florida
Scotts Bluff, Nebraska	Visalia, California
Sheridan County, Wyoming	Yuma, Arizona

Mr. TIPTON. One point that was subject to some discussion that I think might be useful to discuss very briefly some more is collision avoidance.

I know the entire committee is deeply interested in it, as we are. In view of the fact that the airlines have taken the lead and carried the major burden for the development of the currently projected system, I think it might be useful to have this discussed for a few minutes, what our progress is, what the equipment is like.

Mr. Seltzer, previously introduced, will say a few words on that.

Mr. SELTZER. I should point out that for over 12 years now the airlines have been seeking a collision avoidance system. In fact, approximately a year and a half before the Grand Canyon collision the ATA invited manufacturers, through a broadcast letter, to come forth with any ideas for a noncooperative system, one which would be completely self-sufficient and capable of operating without the need for the other aircraft to be equipped. Unfortunately, I think we got virtually no response until after Grand Canyon. Thereafter, many ideas were offered, but none of them came to fruition.

In approximately 1958, one of the prominent electronic manufacturers came forth with what he had as a proximity warning indicator which could grow into an eventual collision avoidance system. Had that come to pass, orders which would have amounted to \$10 million worth of equipment would have been purchased then. However, we subsequently found that the equipment was not capable of performing as anticipated and the offer was withdrawn by the manufacturer. The airlines had still been urging a self-sufficient system, but our advisers in industry, from the electronic and manufacturing industry, advised us that our sights were set far too high. If we were anxious to obtain a collision avoidance system, we might have to accept, at least for the time being, that which the current state of the art could produce; namely, a cooperative system. It was then that we said rather than get nothing we would rather have something in the form of a cooperative system. That is the reason we are on the path we are at the moment.

It is unfortunate, however, that a system such as we have in mind is necessarily high in cost. The cost is not any more to our liking than it is to general aviation. Certainly we would not expect everyone to be