

fact, many of them are located a considerable distance from the nearest general aviation district office. However, for our own field people, we intend to provide policy guidance and inspector training which is air carrier oriented.

As recognized in your comments and recommendations, we are proceeding with regulatory action to upgrade the air taxi rules, Part 135. Our analysis of the industry comments on our Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making of March 17, 1967, has been completed and a Notice of Proposed Rule Making is in final stages of development. We shall take every possible action to accelerate this rulemaking process.

Let me say again that I can understand your concern and I share the sense of urgency which you expressed. However, I am hopeful that the summary of actions already taken, as well as those underway by both industry and government, will serve to reassure you that positive and responsive steps are being taken. I can assure you that we are not overlooking the problems you have described.

Should you wish further information on any or all of our programs concerning air taxi operations, members of my staff will be pleased to meet with you or your people at any time convenient to you.

WILLIAM F. McKEE,
Administrator.

Mr. DEVINE. In the Washington Post, March 24, there was a rather meaningful article which appeared under the title "‘Tortured’ Jets Safer Than Cars." It cited a number of cases and I think it would be well to make this a part of our hearing record and I would suggest this be inserted in our record.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Without objection, it will be included in the record.
(Article referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1968]

'TORTURED' JETS SAFER THAN CARS

(By David Hoffman, Washington Post Staff Writer)

In the evolution of automobile travel, more drivers and more passengers have meant more accidents and more fatalities, the toll now standing at 145 deaths a day.

Air safety experts have long predicted a similar fate for air transportation—that disasters will inevitably multiply as air travel booms. But a decade of hard statistical evidence is proving the experts wrong.

Last year was the tenth consecutive one in which U.S. airlines flew turbojets. And there was no measurable increase in the number of fatal accidents, the number of fatalities or the fatality rate per passenger mile.

Judged by that most meaningful ratio, the accident rate per aircraft flight hour, the tenth year of jet travel was the safest. In 1967, the accident rate per 100,000 aircraft hours dipped to a record low of 1.2 for U.S. commercial operators.

Enjoying such odds, a passenger can expect to fly a U.S. airline nonstop for 80 years before an accident might cost him his life.

WORKING SINCE 20S

By automating air traffic control, enhancing the competence of pilots, expanding airport facilities, improving the turbine engine and perfecting the jetliner itself, the aviation establishment has engineered a system in which more users survive each year.

Just as the Federal Government moved last year to regulate roadworthiness and crashworthiness into U.S. built automobiles, it moved in the 1920s to regulate safety into U.S.-built aircraft.

Now, almost 80 percent of the world's jetliners are manufactured in Western American states and the craft share one thing in common: their construction was supervised by the Federal Government, by the Federal Aviation Administration's Western Regional Office.

In trade jargon, this Federal supervision is called "certification." It entails dozens of semiformal bargaining sessions in which engineers and pilots from the company and the Government argue the cost of extra safety and try to anticipate—and eliminate—the causes of future accidents.