to return to Columbus, Ohio, If you recall, last Wednesday through Saturday we had some rather ugly weather. Cloud ceilings at this northeast city were down to 100 feet with anywhere from a mile to

one-eighth of a mile visibility.

I made phone calls at least six times in each of 3 days trying to find a "window" through which I could fly, trying to get back to Columbus; a window which would keep me from picking up ice; a window that would keep me away from severe storms and turbulence; a window which would allow me to reach my destination with adequate fuel; and a window which would allow me to find a sufficiently close airport that I could reach and still have the required fuel reserve. I never found that window because there was a lack of information.

The problem was basically at that point of departure. The atmosphere had an uncommon characteristic during that period; that is an inversion where temperatures went up instead of down as you increased in altitude. This was a desirable situation during that period because it would allow me to fly at a higher altitude without picking

up ice which, in my aircraft, we had no means of removing.

The temperature on the ground at this airport was 33 degrees. I had the suspicion that the first 3,000 feet would put me in rather high icing conditions. I would have gladly paid \$25 for that information; that is, who is picking up ice? Has anyone picked up ice? Nobody could tell me at the flight service station. I said, "Will you give me the telephone number of the approach control?" They said, "No, we cannot, it is an unlisted phone number."

I could have gone to the tower and asked permission to enter the tower and ask them to contact an aircraft coming in. Instead, I went to my airplane, started the engine and turned on the radio to a ground

control frequency.

A Mohawk BAC-111 just landed and I called the pilot asking if he picked up any ice in his landing approach. He said, "No; very little."

At that point, I had my information. But it seems rather ridiculous that you have to go through this exercise to gather information in

order to make a decision whether or not to fly.

I have done some very interesting research on risk acceptance in pilots. In this experiment we asked pilots to fly at a 2-foot altitude toward two bamboo poles and try to fit the aircraft between the two poles. We would vary the width of the poles in a random fashion so the pilot never knew the size of the opening with respect to the aircraft's wing span. We did not give him any information. We let him ask us for information. We said, "Try to go through. If you cannot, pull up and go over it."

As a result of this experiment, we were able to get a fingerprint on the pilot which described his willingness to accept risk. We found where he was willing to take risks and where he was not. We found out who was the Casper Milquetoast and who was the so-called tiger.

One interesting result of this research was that the so-called tiger, the one who took the big chance and didn't really understand what the consequences were, was the pilot who did not seek information.

This is significant, and it is borne out in many of the accident

reports.

All you have to do is look at them. This is one of the major problems we have in our airway system.