reduction actions which will lead to savings of $81.7 million in fiscal year 1966 and $27.8 million in 1967."

"These goals are in addition to the more than $100 million of savings accomplished since 1960," said the pamphlet.

"Hitting the 1966 and 1967 targets will require more effort from each employee—surpassing them will challenge his imagination."

However much it has challenged the imagination, it's certain that the penny-pinching program has posed a serious physical and emotional challenge to our ATCS personnel!

Another illustration of how our hard-pressed, over-worked and under-appreciated air traffic men are often taxed to the limit of human endurance, while inevitably increasing the possibility of tragic error, was contained in the NAGE–LA Newsletter (Los Angeles ARTC Center) of December 23, 1966. In the month of September 1964, said the Newsletter, the center had *39,626 operations* and a staff of 296; in September 1965, *47,066 operations* and a staff of 285; and in September 1966, *56,594 operations* and a staff of *285*. And a 17 percent increase in traffic was predicted for this year.

This sombre pattern of sharply rising operational loads without commensurate increases in personnel and adequate technological provisions is common to almost all air traffic control points in the United States today. And the crisis of need, particularly in consideration of the fact that the margin of safety in American air lanes is probably at a record low point, worsens from month to month as the gulf widens between control measures and traffic flow.

God forbid that we should be jolted into action by a series of air tragedies.

At a time when much more, certainly not less is needed, the FAA has been boasting of its cost-cutting, penny-squeezing policies. The FAA's "Intercom" bulletin of July 18, 1966 reprinted a letter from President Johnson to "Dear Bozo" (i.e., General William F. McKee, FAA Administrator) and reading in part:

"I have noted with satisfaction the excellent work which you and your associates at the Federal Aviation Agency have been doing in reducing costs and manpower while absorbing additional workload and improving service to the public.

I have taken particular note of your cost reduction program under which you saved *$47 million* during the 1966 fiscal year. These savings have been accompanied by a reduction in Agency employment of more than 3,500 employees—eight percent since 1963. The Agency has succeeded in combining economy with a safety program which has helped the commercial air carriers of the United States achieve the best safety record in the world and the best record for any five-year period in the history of American aviation. You have clearly demonstrated that outstanding performance in a critical and complex program can be continually achieved while reducing costs . . ."

The President's confidence that the "outstanding performance" can go on this way is open to serious challenge.

As always, the men and women who bear the burden will continue to give their best; but their best is no longer enough. They need help—both human and electronic help.

System errors at many Air Traffic Control Centers are alarmingly high. In May of 1966, for example, an office bulletin at an East Coast Center reports *64 system errors* the previous year.

In a review of a "serious air traffic staffing problem," the Manager of the Los Angeles Area Office advised the director of the Western ATC Region (September 13, 1966), that "the recruitment process is too slow, cumbersome, and has not been available to us during the past three years."

He further advised, ". . . potentials in airline activities are more attractive than in the FAA and many of our better people are leaving to accept employment with the airlines; equitable pay for complexity and responsibility was adversely affected when Level II VFR Towers and Level III Approach Control Facilities were created—promotional ladders are no longer attractive; we are robbing Peter to pay Paul by selecting within-grade candidates . . . "

The ATS System Error Reporting Program went into effect December 1, 1963. Statistics accumulated since then demonstrate the clear need to reduce—by such measures as added manpower and equipment and certain fundamental changes in FAA concepts—the number of errors occurring.

A bulletin issued in June of 1965 by the Boston Air Traffic Office, however, said the goal of each facility must be total elimination of control errors and solicited the recommendations of all personnel for achieving this goal "within