

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Galipault is known to me. He is a constituent from my district. He has contacted me over the past year on air safety and I am happy that he has an opportunity to present his testimony this morning.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Anyone who is a friend of Congressman Devine is a friend of mine.

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. GALIPAULT, PRESIDENT, GALIPAULT & ASSOCIATES, WORTHINGTON, OHIO

Mr. GALIPAULT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess the best characteristic of a last witness is to be able to adapt and meet the change in situation.

I wrote my testimony quite independently of Mr. Bailey last Monday and I showed it to him this morning. He said, "John, it looks like we are thinking the same way."

Therefore, I think I will deviate somewhat from my original presentation and talk a little more off-the-cuff than the other gentleman.

Mr. DEVINE. May I suggest the testimony may be made a part of the record.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Your full statement will be included in the record as if it were read.

(Mr. Galipault's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. GALIPAULT, PRESIDENT, GALIPAULT & ASSOCIATES, WORTHINGTON, OHIO

I am delighted to have the opportunity to present my views on the problems of aviation safety. Although much of which you will hear in my testimony may be redundant, it does represent a growing feeling within the aviation community that careful, considered planning be undertaken in the "Care and Feeding" of our National Air-Space System.

I am not here today representing any special interest group or carrying any specific bias regarding the status of air transportation safety. I am, rather, presenting some thoughts that might serve as focal points in further evaluations of air safety.

Let us begin by considering what the accident phenomenon is. An accident has been defined in many ways, but there is general agreement that two essential ingredients must be present for an accident to occur; namely, the presence of unsafe conditions and the initiation of unsafe acts. Both unsafe acts and unsafe conditions may be obvious and clear to the investigator or they may be subtle, hidden, interacting covertly and building up to a catastrophe in short or long periods of time. It is rather difficult for the accident researcher or investigator to predict the proper combination and magnitude of factors that produce an accident. The term "Accident Phenomenon" to aviation safety experts is in fact a mysterious, bewitching, and regrettable event that frustrates even the most astute and educated professionals in aviation. Yet, post-accident investigations have, in many cases, revealed aircraft structural failures, design deficiencies, and inadequate operational procedures which are corrected usually at great cost in time, money, and personnel.

My concern today is with the human aspects of aviation safety that may or may not be alluded to, cared about, or even interesting. My comments are directed, in a sense, as criticisms to all members in the aviation community. I freely criticize the Federal Aviation Administration, the air carriers, general aviation, and the various special interests groups representing each of the above.

Today's air traffic control system is somewhat analogous to Aunt Minnie's corset. The old garment does a fair job of keeping things from busting out as long as Aunt Minnie is not too active. Should Aunt Minnie put on weight or should one of the stays break, a catastrophe could result and injure innocent bystanders. The air traffic control system is bursting at the seams, and there is little prospect of containing the tremendous growth in air traffic. We do not suggest that