

A burnt-out air traffic controller is not a likely prospect for any other kind of job. He is one of the most highly trained and skilled specialists in the narrow field that our society promotes today.

On the other hand, if at age 40 he is no longer suitable to run a high-density scope or the "boards" as they are called in the profession of air traffic control jargon, if he had both flight experience and the appropriate ratings, he would be a most valuable pilot.

As an employer who employs nine pilots and runs various operations, I would be very quick to hire such men more so than some who are ignorant of air traffic.

We think some required education of the pilots about what the front-line of traffic is all about should be mandatory in the ratings.

I will not give a commercial license to anyone who takes an instrument rating although the Agency permits this. We will not give a license to anyone until they have been in the towers and observed the operations.

We think a pilot ought to know what loads he imposes when he comes into a high-density area and asks for a sudden clearance.

We feel he should know what happens in those IFR rooms when he declares a priority and asks to be landed immediately. Just as controllers must spend more time in cockpits, we think the law should require that pilots spend more time in air traffic control.

Whereas there used to be a domination by the pilot in an advisory capacity by the controller, there is in fact a partnership in all controlled aircraft.

We take nothing from any of the pilots. Indeed, I think that that is a highly skilled profession and must continue to be so.

On the other hand, there is no way to move an airplane, at least a big one, in the United States today without a successful partnership between an air traffic controller and a professional pilot at the controls.

Unlike the pilot, the controller has no copilot. If he makes a mistake it probably won't be picked up in time.

Unless the personnel shortage, which is the most critical problem, is alleviated, the controllers have two decisions.

They can either permit the increase in traffic to further overstress the system until collisions began to occur and people are willing to pay great attention or they can exercise their responsibilities to absolutely refuse to take that additional traffic into existing facilities and thus curb the annual increase.

Their feeling is that judgments as to where the limits of safety may be are daily judgments in a rapidly expanding system and it is their responsibility to make those judgments and to live with them, not the responsibility of those higher up or further out in the Agency who are not familiar with any individual scope on any given day.

For that reason, in the exercise of their responsibilities, they take the position that they should and will in areas where the operation is really existing only on the resilience of an able young man who is able to operate overstressed for long periods of time but should not be doing so, but when he finds he is losing some of his targets or that near misses are occurring, he should at that time refuse to take another handoff until his radarscope is in control.

I should like to see exhibited before this committee a videotape with an audiotape of air traffic controllers operating a radarscope or operat-