PAGENO="0001" U~L) V * ~LkflJ. I AVIATION b(~I'3Sc SAFETY ~ HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERONAUTICS NINETIETH CONGRESS FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS ON AVIATION SAFETY 26, 27, 1968 JULY 24, AUGUST 28, 29, 1967; MARCH Serial No. 90-34 Printed for the use of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce ir I I J~ 7 tLS. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1968 92-715 PAGENO="0002" SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL, Maryland TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts JOHN JARMAN, Oklahoma JOHN E. MOSS, California JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida HORACE It. KORNEGAY, North Carolina LIONEL VAN DEERLIN, California J. J. PICKLE, Texas FRED B. ROONEY, Pennsylvania JOHN M. MURPHY, New York DAVID E. SATTERFIELD III, Virginia DANIEL J. RONAN, Illinois BROCK ADAMS, Washington RICHARD L. (XI3TINGER, New York RAY BLANTON, Tennessee W. S. (BILL) STUCKEY, Ja., Georgia PETER N. KYROS, Maine ANDREW STEVENSON JAMES M. MENGER, Jr. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER, Illinois SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio ANCHER NELSEN, Minnesota HASTINGS KEITH, Massachusetts GLENN CUNNINGHAM, Nebraska JAMES T. BROYHILL, North Carolina JAMES HARVEY, Michigan ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina TIM LEE CARTER, Kentucky G. ROBERT WATKINS, Pennsylvania DONALD 0. BROTZMAN, Colorado CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ja., Ohio DAN KUYKENDALL, Tennessee JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas' WILLIAM J. DIxON ROBERT F. QUTHRIE 1ApDolnted Aug. 1, 1967. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL, Maryland, Chairman SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio GLENN CUNNINGHAM, Nebraska ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina~ DAN KUYKENDALL, Tennessee COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOR1~llGN COMMERCE~ HARLEY 0. STAO(IIIRS, West Virginia, (Jha'irman W. ~. WILLIAMSON, Clerk KENNETSI J. PAINTER, Assistant Clerk Professional Staff SIJBCOMMITTEI~ ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERoNAUTICs JOHN D. DINGELL, Miehigan J. J. PICKLE, Texas DANIEL J. RONAN, Illinois BROCK ADAMS, Washington (II) PAGENO="0003" CONTENTS Hearings held on- July 24, 1967 (full committee) August 28, 1967 (subcommittee) August 29, 1967 (subcommittee) March 26, 1968 (subcommittee) March 27, 1968 (subcommittee) Letter dated July 7, 1967, from Chairman O'Connell of the National Trans- portation Safety Board, re status of three recent commercial airline ac- cidents (Urbana, Ohio, March 9, 1967; New Orleans, La., March 30, 1967; and Marseilles, Ohio, March 5, 1967) Statement of- Allen, Bobbie R., Director, Bureau of Safety, National Transportation Safety Board, Department of Transportation _~~__ 7 Bailey, F. Lee, acting executive director, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization _______~______________________ 34~ Brotzman, Hon. Donald G., a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado 315 Burton, Clifford P., executive director, Air Traffic Association 304 Clausen, Hon. Don H., a Representative in Congress from the State of California 277 Galipault, John B., president, Galipault & Associates, Worthington, Ohio~ 361 Grote, Henry, president, Newark Airport Local, National Associa- tion of Government Employees 282 Hill, James, general counsel, Air Traffic Control Association 304 Jennings, William A., director of aviation safety, Airline Passengers Association 332 Jensen, Walter A., assistant vice president, operations and engineer- ing, Air Transport Association 221 Jones, David, United Airlines pilot, Washington, D. C . 178 Jones, Roys C., director, air traffic control department, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association 188 Kayne, Victor J., vice president, policy and technical planning, Air- craft Owners & Pilots Association 188 Linnert, Ted, director, engineering and safety department, Air Line Pilots Association 152 Lyman Stanley, vice president, Federal Aviation Administration affairs, National Association of Gov~ernment Employees 275, 282 Lyons, Kenneth, president, National Association of Government Employees 276, 282 McKee, Gen. William F., Administrator, Federal Aviation Admin- istration, Department of Transportation 18 Maready, William F., attorney, Winston-Salem, N.C 328 Minshall, Hon. William F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio 353 O'Connell, Joseph J., Jr., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Department of Transportation 4 Peterson, Iris, vice president, Steward and Stewardess Division, Air Line Pilots Association 152, 166 Ruby Charles, president, Air Line Pilots Association ~ 152 Seltzer, Stanley L., director, air navigation and traffic coi~trol, Air Transport Association 221 Smith, Frank Kingston, executive director, National Aviation Trades Association 258 Thomas, David D., Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Admin- istration, Department of Transportation 19 Tipton, Stuart G., president, Air Transport Association 221 Von Kann, Gen. Clifton F., vice president, operations and engineeering, Air Transport Association 221 Weatherly, Lloyd H., Jr., manager, Catapult and Arresting Gear Division, All-American Engineering Co., Wilmington, Del 321 Page I 151 277 315 341 2 (III) PAGENO="0004" lv Page 28~ 357 211 214 219 216 334 237 238 239 243 223 223 224 226 227 236 247 246 Statement of-Continued Whitney, Alan J., executive vice president, National Association of Government Employees Woods, John P., executive assistant, National Business Aircraft Association. Additional material submitted for the record by- Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association: Collisions between general aviation aircraft, statistics on General aviation use of airports in the Paris, France, area Letter dated July 7,~ 1967, from AOPA to FAA, re "positive control area" Major airports, use of, by venous types of traffic Airline Passengers Association: Bibliography of literature available on postcrash fire hazards, ~ Air Transport Association of America: Appendix A-Airports without tower ~ Appendix B-Airports recommended for radar service in fiscal year ~ Appendix C-Additional airports expected to have airline jet service by ~ Continuous power airports, list of 50 Figure 1-Total IFR aircraft handled at FAA air route traffic control centers (chart) Figure 2-Aircraft operations at FAA control towers (chart) _ _ Figure 3-FAA F&E funding vs. aircraft operations (chart) Figure 4-Towers, radars and ILS at airline-served airports (chart) Figure 5-Making better use of radar (chart) Figure 6-Contributions to domestic airways system from 5 percent ticket tax (chart) Proposed AlA crashworthiness development program Turnover of FAA air traffic controllers Brotzman, Hon. Donald G.: Exhibit A-Letter dated May 5, 1967, from William F. McKee, Administrator, FAA, re airline pilot training Exhibit B-Article from Denver Post, March 17, 1968, entitled "How We Can Stop `Murder in the Mountains' " Federal Aviation Administration: Air navigation facilities for which FAA has established criteria, number of airports at which installed, and number of airports which meet criteria but where not installed (table) Air Transport Association recommended program, statement on estimated cost to implement________-_-___________________ Annual air traffic volume and instrument operations at 35 U.S. airports, in rank ~ Compilation of airports served by commercial aircraft, which do not have radar, control towers, ILS, lighting ; and airports which are qualified but do not have such facilities ~ 96-134 Correspondence between the National Transportation Safety Board and the FAA re air-taxi opera~ors ~ 371~376 Hendersonville, N.C., crash, statement on estimated cost of_ _ _ _ 28 Radar at airports serving 20 to 30 daily commercial air carrier operations, estimated cost of installing ~____________________ 61 Unobligated balance of fiscal year 1966 "Facilities and equipment" appropriation, statement on ~ 40 Fulton, lion. James G. : Extension of remarks re "Air Transportation Safety," from Congressional Record, August 28, 1967 ____~_~~. 280 Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee : " `Tortured' Jets Safer Than Cars," article from Washington (D.C.) Post, March 24, 1968 _ 376 Minshall, Hon. William E.: "Air Safety Is Going To Be Costly," article from the Cincinnati Post & Times Star, February 5, ~ "Panelists Agree $5 Billion Needed for Air Safety," article from the Cincinnati Enquirer, February 5, 1968 National Association of Government Employees : Statement on FAA electronics equipment maintenance policy National Transportation Safety Board, Department of Transportation: Aviation safety recommendations, 1963-67 Summary of midair collisions, 1956-67 (table) Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, letter dated March 25, 1968, from F. Lee Bailey, acting executive director, to Gen. William McKee, Administrator, FA ~ 317 317 71 247 67-68 355 3M 301 88-96 42-58 351 PAGENO="0005" AVIATION SAFETY MONDAY, JULY 24, .1967 HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES, COMMIrPEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harley 0. Staggers (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. This morning we are going to receive testimony on the subject of aviation safety. This certainly is one of the most important matters within the jurisdiction of the Oommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. I don't believe that a day goes by without some contact being made with me concerning one facet or another of aviation safety. Before we hear from our first witness, I would like to clarify a few items which have been somewhat distorted and confused in reports on aviation safety and on the unfortunate and most regrettable midair collision on July 19 near Asheville, N.C. We are not here to investigate nor to attempt to determine the prob- able cause of that accident. Our interest is legislative in purpose. We want to determine if existing laws are being executed in full accord- ance with their intent. Beyond that-and I am sure that the witnesses who appear before us today are well aware of this-we are ready to consider any recommendations for legislation which can further en- hance aviation safety. I want to make it clear to all concerned that the committee is neither equipped nor qualified to search out and identify the detailed facts and causes of specific. accidents. I am s~e that all of us are interested in obtaining as much information as we can on the accident which oc~ curred in North Carolina last week, but we must be sure not to put the witnesses in a position of speculating or theorizing about this accident. The investigation of this crash is still in its early stages, and here I would like to say something about the investigative processes which are followed in every case where a fatality occurs. The Bureau of Aviation Safety under the National Transportation Safety Board is staffed by experts who respond to a notification of an accident by immediately proceeding to the scene. Under an investi- gator in charge they are organized into a number of groups, each of which has a specific task. The groups are named in an an explanatory manner such as air worthiness, structures, powerplants, operations, witnesses, weather, human factors, and air traffic control. (1) PAGENO="0006" Ii 2 I am sure that the witnesses will give us further details on how these groups perform their functions. Earlier this month in response to my request, Chairman O'Connell of the National Transportation Safety Board, summarized his Board's progress as to three accidents which occurred this spring, and set forth the routine which is follàwed in every case where there is a necessity to determine probable cause. You will fix~d this letter in the July 11 Congressional Record (p. H8463).* I believe the clerk of our com- mittee has some copies of this available for distribution. (The letter referred to follows:) DEPARTMENP OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAPRTY BOARD, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, Washington, D.C., July 7, .1967. Eon. HARLEY 0. STAGGERS, . C1u~ir'man, Comemittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN : In accordance with your request, the Board is more than happy to bring you up to date on the status of three commercial airline accidents which occurred in the past few months . and in which your Committee has expressed a particular interest. . In addition, this letter will serve to review again with you, for your benefit and for the benefit of your Committee, the prpcedures the Board follows in con- nection with the investigation and reporting of results in aviation accidents of this type. 1. Air collision at Urbana, Ohio, involving TWA DU-9 and a Beechcraft B~'on B-55, privately owned, March 9, 1967.-Since our last progress report to you in connection with this case, the detailed field investigation has been completed ; an extensive public hearing was held in Dayton, Ohio; on June 6-8, 1967 ; and we are presently receiving comments and suggestions from interested parties who have, under our rules, thirty days from the date of the hearings in which to submit them. ~ ~ . . . . ~. DeltaAirlines tra4ni~g flight crash dt New Orleans, Louisiana, March 30, 1967.-The field investigation has been completed and a public hearing has been ~cbeduled to begin in New Orleans on Euly 19, 1967. The hearing will be pre- sided over by Member Oscar Laurel of this Board, and at that time all of the known or ascertainable facts will become a matter of public record. It is expected that the hearing will not last more than two days. ~ . 3. La/ce Central Airlines, accident near Marseilles, Ohio, March 5, 1967.- The field investigation in this case has been completed and a public hearing is scheduled. tO be held in Indianapolis, Indiana, commencipg on August 2, 19~7. In this case, toe, the hearing is expected to ~ reveal all of the known and ascertainable facts and to point the way ~ toward corrective action if such has not already in fact been Instituted. . . . . I am sure you are quite familiar with the investigative process ~f the Board in aircraft accidents o~ the sort we have been. discussing, but it might be well to restate it for the record. . . The investigation of civil aircraft accidents is now the responsibility of the National Transportation Safety, Board. This responsibility, with a staff ~ of cx- perienced air safety Investigators, was rE~cently transferred to us from the Civil Aeronautics Board u.ncl~er the provisions of the Department of Transportation Act, but the function had been exercised by the CAB from 1940 until the recent transfer to us.~ ~ . . . . The practice has always been to organize a team of experts In the various tech- nical areas that might be involved in any such accident, under the leadership of trained investigators representing the National Transportation Safety Board. After as exhaustive a field investigation as the situation requires and permits, the Board schedules and holds a public hearing at or near the site of the accident. At this stage of the process, all interested parties, such as the airline concerned; the Federal Aviation Administration; air line employees associations; air- frame manufacturers; engine manufacturers; and any ether possible interested parties, are active participants in adding to and thus developing a complete record of all the known or ascertainable facts. PAGENO="0007" 4 Our first witness this morning will be Chairman Joseph J. O'Con- nell, Jr., National Transportation Safety Board, Department of Transportation. Before there are any questions, we will have all of our panel give their testimony and then question the entire panel. STATEMENT OP fOSEPH J. O'OON1~ELL, JR., OEAIRMLN, ~NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, DEPARTIRNT OP TRANS~OR- TATION Mr. O'CONNELL. Mr. Chairman ~and members of the committee, we are delighted to appear~1~Tore yôth~ ~càthrni~tte~e this morning, and to provide you with whatever information we can that will be' helpful to you m the consideration of problems called forcibly to your minds by recent aircraft accidents. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I wouM like first to indicate very generally how we have planned to make our original presentation this morning. If the way we propose to approach the problem does TLQt meet with your approval, we will, of course, aocommodste ourselves to your wishes. It `did appear to me, however, that an orderly initial presentation by us would facilitate your work. What I have in mind is to provide you initially with a fairly brief description of the process used by the Nat~ioual Transportation Safety Board in the investigation of aircraft accidents. In this presentation I will indicate as well as I can the purposes which the process is intended to achieve and, generally, the extent to which we believe such purposes are being achieved. Following that, I will present you with a brief status report on the five commercial air- line accidents which are actively under investigation by our board. ~ in this area, Mr. Chairman, you will recall that I gave you a prog- ress report on three of them on th~ lth of July, and what I have to say this morning will bring that report up to date and supplement it by a status report on the BAC-411 Mohawk Airlines accident and the most recent tragic accident near Asheville, N.C., last Wednesday. Following that, Mr. B. R. Allen, Director of our Bureau of Avia- tion Safety, is prepared to give you a factual description of a Board field investigation of an aircraft accident as it actually unfolds. He intends to use the Asheville accident as an illustration and I am sure that you will be benefited by what he has to say in this regard. Then, Mr. Allen will give you a very precise statement of what we now know about the Asheville accident. As you know, we are very actively engaged in investigating that accident as of this moment and I would have only one word of caution in connection with what Mr~ Allen is prepared to say. That is, that while we will give you every bit of factual information known to us to be both uncontrovertible and relevant, we will not indulge in any type of speculation, or other- wise go beyond reporting the precise facts as we now understand them. I am sure that you gentlemen will understand the reason for this caveat. The investigation of civil aircraft accidents is now the responsi- bility of the National Transportation Safety Board. This responsi- PAGENO="0008" as to our be~iring, the Board analyzes the record and other ~i issues a formal report as to the probable cause of pp istrator 1. n Adminisi i,you may] rever, I woi o say i anyone. V ~ and we want i do ~` that L. crash.' a situal are öf~concern to ai I know that knw receive a ~rest~ and lila, need that we the ~ Subcomm ~committee. .. The. CHAIRMAN. I might say to the if it is warranted. That is.the: ings this morning, to determine . ~. miss in i should be doing as the Congress representatives of the people, and what the experts'. ideas and tdoughts are as to what can be dane to further promote air safety. I am sure they will do their very best to do just that. o be L, ic hearings per ~eronau~ics of this 3 y stages of the hives JAIRMAN. Now we will be pleased to hear )nnell,Jr., - - -. PAGENO="0009" 5 bility, with a staff of experienced air safety investigators was recently transferred to us from the Civil Aeronautics Board under the provi- srnns of the Department of TranspQrtation Act, but the function had been exercised by the CAB. from 1940 until the recent transfer to us. The practice has always been to organize a team of experts in the various technical areas that might be involved in any such major accident, under the leadership of trained investigators representing the National Transportation Safety Board. ~AJter as exhaustive a field investigation as the situation requires and permits, the Board sched- ules and holds a public hearing usually at or near the site of the ~accident. At thisstage of the process, all interested parties, such as the airline or airlines concerned ; the Federal Aviation Administration ; airline employees associations ; airframe manufacturers ; engine manufactur-* ers ; and any other possible interested parties, are active participants in adding to and thus developing a complete record of all the known or ascertainable facts. Subsequent to such public hearing, the . Board analyzes the record ~nd other information known to it and issues a formal report as to the probable cause of the accident, Of coUrse.,~you know, this process is conducted entirely in the Open, and ~s rapidly as facts are identified as uncontrovertible and relevant, beginning at the accident site, they are immediately made known to the interested parties to the investi~ gation and are at the same time released to thB news media and the public. In fact, a major part of the constructive results which flow from accident investigations is the immediate. putting to use for corrective jpurposes of all the information developed during the preliminary stages of the investigation or in the public hearing. In connection witifi the point I have been ffial~in.g about the desir- ability of havin~, an evei~t and consist~t flOw of fectual mformatio~i available to all mterested partie~ as rapidly as such facts have been clearly ascertained, the Board has recently ~ adopted a change ~n its j~rocedures to supplement this aspect of our operation. We now plan to issue a summary statement of the facts as they have been developed in the hearing in eadh accident investigation in which a formal hearing is held, within 10 days after the. hearing has been concluded. We initiated this revised procedure in the Lexingtori, Ky., air-taxi accident, and we intend to follow it in all subsequent oases.~ ~ Just a word as to our purpose in this regard., ~ ~ ithough, as has been pointed out and as Mr. Allen will elaborate, our field. investigations are held entirely in the open and with a large number of interested people privy to and contributing to the investigation, and even though, as I have said, some attempt has been made to release to the news media and the public-even from the scene of the accident-~revelant facts as they become clear, the first time . the gen~ral public has an opportunity to ~et a reasonably coherent picture of the accident is~ through the vehicle of the public hearing, which is normally held a month or two after the accident itself. We have come to believe that while the public hearing affords those in the public interested enough to follow it an opportunity to learn the detail of the facts developed, such familiarity is for the most part PAGENO="0010" 6 confined to parties having a sufficient interest in the specific accident to participate in the hearing or, in any event, to follow it closely. Having that in mind, and realizing that for good and sufficient reasons there is usually a substantial interval of time between the public hearing and the final Board formal determination c~f the prdb- able cause of the accident, we have decided that the issuance of a summary statement of the facts developed at such a hearing would be of benefit to the public and to the situation generally and, therefore, we propose to do that from here on. As to the status of the National Transportation Safety Board's current investigations of major air accidents, I would at this point like to give you a report as to each of such investigations: 1. Air collision at Urbana, Ohio, involoving TWA DO-9 and a Beechcra~ft Baron B-55, privately owned, March 9, 1967. The detailed field investigation has been completed ; an extensive public hearing was held in Dayton, Ohio, on June 6-8, 1967 ; and we are now receiving comments and suggestions from interested parties. Our staff will then analyze all of the data which have been accu- mulated and, under the supervision of Board member McAdams, wh~ presided over the hearing, will begin to prepare a draft of a report on the probablecause of the accident. 2. Delta Airlines training flight crash at New Orleans, La., March 30, 1967. The field investigation has been completed and a public hearing was held in New Orleans on July 19 and 20, 1967. The hear- ing was presided over by member Laurel of this Board, and all of the known or ascertain'a~ble facts were made part of the public record at that time. Within 10 days we will issue a summary of the facts as developed in the hearing and will then proceed to the preparation of a formal report of the Board determining probable cause. 3. Lake Central Airlines accident near Marseilles, Ohio, March 5, 1967. The field investigation in this case has been completed and a public hearing is scheduled to be held in Indianapolis, md., commenc- lug Ofl August 2, 1967, at which hearing Admiral Thayer of this Board will preside. 4. Mohawk Airlines, BAC-lil, near Biossburg, Pa., June 23, 1967. The field investigation in this case is still underway and as soon as it has been compiet~d we will schedule a public hearing. The proces~ from here on in this case will be the same as in others which I have already described. 5. Air collision near Asheville, N.O., involving a Piedmont Airlines Boeing 727 and a privately owned Cessna 310, July 19, 1967. The field investigation in this ease is actively underway and no additional corn- ment is necessary from me in connection with it since, as was earlier stated, Mr. Allen will address himself to the investigative process and to the faet~ as we now understand them in this case. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would now turn our presen- tation over to Mr. Allen. PAGENO="0011" 7 STATEMENT OP BOBBIE R. ALLE~N, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OP SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ]IEPARTMENT OP TRANSPOETATION Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, it is vital to the effective operation of a centralized team concept of accident investigation that a "go team" be on standby alert at all times. This team must be prepared to depart for the scene of a major air carrier accident on short notice. The Na- tional Transportation Safety Board has four such teams. However, personnel shortages in various specialist fields make it impossible for the Bureau to staff more than two complete teams at the present time. In these critical shortage areas, the specialists involved are required to serve double and triple duty from team to team. One of these four teams was on the alert and was launched when notification of the Hendersonville accident was received on July 19. Notification of the Piedmont accident was first received about 12:30 p.m. on July 19 from a Government agency press officer who in turn had obtained it from news sources. Immediate calls by our office to the FAA Communications Center and the airline concerned quickly established the approximate scope of the tragedy and it was abundantly clear that a major team investi- gation was required. Action was taken to notify the investigation team members. Following the notification a Government aircraft with a major por- lion of the team aboard departed Washington National Airport for the accident site. The team was accompanied by National Transporta- tion Safety Board member Gov. John H. Reed, and Mr. Marion F. Roscoe, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety. Mr. Thomas II. Saunders was the investigator in charge of the team. During the same period that our team members were being notified of the accident, action was also taken to alert representatives of inter- ested organizations such as the FAA, airline, airframe, powerplant and equipment manufacturers, pilots, flight engineers, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers associations. In view of the fact that the Hendersonville accident involved a mid- air collision between an air carrier aircraft and a private aircraft we also notified the Air Transport Association, the National Business Air- craft Association, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. In every case we invited their participation and they responded mag- nificently by assigning qualified aeronautical experts to assist in the investigation. During the first few hours following an accident, the many people who are to participate in the investigation are converging on the site from widely dispersed areas of the country. For example, Boeing Air- craft Co., personnel came from Seattle, Wash. ; Cessna Aircraft Co., personnel came from Wichita, Kans. The working procedures of the Bureau are so well established, and known through the industry, however, that it is not uncommon for the investigation to be organized and in full operation within a few hours after the accident occurs. In this case, the first organizational meeting at the accident site took place during the early evening hours following the noontime accident. PAGENO="0012" 8 When our team arrived in Hendersonville they found that the local and State authorities had done an excellent job of establishing security over the wreckage considering the difficulties which confronted them. They had procedures in hand for the identification and removal of the victims. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had responded promptly as usual in the dispatching of an identification team to assist in the investigation. I would add at this time that in the Hendersonville, N.C., accident 81 positive identifications have been made. The 82d and final identifi- cation, of necessity at this time, was accomplished througti the process of elimination. The organizational meeting, which I referred to a moment ago, is the first order of business upon arrival at the accident site. The investiga- tor in charge at this time explains the Board's functions under the law and defines the rules of the road insofar as the conduct of the investiga- tion is concerned. Once these indoctrination steps were completed, Mr. Saunders pro- ceeded with the formation and assignment of personnel to the various working groups essential to the conduct of the Hendersonvi'lle investi- gation. The groups assigned at the ilendersonville investigation were as follows : structures, system, powerplants, flight recorder, mainte- nance records, operathons, air traffic control, weather, witnesses, human factors. It should be emphasized that the field investigation phase of an accident investigation is for the purpose of documenting observed facts. It is not the task of these specialized groups to analyze the facts and arrive at a determination of probable cause. I shall endeavor at this time to summarize briefly the functions assigned to the various groups and describe how these activities are progressing in the Hender- sonville collision case. At the outset, I should like to state that both the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder carried on Piedmont flight 22 were removed 111 good condition and these instruments were flown back to our Washington headquarters for a readout by our `specialists early on the morning following the accident. A brief ~ rósumé of the findings are. as follows : The flight recorder showed that all parameters, altitude, air speed, heading, vertical acceleration, were functioning in a normal manner. The readout showed that the collision occurred at approximately 2 minutes 37 see- onds after liftoff of the Boeing 727 at a mean-sea-level altitude of approximately 6,132 feet, at an indicated air speed of 228 knots, and indicated magnetic heading of 100°. The flight recorder further revealed that the aircraft had been in a stabilized- Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Alien, I have your prepared statement but I can't follow it. Are you jumping from one page to another or is your testi- mony different than the prepared statement ~ Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Friedel, I apologize. The information I have here was not available at the time I prepared my written st~temen't. Mr. FRIEDEL. Would you notify us when you depart from your pre- pared `statement? Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir; I certainly will. PAGENO="0013" 0 The fli~ht record further reveals that the Boeing 727 was established in a stabilized climbing turn altitude for approximately 20 seconds prior to collision impact. The operations group is responsible for developing all facts con- cerning the history of the flight and flightcrew activity in the final phases of the flight, before and as the accident occurred. This includes flight planning, dispatching, weight and balance, radio communica- tions, navigation facilities, en route stops, refueling, and aeronautical experience, flight checks, and general information concerning the fiightcrew. The medical history of the crew, including any recent illnesses, psy- chological factors, crew rest periods, and activities during the 24 hours prior to the accident is determined. This latter aspect of ~he investi- gation is coordinated with the human factors group to insure that all information assembled is utilized to full advantage. The operations group also develops information on the flightpath just prior to the accident. In this effort, coordination with the air traffic control and witness groups is essential. An approximate flight- path of the two aircraft involved is being prepared in the Henderson- ville investigation. Work is proceeding in the documentation of cockpit instrumentation, crew history, flight planning, dispatching, and operational procedures employed. The weather group is responsible for the collection and compilation of all factual meteorological data pertinent to the accident, including both surface and upper air reports of actual conditions, pilot reports, recorded meteorological data, as well as forecasts of anticipated con- ditions prepared and issued by the responsible agencies. Of necessity, close coordination must be maintained with other groups, particularly the operations, air traffic control2 and witness groups. In the instant case, we are particularly interested in ascertaining the sky conditions, cloud coverage, and visibility in the area before and subsequent to the time of the accident. This phase of the investigation is virtually completed. The air traffic control group is responsible for the review of the original records of the air traffic service units whose activities or serv- ices may have been involved in the accident. Examine where available all radar screen recordings ; monitor all original voice recording, and verify that written transcripts of voice communications are consistent with the rerecordings. Provide a re- construction of the history of the flight based on ATO information. Determine the operating status of pertinent navigation aids, corn- munications equipment, radar, transponder equipment, and so forth, and provides technical data on all such equipment and its operation, ascertain if the equipment is capable of operating to prescribed stand- ards in the geographical area where it is installed. The chairman of this group is responsible for the cockpit voice recorder readout and coordinates this activity with the operations group chairman. In a midair collision, it is axiomatic that a substantial portion of the investigative activity will be concentrated in the air traffic con- trol area. This has been the case in this accident investigation just as it was in the earlier midair collision near Urbana, Ohio, and in all preceding midair collisions. PAGENO="0014" 10 We have interviewed at length the controllers involved in the case; have listened to all relevant tapes of control instructions ; have in- spected facilities and reviewed procedures employed. In conjunction with the operations, witness, and flight recorder groups, an approximation of the flightpaths involved is being pre- pared and control ~ instructions are being related to specific points along these flightpaths. The witness group is responsible for contacting and interrogating all persons who may have seen or heard some portion of the flight or who may have knowledge concerning the flight or of the weather conditions at the time of the accident. They obtain signed statements from witnesses. The extent of the group's activity can range from questioning a relatively few witnesses to a door-to-door activity cover- m~g great distances along the flightpath in which hundreds of possible witnesses are interviewed. Information concerning observed positions, altitudes, sounds, aircraft behavior, and airborne disintegration is developed m this manner. The location of witnesses at the time of the accident is plotted on a suitable map of the area. Close coordination is maintained with the operations group in de- veloping the probable flightpath from the witnesses' statements and with the human factors group in the interrogation of witnesses. During the interview of the witnesses to last week's midair collision, particular attention is being devoted to the development of as much information as possible relative to cloud and visibility conditions surrounding the accident site and to the description of the attitudes and maneuvering of the two aircraft involved. The human factors group is responsible for the aeromedical and crash-injury aspeôts of the investigation. It is concerned with the possibility of crew * incapacitation, the general physical and psycho- logical conditions of the crew members, and the environmental factors which might have affected the crew. It is also concerned with the possibility of psychological factors among passengers that might have been contributory to the accident. It covers matters involving autopsies of crew and passengers as appro- priate. Although not involved in this specific accident, this group also investigates the survival aspects and design factors which may have contributed to the injury or death of aircraft occupants ; the circumstances of evacuation ; search and rescue ; and the performance of ground firefighting services. This includes an examination of the respective equipment and the manner in which it was used. All of these activities must be closely coordinated with the operations, wit- ness, and structures groups. Since the most recent midair collision was not a survivable accident, the work of this group is focusing upon the crew member aeromedical aspects and identification problems. The structures group is responsible for investigating the airframe and flight controls. If the wreckage is scattered, the group's first concern is to locate and identify as many sections, components, and parts as possible and plot their exact positions on a wreckage distri- bution chart. They give priority to location and recovery of recorders (flight and cockpit voice) installed on the aircraft. A reconstruction of the structure may be desirable and this could vary from laying out various pieces of wreckage on a flat area to PAGENO="0015" 11 the more complicated reassembly of all available pieces in position on a framework. This procedure is most often used in collision, structural failure, m- flight fire or explosion-type accidents. Its purpose is to identify the point of original failure and to establish progression of the breakup pattern. A three-dimensional mockup is being carried out in the Hendersonville case to assist in determining the respective positions of the two aircraft at impact. The powerplants group is responsible for investigation of the engines, including fuel and oil systems, propellers, engine, and powerplant controls. The initial work of this group is carried out in conjunction with that of the structures group in the locating and plot- ting of wreckage. This group is responsible for determining the existence of any pre- accident malfunction or distress of the powerplants or their component systems. These functions must be coordinated with the structures group. There is no evidence to date in this investigation that powerplant problems were being encountered. It is anticipated that the work of this group will proceed quite rapidly. The systems group is responsible for detailed examination of all systems and components such as hydraulics, electrical and electronics, radio communication and navigation equipment, fire extinguishing units, oxygen, and so forth. The examination includes determination of the condition and or operational capabilities of the components. The examination includes determination of the positions of associated controls and switches. The latter examination will be coordinated with the operations group. Special attention is being devoted in the instant case to the deter- mination of the position of controls and switches which would have an effect upon the maneuvering of the aircraft. I would add at this time that the findings of the systems group in the Hendersonville case confirms and verifies the aircraft heading that we find on the flight recorder readout. I have already briefly ex- plained and given a rósum~ of a flight recorder readout so I will not give you the prepared text for that particular group. The maintenance records group is responsible for reviewing all maintenance records to ascertain the maintenance history of the air- craft in respect to adequacy of inspection, malfunctions that might be related to the occurrence, time on the aircraft engines and compo- nents, and time since overhaul. There is nothing to sugges at the present time that a maintenance problem was involved in the accident. On July 20 it was decided to conduct a special cockpit visibilities study. This study will evaluate the cockpit configurations of the type aircraft involved in this midair collision and determine what ob- structions to vision exist with respect to aircraft structure. Of neces- sity this study cannot be completed until the flight path reconstruc- tion has been completed. It is anticipated that the activity of certain of the groups at the site of the accident will not be concluded for another week to 10 days. Following the field phase of the investigation, the group chairmen will return to the Washington office (or to the field office) and each will prepare a factual report of the findings of his group. The group PAGENO="0016" 12 chairn~ian's repOrt is submitted to their respective group members for coordination and comment. The factual reports, together with photographs, charts, drawings, witness statements, laboratory reports and other documentary prod- nets of the investigation are introduced into the public docket and are. universally available upon request. Mr. Chairman, I have some additional information that was not available at the time of my prepared statement being prepared. At this time I would give you some information concerning the flight; involved in the accident, the two aircraft involved in the accident. The accident involved applied air collision between a Boening 727~,. N68650, Piedmont flight 22, and a Cessna 310, N1213 Sierra, owned and~ operated by Lanseair, Inc., Springfield, Mo. The accident occurred near Hendersonville, N.C., at approximately 12 :01, eastern daylight time, on July 19, 196T. There were a total of' 79 passengers abroad the Boeing ; 74 passengers, three flight deck' crew members and two stewardesses aboard the 727. The Sessna 310 had two pilots aboard and a passenger. Total fatalities in the accident' were 82. The crew history of the Boeing 727 crew : Captain, Raymond Frank' Schulte, age 49. He held an ATR rating with a type rating in Boeing" 727. The date of his last physical examination was July 1967. His total flight time was 17,116 hours. Total flight time in Boeing 7'2D equipment was 151 hours. The first officer was Thomas Calvin Conrad, age 30. He held a commercial pilot certificate. His last physical was in March 1967.. His total flight time was 1,839 hours, with 134 hours in the Boeing: 727 equipment. The flight engineer was Lawrence Carey Wilson, age 37. He held an~ ATR rating, a flight instructor, and flight engineer certificates. His' total flight time was 7,754 hours, with 280 hours in Boeing 727 equipment. The pilot of the Cessna 310, Mr. John David Addision, age 48. H~ held commercial pilot license with both instrument and flight in- structor ratings. He held a current second-class medical certificate with~ the limitation that pilot shall raise corrective lenses and have a second pair abroad the aircraft. His total flight time as he reported it in August 1966 was 10,000 hours, with 100 hours in the previous 6; months. The second pilot on the Cessna 310 was Robert Eugene Anderson. He held a private pilot's certificate, aircraft single engine, land. He held a current second-class medical with no limitations. His total flight time was reported at 473 hours. The passenger abroad the Cessna 310 had no record of pilot's license ever being issued to him. Mr. Chairman, I also have with me here today the transcripts of" the air traffic control transmission. At this time I will read the trans- cript from the Atlanta Center and give you a verbatim transcript of" the communications that were conducted on that flight. The Atlanta Center was handling the Cessna 310. At the time of this tape, the benchmark is at these times that I will give yo'u,~, in Greenwich mean time. PAGENO="0017" 13 At 1537 hours and 25 seconds Atlanta Center made the transmission of "West." The Charlotte radio approach control responded, "Cessna three one three correction three one two one Sierra 11 miles west primary target out of four thousand five hundred climbing to six." Atlanta Center responded, "Radar contact." Charlotte approach control position responded with "GD" at 1537:30. The next transmission was from the Cessna 310, November 3121 Sierra. The transmission read as follows : "Atlanta Center three one two one Sierra at 6,000 now." The center responded "Twin Cessna three one two one Sierra At~ lanta Center Roger radar contact climb and maintain 8,000. Report reaching." Cessna responded, "Roger" at 1538:40. The next transmission was from 3121 Sierra, as follows: "Atlanta Center three one two one Sierra is at 8,000 now." That transmission occurred at 1541 and 30 seconds. The center responded "Cessna three one two one Sierra level eight,. is that right?" Response by Cessna-I beg your pardon. There was no response to that transmission and the center came back a few seconds later and said, "Cessna two one Sierra, are you level eight now?" Cessna 3121 Sierra responded, "Affirmative level at 8,000." The center rogered for that at 1541 and 50 seconds. Shortly thereafter, Atlanta Center instructed November 3121 Sierra. "Contact Atlanta Center one two five point five." 310 responded "Roger one two five point five." That occurred at 1547 and 20 seconds. We now switch to the recorder No. 2, Channel 15 position, R9. This~ the Spartanburg radio position. The first transmission is from November 3121 Sierra. "Atlanta~ Center three one two one Sierra at 8,000 feet." This time is 1547 hours 55 seconds. Atlanta Center responded, "Other aircraft calling center say again,. please." "Three one two one Sierra is at 8,000." Center, "November one three two one Sierra Roger Asheville altim-. eter is three zero two one correction on that the altimeter is three zeroS two seven at Asheville." The center followed this with another transmission, 1 minute and 45 seconds later, at 1515 and 45 seconds. "November one three two one Sierra traffic 12 o'clock four mi1es~ westbound slow." 3121 Sierra responded "Negative contact." Atlanta Center came back and said, "Cessna one correction three one two one Sierra is that your correct identification three one two one Sierra." No response. The center came back "Cessna three one two one Sierra Atlanta.'~ The Cessna 310 responded "Three one two one Sierra." 92-71 ~-68------2 PAGENO="0018" 14 The center caine back with "Cessna two one Sierra is cleared to the Asheville VOR descend and maintain 7,000 expect ILS approach at Asheville." ~ November 3121 Sierra reported "Leaving eight at this time." The time was1551 hours, 45 seconds. Atlanta Center responded with "Cessna two one Sierra your trans- missions are hard to read say you are leaving 8,000 now." Cessna 31 responded "I left 8,000 for seven." The time was 1552 and 20 seconds. Atlanta Center "Roger." Atlanta Center subsequently came in with the transmission of "The traffic for two one Sierra is now at your 12 o'clock position about a miles north westbound." 3121 Sierra responded, "Negative contact. We're in the clouds." The time was 1552 and 30 seconds. Subsequently, November 3121 Sierra transmitted "Atlanta Center two one Sierra is this transmitter any better." Atlanta `Center responded "Two one Sierra its a little bit better radar service terminated now contact Asheville approach one two five point three." The time was 1553 hours. The first part of the next transmission was unintelligible but it says "Point three." This occurred at 1553 hours and two seconds. The next transcription that we have is on Recorder 2, Channel 13, Position A9, which is the Spartanburg interphone position. Atlanta Center transmits, "Atlanta." Asheville tower responds, "Asheville request clearance Piedmont twenty-two." The time is 1553 hours and 5 seconds. Atlanta Center responded "All right call you back H.O." Asheville tower responded "OK and do you know where the Cessna two one sugar is right now disregard he's coming." Atlanta Center responded "You got him." The Asheville tower responded "Yeah." The Asheville tower responded "OK." The time is 1553 and 15 seconds. We now switch to the transcript of Recorder 2, Channel 16, Position D9, which is the Spartanburg interphone position. The time is 1538 and 15 seconds. Asheville Approach Control, "Go ahead with your inbound." Altanta Center said, "OK first one is November three one two one Sierra Cessna three ten Asheville VOR estimates one five five four descending to 7,000 Charlotte direct Asheville cleared to Asheville VOR be your control crossing the Spartanburg three five seven radial next one Piedmont ten twenty-two Martin four zero four slant Alpha Broad River estimate one six zero three descending to seven thousand Atlanta direct Asheville cleared to Broad River your control, crossing Victor fifty four and I've got one more." Asheville tower approach control responded, "Go ahead." Atlanta Center then transmitted "Air Evac two five seven niner xiiner C one thirty one slant Bravo Asheville VOR estimate one six one seven be descending to seven thousand from over iloiston Mountain Victor thirty-five Asheville cleared to Asheville VOR your control Mitchell JD." PAGENO="0019" 15 Asheville Approach Control then gave the initials "JD" and the time was 1539:30. Atlanta Center responded "Asheville tower clearance" at 1553:55 and the Asheville tower responded with "Asheville." The center gave the following : "Clear Piedmont twenty-two slant Alpha to Roanoke Airport via direct Valdese J fifty three flight plan route maintain two one zero JZ." The tower responded "JC" at 1554 :05 and the Atlanta Center responded "Atlanta." The Asheville tower came in "Asheville Piedmont ten twenty-two is out of seven and put two one sugar three one two one sugar out of seven and Piedmont twenty-two be off at five nine." The time is 1558 and 30 seconds. The Atlanta Center responded with the initials "JZ." And Asheville tower responded with the initials "JC." This is 1558 :35. The tower responded "Asheville" and the Atlanta Center said "Pied- mont twenty-two can you switch him to me yet?" The Asheville tower said "Afraid I can't right now he is unreported and this three ten that was inbound was cleared over to Asheville beacon and he's also unreported and we have a public report of a crash down around Hendersonville." Mr. Chairman, since this time, since the accident has occurred on this transcript, I will switch over to the transcript that came out of the Asheville tower. I think it will give you a little more information as to the actions concerning the 727 flight. This would be the flight data position, approach control in th~ Asheville tower. The time is at 1550 hours. At 1550 hours and 25 second, "Asheville Approach Piedmont ten twenty-two." Asheville approach control responded "Piedmont ten twenty two Asheville approach." Piedmont 1022, "We are at thirty-five west at 7,000." The response from the approach control was "You are thirty-five DME from Asheville you mean?" Piedmont 1022 responded, "Yeah, we're southwest. We're level at seven." Approach control, "Ten twenty-two Roger. Maintain seven. Wind light and i~ariable, altimeter is three oh two six." At 1551 :03 Piedmont 1022 transmitted "Thirty twenty-six Roger." 1551 :25, approach control transmitted : "Eight three Zulu Asheville approach." Then there is a ring on the interphone line that comes in at this time. This is the Atlanta Center calling the Approach Control. The transmission "Atlanta", 1553 :08. Approach control responded "Asheville, request clearance Piedmont twenty-two." The center responded "AT1 right, I'll call you back. HO." Approach control, "OK, and do you know where this Cessna two one sugar is right now-?" Then at 1553:08, 3121 Sierra transmitted: "Asheville approach Cessna three one two one Sierra is out of seven-at seven." PAGENO="0020" 16 Approach control then transmitted "Disregard he's coming-" anct the center said "You have got him?" That coincides with the transmission we had a few moments ago. The approach control said "Yes." ARTO said "OK." At 1553 :11 seconds, Approach Control made the following transmis- slon : "Three on~ two one sugar, Roger. What radial are you passing now off of Spartanburg?" At 1553 hours and 21 seconds, 3121 Sierra responded with "Stand by one At 1553 :42 seconds, the 301 responded "We're on three four zero." Approach Control said "Three four zero?" 3121 Sierra replied "Affirmative." Approach control responded "OK." At 1553 and 55 seconds Approach Control transmitted "Asheville tower." The ARTC came in with-this is the Atlanta ARTC-came in with "Clear Piedmont Flight twenty two slant Alpha to IRoanoke Airport,. via direct Valdese, J five three, flight plan route, maintain two one zero JD." At 1554 and four seconds approach control responded "OK," with the initials "JC." 1554 and `29 seconds, Approach Control transmitted "Piedmont tem twenty-two descend to 6,000, cleared for an ILS approach, plan to circle runway one six." Piedmont 1022 responded, "Ten twenty two." Approach control then transmitted "Asheville." Atlanta Center came back with "Reference AIREVAC two five seven niner niner again." Approach control responded "OK" and the center transmitted "Re- vise the estimate-the radio beacon estimate to one six one one." The initials "JD". Approach control responded with the initials "JC" at 1555 and two seconds, "Piedmont ten twenty two reported leaving seven." Piedmont 1022-I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman. That last trans- mission that I read came from the Approach Control and was instruc- tions to Piedmont 1022, leaving seven. And Piedmont 1022 acknowledged with the following transmission "Ten twenty two out of seven." Approach control then transmitted "Roger, report Broad River inbound to the tower one two one point one." At 1555 and 20 seconds, Piedmont 1022 responded, "One twenty one point one." `\~\Te next have a transmission here from the fire department to the tower and they are asking, "Have you ~ot an inbound on AIREVAC ?" Approach control responded, "Yea, it should be here about 15 after." The fire department responded "Does he want me to stand by for anything?" Approach control responded "I imagine he will want the fire truck, Bill." The fire department responded, "Uh, radio is in the office. I'll go on up to the firehouse." Approach control responded, "OK we'll land him on one six." The fire department responded "OK." PAGENO="0021" 17 Approach control, "-and you can pick him up anywhere you want to." At 1556 hours and ~7 seconds Approach Oontrol gave the following transmission of "Three one two one sugar, cleared over the VOR to Broad River. Correction, make that the Asheville radio beacon-rover to the VOR to the Asheville radio beacon. Maintain seven thousand re- *port passing the VOR." At 1556 hours and 41 seconds, 3121 Sierra responded, "Two one Sierra." We now hear a ring over the tape and this is the interphone line ringing. The transmission from the Atlanta Center, "Atlanta." The approach control facility responds, "Asheville, Piedmont ten twenty two is out of seven ,and-~--uh-put two one sugar, put three one two one sugar out of seven and Piedmont 22 will be off at 59." Approach control then gave the initials "JO." . At 1558 and 20 seconds 3121 Sierra transmitted "Two one Sierra just passed over the VOR. We're headed for that-uh-for-uh-Asheville now. ~ Approach control said, "Two one sugar by the VOR, descend and maintain six thousand." At 1558 and 41 seconds, 3121 Sierra transmitted "We're leaving seven." At 1600 approach control transmitted "Asheville." There is an unidentified transmission at this point and we have not been able to determine who made this transmission. "What's-uh-have they got some kind of convention up there today ?" Approach control responded, "No, not that I know of." That is in the unidentified transmission. "That's the busiest I've seen that airport in a long time." Approach control said, "It's-uh-one extra Piedmont flight. I think they've got some kind of camp, some camp children (garbled) reservations." . . The approach control responded with the initials "JO." At 1600 hours and two seconds, approach control transmitted "Cessna three one two one sugar, cleared for an ADF two approach to runway one six. Report the Asheville radio beacon inbound." Approach control then came up with "Tower." And then there is a transmission from the Piedmont station agent and it is garbled. "This seventy four thirty be starting back out-how closeishe?" . ~ . . Approach control responded, "Seventy four thirty?" And Piedmont station agent responded, "Well, he's ten twenty." Approach control responded "Ten twenty-is he going to be seventy four thirty outbound?" The Piedmont agent responded, "Seventy-seventy four thirty ship number going back." "OK, he's touching down now." Mr. Chairman, at this point in time the accident has already oc- curred. The next transmission is at 1604:27. All of these transmissions are subsequent to the accident. Gentlemen, that concludes my presTentation. I will try to respond to any questions yoil may have. PAGENO="0022" 18 The CHAIRMAN. We will have the rest of the panel before questioning. Mr. WATSON. Are you referring to the South Carolina Control Center when you say Spartanburg? Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. This was Spartanburg VOR. This is a navi- gational facility that the Cessna was using. Mr. WATSON. That is the South Carolina station? Mr. ALLEN. Yes. Mr. WATSON. Thank you. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Chairman, I have a question on identifi- cation. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Would you identify which of the Piedmont air- craft was the one that was in the crash? Mr. ALLEN. It is Piedmont Flight 22. Piedmont Flight 1022 was a Martin 404 inbound and landing. The CHAIRMAN. General McKee. STATEMENT O~' GEN. WILLIAM F. McKEE, ADMINISTRATOR, FED. ERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OP TRANS- PORTATION General McKEE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity to come before you today to discuss with you further the subject of aircraft safety. I would like to review with you briefly FAA's functions and what we do, particularly with respect to the operation of the airway and air traffic control system, and the investigation of aircraft accidents. FAA's basic responsibility in the recently created Department of Transportation continues to be aviation safety. We operate the air traffic control system for both civil and military aircraft and provide a system of air navigation facilities designed to promote the safe and efficient movement of aircraft in air navigation. We certificate airmen, aircraft, and air carriers in accordance with our safety performance standards, and promulgate rules and assign the use of navigable air space,.rules of the road for civil and military pilots, and a broad~spectrum of safety rules governing the operation of ~ air carriers and general. aviation aircraft. The investigation of aircraft accidents for the purpose of determin- ing the facts relating to each accident and its probable cause is a function of the National Transportation Safety Board. This is not to say that FAA does not have a vital concern with the investigation of accidents. The Safety Board provides for the appropriate participa- tion of FAA in its investigation-this excludes participation in the determination of probable cause-and on our own initiative we care- fully review the facts as they develop to determine what can be done to improve and strengthen our rules, procedures, or systems to prevent the recurrence of accidents and incidents. If any facts come to light during the course of an accident investiga- tion which clearly indicate a need for a change, such as a modification to an aircraft, pilot standards, or operating rules, FAA does not await the announcement of a probable cause determination but proceeds im- mediately to effect corrective action. PAGENO="0023" 19 The aircraft accident record which has been compiled so far this year has been a matter of serious concern to us. We discussed this mat- ter with you earlier this year. The tragic midair collision of two air- craft over North Carolina last Wednesday, taking the lives of 82 persons,.has been a loss which has affected us all very, very deeply. We know you share our concern with these accidents. Now, Mr. Chairman, much has been said in the past few years and particularly of late about the intermix of general aviation and air car- rier aviation. The question is frequently asked, "Why don't you segre- gate the two, not only in the airspace but by airport?" At this point, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Thomas, my Deputy Administrator, who is generally con- sidered by the aviation community as the leading expert in the coun- try in air traffic control, to discuss this rather complex question. I think it will clear up a Tot of questions in the minds of members of the committee. Mr. Thomas? STATEMENT OP DAVID D. THOMAS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OP TRANSPORTATION Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, first, just as a matter of clarification, I believe the "Spartanburg" referred to on the record was the Spartan- burg sector of the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center, which was handling en route traffic in that area and that the recording was of that sector. . If the committee would bear with me, I would like to be just a little bit elementary. I know all of you know this, but I think it is necessary for some understanding of our problem ; that is, we exercise air traffic control by two methods One method is rules, rules of the road, such as those which apply when you drive on the highway. Those rules are used when the visi- bility is good. They are very effective when the airspeeds are moderate and when the density of the traffic is such that one can deviate from a fiightpath to avoid another aircraft without, of course, getting into the ffightpath of another, or slowing down tr~ffic. The other method that we use in traffic control is the issuance of instructions from the ground. We use those whenever the weather con- ditions do not permit the pilot to see and be seen under adverse visi- bility conditions, or when the airspeeds, such as at the high altitudes occupied by the jets, simply do not permit the use of this device. We also use it to insure an orderly flow of traffic in the high-density areas. Under the latter conditions, when we exercise it from the ground, we do get flight plans from aircraft and know what they intend to do. We do give them instructions. We know their position either by radio contact where we do not have radar, or by following them on radar where that is available. With that, very brief an4 very primary description of our traffic control system, we might look at the problem of segregation of traffic: First, there is a great deal of natural segregation of air traffic in the United States. One is a natural segregation by altitude. The jets and the turbine-powered airplanes operate most efficiently at the higher PAGENO="0024" 20 altitudes, and the slower, piston airplanes operate more efficiently at the lower altitudes. We do have a great deal of natural segregation there. Generally within the United States, over 80 percent of the traffic is under 12,000 feet, and travels distances less than 250 miles. Most of the jets operate between 25,000 to 40,000 feet, and turbines generally at 12,000 to 30,000. Of course, this runs out, because they all must use the lower air- space. They all must come downtO an airport and leave ~in airport. We get the mixing in the lower airspace. . ~ ~ ~ Another type of segregation is by airport. Less than 10 percent of the traffic at JFK, for example, is general aviation, and most of that 10 percent is air carrier oriented ; that is, it is air taxi, bringing pas- sengers to and from the airlines, or corporate aircraft bringing them to and from the airlines. Of course, this changes character as the corn- munity size decreases. For example, at Asheville, 64 percent of the traffic is general avia- tion, and when you get to a place like Rockford, Ill., 95 percent of it would be general aviation. This natural segregation isn't absolute nor does it operate when the weather is good, because all the aircraft operate in the lower airspace. Our present policy is to combine the rules of the road with the neces- sary ground control as appropi~iate. As a matter of fact, despite the lack of radar in a great many locations served by airlines, about 90 percent of the passengers are served at locations where we do have airport radar available. There are many reasons that are advanced for seeking some segre- gation between general aviation and the air carrier operations. These, I think, can be divided bet\veen economic reasons and safety reasons. Among the economic reasons that I would dite is that we get corn- plaints that light aircraft should not use the i~unw~ys and delay air- line aircraft filled with passengers. Here, if control is adequate, and it is our attempt to see that it is, the questiOn is one of delay. and eco- nomics rather than one of safety. Another economic reason advanced frequently is that these are very expensive runways, long ones for jets, and they perhaps should not be used by small aircraft because they do not need all this runway ca- pacity. But, again, this is economic rather than safety. When one looks at the safety aspects, I think one would not look at the character of use asto whether it is general aviation, military, or air carrier. One would look to the capability of the aircraft. For example, a 4-engine Jetstar flown by two ATE pilots would op- erate at substantially the same speed, use the same runway, and so forth, as a 727. From a safety viewpoint, you simply could not dis- tinguish `one from the other. If one also considers that our forecast in the next 10 years is that we foresee about 8,000 turbine aircraft in the general aviation fleet and about 3,500 turbine aircraft in the air car- rier fleet, it looks to us like the business fleet will be larger in terms of the number of jet aircraft than will the airlines. So I think one would look toward equipment, capability, or some- thing other than the character of use. There are, of course, many solutions to the problem. One ~oiution would be, perhaps, that we would provide more airports which would PAGENO="0025" 21 have sufficient runway length and equipment around the major metro- politan areas. This is about the only place where it occurs, where there is a congestion problem. The business aircraft that would use those runways would be at- tracted to them and thereby would be removed from the long, jet run- ways at some of the major metropolitan airports. If you look at the traffic picture in the United States and say we simply will ground all the airplanes which cannot comply with instru- ment flight rules or general aviation, we might look at the volume of traffic that we have. At the present time we are running about 32,000 daily instrument flights in the United. States. We handle about 120,000 daily operations at locations with FAA towers, and we don't know precisely how many operations occur at places where we neither monitor nor measure, but our best estimate is that it is at least double thisamount, or 200,000 to 250,000 flights a day. If we expanded the present IFIR system to require everyone who flies to be under the control of the ground, we would have to expand this number of 32,000 up to some 250,000, which is a manifold in- crease of our capacity. It would cost several billion dollars and take several years to do so, if one thought it was necessary. If we took another tack and said that we would not permit the air- lines to operate at any place where they do not have radar service, for example, we would stop airline service in about 400 cities. Conversely, we would get into a very large radar program in order to equip those cities, or we would simply stop general aviation from operating in and out of those cities a~id ground a large part of the general aviation operations today. We think both the air carriers and general aviation are vital to the economy of the United States. The object is not to restrict either, but to provide the facilities and procedures to give maximum safety to both. There are quite a few things that might be done.. There is no single, dramatic solution to the problem. It simply won't be solved by a single action or a single solution as we see it~ Obviously, we need more air- ports and more reliever airports around the large cities. Obviously, we need to expand the radar and instrument landing systems as we are attempting to do. There are procedural things, and we are working on many of those, such as lowering and expanding the positive control area to provide more protection for the high-speed traffic. We could limit the speeds in the lower airspace so that the aircraft are more compatible with each other. There is a great deal of work continuing on. the expansion of radar services and traffic patterns around airports. This . is a never-ending job which we will continue. On the aircraft, itself, there has been work done over the last 20 years on trying to enhance their conspicuity, such as by better lights, better paints. It hasn't been too productive, but we think more can be done on lighting `and perhaps paints. We are working on enhancing radar returns, both from a passive viewpoint so that the aircraft structure itself reflects radar better, and also on the beacon. As all of you know, there is a great deal of work and now some promise shows on anticollision warning devices, particularly for large aircraft, against large aircraft. But they are some 5 years away. PAGENO="0026" 22 There is also work that we can do on the airman end, in helping to reduce. cockpit workload and particularly to continue education on scanning and keeping a sharp lookout at all times. In summary, I tMnk that it is going to take a lot of actions, con- tinuous work, all of which will contribute to solving the problem. But as far as we can see, there is no single, dramatic solution to the problem at all. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your testimony for the entire group ~ General MCKEE. This completes the testimony. The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank all of you for coming today. I might repeat for the benefit of those who were not here when we commenced that this is not an investigation of the Asheville accident. This is an investigation into what the procedures are that are used so that Congress can be informed. This is not a witch hunt. We are not trying to pin the. blame on anyone. We are not the investigators. These men are the experts. I wanted, as the other Members of Oongress did, to have them here to tell the story. We will observe the 5-minute rule this morning. I have several questions combined into one. I thought maybe I could give them all at one time, combining them. Can you tell us briefly about the current work on the collision avoidance system and when improvements in this area might be ex- pected ? Also, is it necessary at this time to. equip all aircraft with devices which would contribute to a collision avoidance system ? Third, what will be the cost ? Can you have a collision avoidance system without having equipment on all aircraft ~ This all pertains to one subject. General M0KEE. There has been intensive work going on, Mr. Ohair- man, by the FAA, by industry, and by the airlines on a collision avoid- ance system. This has been a subject of deep concern for a number of years. , The latest evelopment by industry, still in the development stage, and which has~not been proved out yet, is a rather complex collision avoidance system. There are a number of companies, three, including McDonnell, Collins, and Bendix, who have been working.on this with the airlines and with us. . The way it looks now in our best estimate, if this proves out to be an effective collision avoidance system, it will be about 5 years before you could get it installed. It would cost between $30,000 and $40,000 to equip each airplane. The airlines are. wiliing..to spend this . amount of money if they can get an effective. system, but I should point out that this is only effective as between one airline aircraft and another, and wouldn'ot be effective as between an airline aircraft `and a general aviation aircraft. If you look at the number of general aviation aircraft in the country, about 100,000, it is obviously impractical to equip all of those airplanes with a device that expensive. We recognize this, and FAA has insti- tuted a development program in an effort to get a system much less expensive that could be installed in all general aviation aircraft. In all honesty, I must say that that is some time away and we have no breakthrough as of this time in this area. PAGENO="0027" 23. In addition to the $30,000 or $40,000, per commercial aircraft for this system, this will also require a ground system which the FAA would have to put up, which we estimate would cost in the neighbor- hood of $50 million. To sum up, this system is sometim.e away. Intensive efforts are being made to develop the system. I would hope by the end of 5 years at least all of our air carrier airplanes can be so equipped and that we can have at least an effective system in that regard. It will be a lot longer before we can do it with all of the aircraft in the airspace. The C1IAIRi~rAN. The last two midair collisions have been in corn- paratively uncongested areas. This is a series of two or three questions again. Is this merely coincidence ~ I would like your comments on the corn- parison of risk between locations such as Urbana, Ohio, and Asheville, N.C., on the one hand, and Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C. on the other hand. General MCKEE. It is certainly a coincidence that the last two mid- air collisions have occurred in areas that are certainly far from being congested. On the one in North Carolina, as pointed out previously, I can~t comment on what caused it. In those areas, we do not hav&-at least in North Carolina-terminal radar. Whether radar would have help~d there or not, I don't know. But I think it is very difficult. to say where you are more likely to have an accident, in one place or another. You would expect these accidents to occur much more frequently in the highly congested areas like Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, than you would in a relatively unçongested area. It is a very difficult question to answer, Mr. Chairman. I wish I could b~ more specific. The CIIAIRMAN. Mr. Friedel ~ . Mr. FRIEDEL. Would you elaborate a little more? Would you con- sider Washington National a very congested~area? ~ .,. General McKEE. The history of Washington National is long, corn- plex, and difficult, Mr. Friedel, as you are well aware. As you know, as a result of the opening up of W~tshington Nation~l to short-haul jets, the subsequent congestion that occurred, we took sorne very pos- itive and direct actions, difficult a~tions~ I might add. * ~ But as a result of our actions, the airlines volunteered to reschedule their flights so that we could limit them to 40 scheduled operations in any one hour. We went to all elements of the general aviation corn- munity and sought from them a voluntary restrictioi~ on the number of general aviation flights into Washington National Airport. They have cooperated very well and so havethe airlines. ~ ~ . . ~ ~ Sure, we have a lot of flights into Washington National, but Ithink it is interesting to note that the nurnber of flights into Washington National in and out today are about the same as~they were in 1959 and 1960. So there has been no dramatic increase in the number of opera- tions. To clear the air a little bit, and looking at all that has been said in various segments of the press and other places, I certainly consider Washington National just as safe as JFK, or O'Hare, Los Angeles, or many other places across the country. I have no hesitation, and apparently a lot of people in the Con- gress have no hesitation, or concern, about going into Washington National. PAGENO="0028" 24 Mr. FRIEDEL. I think we might disagree on that. Only last week- General MOKEE. I agree. I would like to see a lot more people go into Dulles or Friendship. Mr. FRIEDEL. I would, too. But last week I went to New York and the plane was loaded and stayed on station about 15 minutes. Then we went out to the runway and we were there for another 25 minutes. Six planes took off and we were behind them. Then six or seven more came in. I think it is congested. General McKEE. But you can't always blame this, Mr. Friedel, on Washington National. Very frequently planes stand on the ramp at Washington National not because they can't get off of Washington National. It is because they can't get into La Guardia. There is no use in having a plane take off and go up to New York and sit in a stack for an hour. That is a very expensive operation and people don't like it. If you are going to waste time, you might as well waste it on the ground, rather than boring holes up there. Mr. FRIEDEL. I came through the same experience last Friday coming back. We had to stay on the ground for a while because of the conges- tion at Washington National Airport. General MCKEE. I think the problem of congestion, a major problem throughout the United States, will only be resolved when we are able in this country to provide better airports than we now have, airports with more runways, with more ramp space, with more taxiways for commercial operations, as well as general aviation airports to relieve this congestion that we have at the major complexes. I think we also have to recognize and realize that the airport is a l)al't of the air traffic control system., just like radar, communications, and all the rest of it. We can't divorce the airport from this prob- lem. I think 111 the whole air traffic control system, the major l)ottie- neck is the airport. Mr. FRIEDEL. I understand the Asheville tower did not have radar. General MCKEE. It did not. Mr. FRIEDEL. Can you tell us why? General MCKEE. On that subject, and I am glad you raised it, we have in this country about 527 airports that have some form of corn- mercial operations, a lot of them only one, two, or three operations a day, and a lot of which have mostly general aviation operations. We had to put up, which we did, and we reevaluate it every year, a criteria on which an airport will qualify for radar. That criteria is a minimum of 100,000 itinerant operations, plus 20,000 instrumei~t op- erations a year. You say "Why that criteria ? Why isn't it more ? Or why isn't it less?" Well, it is a matter of judgment, and it is the judgment of the best people we have in the air traffic control system, that with operations less than this our present system can reasonably handle the traffic. You say at Asheville this didn't happen, but I don't know, and I can't say, whether or not at this point in time a radar at Asheville would have prevented this accident. I don't know-. But I think this committee should recognize and realize, right or wrong, that we could put radar, we could put instrument landing systems, we could put runway aproach lights on all of these airports now being served by commercial operations, if we are willing to step up the expenditure, the PAGENO="0029" 25 initial expenditure, of between $800 million and $900 million for the system and a recurring expenditure per year to handle all of this of about $150 million to $200 million a year. The OHAIRMAN. Mr. Springer ? * Mr. SPRINGER. General MoKee, the way I figure it, on six accidents this year there were 202 deaths. In figurIng this out on the basis of con- tact with general aviation, this comes out, for the year, if you multi-' plied it-talking about just general aviation-197.10. That is quite a number. General MCKEE. Yes, sir ; it is. Mr. SPRINGER. And if I figured it out right, if you included the same number as you applied the rest of the year, that would be 255 alto- gether, for all kinds. The 197.10 are collisions with general aviation. Now, if I may come to Washington National Airport, in 1966 there were 85,499 general, there were 6,707 military, there were 226,755 commercial transactions. That is a total of 318,963. That makes an average, each day, 365 days a year, of 876 landings and takeoffs, or one every minute and a half. That is a lot of transactions, isn't it? General MCKEE. That is true. Mr. SPRINGER. Your problem at National, as well as O'Hare, Ken- nedy, La Guardia, or any of the rest of them, is the peak hours. General MCKEE. That is true. Mr. SPRINGER. They are coming in faster than every minute and a half, around 4 o'clock, are they not? General M0KEL That is true. Mr. SPRINGER. As I see them line up out there, they are going just as fast as they can take off, aren't they? General MCKEE. Just as fast as it is safe for them to take off. Mr. SPRINGER. Well, that might be true. There were 13 I counted lined up the other day. General MCKEE. The reason they were lined up is for safety pur- poses, one reason. Mr. SPRINGER. I wouldn't deny that, General. I am not trying to im- pinge on that point. But 876 transactions per day is too many, in my opinion, for National Airport. General MCKEE. At Chicago they run as high as 2,000 a day. Mr. SPRINGER. Yes, . sir, and I can tell you that the truth of it is that O'Hare is the busiest airport in the world, and in the wintertime they have more daily transactions in a 24-hour period than all of Western Europe. That is pretty heavy traffic. General MCKEE. At O'Hare, as you know, the general aviation opera- tions are generally small. Mr. SPRINGER. Yes ; I know that. You may say they are small, but there are still some. What would you think, when it could be arranged, that the 24 big- gest airports in the country, in those cities where they have more than one airport, to send the general aviation to some other airport ? I am talking about as a trial starter, to find out how it works, to put general aviation at some other airport. General MCKEE. They are doing this, Mr. Springer, in most of the large terminals. They are doing it in Ohicago, in Los Angeles. There is a major program underway in New York which is very necessary, to provide general aviation airports around the New York area. PAGENO="0030" When you look at the Washington area, we have .a solution. That is provided in the Chairman's bill, to set up a corporation that would include Washington National and Dulles. In that bill, there is authority for the corporation to plan for general aviation airports around the Washington area, whith I think are seriously needed. Mr. SPRINGER. Let's say until the Chairman's bill can be worked out, can we do anything here, in transferring general aviation to the Eolling-Anacostia area, or to Dulles ? That is not doing much business.. General MCKEE. I don't have the authority to do it, unless I can show loud and clear that we have a real safety problem. When you look at the problems all over the United States, I can't declare, in all honesty. Washington National as a crisis airport. It isn't. Mr. SPRINGER. I am glad to hear that, because there are some of us that would differ with you on that. You are certainly a knowledgeable person. I would take your word for almost anything. ~ General MCKEE. There are a lot of people who would seriously dis- agree. I would like to see less traffic at Washington National. I get more complaints every day about Washington National than any other thing in FAA. I get it from everyone in Washington, practically. Anything we can do to relieve Washington National, I am all in favor of. Mr. SPRINGER. What would be wrong with transferring general aviation to Dulles ~ General MoKi~E. I don't have the authority to do that. Mr. SPRINGER. Who does have that authority? General MCKEE. I don't think anybody does. The way the law is set up, when you read the law, the only time I can step in and demand that is if I can justify it strictly on a safety reason. Mr. SPRINGER. You say you can or you can't? General MCKEE. If I can justify it on a safety reason. Righi now I can't do that. Mr. SPRINGER. You think, then, that National as it is, with all these coining in, with these 6,000 military aircraft, that it is safe? General MCKEE. I consider it as safe as any other airport in the country with a like amount of traffic. Mr. SPRINGER. That really doesn't tell me much of anything. General McKEE. Mr. Springer, and you know this as well as I do,. regardless of what we do, we can put in radar at every airport in this country, ILS systems at every airport in the country, it will obviously greatly improve the operations. But even with all of that, and billions of dollars on airports, I couldn't guarantee you a 100 percent safe operation, as long as we have people who make mistakes and as long as we have equipment that goes out. There is no infallibility in this thing. What we subscribe for is the maximum possible safety we can get. Mr. SPRINGRit. I don't think any one challenges that people make mistakes and that equipment will go oat. Those things ~iil happen. But what we are talking about is that the percentages go down. the fewer aircraft come in, don't you think so, with the fewer aircraft us- ing an airport? General McKi~. That is right. If you had none, you would have 100 percent. 26 I ~1 PAGENO="0031" 27 Mr. SPRINGER. That is very true. But if you reduced this, it comes out to 32 percent of the time National Airport is occupied with private aircraft, 32 percent of the time. General MCKEE. I would like to lower that figure substantially. ~ Mr. SPRINGER. Would you agree to that by a transfer to some other airport of general aviation? General MOKEE. If we had the authority to do it and if there were some means of doing it, yes. That is the reason I think we have to step up to building additional general aviation airports around the Wash- ington area. I don't think Dulles is the permanent solution. If we were sitting here in 1973, this committee would be complaining to the Ad- ministrator about the congestion at Dulles. Mr. SPRINGER. That is only a partial answer. I think you `are try- ing to be fair about this. I do want to pursue it later. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moss. Mr. Moss. Mr. Allen, in your `first paragraph you talk about the difficulty of staffing the four teams because of the scarcity of specialists. `To what do you attribute this scarcity of specialists necessary for the teams? Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Moss, I think the shortages ~o directly to the allo- cation of resources tio the Bureau in the acquisition of people. Mr. Moss. Have you requested more funds from the Congress in order to complete the recruitment of the personnel and `been denied them? Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. Over the past several years, the' funds ap- proved have been less than the funds requested. Mr. Moss. Have they been specifically identified as being funds for these purposes? Mr. ALLEN. I think, sir ; we have identified-let's talk in terms of positions. We have identified positions which are related to investiga- tive activities in terms of man-years. These positions have been denied. Mr. Moss. The import of your statement, General McKee, on Washington National, in response to Mr. Springer's question, was that really it has no more flights today than it had in 1960, some 7 years ago. General MCKEE. I said about the same. We have the exact figures. Mr. Moss. Is this a very reliable criteria ? Is the type of aircraft, the speed of the aircraft, the size of the aircraft of greater significance than just the total numbers of aircraft? General McKm~. I don't think so, Mr. Moss, in terms of air traffic control. But it is very definitely a great deal different in terms of congestion on the ground and in terms of the number of passengers~ carried. Many more passengers are being carried now. Mr. Moss. Isn't it also in the air, if a plane is moving with a much greater speed, isn't it in effect shrinking the air space? General MCKEE. I will let Mr. Thomas, my expert in air traffic control, answer that. He flies into Washington National all the time in jets. He understands it better than I do. Mr. THoMAs. Mr. Moss, Washington National is one of the few' airports that hasn't increased in numbers of operations during the past few years, even with the addition of jets, because the level of traffic has been maintained arbitrarily. The approach speeds for jets PAGENO="0032" 28 are under 200 knots, usually under 180 knots and down to 125 or less over the fence. The piston airplanes of 10 years ago were approach- ing at 150 and 120 or so over the fence. There is not that much differ- ence in the speed. The airplane only occupies the runway for about 40 or 50 seconds and when a runaway is not occupied it is safe for another one to do so. I think the problem here is inconvenience rather than safety. The parking ramps are congested, and people do wait because there are other airplanes there. But I think the problem is inconvenience to the passenger. Mr. Moss. I think you can throw in a few others, but I won't bother to take the time to go into that. General McKEE. I could spend a great deal of time on that one. Mr. Moss. Let's consider the cities where we have no radar. It was indicated that the criteria applied is volume of traffic. Doesn't the criteria also take into consideration some of the characteristics which might occur around those airports : weather, whether or not it is subject to localized fog or haze, whether there is unusual turbulence at certain seasons of the year or certain times of the day ? Aren't those items equally important ~ There is an abundance of evidence that you can lpse many lives at small airports. The instant case is proof of that. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir, any criteria we have, obviously, is just a guide and not precise ; 100,000 operations are not much different than 99,000. This is why we also put in the instrument operations to take into account the weather. Only 20,000 instrument operations are required. ~ There are places that do have adverse weather. We obviously do look *at other characteristics. But as a general rule in speaking of radar, this gives us a pretty good handle upon the type they should have as well as volume. Mr. Moss. What is the cost for radar at Hendersonville? Mr. THOMAS. The general price is around $650,000 for the radar, and another $100,000 to $150,000 for the air traffic control facilities that go with it. So for $750,000 we could equip it. Mr. Moss. What would you estimate the cost of the crash at Hender- sonville to be? Mr. THOMAS. Sir, I have not tried to compute that. It is very expen- ~ive in terms of life and dollars. Mr. Moss. Mr. Ohairman, I wonder if we could request that. The CHAIRMAN. A's soon as they ~ould gather it. I think that is ~omething that should go `into the record. (The following information was subsequently submitted:) STATEMENT oi~ FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ON ESTIMATED COST OF HENDERSON\TILLE (N.C.) CRASH In his testimoily before the Committee, the Deputy Administrator said that the cost of the accident is very expensive in terms of life and dollars. At this point, it would be poslsible to estimate sOme elements of the cost. For example, the cost of two new aircraft of the type involved in the accident would be about $4.5 mil- lion. Of course, the most serious loss in connection with the accident is the lives of the passengers and crews. We are not able to describe that loss of life in terms of cost. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Devine? Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to direct my inquiry to Mr. Thomas, if I may. PAGENO="0033" 29 In sheer numbers or volume on a comparison basis, Mr. Thomas, am I correct in assuming that there are approximately 2,000 commercial nireraft and approximately 100,000, I believe to be the figure that Gen~ eral McKee `used, of the general aviation aircraft? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. I believe the figure for commercial now is about 2,400 or 2,500. Mr. DEviNE. So for every commercial aircraft there are roughly 50 general aviation aircraft? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. I hope the public recognizes that. They generally think there are more commercials than general aviation aircraft. Mr. THOMAS. And we might also note that there are another 25,000 military aircraft occupying the same air space. Mr. DEVINE. In addition? Mr. THOMAS. In addition. Mr. Di~vn~. I know you are acquainted with Norman Crabtree, the State director of aviation in my State of Ohio. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. lie has suggested that a study be matTe of the desir~ ~b~1ity of establishing climb and descent corridors for jets departing from and arriving at major airports. I believe at Lockburn,TAO Base, in my district, they have established that in a southwestern direction. The general aviation must stay out of those corridors. Have you pur- sued that in the past ? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir, we have examined that at length. It was one of the solutions that we hoped to apply for the ~rery high performance military aircraft as compared to the performance of the civiljet. Here we were talking about "afterburner" climbs of very high rates, where the airplane pilot feels like he is on his back. He is not actually, but it is very difficult to see ahead because of the airplane angle. `So we did try to protect the high performance operation with the c1im~b corridors. It hasn't been too successful, de~pite the fact that the corridors are marked on the maps. People do wander into them.~ Another problem is that usually departing aircraft want to go in unother direction. The wind is another direction, for example. If we placed them all around each airport, we~ would completely block the air space. Our own view is that it is better to hold the speed and the performance down and give radar advisories, which would offer more safety than trying `to sterilize the air space for two or three operations a day for high performance. That, perhaps~, is nOt itecessary. Mr. DEvINE. I believe, General McKee, you figured that 80 percent of the aircraft is 12,000 feet or under.. Mr. THOMAS. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. But all aviation must go through this area in landing and taking off. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. IDEVINE. On a personal experience standpoint, I was talking to u physician over the weekend and in his practice he is examining flight tower personnel. He said that he was appalled at the number of flight tower personnel who wouldn't fly for love nor money because they know the situation that is up there. PAGENO="0034" 30 I think this is something that should be of concern to all people. That is one of the reasons we should haverather broad hearings, Mr. Chairman, so that we can satisfy the public that everything is being done that should be done in this area. ~ Have you a comment ? . . General MCKEE. I have a comment, Mr. Devine. Occasionally, when- ever we can, we try to take the tower personnel on a trip to some other place where they can see another type of operation, like going into New York. As far as I know, we haven't had anyone refuse to go yet. Mr. DEvINE. I know, there are some frantic times in those towers. I have a great deal of respect and admiration for these men. I don't know why they all don't have nervous breakdowns after a while. Mr. THOMAS. A large number of them are pilots and were selected on that basis. The CI-IAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. Mr. ROGEES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKee, I understand you said there are about 418 airports that serve commercial aviation that do not have this surveillance radar. Is that about correct? General MCKEE. That figure is correct. Mr. ROGERS. How many airports are served by scheduled commercial aviation that don't even have towers? General MCKEE. Without towers? Mr. THOMAS. 285, Mr. Rogers. Mr. ROGERS. As I understand it, you have a criteria where as soon as they have enough numbers of planes coming in and out this triggers whether they would get a tower or radar. General MCKEE. That is correct. Mr. RoGERs. How many airports have qualified under your criteria that do not yet have radar and do not yet have towers ? Could you give methose figures? Mr. THoMAs. Under the present criteria that we read for radar~ there are some six. On towers there are around 50. Mr. ROGERS. When was your criteria last changed? Mr. THoi~1As. I believe it was last changed about 1960. It was last reviewed in 1965 and reevaluated. It is looked at about every other year. Mr. ROGERS. But there has been no change since 1960 in the criteria? Mr. THoMAs. No, sir ; the tower one has stood the test of time very well and the radar one was changed about 6 years ago. It was looked at again last year. Correction, 1965. Mr. ROGERS. What is your budget request for radar systems in the present budget, and for towers? Mr. THOMAs. There is nothing in the budget request for radar sys- tems or towers in the.current budget. Mr. RoGERs. Nothing? Mr. THOMAS. That is correct. Mr. ROGERS. As I understand it, your agency is going to get into the SST, which is already at approximately $700 million, if this appropria- tion is approved, and the House has already approved $142 million. Do you give greater priority to the SST than to the radar systems and towers that perhaps do something on safety now? PAGENO="0035" 31 General MCKEE. Mr. Rogers, I would like to answer that question. It is not a question of the FAA giving priority to radar or to the SST. The FAA just happens to be the manager of the SST program. The SST program is an administration program. Mr. ROGERS. I realize that. Radar programs are administration, too. General MCKEE. I am not in a position to say let's cancel the SST program to get more radars. Mr. ROGERS. As I understand it, the idea originated in Germany some years ago. General MCKEE. I think the idea of an SST started long before the FAA got into it. It started in NASA. I do know that General Quesada was interested in it. Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask you this question, because I don't have too much time. From my understanding of the testimony so far, it seems that this small plane was about 12 miles off. There were cloudy con- ditions. Wouldn't radar help a pilot in that condition? As I understand, Atlanta had told him to come over to Asheville. Wouldn't radar help them identify where those planes were and they could give a warning to the pilots ? Isn't that the purpose of the radar? General MCKEE. Radar obviously has two purposes. That is the reason that it is concentrated in the high-density areas. Radar greatly speeds up traffic, control of traffic. It also serves another purpose of identifying where an aircraft is and giving a warning. With regard to the Asheville problem, as the chairman pointed out I am in a position now, as the Administrator of the FAA where I can- not appropriately comment on what could or might have happened or what radar would or might have done. Mr. ROGERS. I understand that. You don~t have the facts. We are not asking you. You don't make a determination of that. I am saying assuming. ~ General MCKEE. As a general matter, with money no object, as I pointed out, obviously there are many areas in the country that from our point of view, and the responsibility we have, sure, we would like to have radar. But there is a question of priority in the budget, looking at the overall national programs. Mr. ROGERS. But you have none requested in the budget this year. General MCKEE. There is none before the Congress. Mr. THOMAS. There are no new ones. We have funds for the opera- tion this year for six new radars goingin as well as 10 towers. But they were all in last year's budget. As far as new radars are concerned, there are none in the budget. Mr. ROGERS. May I conclude by saying this, that I realize the. anti- collision device is some years away, as I believe you said. I understand that from many experts. But it seems to me in areas * where we can now do something, such as radar and control towers, this is the prob- lem we ought to attack. We know something can be done. I would hope that the Budget people and your own people would review your criteria and certainly your request for additional radar and control towers. General MCKEE. I would like to say here, Mr. Rogers, that looking at the fantastic growth in aviation, both air carrier and general avia- tion, I would agree that this question must be reexamined hard and cold in the light of the overall situation in the country. PAGENO="0036" 32 If it appears that it should be done, I am prepared to come in and recommend it. Mr. ROGERS. That is encouraging, General. I think that would be helpful. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harvey. Mr. HARVEY. General McKee, in your judgment, is a good system of radar a solution to this problem, or should research and develop- ment develop a system that isnot yet in existence? General MCKEE. Both, Mr. Harvey. The radar system but even more important, really, than radar, is the instrument landing approach systems. I think they go hand in hand. This will give us right now, with the state of the art being here, a substantial improvement. I covered for you the collision avoidance system and where we stand with it. We are also carrying on research and development in air traffic control systems beyond what we see today. We have to look beyond 1975 and look at the environment with which we will be con- fronted in the hopes that we will be able to manage and control the traffic in that era, where you will have jumbo jets, jets of all kinds, more and more jets coming in, the supersonic transport operating. So that is the picture we are confronted with. But we cannot rela,~ in the area of research and development. Mr. HARVEY. But the airport actually had ILS, didn't it? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; it did. Mr. HARVEY. It was not on in this case? Mr. THOMAS. No, sir ; it was on the opposite direction. It was on a 34 end for north landings and they were using a 16 end, for a south landing. Mr. HARVEY. Last year we were talking about the New Orleans crash, General, where a Delta airliner had been practicing land- ing and takeoffs, with two engines out on landing, and so on. We all generally agreed at that time that that was a poor practice, of doing that over a metropolitan area. Has the FAA issued any regulations since that time to prevent that sort of thiii'g from happening again? General MCKEE. As a result of that hearing and my commitment to the committee, the FAA had a series of meetings within the Air Transport Association, the Airline Pilots Association, and we did take a number of actions. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I made a report in writing to the committee of the actions that we had taken. I have carried out my commitment. I don't know whether you want to take time now, but we are preparedto go into it. Mr. HARVEY. Have you reported that to this committee? General MCKEE. Yes, it has been reported to this committee. Mr. HARVEY. I was not aware of that, Mr. Chairman. I don't be- lieve the membership of the committee has received that information, so far as I know. Those are aUthe que~tiOns I have, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The clerk, will be instructed to see that every member of the committee receives the information referred to. Mr. Van Deerlin? Mr. VAN DEERLIN. ~Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PAGENO="0037" 33 General, our attention this morning, very understandably, has been concentrated in Asheville, the scene of the most recent collision, and at National Airport here in Washington. I would like to waft your attention westward, if I may, to what is probably the second or third most crowded airspace corridor in the Nation, that of southern California. I have ascertained from your of- fice in Los Angeles that just this year, in April and again in May, there were two near midair collisions reported on flights leaving San Diego International Airport. The first was on April 22, involving a Western Airlines 720 which had taken off on a Los Angeles-bound flight shortly past noon. The plane had to take evasive action at 8,000 feet to avoid two Navy jet fighters, which were apparently doing acro- batics in the path of a conimercial liner. The WAL pilot said he had to take evasive action, and claimed a near collision. Again on May 24, American Airlines flight 46, a Boeing 727, cle- parted from Lindbergh Field for Dallas. Six minutes later the pilot reported he had passed in close proximity with an unidentified light aircraft. That unidentified plane turned out to be a single-engine Navion, which later landed at Lindbergh Field. The private pilot acknowledge he was unfamiliar with San Diego airspace and uncertain of his position at the time of the near collision. FAA wrote it up as an unofficial near midair collision. In connection with this one, the FAA explained that planes are released visually for takeoff from Lindbergh Field by the control tower. Radar control, which is based at a Navy field some 5 miles away, is supposed to pick them up within 1 mile of the end of the runway. The commercial pilot in this near mishap got no word from this radar protection, although radar had picked up the other plane. It was somehow not made available to the pilot. Inasmuch as the mishap occurred some minutes after he left the runway, I was wondering why it is that here is a field which is pro- tected by radar-and I don't expect that you right offhand can have the answer-why there should be a delay in getting messages like this to the pilots ? . . General MCKEE. I think Mr. Thomas is acquainted with the partic- ular incident you are talking about. Mr. THOMAS. I am acquainted with both of them. In the latter case, the radar is at Miramar, and we operate a Navy radar there for the benefit of the whole San Diego area. The American pilot, as I under- stand it, had not changed his departure control frequency. He was still working the local control frequency with the tower. The radar did see both airplanes. They did pick up the light air- plane. American passed almost immediately after takeoff. Neither of them declared it .a near miss, although undoubtedly it was close. We examined both of them. In the case of the Western and the two Navy airplanes, Western reported them as F4's. We followed them on radar until we lost radar coverage and had the other Navy bases try to pick them up. El Toro did pick up two A4's. There was not continuous radar contact and the A4's claimed they were not in the area. We went back to the Western PAGENO="0038" I 34 pilot and he said they were F4's, and the Navy is still searching for two F4 pilots in that area and we haven't found them yet. But you do bring up the point of a need for continuous and almost instantaneous frequency changes. That is an equipment problem we are working on. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. Do you find in general a reluctance on the part of commercial pilots, possibly for commercial reasons, to refrain from reporting near misses ~ Mr. THOMAS. This has been stated, and has been stated by the pilots. Idon't think it has anything to do with the commercial reasons. I think it is more a fear of punitive action in case they were in error, either by location or altitude or something else. We are working with the pilot groups to try to get all the informa- tion we can and remove any possibility of punitive action. We want the facts as much as they do, to see what corrective action can we take. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. I notice in the second one, the Dallas-bound flight, the pilot had refrained from recording it as a near collision, yet the FAA seems to have reached a different conclusion and has so logged it. Mr. THOMAS. There was a surprise effect. There was a light fog there. The American `727' was emerging out of it and the Navion was on top of it. They both were surprised. I really don't know how close they came. It is a situation that we would like to correct. Whether it was an actual near miss or not. We would like to prevent surprises. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. We have considerable military flights all over southern California, in addition to an increasing commercial and pri- vate flight capacity. General MCKEE. As a matter of policy, we would like very much to see all. real near misses reported because if we have the facts it gives us a good line on corrective action to be taken. I don't believe in sweep- ing any of this stuff under the rug. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Broyhill. Mr. BROYHILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. An airline pilot receives training and retraining in the course of their careers as airline pilots. Are private pilots required tO take any retraining or recertification at any time ? ~ Mr. THOMAS. No, sir ; they are not. Mr. BROYHILL. Has the FAA ever gone into this, to see whether you should require recertification? Mr. Tnoa~rAs. Yes, sir ; we have several times in the past. As a matter of fact, we are right now. Anything we would do in this regard ob- viously has to be handled under rulemaking, where we go out for corn- ment. We do think that reexamination by FAA or checking by an in- structor, or some demonstrations of recent experience demonstration would be helpful. General MCKEE. I think your point is well taken, Mr. Broyhill. We recognize it and are moving in this direction. Mr. BRovrnLL. All pilots do have to take a physical examination periodically. General McK~n~. That is correct. Mr. THoMAs. Yes, sir, and they must have had reieency of experienee for any particular operation, such as landing, a takeoff, instruments, and so on, before they can carry passengers. PAGENO="0039" 35 Mr. BROYHILL. How is this enforced or how is it policed by the FAA? General MOKEE. The pilot statement. It is up to him to prove it in case anything goes wrong. It is not something that we could conven- iently enforce or police any more than we can the last time he drove an automobile. Mr. BR0YHILL. The controllers are also continually trained and re- trained ? Do you have a program in this regard? General MCKEE. Yes, sir. The controllers get a great deal of training. They are checked frequently. They are checked for each position which they operate. They are under constant supervision. This is an en- tirely different situation than a case where a member of the general public operates something, and not under direct supervision, as in the case of a controller, or an airline pilot, for that matter. Mr. BROYHILL. In the Asheville-Hendersonville case, are you in a position at the present time to state whether or not you feel there was any lapse in the procedures, the prescribed procedures? General MCKEE. I don't think we should comment on that at all, Mr. Broyhill. Mr. BROYHILL. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pickle. Mr. PIcKLR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKee, I address this question to you, and to any represent- ~tive of the CAB who might be here. Why is i*t that the special Commission which has been set up to study airport congestion has not been more aggressive in making some announcement of plans or in holding public meetings, or in making recommendations either to us or to the Congress? It seems to me that this special Commission has been both hesitant, timid, and certainly secretive in making known to the Congress its recommendations. I will admit that you and Mr. Murphy, whom I assume head this Board jointly, have done a lot of planning. But so far as I know you have not given to us a plan or some kind of a concerted approach to this problem. Your Commission has been in existence now for 8 or 9 months. I know that members of our subcommittee met with you and we know you are sympathetic to the problem. You said early this morning that the main problem here is airport congestion, and not just this one accident. Though, of course, we are looking into that this morning. But the biggest problem that faces us is a~irport congestion. That covers the whole field. Why haven't you all made some sort of recommendations? General MCKEE. Sir, I think there is a little misunderstanding about the Commission. This committee is cochaired by the Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Boyd, and the Chairman of the CAB, Mr. Mur- phy. I wanted to. get that straight on the record. I am not in very much of a position to speak for those two distinguished gentlemen. I can say that it is my understanding, and I have to underline that, that Mr. Murphy and Mr. Boyd have made a recommendation to the White House. It is further my understanding that their recom- mendations are under review. As to when a report will be made on these recommendations, Mr. Pickle~ I am not in a position to answer. PAGENO="0040" 36 Mr. PIoKLi~. I do recall now it was Secretary Boyd and Mr. Murphy who headed this Commission. I regret that neith6r one of them are here. I will address those questions to them later. I can see why you would hesitate to speak for them. But it is so secret we don't even know who is a member of this special Commission. Why would that be, gentlemen? General MCKEE. I can't answer that question. Mr. PICKLE. I sure am full of questions but I have the wrong man to ask. Mr. ROGERS. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. PICKLE. Yes. Mr. RooERs. Dots the FAA have to wait for an outside commission before you can make a recommendation concerning the safety of airports? General MCKEE. No, sir ; we don't Mr. Rooiu~s. What recommendations has your agency made? General McKi~E. We do all we can in terms of the appropriations we have under the Federal Aid to Airport Act. There is an authoriza- tion, as you know, of $75 million a year. I am sure you are aware of the action Congre~s has taken on these appropriations. Within the resources we have we are taking every step forward we can. Mr. ROGERS. I am not very encouraged by that answer. I don't even find a request for more radar and more towers in your budget to the Congress. You are not even requesting them. I don't think that is a very good answer. I thank the gentleman for yielding. . Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, I am going to address my questions on this point to the CAB and the Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Boyd. The CiIAIRMAN. Mr. Watson. Mr. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sure the gentlemen sitting at the witness table are as concerned as I am. They say in golf that it is not only the way iou address the ball or approach it but the followthrough that gives you a good shot. I have been concerned about the interest that has been shown by this committee and by your agencies whenever we have these tragedies occur. Perhaps the answer has been given to the chairman of the committee or to the staff, but as I recall there was an extensive investigation on several 727 crashes. So far as I know, I have never seen any follow- through on the part of those making the investigation. We are concerned about congestion, but as I understand it this crash in Ilendersonville was not a question of any congestion, but simply a matter of a plane in the process of taking off colliding apparently with one in the process of landing. Is that a~bout it, Mr. Allen? Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. You had one aircraft, the Piedmont flight 22, departing Asheville Airport and the Cessna 310 was approaching for a landing at the Asheville Airport. PAGENO="0041" 37 Mr. WATSON. As I recall your reading some of the flight recordings, :at one time was it not indicated that these planes were identified as berng 3 to 4 miles apart? Mr. ALLEN. No, sir, I don't recall that there was any distance given in the transcripts that I read. Mr. WATSON. Well, we will not pursue that. I am sure your investiga- tion has not been completed. I am sure all of you have read the book by Capt. Vernon W. Lowell. I don't know the gentleman, but he makes some rather serious and grave statements. He deals with this matter of midair collisions. lie states, and I wonder if any of you gentlemen will verify it, that the statistics on near collisions are shocking. There are approximately 500 traflic-controlled near-misses in the United States annually that reach the record books, and he would con- dude that many are never reported. Is that factual, according to your record, Mr. Thomas? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; there are between 400 and 600 a year reported. We investigate those. How many that occur and are not reported, obviously, we don't know. This is out of about 250,000 flights a day. Mr. WATSON. Yes ; but over 500 reported is a rather grave matter, isn't it? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. WATSON. He states further that when you have a midair col- lision there are seldom any survivors. That would be your experience, wouldn't it? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. WATSON. I wonder what, specifically, your agency has done ii~ trying to reduce this. This gentleman states further, and I do applaud him for not only criticizing but making some suggestions, on. page 85, that, "There is in existence now an electronic collision warning do- vice," and he recommends that all aircraft, large and small, be equipped with that. Would youcom.ment on that statement ? General MCKEE. I have already commented at length on the status of the collisioii avoidance system, Congressma~n. Mr. WATSON. Perhaps I was reading this book and didn't hear you. I did hear some discussion about anticollision. I know the pilot would have to avoid the collision. I am thinking about a warning device. General McKEE. I made a complete statement on that, sir. I have a piece of paper that I didn't use in talking to it, but I would be happy to give it to you. It would give you the exact status of where that stands. Mr. WATSON. I would behappy to read it. Is there or is there not such a thing as an electronic collision warning device in existence today? General MoKi~s. There is not. It is only in the research and develop- ment area. There is not one in production nor is there one that has been proved out. Mr. WATSON. To your satisfaction or to whose satisfaction? I PAGENO="0042" 38 General MCKEE. To the satisfaction of the FAA, the industry and even the manufacturers. They have made great progress, very great progress. We are going to proceed into the actual hardware of making three of these. Each company is going to do it. They will be proof- tested to determine which is the best and to determine if it is really an effective system. If it is, the airlines have agreed that they will put it into their airplanes. FAA would have to come up to the Congress and ask for some $50 million, which we are prepared to do, to put in the ground system. Mr. WATSON. We are all aware of the accelerated speeds at which planes travel tday, and you cannot rely upon visual observations You would be on top of one another by the time you saw the plane~ You would have to resort to some electronic or radar device for de- tection of an oncoming plane. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. I just want to s~ty one more thing on the collision warning device. The Air Transport Association within the last 30 days has issued specifications for such a device. This is a result of industry, government and the airlines all working together on it~ So all the brains that we know how to get on it have been on this problem. With regard to the speeds, obviously, there is a speed where see and be seen is no longer valid. The only solution to that at the present time is radar control. This is why we have positive radar control at the high altitudes where those speeds are exercised. Mr. WATSON. Thank you. I hope we can pursue this diligently. This man further states that we have had 15 midair collisions in the past 20 years. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rooney. Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, I will direct my questions to General McKee. General, as you know, during the past 2 years of your adminis~ tration I have been trying actively to ~et radar installed at the Allen~ town-Bethiehem-Easton Airport. This airport is no different than the Hendersonville Airport or any other airport in the country. You speak about radar and you see the need for radar. You wish you could establish radar facilities at every airport in the countryd You made that statement, is that correct? General MCKEE. I said it would be highly desirable, obviously, if money was not an object. Mr. ROONEY. Every reply I have had from your office is always in dollars and cents versus lives. Last year, in fiscal 19~37, under the new facilities and equipment, how much was requested by FAA? General MCKEE. In fiscal 1967? Mr. RoowEr. Yes. General MCKEE. On radar? Mr. ROONEY. Well, new facilities and equipment. Doesn't that in- clude radar? General MCKEE. The total for facilities and equipment that was re- quested of the Congress was $28 million. Our request was $73 mil- lion. That was to the Bureau of the Budget. PAGENO="0043" 39 Mr. ROONEY. You requested $28 million in fiscal 1967 and you were granted $28 million. G*meral McKEi~. That is right. Mr. RooNEY. This was $11 million less than you requested in fiscal 1966. So why don't you request more money? General MCKEE. I think in that regard, Mr. Rooney, we have to look at the overall situation in the U.S. Government. AU of the agen- cies of the Government, obviously, would like to have everything they think they want. Obviously, if everyone got what they thought they wanted, we would have a budget many billions of dollars more than the budget we have today. I am only a part of an administration. We have to take into account the other problems. We have a problem in Vietnam. We have prob- lems of highway safety. We have problems of marine safety. So there are a lot of things that are highly desirable but, neverthe- less, in the priority system we can't justify them. Mr. IROONEY. You are now talking like the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. You told me that you needed the money, that we needed the facilities, and yet you don't request the money to install radar installations throughout the country. Let's get back to 100,000 itinerant operations. That is a misnomer. We at the Allentown-Bethlehem Airport have 103,000 itinerant opera- tions, but unfortunately, 37,000 of those are local. What difference does it make if you have a local plane landing and taking off to go to Washington and return to the A-B Airport ? If you have 100,000 flights in and out of that airport, why can't they qualify for radar? Mr. THOMAS. The reasoning behind it is that the local flights are familiar with the area and by our definition are those that are gen- erally within the traffic pattern. From our viewpoint, those that re- quire more traffic handling, particularly a function of the Federal Government, are those from away from that airport. Those in the traffic pattern we did not count. We have been giving consideration to counting those as well. At the time they occupy the runway they look just like any other airplane. Mr. ROONEY. I have two final questions. General McKee, I would like to ask one other question about the 1966 request of $51 million for new facilities and equipment. You were granted $49 million. How much of that was spent? General MCKEE. This was in 1966? Mr. RooNEY. Yes. General MCKEE. We asked for $51 million and were granted $49.8 million. Do you want the status of the expenditures? Mr. ROONEY. You were granted $49 million in 1966. How much was unexpended? General MCKEE. I don't have that figure with me. Mr. ROONEY. It is in the neighborhood of $25 million. PAGENO="0044" 40 General 1~iCIcEE. I will have to fiiinish that. for the record. I can assure. you that we sI)encl it as fast as we ieasoiiably caii when we get. it. ( The followiiig infoiinat ion was su I ~s~'q ii en t ly sl1l)In] t.t.ed :) FEDERAL AvIA'i~oN ADMINISTRATION SiAT1~1I~xT ON TJNo1~LIoMED l3ArANCE o~' FISCAL YEAR 1966 FAcILITIES AND EQUIPMENT APPRoPRIATIoN Of the $49.8 million Facilities and Equipineiit money authorized for FY 1966, obligations of $30.1 million have been incurred as of June 30, 1967. In regard to the unobligated balance of $19.7 million, these funds are programmed for completion of projects which have been started. Included in this amount is $12.7 million for automation and $3.8 million for air traffic control tower facilities. Mr. R00NEY. I believe Mr. Alien made a statement about the physical condition of the pilot in the geiieral aviatioii 1)1ai~e, and said his age ~and said that he did have corrective lenses and was told to carry :aflOtheI~ i)air of glasses in the plane. 1-lave you any idea whether or not. the l)ilOt had his glasses on at the time ~ Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Rooney, at; this point in time we have not been able to determine whether or not the pilot was wearing glasses, nor that he carried another pair in the aircraft. That does not mean that they were not there. It is a very difficult and painstaking search to locate these items. Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no fiuther questions, but I believe something is wroig with our entire operation on how we get to the formula for itinerant operations and I think something ought to be (lone for the FAA to install more radar facilities in every airport in this coui~t.ry that has an operatioii of 100,000, whether it is itinerant operations or locally based operations. The ChAIRMAN. Mr. Brot.zman ~ MI'. BROTZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Time being what it is, I don't think we can go into all the areas that this committee really needs to look into in the limited time we have. I personally feel that the recent occurrences demand that we proceed further i;o know more about the whole area of air safety. I have one question specifically, however : Is there a definition of a near-miss ? What are we talking about when we talk about a near- miss? I1~'fr. TT-ioxrAs. Yes. sir. The O1)vJOIls ciefimtjori is when a pilot reports a near-miss. We spend a great deal of time on it. We have classified them in no hazard, that is, when direction and altitude would have made a midair collision improbable regardless of evasive action taken. lYe get some reports of pilots watching for 2 miimtes and a near-miss occins, or he was at least 1,000 feet away. We tend to discoimt those. Then we classify as potential, an incident which would probably have resulted in a collision if no action had been taken by either pilot. A proximity of less than 500 feet would usually by reqmrecl in this case ; that is where the pilot actually sees the situation and takes ~.ct.ion and avoids it. Then we say critical is a situation where collision avoidance was due to chance rather than the act on the part of the pilot. In other I I I I PAGENO="0045" 41 words, he just saw something go by and took no action or didn't see it in time. Of these 500 or 600 reported a year, there are very few that fall in the critical category. One of the reasons they may or may not, and we don't feel too good about our own statistics because we rarely get the other pilot's view, it is an unknown aircraft and we can't find him, so we have one pilot's view. Sometimes we have two, as in the case of the Navion-American flight. In the case of the Western and the two Navy aircraft, we don't know, so we just classify that as either potential or critical, because we don't know. Mr. BROTZMAN. Are most of these near-misses occurring in airports where they do not have radar? Mr. THOMAS. No, sir. There are two reasons for that. One is a large number of them occur en route where it is not a terminal situation at all. In the terminal situation where we have radar, we have the most traffic and, therefore, the most potential. Where we don't have radar we have the least potential. We have analyzed them. Quite often you will find that they are in the terminal area with visibility of more than 5 miles. There will be a slight preponderance either departing or taking off and not just in the traffic pattern. So we find almost and equal number of them en route, and it is very random. Mr. BROTZMAN. I believe you mentioned a moment ago that there seems to be some fear of reporting a near-miss, because of threatened punitive action. Is this the company that penalizes the pilot for some- thing he has done, or is it the FAA? Mr. THOMAS. The penalty would come from us. Of course, as I say, we are now trying to arrange to get the information without any penalty. But a pilot reports a near-miss and we examine it. The way the fear originated was that we examined and found out that he was at the wrong altitude or hadn't followed his instruc- tions or something else, some other violation. We then took some action. This is reputed to have dried up the near-misses. However, I notice that the critical ones that are reported continue about the same. We are trying to encourage the pilots to give us all the information they can. Even if we find them in the wrong, we will not impose a penalty because we want to know the proper cor- rective action. Mr. BROTZMAN. It would seem for us to understand this problem fully, . we have to be able to nail these statistics down more ac- curately. I am just relying on a newspaper account that I read this morning, stating that in 1966 there were 463 near-misses reported, but that the average since 1960 has been 532. This would indicate, if these figures are even in the ball park, that either the situation is getting better, which I doubt, or that there are, in fact, a lot of near-misses that are not reported. Mr. THOMAS. Since the traffic is growing rapidly, the potential for near-misses would be increasing. The actual number reported is going down somewhat. I would suspect the situation is not improving, as the reports would indicate. Mr. BROTZMAN. I thank the chairman. PAGENO="0046" 42 General MCKEE. The main thing, I think, Mr. Brotzman, is we have to get to the bottom of this. That is the reason I am willing to take off the penalty and get the pilot to report so we find out what the situation really is. Mr. THOMAS. Could I add one more thing? We have tried anonymous reporting. They were so anonymous that we had absolutely nothing. We just couldn't do anything with it. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair notes that we have been in session now for some two hours and a half. If it is all right with the panel, we will resume at 2 o'clock. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock, ( Whereupon, at 12 :38 the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.) AFTER RECESS ( The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Harley 0. Staggers, chairman, presiding.) The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. When we stopped the proceedings at noontime, Mr. Satterfield was to question~ Mr. O'Connell, did you want to make a statement at this time that perhaps would be pertinent? Mr. O'CoNNi~u~. If you will permit me to. Mr. Chairman, I have before me a summary of midair collisions which have occurred in the TJriited States between 1956 and 1967. I also have before me a breakdown of those indicating in some detail the type of aircraft, the time of day, and pertinent information with re- spect to them. The summary is readily available, and has already been released, although not as up to date as this. The detail which ac- companies it contains very valuable information, and it occurs to me that it would be very helpful if it were included in these proceedings, and I would like to offer it. The CHAIRMAN. It will be included at this point in the record. Thank you. ( The material referred to follows :~ MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION, 1956-67 Year Number of Total accidets Fatal Number of* fatalities Number Air of accidents by segme Air Air carrier carrier ts of aviatio General aviation n involved General carrier (general (military) aviation) (military) aviation 1956 17 11 161 1 1 0 1 14 1957 1958 1959 1960 15 16 13 26 6 12 10 10 1 19 86 20 2 152 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 4 0 4 2 3 2 10 12 10 19 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966(preliminary 1967 (preliminary) Total 20 19 13 15 27 14 11 10 22 9 27 3 6 7 12 14 30 6 21 9126 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C) 21 0 5 2 2 2 0 2 20 14 11 13 24 13 6 206 107 682 3 8 4 25 166 Includes 3 persons on ground. 2 Includes 6 persons on ground. Source: Department of Transportation, National Transportatins Safety Board, Bureau of Aiation Safety, July 20, 1967. PAGENO="0047" Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action 5± None Traffic pat- Go-around~__ Practice No No. tern. -- _do do Level off! 1mg No Yes. touchdown. 5+ ___do do Ldg. final ap- Air taxi No No. proach. passg. __do do Initial climb do No No. 5+ VFR 1 ml Cruise Solo No Unk. None_~ 1 mi do Pleas No Unk. 5+ _~do Traffic pat- Final ap- Pleas No No. tern. proach. do do Pleas No No. 5+ _..do 2 ml Climb to Practice No No. cruise. 2 ml do do No No 5+ _...do 2 ml Climb to Practice No No. cruise. _....do 2 ml do do No No. 5+ _..do Traffic pat- Initial climb~ DuaL No Yes. tern. do do Solo No No. Docket Date No. toôation MIDATh COLLISIONS, U.S. CIViL AVIATiON PRELIMINARY INFORMATION, 1966 fcraft ~-O075 Mar. 10 2-0060 Feb. 5 MuscleShoals,AIa Aeronca L-16 None Day..... 573 VFR Cessna 150 None Fatalities w Day! night Alt (feet) Wx. Fit Phase of cond. Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation 2-0091 Jan. 23 2-0107 Feb. 5 Day - - - 2-0178 150 VFR June 11 Day.. - - - 2-0178 1,700 Venice, La Sikorsky S-62A Bell 47G-2A Rockton, III Piper PA-22 1 Cessna 172 3 1 Wappingers Falls, ~ Beech 23 1 1 Piper PA-22 1 Livermore, Calif Schweiger SGS-126 Pratt-Reid LNE-1 Livermore, Calif SchweigerSGS-126 Pratt-Reid LNE-1 Ann Arbor, Mich Cessna 150 Piper PA-22 VFR June 11 Day.. - - - None None 4 2 None None None None 865 2-0260 VFR June 26 Day~_ 2,000 VFR Day - - - 2,000 VFR None Day...... None 860 VFR PAGENO="0048" Kankakee, III_ Cessna 150.. Beech 23 Warwick, R.I Piper PA 28 1 Cessna 150 2 Near Anchorage, Alaska_ Piper PA-18 do 1 1____ Santa Ynez, Calif Piper PA-iS Cessna 150 Minden, Nev Cessna 150 do Los Angeles, Calif Bell 47G-4 2 1 do 1 ~ Jacksonville, Fla Piper PA-23 Piper PA-28 MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION-Continued 1966-Continued 5+ None_ - - - Trifaic pattern Final ap- Dual No No. proach. _do do do Solo N No. 5+ __do do Circling Air taxi No Unk. passg. _~do do Final ap- Dual No No. proach 5+ do Beyond 5 ml. Cruise Pleas No Unk. -_ do do Unk Ilunting No Unk. 5+ _do Traffic pattern Final approach Dual No No. - do do do do No No. 5+ -- do do Circling Solo No Yes. do do Dual No Yes. 5+ -- do Beyond 5 mL Cruise Police patroL - No No. -- do do do do No No. 5+ ~do Traffic pattern Final approach Pleas No No. do do Pleas No No. June16 ColumbiaCity,IncI Curtiss C-46 2.~ 2 CargoD Piper PA-23 i Docket Date No. Location Aircraft 2-0318 July 9 2-0350 Jan. 22 Fatalities w Day/ night . Alt. (feet) Wx. Fit. Phase of cond. Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation ~5S 2-0355 Feb. 20 Day - - - 632 2~~0423 VFR None None 2 May 18 Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action Day.. - - Unk. 2-04&4 July 2~ VFR 2-0479 Aug. 30 500 2-0515 Day - - - Day VFR July 23 743 VFR None 2 None None None None None None Day - - - 540 VFR 800 Day - - - Day - - - VFR 341 VFR PAGENO="0049" 1-0033 Dec. 4 Near Carmel, N.Y - L-1049C - 3 B-707 2-0001 Jan. 1 5+ FR 5 ml. ~ Cruise Passg. D Yes___ Yes. do Passg. D Yes_~. Yes. 5+ None - 5 ml. + do Pleas Unk...~. link. __do Climb Pleas Unk___ No. 5+ ~do Traffic pattern Final approach Solo No No. do ~do Pleas No No. 5+ ~_do do do Dual No No. do do Pract No No. 5+ _...do 1 ml Acrobatics_...._ Show No No. 1 ml Cruise do No No. 5+ _do_... 2 ml do Pleas No link. __do 2 ml do Pleas No Yes. 5+ ....do Traffic Final Pleas No No. pattern, approach. ~do do do Pleas No No. 5+ ..~do 5 mi.+ Swath Aerial No No. application. ....do 5mi. + do do No No. 5+ VFR 3 ml Climb Solo No No. None ___ - 3 ml Desc Pleas No No. 5+ .....do 3~ mi Swath Aerial No No. application. ....do 3/~ ml do do No No. 5+ ....do 5 mi.+ Cruise Dual No No. S mi.+ çlo Pleas ~es._.... NQ. Cs I 1965 4 Day._.... 11,000 VFR None Folsom Lake, Calif PA-24 3 1 4 Day...... 3, 000 VFR Beech 35-33 None 2-0017 Jan. 17 Nashua, N.H PA-22 None Day...... 223 VFR Cessna 140 None 2-0069 Feb. 21 Fredericksburg, Pa PA-22 None Day...... 595 VFR Aeronca 7-AC - None 2-0251 Feb. 26 Fort Lauderdale, Fla Boeing A-75 1 _~ 1 Day...... 2, 500 VFR NAA-T-6 1 .~ 1 2-0256 May 2 Westerlo, N.Y Hughes 269A 1 1 2 Day._._. 1,700 VFR T-craft BC-12D 1 1 2-0283 Mar. 6 Cable, Wis PA-20 None Day...... 1, 800 VFR Fairchild M-62A None 2-0287 Apr. 16 Kaplan, La Grumman G-164 None Day_~ 42 VFR None tin 2-0292 May 14 Lodi-GarfIeld, NJ PA-22 Beech 23 1 2-0295 May 4 Garwood, Tex Funk F-23 Callair A-S 2-0335 July 3 Atlanta, Ga Cessna 150 - PA-24 None Day...... 1,800 VFR None Day..... 129 VFR None Day__ None Day...._ 2, 600 VFR Nqne CJe PAGENO="0050" Fit. Phase of Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action 5+ None 4 ml Cruise Duai No Unk. _~do 4 mi do do No Unk. 5+ ~~_do 5 mi.+ Swath Aerial No No. appiication. ~do 5 mi.+ do do No No. 5+ _do 5 mi.+ Cruise Fish spot No No. ~~do 5 mi.+ do do No No. 5+ ___do 5 mi. + Ciimb Towing No Yes. ~ 5 mi. + Desc Buss No No. 5-f- ~do 3~ ml Finai ap- Solo No No. proach. 3~ mi do Dual No No. 5+ ___do 5+ Cruise Aerial No No. approach. 5+ do do No Yes. 5+ ~ ~ ml Final ap- Pleas No No. proach. ~do 3~ ml do do No No. 5+ VFR 2 mi Cruise 1mg No No. VFR 2 ml do Buss Unk_ Yes. 5+ None - - Traffic pat- Final ap- Pleas No No. tern. proach. do do do No No. Docket Date No. Location i~iDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATlON-~ont~nued 2-0454 May 26 Aircraft 1965-Continued 2-0514 Aug. 31 Fatalities ~_ ~- c~ 0 Day! night Alt. (feet) Wx. cond. 2-0651 Sept. 2 2-0672 2 2 Day...... - Aug. 15 2,880 VFR None 2-0673 Day - - - Aug. 29 250 VFR 2-0689 None None Day...... 1,850 July 12 VFR None None Granite, Md PA-28 2 ~ PA-28 2 ~ Bonita, La PA-25 PA-25 1 Near Foxwells, Va Champ 7-ECA. do Near Fremont, Calif PA-18 Beech E-35_______________________ Northbrook, Ill Cessna 150 do____________________.______ Near Clements, Calif Cailair A-9 _________~ 1 PA-25 Neffsviiie, Pa Cessna 170 PA-24 ~ 1 Montgomery, Ala Lockheed 1-33 PA-28 Flushing, N.Y PA-23 PA-22 Day - - 2-0690 3,300 June 27 VFR None None 800 2-0693 VFR Oct. 12 Day...... 2-0698 750 Sep. 4 VFR None None Day 577 VFR Day None None None 2,500 VFR Day None 14 VFR PAGENO="0051" None Day_...._ 9,000 VFR 30 VFR 5+ None_ - - - Traffic pat- Final ap- Instruct solo - No No. tern. proach. do do Pleasure No No. 100 VFR 5+ _do do do Practice No No. do do do No No. Unk. _do do do Business No No. Unk. - do do do do No No. 5+ - - do Cruise Pleasure No Yes. VFR 5+ Descending.. - Practice No No. 2-0822 Nov. 1 FortWayne,lnd Cestna 112 None Night_ 933 VFR Cessna 150 None 2-0826 Sept.10 Louisville, Ky DC-3 None Day...._ 2,349 VFR Cessna 150 1 1 2-0844 Dec. 5 Wheeling, Ill Beech 23 None Day_._. 996 VFR Cessna 182 None 2-1030 Nov. 14 New Carlisle, Ohio PA-18 None Day_... 1,600 VFR J_3 1____ 1 2-1033 Dec. 19 Knox, Ind... PA-23 2 1 _.~ 3 Day_~_ 1,714 VFR Stinson 108 None 2-1039 Oct. 31 Pacoima, Calif Luscombe 8-A None Day...... 1,600 VFR PA-28 1....... 1 2-1083 Nov. 7 Tulsa, OkIa C-124 Cessna 172 2 1 - ~+ ..dO ~ mi dO ~oló f1o yes. - do 3( ml. do do No No. 5+ .~do 4 mi Climb Charter No No. - do 4 mi Desc Prac No No. 5+ __.do Traffic pattern Landing Pleas No Yes. ~do do Climb do No No. 5+ _....do 1 ml Traffic pattern. Prac No No. - _.do 1 mi Cruise Pleas No..... - No. 5+ ...._do 1 mi do Pleas No No. - ....do 1 mi do do No Yes. 5+ - ....do 3 ml Traffic pattern.. Dual No No. 3 mi Climb Pleas No Yes. N/R IFR 5+ Cruise Mil Yes_.... Yes. N/R None --- 5+ do Pleas No No. 1964 2-0033 Jan. 4 Palo Alto, Calif Luscombe 8-A None Day._ Globe GC-1B None 2-0132 May 4 Baton Rouge, La Piper PA-22 1 - 1 Day...... do 1.... 1 2-0355 Apr. 30 Enid, Okla do None Dawn.... 1,470 VFR Cessna 210 None 2-0363 May 16 Westminister, Calif Ercoupe 415-C 1 ~. - 1 Day...... 2, 500 VFR Douglas A4-B None PAGENO="0052" Vis. Fit. Phase of plan Arp. prox. operation Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action 5+ None Cruise Pleasure No Yes. __do 5+ do do No No. 5+ _~_do Traffic pat- Go-around do No Yes. tern. ~do do Initial climb_ Instruct duaL_ No No. 5+ ~do Procedui~e Aerialappli- No Yes. turn. cation. ~do 5+ do do No No. 5+ ~_~do Normalcruise Business No Unk. 5+ Climb to Practice No Unk. cruise. 3 ~do Traffic Circling Instruct. No No. pattern, solo. do do Instruct. No No. dual. 5+ ...do 4 mi Normal Air taxi, No No. cruise, pass. .~do 4 ml do Pleasure No No. 5+ - _do 4 ml do Instruct. No No. check. 4 mi do Practice No No. 5+ ~do 3~ ml Final ap- ..~do No Yes. proach 3~ do Pleagure ~o No, Docket Date No. Location MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION-Continued 2-0476 Aircraft July 8 1964-Continued 2-0544 Fatalities -~ Day! Alt. Aug. 6 0. C,) 0 2-0645 Wx. cond. Sept. 3 Day - - - 2-0708 Sept. 9 VFR 7, 000 Unk. Day - - - 2-0816 None Nov. 25 VFR None Day.. - 2-0833 1,400 Nov. 9 VFR Max, Nebr Slingsby Lark 4 None Schleicher KA-6CR None San Jose, Calif Cessna 170 None Cessna 150 Near Quincy, Wash Boeing A-75 Piper PA-25 1 Near Victoria, Tex Beech D-18S 1 Grumman F-hA 1 Santa Monica, Calif Cessna 150-C Cessna 150-D Ponca City, Okia _.__~ Cessna 206 Piper PA-24 __________ 1 1 Anaheim, Calif Cessna 120_______________________ Cessna 150 i Olathe, Kans Cessna 182___.________._____ cessna 170-B_________~_____~____ 2-0938 Day.._ 16,000 Dec. 13 VFR None Night_ - None 1, 000 2-0959 VFR Dec. 12 None Day___. 6, 500 2 VFR None Day 3, 000 VFR None None Duslc VFR PAGENO="0053" Apr. 13_ West Hollywood, Fla Cessna 172 Funk Apr. 24_ Pacoima, Calif Cessna 150 Cessna 172 Nov. 5__ Warren, R.l Cessna 150 Cessna 182 Apr. l___ Near Las Vegas, Nev Navion 1 F-105 1 July 17 Lombard, Ill Bellanca PA-15 None Day.._ None None Day.._ None None Day....._ None 1 Day...... None Day...... None 5+ ...do 3 ml Normal Demonstra- No No. cruise. tion. do 3 ml do Instruct. No No. solo. 5+ _...do Traffic Final ap- Pleasure No No. pattern. proach - ..do do do Practice No No. 5+ .....do 5+ Normal Corporate_ - No No. cruise. 5+ do Pleasure No No. 2-1032 3-0429 3-1517 Nov. 23 pomona, Calif Cessna 150-O 1 1 Cessna 150-A 1 - Feb. 22 Albuquerque, N. Mex -- - Cessna 150 Piper PA-22 June 2 Lexington, Tenn Cessna 310-C Piper PA-22 2 Day__. 1,850 VFR 5,470 VFR 2-0307 None Day...... None None Day._ 3,500 None 2-0182 VFR July 30... Allentown, Pa Stinson 108 1 Beech L-23 2 Jan. 30... Agawam, Mass Ercoupe T-Craft 2-0875 1963 2-1120 1 Day...... None Day.... None 3-1606 2-1676 60 VFR 2-2064 250 VFR Unk. VFR 2,000 VFR Unl._._ None___ 3 ml Cruise Pleas No No. IFR 3mi App Trng No .. No. 150 VFR 23/s. None 3~ ml TP Bus No No. ._do ..~ 3~ ml Final Pleas No..... No. approach. NF .... do -...... On TO Practice No No. .do ...._ Arp ._.......do Instruct _.... No No. NF .._._ do J,~ ml Final ap- Practice No ..... No. ~ proach. ._do 3~ ml do Pleas No ...._ No. NF do 5+ Cruise Instruct No....__. No. 5+ do link No ....._ No. NF..._ link..___ 5+ Descent Bus link.... No. link 5+ do Trng...... No. NF None.. - -- On arp TO Pleas No No. On arp do Instruct No.._...._ No. 1,100 VFR 15 VFR PAGENO="0054" VFR VFR VFR VFR Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action NF____ None__ __ 3( mi Final Business No No. approach. ~do ~ ml do Instruct No. 2~/~- ~do TP do Publicfly No No. 3M - ~~do TP do Business No NF do TP Climb do No No. ~do TP Final do ~ ~ approach. Docket No. Date Location 2-2121 MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION-Continued 1963-Continued Aircraft July 30 2-2332 Oct. 13 2-2487 Fatalities .~ Day/ night Alt. (feet) Wx. FIt. Phase of cond. Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation 0_ C.) 0 ~-. June 2 2-2489 Aug. 25 100 2-2490 Sep. 2 Tulsa, OkIa Cessna 172 Cessna 210 Caro, Mich Beech 35 Cessna 172 Wheeling, III Aeronca 11 Cessna 140 Amityville, NY PA -22 Cessna 205 Gainesville, Tex Beech 1-24 Cessna 210 Tempe, Ariz N3-N PA-22 60 2-2491 Sep. 12 50 1 Day~_ None None None Day._ None None Day~_ None None Day__ None None Day__ None Day_ 2-0028 Feb. 1 NF____None --__-~ 3~ mi ~ Final ap- Bus No No. proach. do 3~ mi do do No No. NF do ~ mi do do No No~ ~do 3~ mi do do No No. NF do ~ mi do ~ Pleas No No. ~do 3~ mi do do No No. 35 VFR NF do ~,( ml Ao Instruct No No. ~do 3~ ml do Bus ~ No No. Unk. VFR NF do 34 mi do Instruct No No. ~do y~ ml do Pleas No No. NF do 5+ Cruise Aerial appli- No No. cation. - ~do 5+ do Pleas N~ No. Unk. VFR 2-0042 Jan. 18 1962 2-0212 June 18 Broomfield, Cob PA-24 1 1 Cessnal50 _______________ 2 Madera, Calif Cessna 172 1 ~ Piper PA-22 1 1 ~ Glendive Mont PA-24 1 ~ Cessna 170 1 -- -- 2 Day~ 200 2 1 Day~ TP 2 VFR 1 Day~ TP VFR PAGENO="0055" 2-1389 Oct. 2 St. Augustine, Fla - Beech G-18~ 2 2 USN F3H-2 1 2-2166 May 30 Sherman, N.Y Cessna 172 1 Aeronca 7 1 1 2-3489 Aug. 11 Steamboat Springs, Cob... Beech T-34 1 PB4Y 2-3952 Aug. 15 Sacramento, Calif Cessna 150 I F9F 2-4760 Nov. 10 Daggett, Calif Cessna 320 Cessna 182 1 3 - 2-0219 May 8 Wichita, Kans Cessna 175 C-47 2-1118 Oct. 22 Chickasha, Okla Cessna 210 Cessna 170 2-3352 Mar. 31 Montgomery, Ala Cessna 172 Cessna 150 2-4098 Oct. 13 Fort Collins, Cob do Beech 35 2-4220 Sept. 14 Buffalo, N.Y Cessna 172 Cessna 175 2-4447 Dec. 5 San Jose, Calif Cessna 140 Cessna 150 ~-46O4 July 21 Moorpark, Calif.... Cessna 182 - centaur L-13 NF_...... IFR 2 mi Cruise Corporate_.._ No No. FR 2 ml Climb Training (mO). NF_~_ FR -_---- 5+ ---------- Unk Corporate..... No ~ No. Unk 5+ do _..~ Mib. Op NF _ None.... _ 13j mi Approach _~ Pleas ~ No No. - do 1~ ml ~ do do NF do (ink Swath run~._ Fire control.... No ..do Unk do do No Yes. 350 VFR NF do On arpt Climb Stu. solo No..... No. Mil On arpt do Training Yes..... No. 9,500 VFR NF._ VFR 5+ Cruise Business No No. NE.... VFR 5+ do Pleas No No. 250 VFR 9M_ _ __ None.... .. 3'~ mi Approach...... Business No No. VFR........ 3/~ ml do Military No No. 10 VFR NF........ None...... On arpt do Public flying... No No. ..._do On arpt do Business No No. 200 VFR NF.. -.. - None....... On arpt Final approach.. Training No No. _..do On arpt do do No No. 50 VFR NF do 3( ml do Dual training.. No...._ No. _....do 3~ ml do Business No No~ 150 VFR NF do TP do Dual Instruct. No No. .....do TP do Ferry No No. Unk. VFR 5 do TP do.......__ Training~... No No. ...do TP Climb.. __...__ Dual instruct.. No No. NF do 2 ml Flight Acrobatics.... No No. 2 ml do dQ No No. 2-0760 June 8 Tallahassee, Fba Lockheed 18 2 2 ....... 4 Day...... 8, 000 VFR Lockheed T-33A None 4 Day...... Unk. VFR 1 Day..... Unk. VFR 1 Day..... Unk. VFR None None None 4 None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Day.... Night.... Day....... Day..... Day..... Day...... Day...... Day...... Day....... lInk. VFR PAGENO="0056" Dec. 10 Dec. 3 Sept. 12 Jan. 7 Location Aircraft 1962-Continued Palm Springs, Calif Bell 47 None Day~__ do None Grain Valley, Mo Mooney M-20 Piper PA-28 None None Day~ Middletown, Pa Beech 1-34 Curtiss C-46 None None Day~__ Boise, Idaho Piper PA-12 Day~_ Cessna 150 Hopkins, Mien Cessna 190 1 -___ I Day~_ Cessna2l0 1 ~ 1 Spanaway, Wash Cessna 195 Day__ Piper PA-18 1 1 ~ 2 Mar. 16 Pompano Beach, Fla Grumman G-159 Day~ Aeronca 7-AC 1 1 ____ 2 Apr. 4 Riverside, Calif Beech 1(35 I 1 ~ 2 Day~_ Cessna 172 2 2 Apr. 22 Amarillo, Tex do 1 1 ~ 2 Day_._ Cessna 170-B 15 400 Unk. VFR VFR VFR Fit. Phase of Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action NF~__ None__ ~_ TP Finalapproach Construction No No. work. TP do do No No. NF do TP Approach Dual instruct_ No No. ~do TP do do No No. NF do Beyond 5 mL Gruise Experiment~ No No. ~do do do do No No. NF__ None _ __ ~ mi Landing Practice No No. ~do ~ mi do do No No. NF do 3~ ml do Air taxi No No. ~do 3~ ml do Pleasure No No. NF do~~ Trafficpattern do do No Yes. ~do do do do No No. NF_ ___ VFR Over arpt do Business No No. None do do Pleasure No No. 15+ do Traffic pattern do. Bcsiness No No. .~do do do lnstruction_ ~ No No. NE Unk do Descending_ Business No No. None do Landing Instruct solo~ No No. Docket Date No. MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION-Continued 2-4681 Fatalities . ~o ~ ~ 0. ~.) 0 I-' Day! night Alt. (feet) Wx. cond. 2-4744 2-3562 2-2798 2-0010 Feb. 21 2-1275 Feb. 21 1961 2-2704 25 VFR 2-0972 150 VFR 2-0959 450 VFR 15 VFR 75 VFR 100 VFR PAGENO="0057" 80 10 VFR VFR 2-0980 2-4466 May 11 Bishop, Tex Piper PA-18A 2-4465 2-0237 2-2847 10 VFR ..do May 16 Troy, N.Y Piper J-3 Day~.. Luscombe 8-A 1 1 2 May 22 Near Chinitna Bay, Piper J-3 1 1 Day__ Alaska. Piper J-4 1 1 May 30 Spring Valley, N.Y cessna 150 Day.... Ces~pa 172 10 Palo Calif 2-3572 1,500 500 VFR VFR 2-1587 2-1693 Day - - 10 VFR June 21 Near Payson, Ariz Bee~b 1-34 Day.. - Cesspa 180 1 1 2 June 29 Bishop, Tex Piper PA-25 Day.. - Piper PA-18 Aug. 9 Friendswooil, Tex Cessna 150 Day.. 2-4333 250 VFR 2-3329 2-4a82 NF ___ do 5+ Swath run~ Aerial appli- No No. cation. ~do 5+ do do No No. NF___ Unit 13~ ml Cruise Business No No. Unk ~ 13/2 mi do do No. No. NF_ _ None ___ Unk Low pass Hunting No No. ~do do do do No~ No. NF do Unk Cruise Practice No No. __do do do Pleasure No No. NF do 3.~ ml Landing Business Unk~_ No. __do do do Dual instruct Unk~ No. NF _do Unk Borate cliop~ Fire Cont Unlc_ No. ._do do do do Unk__. No. NF~ do do _ Swath Run_~ Aerial appli- No No. cation. _.do do~_ do do No No. NF~ link ~ ml ___ Landing ___ Business No~ Yes. _.do~ do do Dual Instruct No No. NF.._... None Traffic _do Pleasure No No. pattern. ~do do do do No No. - - Unk Unk Cruise Business No No. - ~_do.~____ - do do do. No No. NF None Unk Soaring______ Pleasure No No. do-~ do do lb No. Sept. 22 Bellevue, Wash Aeronica 11 AC NighL do Oct. 6 Pittsfield, Maine Cessna 180 Piper PA-22 Oct. 15 Elsinore Valley, Calif__...._ Schweizerl-26 400 VFR 250 VFR NighL 4,400 VFR Day - - Unk. VFR PAGENO="0058" Docket Date No. Location 2-3921 MIDAIR COLLISIONS, US. CIVIL AVIATtON-Continued 1961-Continued Aircraft None 2-3979 Fataflties .~ Day! night Alt. (feet) Wx. FIt. Phase of cond. Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation ~. () 0 I- Nov. 5 Santee, Calif Cessna 140 1 ~ 1 Day~ Taylorcraft BC-12D 2 ~ 2 Nov. 22 Chia, Bogatã, Colombia~ Piper Comanche Piper Cub 1 ~ 2 ~ 1 2 Day~ Dec. 2 New Meridan, Coon No American SNJ4 Day~ Luscombe8-A 200 VFR 2-0&03 Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action 300 VFR 2-0656 1 ~ 000 VFR 2-0442 NF None Traffic Take off Solo instruct_ No No. ~__ pattern. do do Dual instrucL No___ No. NF ~_ do do Climbing Pleasure Unk~_ No. -. do Landing Dual instrucL_ Unk~_ No. NF link 5+ Cruise Photography_ Unk No. ~_ 5+ do do Unk__ No. 1960 2-0315 2-0633 Jan. 27~ El Cajon, Calif Cessna 182 Day 6, 200 VFR Douglas AD-5W Jan. 31~. York, Pa Piper PA-22 Day_ Cessna 120 Feb. 3__ East Berlin, Mass Fairchild M-62A 1 1 ~ 2 Day~_ Piper J-3 Feb. 7 ~ Rosemont, Minn Piper PA-20 Day~_ Cessna 150 Feb. 28 Albuquerque, N.Mex Piper PA-22 Day~__ Cessna 140 Mar. 14 Deer Park, N.Y ---_~--_-_ Champion 7-FC Day__.. Aeronca 7-AC 2-148.3 150 Unk. VFR VFR 5 VFR 20 80 NF~__ None~_ More 5 mL~ Cruise dualinst No No. Unk do _do Unk No. NF~_ None~~ Traffic pattern Landing Air taxi No No. ~do do do Pleasure No. NF do More 5 mi~ Cruise do No.~ No. ~do do do do No. NF do Over arpt Landing do No. ~ No. ~do do do do No. NF do do Takeoff do No.~ Yes. ___do do do do No. NF do~__ ~ ml Landing Student soIo~ No Yes. __do ~ ml do do No. VFR VFR PAGENO="0059" 2-1913 2-2071 2-1146 2-2062 2-4691 2-4246 2-3902 May 22 May 27 July 4 July 7 July 24 Aug. 10 Sept. 4 2-1718 1 1-0061 2-1994 200 VFR 125 VFR 2-1515 June 26 50 VFR 700 VFR 2-0863 Mar. 14 Harvey, La Cessa 180 (Seaplane) Day~_ Cessna 180 Apr. 20 Hickory, ftC Cessna 310 3 1 ~ 4 Day~ Fairchild F-27 May 20 Lake Village, Ark Piper PA-18A Day~_ Madera, Calif DeHaviUand 60-GM Day~_ Davis DIW Near Point Mugu, Calif_ Cessna 172 _______~____~_ Day___ Military F4D1 Plain City, Ohio _____~ Mooney MK-20A ___ 3 1 _ ~ 4 Day___ Fort Wayne, nd Pack & Associates "D"__ 1 _ 1 Day____ Kensinger ________________ 1 __ 1 Bishop, ~ Beech M-35 Day_~_ Cessna 150 Winthrop, Wash _~____ Mooney 20A Day__ Cessna 180 Dallas, Tex Cessna 182 Day_ Beech Bonanza (35) Elmira, N.Y Schweizer 1-26 do Orlando, Fia Beech A-35 I 1 Day~__ Martin 404 200 VFR 1,500 VFR 80 VFR 5 VFR 2-2750 1 1-0082 Oct. 1 100 NF do Unk ~ - - ~do Business NO t4o. ~do do~_ Cruise Unkn No. NF do 3~ mi Landing Business No No. FR do do Sched. px. Yes. (air carrier). NF ~ None _ _ More 5 mL Pull-up~-- Aerial app No No. -- do do do do No. NF ~ None_~ Within 5 mi Cruise Air show No No. - - do do do do No. Unk_ VFR Unk En route climb Dual inst. Unk~ No. (inst. trg.) __do On arpt unk - Takeoff climb Military Yes__ Yes. NF_~ None Unk Climb Pleasure ___ No No. - ~do On arpt unL - Cruise do No. NF do Overarpt Airrace Airshow No No. -- do do do ~ do No. NF do On arpt Landing Inst/dual ~No No. - ~do Over arpt do Business No. NF do Traffic pattern do Pleasure No No. .~do do do Forest Service No. NF do do do Business Unk No. ~do do do Pleasure No. NF do Unk Soaring do No No. ~do do do do Yes. NF do Traffic pattern Landing Business Unk~ No. Unk do do Sched/Px. No. (air carrier) Unk~ VFR do Unk Pleasure Unk_ - - No. Unk do Landing Sched Px No. (air carrier) VFR 100 VFR 2-2686 11-0075 I Air carrier docket. Unk. VFR Oct. 4 Sacramento, Calif Cessna 172 1 1 ~_ 2 NighL - C-46 150 VFR 70 VFR PAGENO="0060" MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION-Continued 1960-Continued 500 Unk. 30 15 VFR VFR VFR VFR Docket Date No. Location 2-2219 Oct. 21 Aircraft 1-0087 Nov. 17 2-3137 Denver, Cob Nov 18 Fatalities ~ ~ ~; .~ Day! night Alt. (feet) Wx. Fit. Phase of cond. Vis. plan Arp. prox. operation n_ C.) 0 2-3058 Dec. 2 2-3020 Dec. 3 Kind of Radar Evasive flying serv. action 1-0083 Dec. 16 DC-6 ~ Day Beech D-35 Washington, N.C Piper PA-17 0 1 0 1 Day____ Piper J-3A Palm Springs, Calif Piper PA-23 ~_______~_____~____________~ Day___ Luscombe 8A Vero Beach, Fla ~ Piper PA-22 Day_ Stinson 108 Near Staten Island, N.Y~ L-1049 ~ 39 5 6 50 Day Constellation DC-8_ 77 7 84 600 IFR FR Hamilton, Mont Cessna 180 ~ I 1 ~_ 2 Day__ Taylorcraft BC-12 1 ~__ 1 Appr. 1, 300 VFR 2-1600 Dec. 20 Riverside, Calif Piper PA-24 1 1 Day___ Cessna 150 2,000 VFR NF___ None____ Within 5 mi__ Descending___ Business Unk___ No. do ~______ Cruise lnstJDual ~____________ No. NF____ VFR -____ Traffic pattern Landing SchedfPx Unk___ No. None do ~________ do Business Yes. NF do Unk Formation ~__ Pleasure Unk_ No. flying. ~ do._ ~ do Yes. NF .~____ do ~____ Traffic Landing Business Unk_ No. pattern. ~_________ do ~__~_______ do ~_~__ Pleasure No. NF .__._ do do ~ do ~ do ~ Unk_ No. ~____~_ do do do No. ~_~__~____~____ Unk_ IFR ~_~__ 20 ml ~ Descending Sched/Px ~ Yes_ No. IFR ~ 20 mi ~ do do Yes No. UnI~~ None --~._ Unk Cruise Business Unk~_ No. do do ~ do ~ Pleasure No. PAGENO="0061" 1 Day..... 1 Day~... None Day...... None None None None None None Day. - 2-0032 2-1631 2-2374 June 28 1959 2-4528 July 25 500 VFR 2-3159 Aug. 20 125 VFR 2-4485 Aug. 24 2-1350 Feb. 1 Buena Park, Calif Luscombe 8-A 1 -- -- Piper PA-16 1 Mar. 26 Miami, Fla Champion 7-FC 1 Cessna 150 1 llalfmoon Bay, Calif Beech 35 Cessna 140 Calipatria, Calif Boeing A-75N1 do 1__.. Chowchilla, Calif Boeing A-75 Callair A-5 Moorehead City, ftC Piper PA-18 1 Douglas A-4D Near Cape Charles, Va__ Piper PA-12 1 Philadelphia, Pa Aeronca L-16A Cessna 140 1 Mansfield, Ohio Piper PA-22 2 F-~84F Fullerton, Calif. Piper PA-22 Bell 4-7J Aug. 26 2-1408 Sept. 30 Day. -- 20 VFR 2-1753 Day. - - Nov. 7 2-4509 Dec. 1 NF None__ _ TP Takeoff Pract - ~do TP do Unk No No. N F do Over airport do ~ nstruct .do do Landing do ~ No No. 50 VFR NF_. Unk TP do Pleas No. ~do. TP do Unk No No. Unk. VFR UnL None.. ~ 5+ Swath run~~ Aerial applic - .~do 5+ do do No~~ No. NF do Over airport.... Takeoff do No. _.do do Landing do No Yes. 1, 500 VFR 3 ml do 5+ Cruise Fish spotting_ No No. Unk 5+ Descending~.. Military Yes..... No. Day...... 300- VFR Unk.. .. .. None........ 5+ Cruise Fish spotting 1,000 ....do 5+ do do No No. Day.... 50 VFR NF...... Unk ~( mi Final approach. Unk 3( ml do do No No. 12 None 2 ml Cruise Dual instr VFR 2 ml Low pass Military 1*0 No. Unk. Unk TP Landing Practice -. .do..._.. TP Approch Business No No. &ay..... 1,300 VFR 2 None None None Day..... 1,000 VFR PAGENO="0062" MIDAIR COLLISIONS, U.S CIVIL AVIATION-Continued 1959-Continued Docket No. Date Location Aircraft Fataliti ~ es - * Day/ night Alt. (feet) Wx. FIt. cond. Vis. plan Arp. Phase of prox. operation Kind of flying Radar ser V. Evasive action o_ C.) 0 ~- 2-2964 Dec. 5 Palm Desert, Calif Beech M-35 1 1 Day~~_ Unk. VFR Unk...... None...._ Unk Cruise Demonstr No. Beech B-95 3 1 4 Unk do. do Unk No No. 2-1774 Dec. 15 Cheyenne, Wyo Beech C-35 1 - 1 Day_.... 2,850 VFR UnL.... - VFR 43~ ml do Business North American F-86L None VFR 43~2 ml do Military No No. 2-4565 Sept. 18 Fort Pierce, Fla Piper PA-Il 1 1 Day... Unk. VFR UnL None 3~ mi Final Photo approach. Cessna 172 None - ~do 3~ mi do Instruct No No. NQte: NF-no factor; UnI.-unIim~t~c1 PAGENO="0063" 59 The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Satterfield. Mr. SATTERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKee, I gather from what has been said this morning that what you are really saying is that safety in and of itself depends upon a lot of different components, and that radar as such is only one such component. General MCKEE. That is correct. Mr. SATTERFIELD. I would like to ask you some questions about radar~ since it seems to have been a center of discussion. rphe radar that normally is employed at airports for control, control of aircraft, exactly how good is it as a safety tool? General MCKEE. I will let Mr. Thomas answer that question, be-~ cause he is more familiar with it than I am. It is good. Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Satterfield, we use the best radar that we caii buy, and it still is not perfect. As you know, and I think everyone knows, there are some targets that are very difficult to see-T-33, head on, some light aircraft, because it is dependent upon the airplane re~ flecting energy back to the radar and being picked up on a receiver.. In addition, precipitation, weather, also makes it extremely difficult. to see on radar. Mr. SArrERFIIELD. IS it possible to determine the altitude of the mdi- cations on the type radar you use? Mr. THOMAS. No, sir. We do not use the so-called height-fitiding radar, because it isn't of much value in air traffic control. Mr. SArrERFIELD. Ill other words, if you had two indications close together, they could be at the same altitude, or they could be 20,00& feet apart? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; this is one of the major deficiencies in our radar system, ai~d we give out lots of traffic that really is of little in- terest to the Other pilot. From a climb position, that is, if you were up, looking down, the paths would cross or come near each other. They may be separated by 10,000 or 15,000 feet. This is the sole aim of our big effort on the automation of the airspace, to put a device in the airplane that will read the altimeter, and then transmit the reading to the radar, and show it on the scope, but we are some distance away from that. Mr. SAvrERFIEr~D. Of course, this radar is located in a tower. Is it right where the tower controllers can see it, or does it require an in- dividual to monitor it at all times? Mr. THOMAS. No, sir ; due to the fact that we use a cathode ray tube we are normally limited as to the light we can have, so we have a separate IFR room. In recent years we have had some progress in developing a so-called bright tube, and do have one scope in the tower cab itself, but usually, it is a separate darkroom, separated from. the tower cab. Mr. SATTERFIELD. So there would have to be communication between this room and the controller in the tower? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. SATTERFIELD. In order to work properly, would it require con- stant surveillance, and would it not also require that every aircraft in the area be under constant control at all times? Mr. TrIo1~rAs. Yes, sir; in order to provide traffic control, this is so. Now, we do provide radar advisory service, and I believe you heard PAGENO="0064" I 60 *some 9f this in the transcript that was read, where we point out that ~there ~s unknown traffic 4 miles away. That does not include altitude or type, or anything more. It is an aid to the pilot so that he can look out and detect the traffic with his eyes. However, in order for the radar to provide for separation, the cOntroller must know the identity of the airplane, must be m communication with it, must have a flight plan on it, and the pilot must comply with the instructions from the radar con- troller. Otherwise, it is not too valuable. . Mr. SATTERFIELD. So simply equipping certain airfields with radar in itself would not do much good, unless you had the other things to go along with it, to make it work to the maximum extent possible. Mr. THOMAS. It would take a lot to go with it ; yes, sir. Mr. SATTERFIELD. I noticed some discussion was had earlier this morning with respect to dense areas like Washington, D.C., and I was interested in Mr. O'Connell'~ records that `he is offering for the record. I w~n~der whether or not there is any indication in those records or ~of other statistics to show the percentage of midair collisions and whether or not more of them occur in high-density areas, than in low- density areas. ` Mr. O'CONNELL. I would hesitate to be too specific, on the basis of what I have observed. A quick glance at the detailed information would indicate that a very small percentage of the total number of 206 midair collisions in the past 10 years have taken place in so-called con- ~gested or densly populated areas. ~ Mr. SATTERFIELD. I asked the question for a purpose, because it cer- tainly appears to m~, in my limited knowledge, that the higher the density and the more potential the danger, the better the safety record, :an~i it would `seem to' the that herein lies many of the answers that we are seeking. I am not convinced in my own mind but what awareness on the part of the pilots that they are entering a more dangerous area might in some measure be refi e oted in the low incidence of collision in these dense areas. ` Mr. THOMAS. I think that is true. Mr. SATTERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. `The CHAIRMAN. Mr. K~uyke~nda1L Mr. KUYKENDALIJ. General McKee, and members, it is good to have you here. You never know just how `close to home some of these things we discuss on this committee may be. I noticed this morning in your testimony you mentioned that the 82d person was identified by a process of elimination, and about 20 minutes ago, I got word that this person was one of my good friends from Memphis, my hometown, so it gets pretty close. General MCKEE. I can well understand. Mr. KUYKENDALL. In your discussion this morning, I want to carry on a little bit with what Mr. Satterfield was saying, that he noticed some of these accidents were happening around the rather low-density areas. You also mentioned one of your problems being the fact that you have small country airports with, say, only four or six transac- `tions a day from commeróial airlines. In your present penetration of radar into your commercial airports, do you have any idea what level of transactions that would be ~ Now, earlier in your testimony,' General McKee, you, of course, pointed out ~that there will always be accidents, so we have to discuss here not the PAGENO="0065" 61 total elimination of accidents, but just what praet~eal ~steps ~*e'cán take to reduce them. Ithink we agree here on this ; do we not? General M0KEE. That is correct. . Mr. KUYKENDALL. Now, approximately-and if you cannot give this to us now, I would like to have an estimate in the record-~how many transactions a day does the penetration of radar in ur ~irport~ govern? Mr. THOMAS. I believe, Mr. Kuykendail, that on the hundred thou~ sand, this is something less than 300 operations a day, on the average. They may or may not be air carrier. In the case of Asheville,, which was just below the qualification, there are 30 ~ir carrier landings and ~o air carrier takeoffs. , Mr. KUTKENDALL. That would be 60 transactions? Mr. THOMAS. Yes ; so, generally, you would expect better than 60; somewhere between 50 and a hundred, depending on the mix of the other traffic. . Mr. KTJYKENDALL. Now here is something that I am sure you do not have now, but I think this committee would be interested in, Mr. Chairman. Would there be some cost * estimates to bring that down to the level of 30 transactions a day, or the level of 20 transactions a day? We know we cannot put in a radar service for six transactions a day; no one thinks we can. But what would it cost to bring it down to 30, or 20? ` I think this information would be something the committee should have. . . . General MOKEE. We can develop that, and would be happy to supply it for the record. Obviously, you could have a scale of cost here, if you look at airports in the same category of Ash~vi1le-how many of them. are there, is it desirable to put in radar, what i~ the cost going to be for that level of airport, and then for the next level. You can do this ~n a scaling basis. (The following information was sub~eqnently submitted:) FEDE~RAL AVIATIOi~ ADMINISTRATION STATEMJ~NT O~ ESTIMATED OOSr OF IN- STALLING RADAR AT AIRPORTS SERYIi~G 20 TO 30 DAiLY COMMERCIAL ~IR CARRIER OPERATIONS The estimated cost of jnsta11~ng radar at all aiiiX~rts served Ii3r mmm.ercial ~aircraft which have 30 or more commercial aircraft . movements a day is $30.8 million. We estimate it would c~st an additional $39.8 million to establish radar service at airports served b~ air carrie aircraft whft~h have 20 to 29 éommercial aircraft movements a day. Mr. KTJYKI~NDALL. You menfioned this morning a $750,000 cost of installation of radar I have seen thes&portable radar trailers that the Air Force owns, going around, where they ~a1i have a~ radai~ installa- -tion in a matter of Th hotirs, let us ~y. ~ these thiñgs cost $750,000? Mr.. THOMAS. If you are iooking~ at th~ normal, full-sized surveil- lance radar, yes. The equipme~nt itself is not that much, but this in- eludes all the installation and things to make it work. . The Air Force ~and the military did develop a cheap~r radar, but it is very limited in range, something like 15~ ~nj1es, and ~ is limited in its activity, but our problem is here that even if we only have two operations a day, we should see them within th~ normal operating ranges and th~ aiti- tudes. We are lookiflg at a radar th$ wuld see aboUt 50 miles, and' up to, say 20,000 or 30,000 feet. 1 92-715-68-5 PAGENO="0066" 62 Mr. KUYKE~DALL. Certa~in1y. ~ . ~ ~ ~ Mr. TIwMAs. The price for the electronics itself is much less than~ a half a million, probably around $400,000. The rest of it is getting it installed, and operating it, and the equipment that goes with it, to~ make it work; : ~ ~ Mr. KUYKENDALL. It is agreed that you are not in a position, since you are in the process of evaluating this evidence, of seeing the evi- dence that was involved in this accident, but those of us that heard the chronology of the tape here realize that it happened after they went off the radar here. Now, a couple of quick questions. ILS does not require radar ; yes ? Mr. THOMAS. No, sir. Mr. KTJYKENDALL. GCA does require radar? Mr. THOMAS. GCA is radar, sir. That is one form of it. Mr. KUYKENDALL. So ILS even though it would speed up traffic, anct would allow traffic in bad weather, really would not have a direct con- nection to safety. . ~ Mr. THOMAS. No ; it would have a very positive relation to safety.. It is .a precision landing aid. It would not speed it up. It. is a precision' landing aid to deliver an aircraft to a precise point on the runway.. We have, besides midair collisions, undershoots and overshoots and' there is quite a bit of bad weatliei, so I think the ILS would have a decided beneficial effect on air safety. Mr. KUYKENDALL. It was my understanding if you did not have ILS,. you just would not land. Mr. THOMAS. We do restrict them on weather. The way we get eqmv-. alent safety is not to permit them to land. You gee, with ILS, you can land with 200 feet and a half mile. Mr. KtTYKENDALL. For a technical point of information, t.I'ie collision deterrent equipment that you are projecting for the future, is there a counterreacting radar system? Mr. TiioMAs. What we are thinking about is cooperating equipment,. between two large airplanes, based on atomic principles ~ that is, a very precise timekeeping device, with computers that would calculate the distance, based on each airplane knowing the precise transmittiiig time of all the other airplanes, and then the slant range between each two airplanes. This is still dependent upon an altimeter and a computer to tell the pilot what `tO do. . `. Mr. K1JYKENDALL. Thathk you,. M1~ Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Adams. Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following through on that, has there been developed or is there being used an extension of what used to be called the "friend or foe" device in World War II ? This was simply an indication of an ap- proacIiii~g plane which can be inexpensively placed on a plane. This sends out a radio signal at a particular frequency which will indicate a plane is within a certain range. In other words, you have in efFect a i'adio umbrella around you of 500 yards, a thousand yards, 1,500 yards,, or 2,000 yards, whatever is selected, which ,indicat~s to the pilot that a plane is within that. proximity. Is this type of, device ejther being considered, or has it beeii tried anyplace? . , ,` . Mr. Tim~rAs.This is an integral part of the system. We call if. the radar beacon. Its development now, and it is beyond the old 1FF, is PAGENO="0067" 63 quite sophisticated, compared to that equipment, but the new ones2 and one that is rapidly being installed in the fleets will give discreet iden tity, 4,096 codes, and it will also read an altimeter, and translate that altimeter reading back to the ground, so the controller can look on a radar scope and ~et both the identity and altitude associated with the radar targets. This is our so-called alpha numeric system. ~ Mr. ADAMS. I want to inquire on the alpha numeric system, too. I have seen the operation, which i~ used regionally in several of the areas, and I wanted to know whether or not this plane was still under -what is your regional center there, at Atlanta? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. ADAMS. Was this still under Atlanta regional radar control in its carrier operation ? I am talking now about the Piedmont carrier and the Cessna. I also don't know whether the Atlanta PPI scope would carry into the mountainous region there. Did it, or would it? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; under the air route ~ traffic control center. I might explain for the benefit ~ of others, we have 21 air route traffic control centers that cover almost the entire upper air space with radar. The centers are equipped with long-range radar, which are not located at the site of the center. We pipe radar signals in by tele- communications. Mr. ADAMS. Pipe them in from the various locations and then plot them on your PPI scope? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; and that was a case here when he was under radar. But lest I leave a misimpression that the alpha. numeric is with us, we have it and it is operating, but it will be the early 1970's before we will have the ground equipment in which will provide identity and altitude directly on the rad~r scope. Mr. ADAMS. Now, I wanted to inquire about this regional radar because we have only talked about ground control radar. I don't want this particular accident to obscure from us the overall problem. Now do you contemplate in this to maintain a series of radio or radar beacons that would feed your r~gional centers and give you an overall traffic plot ? Now, I know at the regional centers that I have been in, they can give you a plot of everything that is above the radar blank spots, in the entire 200-mile range. ~ow, was that being done in this area, or could it be done in thj~ area ? ~ ~ ~ , ~. In other wQrds, did they pick up these p1ane~ on the Atlanta syst~m? ~ Mr. ~ THo3~s. It was being done, and can be done. We cover the entire United ~States with radar from our centers, and they give an indication of position, not altitude. ~ ~ ~ ~ Mr. ADAMS. N~t altitudes, I agree, but an indication of position. Now, have you made any sort of anarraugemen~ with, or should we be considering a tie into the military radar which, as I. understand it, also coverg the entire United States in a similar type opei~ation. Do you feel that this would be helpful? Mr.THOMAS. No, sir. ~ ~ ` ~ . ~ Yes, sir, we have, but ;I think ope of the bi~ight ~ots is that hádf of this radar is military. We use the same radar, sir. ~ Mr. ADAMS. That is what I was going t~ ~ next,. ~ ~ ~ .. ~ .~ ~ Mi THOMAS Of the hundred we aie using less t1~an 50 `ire FAA, the rest are military, and they t~se our, i aclar, so this is a joint use of these very ~heavy i~adar. PAGENO="0068" 64 Mr. AbAMS~ NGw, I wantedto inquire thou~t another thing. Was the Piedmolit flight 22 a re~u1arfiight ? I happen to have been in Asheville the day after this accident and as I understand it aU those camps break on Wednesday~ Was that a.special or an extra fligtht coming out of that airpGrt, orwas this a i~egularly sôheduled section? Mr. THOMAS. ~I thrnk it would be better forMr. O'Connell to answer that question. ~ ~ ~ ` . ~ ~ . .~ Mr. O'CONNELL. It Wa~ a regularly scheduledseotion. ~ Mr. ADAMS. Regularly seheduled. * Now, to go back again to th~ question of whether Atlanta radar had picked up the Cessna, I listened to the reports that were being read to us of the radio contacts that took place, and also will it be possible for you in the fairly near future-I know they were reported in the press there-to produce for us a sketch of the radio beacons and the loca- tions of the two craft? Mr. ALLEic. Yes, *~ir. This activity will be performed in the groups that will be participating in this activity,which will be the operations ~gronp, the air traffic cOnth4 grOup, and the flight recorder read out.. Mr. ADAMS. I flotice in your statement that there is a 10-day period, within 10 days after a key event, a summary report will be made. When will that be available ? ~ Mr. O'CONNELL. I might . answer that, Congressman. The summary report that I referred to will not be made in this case for some time, be- cause it is planned that we make them 10 days after the public hearing ~n each case. Mr. ADAMS. All right. Now, while I have you for a moment, I no- ticed in the record here, and you have indicated that you have a sum- mary, starting on. page 6 of your rej~ort, Mr. O'Connell, there are listed the five midair collisions, and four of the five, I notice, are in small centers. Mr. O'CONNELL. Excuse m~. Only two of the five are midair col- lisions. ~ ~ Mr. ADAMS. . I see. Then only the ones at Asheville and Urbana are midair collisions. Both are at smaller cities. Now, we have discussed previously the prohibitive expense of trying to go to ftill radar opera- ticns at the smaller cities. What have you contemplated, or what do you suggest that we might be looking into to authorize in terms of a sapplemental system for * the smaller fields which could be fed to regional centers, so the regional centers can at least pr~tect commer- cial aircraft in the areaby informing them of thetr~iffic even if they cannot protect general aviation ? ~ * . ~ . ~ .1 am woi*lering, for example, in this case, whether Atlanta radar can be alerting the pIah~s taking off at the smaller fields regarding the traffic in the area and what is happening at that particular point. I know they do this to some great degree, and I want to know whether you have considered this, or whether `we need something else. Mr. O'CONNELL. Well, I would like to say that our observation of the two midair collisions which we are discussing here, particu- larly- .. . Mr. ADAMS. Asheville and Urbana. Mr. O'Cq~~Lt. (contii~uii~ig). Do not lead us to a definite conclu- sion that ~otfiEt ~uDpOrt a recommendation for a major expansion in the radar operation, based on these accidents. In the Urbana case, radar did exist. PAGENO="0069" 65 Mr. ADA~tS. The Urban~a planes were on ~ Dayton radar~, weren't they? ~ . ~ ~: ~ ~ ~ Mr. O'CONNELL. That is right. Mr. ADAMS. And this one was on-well, the; plane itself was nc1~ on Atlanta rad~r, but the Cessna would be on Atlanta radar, so. that the plane, as it is~ taking off, could be given information. as th what the air traffic in the area was. Mr. ~ O'CONNELL. Well, it was on radar frornAtlanta when it took off, but it had been turned over to Asheville, which had no radar, before this accident took place, so we have no radar at Asheville. Mr. ADAMS. No. One more question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will desist. Mr. THOMAS. May I, sir 9 Mr. ADAMS. Yes. Mr. THOMAS. The radar, as you know, emanates from the ground and goes out like an inverted cone. My belief is that the coverage at Asheville on raw radar is around ~T,OOO or 8,000 feet. This will be determined by the Board, and the ques- tion is, can we use center radar to give more protection to smaller air- ports 9 You ~an within the limits of coverage. Mr. ADAMS. Well, this is the last question that I had, and perhaps you gentlemen can submit a reply in writing, because I don't want to take any more time. But I want to pay my compliments to the regional control centers. I frankly don't know how the men manage to keep their minds with the tremendous amount of traffic they have to keep track of. But with the commercial airliner, which at this point we are dea1in~ with, carrying large numbers of people, I want to know if it is possible to establish supplemental radar beacons which will feed to your center section information from the 400 airports that are using commercial traffic, and at that point, with whatever expansion of facilities is necessary, have these centers maintain contaët with the commercial carriers to give them traffic reports in each area, whether or not they are flying in the metropolitan areas. Now, that is the question that I have, andif you gentlemen want to submit it in writing that will be fine. I don't want to take too much of the committee's time now. Mr. TIIOMAS. Sir, this is a matter of radar coverage, down low, and if we had the radar coverage down low, then we could give the infor~. mation to all traffic. Generally, atthese airports, we do not have radar coverage from the center down to low altitudes. Mr. ADAMS. That is what 1 am inquiring of you. Mr. THOMAS. If we could put it in-~--- Mr. ADAMS. I am not talking now about a full radar coverage in the general sense, but actually a supplemental radar beacon feed. In other words, all you have at the small field is a radar tower, which feeds by co-ax cable into your regional center. In this we are talking about the 400 airports that are now involved with commercial traffic and yet are below the present FAA cutoff p:oint for full radar. . Mr. THOMAS. Sir, that is the $750,000 per site we are talking about. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Allen, Iwould like to direct my first question to you. * You have given a pretty thorough appraisal of the investigation done by your group, of everything from the psychology and health of the crew. of the planes to the design and maintenance of the planes. To what extent do you investigate the adequacy of the performance PAGENO="0070" 66 of FAA pGrsonnel under the regulations that are covering. the cirmm' stances of the crash, and the activities of that day in connection with them ? . ~ ~ . Mr: ALLEN; Well,Mr. Bixwn, first. of all, 1 would say that we think quite adequately. `I would say, firstofall, that when you consider the method that the investigation is conduct~d, that this assures you that you go into just these aspects that you enumerated. First of all, you have representatives ~ from every segiñent of the industry that is participating. I think that this assures you that you go into just these areas that you suggest. ~ Mr. BROWN. Have you had the authority to make recommendations with reference to FAA regulations? Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. Mr. BROWN. And do you frequently do this? Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir ; we have. I cannot give you exact numbers as `4 today, but I think that over the years, our recommendations will nun'~ber something on the ~ órdèr of approximately 80 to 100 a year. Mr. BROWN. Would you be in a position, if this proved to be the case, to make a recommendation with reference to radar at that par- ticular airport with reference to this particular accident? Mr. ALLEN. If the recommendation in our judgment was justified, we would be in a position to do so. Mr. BROWN. General McKee, I don't want to engage in an argument with you on the degree Øf congestion around Urbana, Ohio, but I would like to point out to you that you have within that area, as you are well aware, much airport space : Columbus, Dayton, and Cincinnati airports, wherein there is the beginning of descent or taking off climb to altitude of planes serving all those airports, fairly sizably trafficked airports, plus four military installa±ions within .a few miles, Wright- Patterson `Air Force Base, Lockbor~, Clinton Sherman Air Base, and Springfield, plus a~ number of small city airports. ~ Now, the `reason I point this out is that I would like to ask you the question of what constitutes high congestion areas ? Are we talking about the numbers of~plahes that, at any one time, are in the area? Are we talking about the number of lahdings that you suggest with reference to National Airport ? How do we assess congestion, and is there any measure thM'you ~ha:v~e that you think would be adequate to give me for, as an example, the top' 50 regions in the country, or airports in the country, with reference to congestion? General MCKEE. I think we can give you the picture in the number of operations in any ` particular area, and I, having lived at Wright- Patterson for 9 years, understand the conflict out there. There are a large number of individual operations, even though you may not have a tremendous number of commercial operations, but from an air traffic control point of view, we look at it in `terms of managing the air traffic, whether it is military, civilian, or general aviation, as you well know, and in that areathey are, obviously, a lot of operations going on; and that area, as you know, does have radar coverage. Mr. BROWN. Well, would you suggest that this area is still not a congested area? General MOKEE. Looking at the overall problem, I would not term that area congested. Maybe `Mr. Thomas has a different idea on the congestion business, but I would not say that was a congested area. Mr. BROWN. Not inthe'xinge `that perhaps National Airport or La Guardia or JFK or O'Hare are congested. PAGENO="0071" 67 General MCKEE. I wou1d~ sh~ it i~ a busy area ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Mr. BROWN. Where does this range in the 527 commercial airports, ~the Dayton Airport ? Do you have any idea ? High ? ~ Low ? ~ Middle? Mr. ThOMAS. Mr. Brown, all the airports you mentibnecl do have radar now. ~ ~ .~ .~ Mr. BROWN. ~ I am not questioning the existence of the.radar. I am tall~ing about the fact that I thinkithat the one at Dayton handles an *awftil lot of traffic. General MCKEE. Dayton is a busy place, as we well know. But I still don't think it would range high on . the list of congested areas. Mr. BROWN. Well, is it possible for you to give me the top 10 percent of the airports in the country with reference to whatever congestion means in your terms? General MCKEE. I could not give them to you offhand. Mr. BROWN. No. I don't mean now. But in written form. General MCKEE. Oh, yes; we would be happy to. (The following information was subsequently stthmitted:) FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION COMPILATION OF ANNUAL AnI TRAFFIC VOLUME AND INSTRUMENT OPERATIONS AT 35 U.S. AIRPORTS, IN RANK ORDER Herewith submitted is a list of the 35 U.S. airports having the greatest nnm~er ~of annual instrument operations. These airports represent slightly more than 10 percent of the airports having FAA traffic control service. Also attached is a~1ist of the top 35 airports in terms of total aircraft operations. 1. Ohicago (O'Hare) , Til 2. Los Angeles, C~if 3. ~ohn F. Kennedy (International) ~" V 4. Washington (National) , ~ 5. Atlanta "~~` ~ * . ` 6. Miami, ~la 7. Oakland, O~1if ~ ~. San Francisco, ~~~n141! 9. Detroit (Wayne) , 10. Dallas (Love Field) , ~ :i~i. Denver, Co1~~ 12. Boston, M'~ 13. La Guardia, NY 14. Newark, V T 15. Philadelphia, ~ Pa t6. Cleveland-Hopkins, Ohio~ iT. Pittsburgh (Greater) , Pa. 18. Honolulu, `~ `~ 19. St. Louis, ~" 20. Houston, Te~ ~1. San Axitonio (Intl.) , Tex_ 22. Minneapolis (W. Chamberlain), 23. Phoenix, A 24. Kansas City (Municipnl ~ Mn~ 25. Seattle-Tacoma, W~h 26. Norfolk, VQ 27. Columbus, OI~ 28. New Orleans (Moisant) , La 29. Oklahoma City (Rogers), (~k1~ 30. Dayton, Oh~n ~31. Memphis, rr~~ 32. T'~'~ ri.~ 33. Covington (Grtr. Cincinnati), Ky 34. Baltimore (International), l'vtal .35. Long Beach, (iQlif fiscal year 1961 532, 889 350, 131 339, 213 299, 500 269, 237 252, 928 243, 707 216, 107 200, 854 196, 546 176, 298 173, 994 171,124 165, 254 163, 545 162, 885 162, 735 153, 951 143, 418 142, 302 133, 318 127, 313 124, 355 122, 879 119, 562 113,088 110,878 109, 126 104, 603 104,540 104, 537 102,140 101, 534 96,562 96,261 ATTACHMENT No. 1.-R.aHk order, total instrument operations, ~~rnclpaI), riawan Minn PAGENO="0072" 68 ATTACHMENT No. 2.-Rank order, tota' aircraft operations, fiscal year 1. Opa Locka, Fla .~ ~6, 949 527 2. Chicago (O'Hare), Ill . ~--~ - - - 588, 3. Van Nuy~,cOa1if 543, 324 ~, 724 4. Long Beach, Calif 5. Fort Lauderdale, Fla 451, 910 6~ Johu F. Kennedy Ii~t., N.Y 451, 533 7. ~ Miam4, Fla .~ 441, 156 8. Los Angeles, Calif 437, 777 ~ 9. Denver, Cob 436, 105 10. S~tn Jose, GaUf 382, 548 211 11. Tami~m~, 1~'1a 382, 12. Santa Monica, Calif 37~, 015 13. Torrance (Municipal), Qa1i~__ - 372, 831 14. Minneapolis (Flying Cloud) , Minn 308, 916 15. Santa Ana, Calif ~` 109 071 16. Phoenix, Ariz -----~ 359, 17. Dallas (Love Field), Tex. 344, 779 18. Oakland, Calif 343, 19. St. Louis, Mo - 341, 918 20. Seattle (Bo~ethg), Wash 332, 806 21. Atlanta (Munie~ipa1), Ga 380, 279 304 22. I~Iip, N.Y 319, 23. Washtngton (Nati&na~I), D.C 318,241 24. La Guardia, N.Y_~.__~-. ,.. ~ 316, 246 25. HawUiorne, C~t1U~ `~ 314, 159 26~ San ~rancis~cQ, Oa1L:~ ~ ~ --~---~-- 298, 908 325 27 Bedford Mass .~ .. ~ 28. Honolulu, Hawaii 291, 816 2~9. Oieveland-Jlopkins, Ohio .~ 291, 090 30. Ooncc~rd, Calif 290, 946 307 31. Widilta,. Kan~ ~ - ~--- 285, 32. Columbus, Ohio_ ~ - 28~, 103 ~33. Kansas City LFair~fax), Kans ~ 281, 187 84. Detroit (Wayne), Mich ~ - 279, 763 35. Ohieag9 (Midway), Ill ~ ~ ~. 278, 939 Mr. BROWN. ~ Now, I"would like to suggest one other thought to you, You mentioned segreption by altitude, and segregation by airport I think there is a possibility, also, of segreg~tionby time, is there not? General MCKEE. The problem that we have in midair collision is thattwo planes try to occupy the same space at the same time. Is it possible that there cou ~d be some place in theregulations which~ you set up a segregation bytime ? ... ~ . Mr~ TH~oM~s. Yes,sir, this ~ is one of the methods of separation that air traffic control uses, but that is- for~the aircraft under the controller. Mr RROWN Has that ever been thought of as a means of segregating use of the facility ~ Mr. THOMAS. I am not-certain that I understand the question. Mr. BROWN. U:se of th~ facility by commercial piaiies for the 45 minutes after the hour, and `use of it by private planes for 15 minutes befpre the hour. ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ . Mr. Tnoi~s. No, sir. ~ . Mr. BROWN. Would this have any practical possibility ? ` ~ ~ . Mr. THOMAS. ~ I don't believe it would, Mr. Brown, `because even if you segregated them b~ 45 and 15, they J~ave that airport, and then `they cross someplace else. ... ~ , Mr. BROWN. Well, it would control the airspace in that particular `locality, wou:Edit not? `` ~" " ~ , , ~ ` , , , ` PAGENO="0073" 69 Mr. THOM4S. Yes, sir, but I thiiik you could do ~ it , more advan- tageously and more efficiently by controlling the aircraft and not sep- arating them by their class of operation, ~ Mr. BROWN. As I understand, y.u indicated that the last change in material on number of operations relating to insulation of radar was examined in 1965, and the last change was made in 1960. Now, I ha~re some testimony that was made before another committee of the (Jon- gress just in 1963-November 1963-which would indicate that we had a 55 percent increase from the testimony you gate today in the last 3½ years of the number of operations which are being handled on a daily or annual basis byFAA. * ~ ~ ~ Now, don't you think this calls for some change in the criteria under which you operate? General MoKEi~. I would like to state ~ as a matter of policy, Mr. Brown, that this is now ~ 1967, and we are reexamining this criteria now. Mr. BROWN. The one that you established in 1960 and examined in 1965? General MCKEE. Right. Mr. BROWN. General, have you any knowledge of something called AIM, a research project at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base that is supposed to create a low-cost anticollision avoidance device? General MCKEE. Yes. I know about it. I don't know about it in detail. I think Mr. Thomas has been into that. Mr. BROWN. It is under the control of the Air Force, I believe. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. We are part ofthat effort. Mr. BROWN. Does it hold any promise that you are aware of in this field? Mr. THOMAS. The work by this effort~-and we are a p~trt of it- has to do with the use of the radar beacou, for getting more informa- tion to the ground and trying to get a cheaper addition to the radar, which would read off altitude and identity, if the aircraft were equipped, and you have the basic radar on the ground, plus some other equipments. We are very much a part of that. It is not a funda- mental anticollision device, by itself. Mr. BROWN. You think it offers some promse?. Mr. THOMAS. It offers a great deal of promise. Mr. BROWN. For noncommercial aircraft, that. i~, for private air- craft? Mr. THOMAS. Oh, yes, sir, because we are doing a lot of the work, working with them up at Atlantic City in our own laboratory. . Mr. BROWN. General, I would like to ask a question about con- gestion. On the ground, around the airports, again, using the example of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, there has been an effort to control the development, through zoning, of the land aroundthis military air- field, particularly with reference to runways. Is there any effort like this across the country generally to control the use of land at the end of runways, or where it is possible that a plane might have a collision? General MCKEE. Oh, there is a major effort, not only from the point of view of safety, but also from the point of view of noise. We are working on this with Housing and Urban Development, HEWS NASA, and we consider it a major problem, and one that requires a major effort, not only on the part of the Federal Government, but on the PAGENO="0074" 70 part of the local communities, and' an awareness of the local corn- munities of the importance of the problem. Mr. BROWN. Has the FAA established any numbers of occupancy of the ground per square mile that is desirable in this? General'MoK~E. No, not by numbers per square mile. Mr. BROWN. How do you establish your zoning regulations, then? ` General MCKEE. We have no authority `to establish zoning regula~ tions. We can oniy make recommendations. Mr. BROWN. What recommendations do you make to HTJD in this area? General MCKEE. I cannot give you `the recommendations. But take New York, for example, around JFK and some of the other airports. After we have made recommendations, and this has happened in other areas, the local authorities have permitted housing developments to go up around airports that we strongly objected to, mostly from a noise standpoint, I must say ; but, nevertheless, if you are going to get developments going up out at the end of runways, you obviously do have a safety hazard, and I think communities, would be well advised, particularly in building new airports, or modernizing airports, to take all of `these things into consideration. This is being done very vividly down in Texas, where they are pro~ posing to build a regional airport, and those people are wise ; they are buying up 10,000 acres for the airport, and then buying up 10,000 acres' around the airport in order to protect it. Now, Mr. Jarman'~ place, down in Oklahoma, at Tinker Air Force Base, they have done the same thing. Mr. BROWN. We are getting a little deeper into this than I would really like to get. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for some specific information,. again submitted in writing, if we can get it. The discussion earlier in- cluded the number of commercial airports that have radar, and the number that have towers. Are these the only two criteriathat you established, or the only two~ facilities for which you have established criteria ? How about high intensity lighting? General MCKEE. no, also for lighting, also for ILS. Mr. Thomas' pointed out earlier, we really have more accidents on takeoff and land- ing than, by a considerable degree, midair collisions. We have to estab- lish criteria for all these facilities and equipment, to be sure that the money we spend goes to the places where it is most urgently required. Mr. BROWN. Would it be possible, Mr. Chairman, for the FAA to' submit the facilities at airports for which they have established cri- teria, the number of airports which have these facilities for which criteria have been established, and the number which meet the criteria but do not have the facilities ? Now I am including, I am broadening the expression of interest that was evidenced earlier beyond radar, and beyond towers to include high intensity lighting, anything else that you may have. General MoKi~. I think this is important. We have to look at the whole package and not get diverted that radar solves' all of our problems. I I PAGENO="0075" 71 (The information requested follows:) FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIpN STATEMENT ON CRITERIA ESTABLISHED FOR AIRPORT NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES Submitted herewith is a copy of FAA Handbook 7031.2 dated May 11, 1965, entitled "Airway Planning Standard Number One-Terminal Air Navigation Facil- ities and Air Traffic Control Services". (The handbook referred to has been placed in committee files.) That Handbook contains the current criteria for the establishment of air navigation facilities and air traffic control services. The table below indicates the extent to which FAA, at the end of the Fiscal Year 1967, has installed in accordance with that criteria four of the major types of terminal air navigation facilities and air navigation services at airports served by air carrier aircraft. Facility or service Airports where installed Airports which meet criteria but where not installed Control towers Airport surveillance radar Instrument landing system Approach lighting 238 109 206 187. 29 10 - 35 56 Mr. BROWN. General, I could not agree more with you, and I think if the chairman will give me just 1 minute to make a personal corn- ment, I think we have got to go into this thing in depth, not just to the idea of excluding noncommercial aircraft frOm commercial air- ports, but, rather, with an idea to finding out all of the factors which contribute to air safety, or the lack of air safety ; and then seeing whether or not the job being done by FAA. and those facilities over which the Congress has some control are adequate, including, I would hope, to come to a comment that you made earlier, today, whether or not you have legislative authority to change regulations in certain areas, because I wa~ under the impression that the FAA had pretty broad authority to change regulations with respect to air safety, and it comes to me as a shock that you feel that you don't have that authority. General MCKEE. I don't think we said that we didn't have authority to change regulations where it is strictly a matter of air safety. 1% all depends, of course, on what regulation you are talking about, but we do have authority to change regulations with regard to the opera- tion of aircraft, and all of the rest of i~, which is a very broad man- date that we have under the law. As far as the authority that we have under the law is concerned, the 1958 act, to the best of my knowledge and ability, we are discharging the mission that was given to us with that act. Mr. BROWN. Well, if there is any area, General, in which you do not have the authority to establish air safety regulations, and this corn- mittee can give you that authority, or can see that that authority is conferred upon somebody, so that action can be taken in some of these areas, I would certainly urge that the committee give it consideration. General MCKEE. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kornegay. Mr. KORNEGAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKee, ~$hat is the history of the air traffic control? General MCKEE. The history of the air traffic control? PAGENO="0076" 72 Mr. KORNEGAY. The history of it, with reference to when it started. General MCKEE. I would like to ask Mr. Thomas to give this, since he grew up with it. He sitartedout with it~ Mr. KORNEGAY. All right. General MoKi~E. And hassuifered through the whole business. Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, when particularly the airlines started flying on instruments, that is~ in clouds, in the early 1930's, they oc- casionally would arrjVé over the same fix at the same time, such as at Chicago. The first aittempt in the early 1930's was a combination of the airlines. They got together and would simply exchange informa- tion, and agreed that planes coming ttp from the south would be at 3,500 feet, and from the west, would be at 5,500 feet, and then they would make their descent. It soon was evident that just an exchange of information was not enough, and some direction would have to be included, so the airlines started an air traffic control system in 1935. This was taken over by the Federal Government in 1938, and by the beginning of World War II, there were eight centers established with- in the United States, controlling traffic within a radius of roughly 50 to 100 miles from the centers. These were places like New York, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta. During World War II, it became obvious with the buildup of the milithry traffic that this system should be vastly expanded, and should include the airport traffic control towers, as well as the en route op- eration. It was expanded to cover the entire United States at that time, and after, aud it was operated on a manual basis, simply by filing a flight plan, people exchanging information, until the Grand Canyon- essentially until the Grand Canyon collision of 1956. There was impetus put on then for major expansion and radar, en route, and since that time, it has grown ; equipment has been added to it, computers have `been added. It has become highly sophisticated since that time. Mr. KORNEGAY. Well, how many control centers do you have at the present time? Mr. THOMAS. If we limit ourselves to the 48 States, and this is easier, there are 21. Mr. KORNEGAY. Within thecontinental United States. Mr~ THOMAS. Within the continental United States. That is the en route traffic. Mr. KORNEGAY. And 21 control centers? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. These are the regional centers that were men- tioned. Mr. KORNEGAY. The regional centers, and you referred to Atlanta as a regional center. Mr. THOMAS. Atlanta Air Traffic Control Center ; yes, sir. Mr. KORNEGAY. An area that covered western North Carolina? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. KORNEGAY. Now, do you feel, Mr. Thomas, that the system needs to be expanded? . Mr. THOMAS. We are in the process of putting rn- Mr. KORNEOAY. Over what we talked about, including equipment and a larger system-putting more equipment in smaller airports. Do you need to expand thesystem itself? PAGENO="0077" 73 Mr. rrnoMAs. Well, we have about a $300 million effort going on right at this moment to automate these large centers, so that they can get altitude and identity information directly instead of by means of the pilot speaking and the controller remembe~Hng it. We have grad~ ually been enlarging the radar service that is supplied by th~ airports that are now equipped,'ancl, obviously, moreairports will be equipped with radar. We have been trying to work ` on a priority basis, where the most need is, to put our efforts there first, and as I mefitioned this mQrfling, about 90 percent of the passengers are now covered at the airporth with radar service. And the en route environment is essentially covered as far as their air carrier operations are concerned. The base of th~ en route coverage may vary from 5,000 above the ter- rain to 8,000 or 10,000 feet above the terrain, as you move away from the system. Mr. KORNEGAY. The farther you get- Mr. TuoMAs. The higher, and in the Far West, there ar~ places that we are up to 15,000 or 18,000 feet above sea le'~el, before we have-radar coverage. General MCKEE. I think it is very interesting to note, Mr. Korne- gay, that since 1959, the Congress has -appropriated over -$1 billion in the area of facilities and equipment, directJy traced to air traffic con- trol, and to air safety. My guess is overthe next 10 years they will ap- própriate a significant sum, probably greater than -this. Mr. KORNEGAY. Even greater than that-, I would think, with the in- -crease in air traffic. General MCKEE. So the Congress is well aware of the problem. Mr. KORNEGAY. And the complexity of the system, ~and everything -else. Now, let me ask you thi~, Mr. Thomas : I don't believe it has been touched on in the hearings by any of the questions. With -reference to paint and lights, in other words, the abi]ity of on-c aircraft to see and detect another aircraft in the air, in the vicinity, there -are rules and regulations, I am sure, on those developments, are there not ? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Well, not on paint. We ~ have had a lot of experience and experiments with `paint, as ~ has the military. A few years ago, we tried fluorescent paints to seeif'this would -attract more attention. We have run tests- on patterns 6f painting that. -would be most susceptible of being seen. Actually, if you have- contrasting colors- ~n the airplanes, it does somewhat increase their conspicuity. -One of the problems here is that color, though, fades out with distance ye - .ryrapidiy, and one is depend- ent more than not on the silhouette j-of the - airplane and- its contrast with its background. This led us -into lights, and the rotating beacon that you are so familiar with -is one -of -the most useful things, if the sky is dark, and you are not in bright sunlight. We have tried condenser discharge lights. We are going to do thore work -on that. - One of the things that we are working at cross purposes on, smoke emitted from an airplane, is the be~t anticollision device I know, be- cause you can see the smoke trail, and then see the airplane. We have an .anti~ollution problem, so we are trying to get rid of the smoke, so depending on the p-roblenl,- we work at crOss~purposes. But, actuaily~ we are doing a lot of work, trying to improve conspicuity, and my own PAGENO="0078" 74 belief is that lights off8r our best promise, despite the fact that in bright sunlight, they are very difficult to see. Mr. KORNEGAY. What about the strobe light ? I think you referred to it by a different name. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; the strobe light or condenser discharge is very efl~ective. Some of the airlines have them on, and if you see them, they attract your attention. Mr. KORNEGAY. Would they be visible much longer than the rotating beacon would be? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. We are going to try some light aircraft with those and see if they work. The problem with those, even the con- denser discharge, high power lights, is that they are not visible in strong sunlight. We are also looking at reflective devices, thinking we can get some reflection from the sun. This ground has been ploughed over ; we are going to plough it again, because we may have left some stone unturned. Mr. KORNEGAY. That is all, Mr. Ohairinan. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ottinger. Mr. OTTINGER. ThanJ~ ~ou,Mr. Chairman. I must say, General McKee, that I am not as sanguine as some of my `colleagues about the way the agency has exercised its responsibilities in the area of air safety. I really think you have been derelict in your duty in terms of actively pursuing the reasonable things that might be done to improvö air safety. For one thing, while you are not an independent agency-~ General MCKEE. I am not an independent agency, Mr. Ottinger. Mr. OTTINGER. Right. General MCKEE. I am a part of the Department of Transportation. Mr. OTTINGER. You are a part of the Department of Transporta- tion, but still you are the only technical agency in the Government that is responsible for air safety. General MCKEE. That is correct. Mr. OTTINGER. And it seems to me that your responsibility is to de- fine the needs for improvements in air safety, whether or not you can get Bureau of the Budget approval for them. You are the one agency `of the Government to which we in Congress and to which the public can look for a definition of what is reasonably needed. If you need more radar, if you need more control towers, if you need more landing lights, if you need more airports, whatever it may be, you should come here and ask for them. It is your duty to do so. It is really no answer to. ~ay, "Well, the. Bureau of the Budget would not approve an additional request for funds." ` . . The same thing whenit comes to authority. You say that with respect toseparatin'g general aircraft from comthêrcial aircraft, you don't have the authority. Itseems to me it is your responsibility to ask for the au- thority, if you need it, and 1 think we would consider it very seriously, if you did. You made this remark specifically with respect to moving general aircraft from National Airport to perhaps Anacostia, or some other area. It seems to me that is your definite responsibility, to set out for this committee and for the public what is needed to improve air safety. We look to you, ~as the expert, for this information. You, as the experts, PAGENO="0079" 75 ~shou1d define for us what is needed and what could materially im- prove air safety in the United States. Now, I will just tick off some areas in which I am particularly con- ~cerned about lack of sufficient FAA pursuit of safety procedures and devices. I have asked about some of these matters before and gptten jt~st wague assurances such as : "We are working on it," or "We are study- ing on it." I think more action, more active steps, are required, because ;i: think there are very serious problems. One area of concern is the matter of continuous ground control of ~all aircraft in the Northeast corridor, which is very congested at the Vresent time. As I understand it, at present there is only intermittent ground control. I think that action is needed to see that aircraft are under continuous control during the entire area. Another area of concern is the aspects that have been discussed here of introducing ILS and radar and lighting to commercial airports ~that don't have them. I think it's outrageous that the FAA didn't ask for one penny for these purposes this year. Also I would mention an item about which I wrote you, having sec- ~ondary radar installations available to protect against the radar fail- ~ures we have had recently at Kennedy Airport, and we have had often at La Guardia Airport. Another concern is development of new kinds of radar, especially ~three-dimensional radar. An article in the July 24 issue of Electronics says that there are four. companies at the present time that can produce three-dimensional radar, Maxon Electronics Corp., the ~Hughes Aircraft Co., AVCO Corp., and ITT-Gilfihlan. The artjcle ~says: Any of these companies could install a three-dimensional radar backup system .at any U.S. airport for less than $2 million. I also have indication that the Navy has presently three-dimensional radar. It seems to me that you should be more aggressive in seeing to it that if this really makes a difference to safety is pursued. Still another area of concern is the proliferation of small aircraft ~around commercial airports. This would seem to me to be clearly a threat to safety. Whether you separate small aircraft by requiring them ~to use different airports, or whether you separate them by time, or by the experience of the pilots or equipment carried by the planes, it seems to me greater action is required. Control tower problems have been written about a great deal, and the difficulty a controller has todity to keeptrackof all the planes in the con- gested areas. This is another area that seems to require greater correc- ~tive action. ~ ~ ~ ~ You testified this mornin~ there á,re no recertification procedures for noncommercial pilots. This ~rtainly requires~orrection.* The question of cockpit visibility, the question of control over air :taxis; are two other items. I understand that whil~ your regulations i~nd requirements for commercial carriers are complete and very strict, -there are virtually no controls over air taxis. These are just some of the things that, as a nonprofessional, have ~come to my attention, where it seems to me ,your action is inadequate. Your answer is always, "We are studying it; we are looking into it. Maybe we will do something in the far future." PAGENO="0080" 76 In view of the real erisis tha~t we are confronting, it would require action now. I think you have been derelict in your duties in pursuing thesem&tt~rs mOre diligently. . ~enerai McK~E. I do not' accept your languagethat I have been derelict. Neitherl normy o~her people in FAA have been derelict in ~their duties. I~ din't ktiow of any 43,000 people in the United States who work aromttd the clock and work harderthan the people in FAA. And in defense of those people, and you can give me all the hell you want to personally but I stand up forthose people, every speck of the way. We have got 14,000 controllers working in this control work and working in these centers, and I am proud of them. There are not a finer bunch of men in this country, and if everybody in this country did the job those people are doing, this country would be a hell of a lot better off, and that is my speech, Mr. Ottinger, and I will stand by it. Mr. OmNGEii. Well, I'd certainly agree that your controllers are doing an outstanding job under the most trying circumstances. But that misses the point, which concerns the diligence of your agency in pursuing new safety devices and requiring new safety procedures. Here, the editors * of Electronics magazine certainly don't agree with you~ They say: of all the thousands of Government agencies, it would seem almost impossible to rate one as the worst, yet technical mei~ who have sthdied the air traffic con~ trol problems are ready~ to give that malodorous distinction to the FAA. The agency born to perform great feats of technical inno*~ation has turned out to be weak, ~ ineffectual, unimaginative, and apathetie~ The threat of midair collision hanging over the United States when the FAA was formed is still with us, only worse than ever. And the FAA is as far from coping with this threat as it was on the day it was founde4. That certainly isn't a very glowingapproval. GeneralMCKEE. I. would like to answer that, too. The CHAIRMAN.. Just a moment. I will allow the gentleman to answer that, then that will be all. You may gO ahead and a~iswer iL General MCKEE. AliT wanted to say is that if I just read the critic-~ . isms directed at me and FAA, I would do nothing else, and the FAA wouldn't. . We wouhi not even have an air traffic control system. I consider that an irresponsible article, and the aviation community will back me up 100 percent. I am surprised you even bring it up. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blanton. : Mr. BLANTON. Thank yc~i, Mr. Chairman. Ge~n~ai McEee, I am nbtgoing to try to put you on the spot, be~ cause .1 realize. that the administration has other things in mind, but. I would like to ask you this one question. Do you think, if the Ana~ costia stripwas m~le available to private. aircraft, it ~vouid ease some of the congestion at National Airport ? General McKi~. Yes, we sai~l:this, last summer. Obviously., any airplane, or numbe~ of airplanes, that you take out of a particular iiirport servetoreli4we the.ecaigcstion. Mr. BLANTON. Now, I am Jeaving out the directive that you-you wo~ild not have to direct tb~m over there.. They would willingly use it, provided it wasavailabie. . General McK~, I think that is true, a lot of them would, and a lot of them would not. . . . PAGENO="0081" 77 Mr. BLANTON. I know that without a dir&~tive, that some of them would not ~ * General MCKEE. This is true. Well, of course, even if it were avail- able, Mr. Blauton, it would only be availthie* on a completely VFR basis, and for airplanes in the Piper Cub category, and very light air- planes, because you are quite circumscribed, as you know, in the area. It would not be available for the heavier general aviation aircraft, or for business jets, or for private jets. So it surely would relieve con- gestion somewhat. Mr. BLANTON. It would not be available for business jets? General MC1(EE. They could not operate there, Mr. Bianton. You see, you have a very limited runway at Anacostia. Mr. BLANTON. 5,000 feet, isn't it General MCKEE. ö,000 ; but there is a lot of building, as you know, going up at Bolling, and there has been a misunderstanding. They talk about Anacostia-Bolling. Boiling is building right now, and there is nothing available at Boiling. Mr. BLANTON. There is one questioti I would like to ask you on these near misses. How do you investigate this? Mr. THOMAS. If they are reported in the air, and they sometimes are, we will try to follow, if we see the other airplane oh the radar, we will try to follow him down, and chase him down to his point of destination, and get the story from ~ both pilots, get whatever infor~ mation that we can. It is very difficult. There are ho tracks left in the air, as you know, and we normally are not that lucky, and the report is some time later, so we have the one pilot's story of what happened, and we do the best we can byexaminingany record we have of traffic at that time, and try to get all the information we can. It is a very difficult and usually unrewarding job. Mr. BLANTON. Well, isn't it true that the majority of these critical near misses occur while under radar surveillance? Mr. THOMAS. No, Sir. There are some that do, however, and- Mr. BLANTON. The majority is not under radar surveillance? Mr. THOMAS. I will have to look at the statistics. My recollection is that more than half are not beyond the radar surveillance. * Mr. BLANTO~T. But if they are ui~der radar surveillance, and you have a man on duty on the radar, he can very easily see these near misses, provided it is reported? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. BLANTON. I know he cannot see the altitude, but he can see the flight path. Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Mr. BLANTO~. Let me ask you this : These feilcw~ that are on radar, I know they are busy, to saythé least, from hearing jhst th~. center's report recording read this morning before us, you can see they are busy. * How much extra would it cO~t to have an extra i~uan on duty looking for these collisions rather than in `~i'ctttal dirëètion of the traffic at these centei~? * Mr. THOMAS. I cannot answer that directly. You have about 8,000 people in the celiters now, and let's say that it ifi~reased that by 25 per- cent. I don't know whether this is right or not. That would be about $20 million a year, $30 million a year. But I hope that the present controllers ~re seeing the traffic, and I think that they do, and I am 92-715-68---6 PAGENO="0082" 78 not sure that the increase in personnel just for that purpose is war- ranted, but we will have to give you-it would help. I don't know whether it is2,000.or not, butit would be in that order, I would think. Mr. BLANTON. Ofcours~, the thing over in North Carolina this past week not being under radar surveillance would not make any dif- ference, if you had 20 people standing there. Mr. THOMAS. No, sir. Mr. BLANTON. But it is my opinion that the majority of them do occur under radar surveillance, because they are in congested areas, which are under radar surveillance. And I cannot see why that an extra man for this specific job, a monitor screen of his own, to look for these things, project them, and warn of the possibilities, as I understand it, you have no such men as this, other than the ones that are actually in direct control of the traffic at the present time. Is that right? Mr. THoMAs. That is correct. Mr. BLANTON. Well, I would like to propose this as being iniresti- gated, as ~a possibility for some safety as far as collision is con- cerned, and I realize that as you said before, that the collisions are a minor part of our accidents. I mean, as far as numbers and dollars and cents and so forth. Who gets the reports whenever you make a report on these critical near-misses ? Mr. THOMAS. The report2 if it is given by radio, is given to the con- troller. He gives it to our flight standards people, if it is an air carrier, the nearest air carrier, and then it is immediately forwarded into our office here in Washington. We have on duty 24 hours a day communi- cation duty officers who take all irregularity reports, and the in~ vestigation starts usually with someone meeting the reporting pilot at the point where he taxis into wherever his point of destination is, to get the freshest information we can. If we are successful in detecting or the other airplane reports, some- times both report-rarely, .bat this sometimes happens-then we will meet the other plane and get the information. I think there may be a little bit of misunderstanding about the radar surveillance. It may occur in areas where we have radar, but they may be outside the radar coverage. Mr. BLANTON. I will address my last question to your report of your investigation, not the reporting of the near miss. Mr. THOMAS. Oh, our report. ~ , ~ Mr. BLANTON. And you give out excellent reports on crashes, and so forth. I read them myself, but I never see any reports on investigation on a near miss. Now, who gets these reports ? Are these.just kept for your records, or do you give the report to the pilot reporting, them, or the airlipe, or the carrier,, or whoever is involved? Mr. THOi~&AS. We ~il1 let whoever is involved know, and then we keep them for our~ ~ own information, and then-we do not publish them, no, as a matter of a published document on them. The informa- tion is available. Mr. BLANTON. I raised this question before, about whenever a pilot goes into a~ congested area, about equipment requirement arid pilot requirement.. Has there. been any study mi~de about congested areas, as to what General McKee said this morning that a bunch of people I PAGENO="0083" 79 cannot `óome into this airport unless there is a safety problem, but could not this be a possibility as far as safety, as far as equipnaent and pilot qualifications ? ~ * ~ Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir, there are, depending on the airport, some requirements. Most generally, if there is a tower, there is a require- ment for two-way communications, and there is not, for locations where there is no tower. Some airports will not permit, for e~campie, student instruction, I know of no airport tha1~ will not permit the current private pilot with two-way radio to land under good weather conditions. As a matter of fact, a private pilot can `follow a flight path to the runway, successfully. Mr. BLANTON. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stuckey. Mr. STUCKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKee, first I would like to say that I think your flight ~servioe people, your air traffic controllers, do a fine job, and I, for one, am very appreciative of the job that they do, and I am real familiar with your flight service operation parlücularly in our area, and I would like to say in Georgia, I think we have got the finest that you have ~nywhere. A lot has been said concerning the general aviation and excluding ~them from a lot of our congested airports, and I realize that we have 50 private or general aviat~ion planes for every commercial plane, but let me ask this question of you : Particularly with our private air- ~craft, private business, coming into airports such as N~ational, aren't most of these pilots basically rated ver~y similar to your commercial `pilots, most of t~hem ; don't they have an IFR ticket ~ General MCKEE. I don't know the percentage. Do you have any feel- ~ing for the percentage of them ~ Mr. ThoMAs. No, sir. The busier the airport, though, the higher the ~percentage, because we run into a very high percentage ~f air taxis and corporates, and they may be better equipped than the airlines. Mr. STUCKEY. Right. So this point I am trying to make, is just- take a pilot with a private certificate. Very very few of them would come into an area like National Airport, right ? Mr. THOMAS. I suspect they are very minimal. ~ Mr. STU0KEY. So let us say that you banned general aviation from National Airport. Your congestion there really is not the problem as much as it is your ramp space and facilities like that, isn't it ? ~General MOICEE. That istrue. Mr. STUCKEY. Well, anyway, the point I am getting at is by exelud- ~ing general aviation, and for some reason, it looks like they have to make general aviation the whipping boy here today, I don't see where this answers any of our problems. And, as far as safety is concerned, -take a small pilot, he stays within ageneral area of, say, 200, 250 miles, ~and he does not.venture into an airport like National Airport, so I don't think really that by banning general aviation from these airports ~that you are really going to improve your safety factor. Mr. BROWN. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. SnIOKEY. Yes. Mr. BROWN. Didn't I understand you to say that the segregation by airport is largely voluntary; that general aviation itself tries to stay away from these high congestion areas, as much as possible? Wasn't that the thrust of your testimony? PAGENO="0084" 80 Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir, th6 thrust was that this is the way it works, and those tha~t.do cx~ipe into: the' highly congested area are, as Mr. Stuckey said, either the air taxis, bringing peop'e in, or the cor- porates, who themselves are very well equipped. Mr~ BROWN; Is th~re any involuntary segregation ? Do you limit any airports at the presenttime from use by general aviation? Mr. PHOMAS. No, sir, except for radio requirements. Mr. &rucici~Y. JFK has tried to eliminate general aviation. Mr. TITOMAS; There are some places that do it by dollars, by landing fees. Mr. STUCKEY. Yes, sir. Mr. BROWN. But not by any safety regulation, other than the two- way radio? Mr. THOMAS. No, sir, because the general said, if we had an involved safety problem, we could take action. I think we are dealing with the convenience problem more than anything else. Mr. STUOKRY. The point I am trying to make-and I would like to hear you, if you agree with this, say so-is that just by banning gen- eral avia~tion from our largest airports, this. is not going to improve our safety factor, is it? . . Mr. THOMAS. No, sir, but by the same token, we would like to see more airports built that are. equipped and suitable, so that therewould be a diversion of aircraft to other airports, as our traffic goes up. Our concrete ig yet so limited. Mr. S~ruci~i~i~. Wouldn't this also apply to your commercial? Mr. ThOMAS.. Yes, sir.~ Mr. STUCKEY. So we need moregeneral airports. Mr. THOMAS.. Yes, sir ; weneed them. Mr. STUOKEY. And for general aviation-I agree with you, but the point I am trying to make, it looks like in a sense we have tried to make general aviation the whipping boy, from what I have heard so far, and I don't think the: separation has affected the safety of the airports we have talked about. ~ Mr. BROWN. Would th~ gentleman yield ? I don't want to intrude on your time, if you have another area of inquiry, but we have hit this: point earlier today, and that is the relationship between National,. Dulles, and Boiling Field, Anacostia. Now, does the FAA have within its jurisdiction the opportunity to require commercial aircraft to use Bolling or Dulies, and exclude them from National on any basis, either a flat exclusion, a requirement for certain devices, or on any basis? General MOKEE. I have no authority to require any general aviation aircraft to use Anacostia, bëc~u~ise I don't have any authority to use Anacostia, even if I wanted to. Mr. BROWi~. Well, now, with Dulles. General . MOKEE~ Unless I could make a safety rule and just say, \ "General * avii~t~on cannot use * Washington National, because it is. definitely unsafe, and, therefore, you can't go in, and I don't care where you go," whether you go to Dulles or whether you go to Friendship, or whether you go to Fairfax, or wherever you go, but I am unable to~ make that determination. Mr. BROwN. There was an effort made, was there not? PAGENO="0085" 81 General MCKEE. We ha~ve~ e~ncouraged, and; as a ~ matter of: fact~ I think we ought to commend the business community, a great many of the leading firms in the country. I wrøte to each one of them, wrote each one of them a letter, and a great many Of~thexn have moved their business flights to Dulles. A lot o~f them are using it. General Motors :and-~-oh, there are any number of them that use Dulles, and prefer Dulles. Mr.~ BROWN. Wasn't there an efl~ort some mouths ago to require that ~on1y planes that would land within 500 miles use ~ National, and that other longer haul planes use Dulles? General MCKEE. Sir, that was the hot summer of 1966. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. But you did have that authority to make that regulation, if you had wished to, in view of the heat that you received, did you not? General MCKEE. In view of the great heat I received. Mr. STUCKEY. Let me ask one other question concerning the Pied~ mont airplane, and the Cessna 310. Were both of them equipped with transponder equipment? Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Stuckey, the `~27 was transponder equipped. I do not have information concerning the 310 at this time as to whether it ivas transponder equipped or not. Mr. STUCKEY. We have also spent a lot of time today talking about your radar, and the cost of it, and the safety factors with our airplanes. Don't you think that the transponder has gone a long way ~ as far as making it a lot safer for flying if it was utilized more? General MCKEE. Yes, sir. Mr. STiJOKEY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Friedel. I might say this before you start : that any of these genth~men that have a question or two to ask, I am going to ask them if they will give it. I hope they won't take their 5 minutes, any of them, because I think most of the questions have been asked, and I don't see any sense in re- peating questions that have been asked, so with that understanding, I am going to go around again. Mr. Friedel. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I assure you that the qttes- tion I have has not been asked yet, and the first question is: I have received some mail about aircraft accidents caused by the pilot drinking. For the record, will you tell us about any regulations prohibiting pilots from drinking before takeoff? General MCKEE. They are quite extensive, and spelled out. That has been a major subject of concern to us, and I will ask Mr. Moore o~ Mr. Thomas to spell out the regtilation. Mr. ThoMAs. Mr. Friedel, most of the airlines have their own rules, and most of them prohibit drinking for 24 hours before a trip, and as far as I know, these rules are quite rigidly followed. In the case of gen- eral aviation, there is the normal legal regulation against operating under the influence of-that is alcohol or drugs, or any other adverse effect. There is no particular provision as to the number of hours before the flight. We tried number of hours, once, but enforcing it, actually finding out whether or not they did drink within a certain time period is almost impossible and also, the varying effec~t of the amrnmt of the PAGENO="0086" 82 drink and what it was is difficult to determine. So we rely on operating under the influence. Mr. FRIEDEL. Well, I understand the commercial pilots are watched very rigidly, and there is no question in my mind that they are all right. But in general aviation, in so many hundreds of airports all over the country where they `don't have towers or anything, is there any thought being given to how they could be regulated ? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; we have given it a lot of thought, but this is an extremely difficult one to enforce, or actually detect, whether or not they have been drinking, so we have gone the education route, or des- ignated medical examiners to g~ive out the information on the diffi- culty of flying after drinking, and particularly the effect of oxygen,. which is cumulative over the longer effects of drinking. But princi- pally, we are trying to get at it by education, and enforcement is ex- tremely difficult, because we do not want to follow the pilot, or have no way of following him immediately before he takes off. Mr. FRIEDEL. All right, now one more question. A very prominent citizen of Baltimore and a pioneer in aviation safety, Mr. Charles Adler, invented an "airplane proximity indicator" in 1951 and obtained a patent on it. lie turned this device over to the Government for $1. Some time after that I went up to an FAA installation in Atlantic City to witness some experiments they were conducting with this device. It could warn the pilot if a plane was too close from the right,. left, forward,or rear within a distanceof 25 miles. I would like to know if anything more is being done to perfect this device, or what did you learn from your experiments? Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir ; I am sorry, Mr. Friedel. I didn't recognize it immediately. Yes, sir, we are pursuing this, if it is the one that I am thinking of, but I think to be more accurate Mr. Blatt should de- scribe it. I believe it is altitude coded light. Mr. JOSEPH P. BLATT (Associate Administrator for Development, FAA) . It is both a split quadrant from the tail section and an altitude- coded light Mr. Adler has developed and we have recognized Mr. Adler's contributions to aircraft exterior lighting by giving him an agency award, and his work is being pursued at Atlantic City. Mr. FRIEDEL. I understood they can tell if a plane was 5, 10 miles, up to 25 miles away, but they couldn't give the altitude, and that was the part you were trying to correct. Mr. THoMAS. This depends on the ambient backgrounds, how well one could see lights. `Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Springer. Mr. SPRINGER. General McKee, I would like to pursue my ques- tion this morning. I didn't have a chance to finish. With reference to Washington National Airport, now there were an average of 876 landings and takeoffs last year per day. You made the statement, I believe, and if I didn't get this correct, would you correct me? You said it was safe. General MCKEE. I said what? Mr. SPRINGER. You said Washington National Airport today is safe. General MCKEE. I say it is as safe as any other airport we have with a like number of operations. PAGENO="0087" 83 Mr. SPRINGER. Well, that is a pretty general statement, because most of the airports are pretty well alike. General MCKEE. That is correct. Just a degree of ~ safety, there is no 100-percent degree of safety at any of them. ~ Mr. SPRINGER. I know that, but the problem is, I think, ~ should it be made safer ? General McKee, do you believe it ought to be made safer ? Or more safe, I should say. General MoKm~. I would like to make it so safe that we could be sure we would never have an accident there, if possible. Mr. SPEINGER. All right. General MCKEE. But on the other hand, as you know, we have taken action to severely restrict the number of operations there per hour~ And you can imagine the pressures that have been on me to increase the number of operations. Mr. SPRINGER. All right. Now, the ones that the pressures have been on have been chiefly, I presume, every commercial airline. Is that correct? General MoKm~. Well, everybody would like to use it. Not only the' commercial airlines like to have more operations. Mr. SPRINGER. Well, the commercial aircraft want to run more. They want to schedule more carriers coming in. Isn't that about the sizeof it? General M0KEE. Well, last ~ summer, yes ; they didn't want any re- striction, which I can well understand, but they did volunteer, when I talked to the presidents of the various airlines about the seriousness of the problem confronting us, they did volunteer to put in this 40-an- hour limitation. Mr. SPRINGER. All right. Now, General, let's just assume, if we took this, the way I figure it, of 876 per day average, and I don't know how that is, but that is the only way I can come about it, is an average, if you take the number of private aircraft, and take those out, you come to 233, to be exact, 222.9-223 landings and takeoffs average a day. If you took those out to some other airport, you would have a landing of only 653 per day. Now, that is not only a safety factor, that is a reduction in the number of ifights, the controllers, that the equipment there has to take care of, of probably a third, roughly. Thirty percent, that is almost a third. If you take 30 percent of 87~ and take it out of that airport, you will have removed from that an average of 223 per day. Now, that is a sizable reduction, isn't it? General `MCKEE. It is. Mr. SPRINGER. Now, it would be reasonable, would it not, to assume that if the controller, whoever is in charge of all their equipment, did not have to log in and out and keep track of those 223 which were going to some other airport, it certainly would make it considerably safer, wouldn't it? General McKEE. Not necessarily make it safer. It would certainly reduce the workload on the controllers. Mr. SPRINGER. All right. General MCKEE. We have controllers at other areas handling more operations by far than they are handling at Washington National. Mr. `SPRINGER. Well, we are back to this thing, though, of where you don't allow any more commercial aircraft to come in out there, isn't PAGENO="0088" 84 that true, because. oi~ the~factor that there is a danger of too many comingin? ~ ~ General McKi~z.. No ; thatisnot the reason. . . ~ Mr. SPRINGER. What is the reason ? General MCKEE. Thereason is congestion in the terminal, congestion in the parking lots, congestion on the ramps. We just can't physically handle them. ~ . Mr. SPRINGER. All right, now, is that the reason that you are not allowing any more ~ Is it not because of the safety factor, of those coming in and going out~ ~ ~ ~ General MCKEE. The primary reason is congestion in the terminal facilitics, parking facilities, and all the rest of them. Mr. SPRINGER. Then it is not safety factor. General MOKEE. We do iiot have a significant, a real safety factor. ~You always have the safety factor. Mr. Springer, even if you have two airplanes. Mr. SPRINGER. I understand, I am not trying to pin you down to im- rossible situations. General MCKEE. We did not do it on the safety basis, we really did it on the basis of actual congestion and physically being able to handle the people, not only on the ramps and in the terminals, and the park- ing areas, the access roads, the whole thing. Mr. SPRINGER. I have got a very few minutes ; I have got to get all this in the record. Your reason, then, for restriction is not-let's qualify it to see if I can get a correct answer-primarily safety. General MCKEE. No. Mr. SPRINGER. All right, I just want to be sure. Now that is your con- sidered opinion as of today. General MCKEE. As of today. Mr. SPRINGER. All right. Well, then, I will have to admit that the Information I am getting is not the same information you' are getting, but you are in a better position, I say, better qualified than I ani from a technical standpoint to judge this, but I am getting what I think is substantial opinion, from whom I would consider qualified people that there is a safety factor, and I am not trying to put you on the spot, if we have an accident, but I will have to admit when I go out there and watch this thing, and I am not affecting, that I haven't experience on this thing, and I have been through a lot of accidents in those 1'T years, and as I watch those landings and takeoffs, I can't help but come to a conclusion that there is a safety factor to all those people coming in and out, and I will admit I have thought twice a month, I go through the `same thing, but that i~ not nearly as bad as some of the airports I have run into, I will admit that, as far as the parkingand getting my bag- gage, isn't as bad as some other airports, but I have a sort of feeling that there is a danger, and I can't express it to you any better than that, but if you say, and it is your considered opinion, taking in all of the factors that you know about, that safety is not the primary reason for your not allowing for commercial aircraft to land, then I will take your word for it. General MCKEE. If the number of operations at Washington National were up to a point where We ifl the FAA. thought that there PAGENO="0089" 85 ~ais asaf~ty faetor, I wouldn't hesitate one spec to further~restr~ct the a~rport, , ~ ~ . ~ , ~ . `. Mr. SPJ~IN~ER. All right, uow ~ppar~ntiy I didn't `read your release very well, and I didn't thsorb that, last~I~ielie~e~ it was in January~ when you out back to 300 miles around Washin~gton ? Was that in January ? ~ * ~ ~ ~ General MCKEE. Oh, that was last summer. Mr. SrRIi~az~R. All right. ~ General MCKEE. I hoped you wouldn't bring up last summer. Mr. SPRINGER. I am not, I am just trying to find out and fOllow through if I can. I thought that was the safety factor. General McKEE. No, that was to try. to limit the number of opera~ tio~s, ~and again, in .tern~sof the terminal, in terms ofall of the fadili- ties. We just had too many people coming in and more airplanes an& more people than we c~uld handle onthe ground. ` Mr. SPRINGER.All right, let me get this straight in the record, then your reason for cutting heck to 800 miles on the allowance of 1~he air~ craft landing and takeoff, at Washington, was due to internal factors, not safety ? All right. I just want to be sure thatthis was on the record, because I certainly did not understand it this way~General McKee, and I am glad to have that matter cleared up. ` ~ I will say that, that I hope you will inform the newspapers, because as I understand it~ and I talkedto some of them, it isn't their belief of what the situation is. It mentioned this question only the other day, but they don't believe this is the primary factor, they believe that that is a danger factor. ~ Mr. BROWN. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. SPRINGER. Yes. ~ General McKEE. I read the newspapers all the time, and people prognosticate a terri'bie tragedy at Washington National, and you can predict, or I can .sit here right now and predict that we are going t& have a tragedy in the next year someplace, whether it is at Washington National or some other place. ~ . Now, if it doesn't occur, nobody pays attention to it ; if it does occur, the guy that makes the great prediction, he becomes a hero and I become a heel. Mr. SPRINGER. I don't think you are going to get too many like hap- pended down at Hendersonville, because there is apparently this field which does not have `much traffic. General McKEE~ Certainly wasn~t congested. Mr. SPRINGER. I don't think the danger of two aircraft coming together is as high as it would be here or at Chicago, or New York, or Los Angeles. ~ ` Anyway, I thank you for your answer. Mr. FRIEDEL. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. SPRINGER. I had promised to yield to Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. If `I may reverse the question, at what point would congestion become a `safety factor, or perhaps to `ask the question more directly, what would `be the area of breakdown, if you just increased with unlimited degree the traffic at an airport? PAGENO="0090" 86 Geñera1McKEE~ My point is that when th~ air traffic control systei~, I including the air traffic controllers, can no longer reasonably and seri- sibly handlethe~ traffic, andthey Urnit them right now. When they reach the limitpthnt at La Guardia or .J. F. K., that the reason a lot of airplanes at Washington National, when the weather is bad in New York, just sit on the ramp out here, because they can't handle them in New York. . ~ . ~ ~ Mr. BROWN. How many flights would that be a minute? General McKin~.Wou1d all dejend on what the airport is, what the weather is, and if you have got a better answer, Mr. Thomas, YOU are controller. ~ Mr. THoi~tAs. No, sir ; it depends entirely. upon the operation. For example,~ just for noise reasons alone, ~ JFK can go down to half its normal operations under one wind condition as opposed to another. Washington National can drop down to half, depending `on weather, and whether you land to the south or north, so this is why we have empowered the controller to impose what we call full control, and when he says that he has no further room for the airplanes, or it is getting out of land, he just skirts the flow off. He does this all over the United States ; he does it right now. Mr. BROWN. I am not sure that answers my question. Is the critical factor the aircraft traffic controller and the capacity of the air traffic controller to handle the traffic, depending upon the situation? General McKi~xs. That is right. And he judges, and he shuts it off, and he is the umpire. Mr. BROWN. But it is the controller. General MCKEE. Yes, sir. Mr. BROWN. Who is the critical breakdown point. Is that right? General MOKEE. Well, he is the one that determines it. It may be a blocked runway. It may be an instrument landing system out. It may be the weather went to low minimums, hut he is the one that determines when capacity has been ` reached, and he needs to divert, or to stop traffic. ` ` ~ ` ` Mr. BROWN. If I could just pursue the pointone step further, Mr. Chairman, what Tam really asking is that without radar, the air traffic controller may have `a certain point at which congestion becomes too great for him to handle. With radar, that point may be a little higher. In other words, an increased amount of traffic, with radar, and bad wind conditions, or something else, but the critical factor is. the air traffic contröllèr, in his capacity to handle the traffic; is that right? Under the circum- stances? ` General McKEE. I think we are plnying on words. If we have no radar we will operate 10 to 15 per hour. With radar, the wind in the right direction, we will go 90 an hour. It is the same controller; he is as capable and is as `busy under one `timeas he is the other. PAGENO="0091" 87 He handles the traffic, depending upon what the fa~i1ities will take. It is not the man that breaks down, it is the . facilities that break down; it is a lack of a runway. It is `a lack of an ILS, and the controller is the ~one that pulls the plug-"It won't take anymore." Because the facilities broke down, not the man. The CITAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, Mr. O'COnnell, do you have any responsibility at all to see after youhave made recommenda- tions and findings of:violation of safety that some corrective measure is taken., or does your group make any recoinmexidations at aU? Mr. O'CONNELL. My responsibility is prinmrily to make recomm~n- dations, after the investigations of accidents. Mr. RoGERs. Do you follow through to see if any action is taken? General MCKEE. He sure does. I have to `answer. I write letters every clay. It used to be the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and now to Mr. O'Connell, describing in detail exactly what action we took on every recommendation they make. Mr. O'CONNELL. ~ongressman, I might amplify that by pointing out that under the statute under which we operate, we are required to make public every recommendation which we make to the Adminis- trator or to any other agency in Government with respect to safety. They are expected to respond to report what action, if anything, is taken, that always becomes a matter of public record. Mr. ROOERS. Suppose the action is not taken that you thought should have been taken? Mr. O'CONNELL. We have no power to go beyond the recommenda- tion. Mr. RocEns. Who would act in that event ? For instance, suppose you made recommendations and the FAA told you what they did about it, but there is another plane crash where the same thing hap- pened, where if a change had been made, perhaps~- General McKEE. They get a new Administrator of the FAA. That as the action that is taken on that one. Mr. ROGERS. Who does that ? The Secretary? General MCKEE. The President. Mr. RoGERs. The President oniy. General MCKEE. I guess the Secretary of Transportation would re- quest that they get a new Administrator. Mr. ROGERS. If we could have for the record, then, a list of therecom- inendations, I would like to see it to give us an example, say, in the last .5 years, and the changes that have been broughtabout to carry out those recommendations. I think it would be helpful for the committee to have it. Mr. O'CONNELL. I would be very happy to submit that for the record. (Following is a list of contents of aviation safety recommendations, 1963-67, submitted by the Natio~ai Transportation Safety Board in response to Mr. Rogers' request. The page numbers refer to the file copies of such recommendations, which are in the committee files.) PAGENO="0092" 88 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITT~D ~URING FISCAL YEAR 1967 Reference No, Recommendation subject Submitted Page No. 7-RE-i _~L~ Issue ADBeech King alt model 90 re fuel switches, flap electrical system July 12, 1966 and fuel crossfeed system. 7-RE-2 Insure compliance with applicable provisions CAR's re Hawker-Siddeley Aug, 1, 1966 aileron and elevator control lock 7-RE-3 Nord 262 oil pressure .waniing light system Aug. 9, 1966 7-RE-4 Aero Commander 200; elevator trip position Indicator, trim tab limits and Aug. 19, 1966 - ~ inspection access. ~ 7-Rl-5 CL-440 crosswind component limitations do 7-RE-6 Replacement Delrin stem aIlaircraft equipped with Bendix RSA-5AD1 fuel Sep. 1, 1966 injector system (PA-30?. 7-Rl-7 Explore possibility improving quality-intelligibility cockpit voice recorders~_. Sep. 19, 1966 7-RE--8 ___~_ Reevaluate P-5 pitot system BAG-i-il and insure reliability in rain and Sep. 23, 1966 below freezing temperatures 7-RE-9 Improve fuel manifold on P. & W. J.T.4A engines (B-707) Sep. 28, 1966 7-RE-b Revise maintenance handbook and establish definite time interval for in- Oct. 3, 1966 spection main rotor driver transmission Hughes 269B helicopter. 7-RE-1L__~_. Fuel selector system Piper PA 32-260 and PA 28-235 Oct. 12, 1966 7-RE-ia Engine failures, Nord 262 Oct. 14, 1966 7-RE-13 Emergency gear extension system, Beech D-185 do_~ 7-RE-14 Carburetor float clearance, Marvel-Schebler carburetors, Bell 47G hell- do ~ copters. 7-RE-15 Relocate cockpit voice recorders on aircraft with aft-mounted engines Oct. 28, 1966 7 RE 16 Design safety criteria BAG i-li Oct. 31 7-RE-17 Adequacy and distribution of manual material and other service information Nov. 9, 1966 high performance, general aviation aircraft (Turbo-Commander). 7-RE-18 Modification inner blade bearing installation-main rotor system brantly . Dec. 22, 1966 7-RE-19 Reevaluation qf fuel system Beech model 95-B55 and alert pilots regarding Jan. 12, 1967 uncoordinated maneuvers With minimum fuel. 7-RE-20 System for det~cting explosives.. do 7-RE-2i Electrical system, aircraft heater, Convair aircraft, Allegheny Airlines do 7-RE---22 Replace rotorblades A. & S. model 18, gyroplane Jan. 18, 1967 7-Rl-23 Approach zoneobstruction lighting Jan. 20, 1967 7-RE-24 Clarify bench test procedures, propeller governor, Piper PA--30; also Feb. 10, 1967 single-engine emergency procedures. 7-RE---25 Positive locking device, rudder pedal mechanism, B-707 and 727 aircraft Feb. 17, 1967 7-RE--26 immediate inspection Hartzell HCB34302E propeller blades; also similar Feb. 20, 1967 model propellers. ~ 7-RE-27 Standardize basic operating proteduresfor ground equipment Mar. 3, 1967 7-RE-28 Manufactures production, repair and inspection of yaw damper coupler, Mar. 10, 1967 Boeing aircraft, be reviewed and improved testing procedures be imple- mented. 7-RE-29 Require mandatory. inspection lower spar cap outboard outer wing panel Mar. 13, 1967 attach point, BEECH C-45H. 7-RE-30 lncludeeontents AD66-2-4 in an additional ADto adequately cover.inspec- Mar. 23, 1967 tion and rework wood and glue joining Mooney 18. 7-RE-31 Revise flight manuals for Hillet IJH-12 to include proper procedures for Mar. 27, 1967 ~ epgaglng ~ercury drive clutch. ` 7-RE-32 Allison Aeroproducts j*opeller pitch lock Mar. 30, 1967 7-RE-33 Issue airworthiness directive requiring internal inspection main integral .~ do fuel tanks Piper PA 28/32. 7-Rl--34 Aircraft evacuation hazards caused by certain seat arrangements and sign.. Apr. 17, 1967 7-RE-35 Review in depth manufacturing process and ~ quality control system at Apr. 18, 1967 Allison. 7-RE-36 Need for immediate corrective action re inflght wing structural failures May 5, 1967 Beechcraft -18. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1966 Reference No. Recommendation subject Submitted Page No. 6-RI-i * Inspection reqdireitients-Excess fuel landing To FAA July 16, 1965 6-RE-2 FAA review adequacy all airline takeoff abort procedures aijd To FAA July 19, 1965 5 FAA's abort certification test procedure to encompass captain to copilot. ~ ~ * ~ ~ * ~ 6-Rl-3 Display of limitation information re radar vector service To FAA July 23, 1965, and ~ ~ ~ ~ Sept. 24, 1965. 6-RE-4 Pratt & Whitney turbine engine modification and overhaul pro- To FAA Aug. 20, 1965 cedures. 6-RE--5 Inspection of outboard engine fire extinguishing lines on Boeing ~ To FAA Aug. 24, 1965 707 and.720 aircraft. ~ ~ ~ 6-RE-6 Alert field insjectors and operators of DC-7 aircraft of'potential do ~ wearcondition in aileron attachments~ ` . 6-RI-i Failure cam drive gear, P. & W. engine in DeHavilland Beaver To FAA Aug. 27, 1965 (Australian). ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6-RE-8 ______ Inspection of tail rotor blades P/N B2-ili-ii, Brantly model To FAA Sept. 2, 1965 aircraft. 6-RE-9 FAA assure that air carrier flight crews are adequately trained on To FAA Sept 16, 1965 systems they control and operate. (Nose gear retractions, Boeing 707 and 720 aircraft.) 6-RE-iO C-46 landing gear drag strut To FAA Sept .20, 1965 45 6-RE-li CV-240 wing gap straps do 48 6-RE-12 Be alert to condition of excessive wear, elevator torque tube To FAA Sept. 24, 1965 52 attach pivot point, DC-6 aircraft. 6-RE-l3 Improve instructions re inspection of 727 landing gear wheels for do 54 cracks and corrosion. 6 91 18 22 25 29 32 38 42' 47 5i~ 57. 60 63 6~ 73, 82. 87 90 92 96 100' 102 106 109' 112' 115' 117' 9 122' 128' 130 134 137' 140 143 12 22 27 30 33 37 39 PAGENO="0093" 89 SAFE1'Y~ECOMM~N1MTIO1~'SUBMtTTED DURING IISCAL YEAR 1966-~-Oon~Inued Reference No. Recommendation su bject Submitted Page No. 6-RI-14 Aircraft Foacling under pt. 135 ~ i~o ~AA Sept 24, 1965____ 6-RI--15 Suggested revisions to Convair 240/340 cheCk list atd training To FAASept.28, 1965 procedures (updating Allegheny Air Lines operations manual) £-RE-16 Require improvements in fuel manifolds of JT3D engines per To FAA Oct 8, 1965 P. & W. SB. 369635. 6-RE--17 _____ Require compliance with Boeing SB. 1178 to bring to safety stand- _ ____do ards those 707/720 series aircraft not modified. 6-Rl--18 Misleading labeling in electrical wiring diagram in Piper Twin To FAA Oct 12, 1965_._.__ Corn. service. 6-RE-19 Recommend survey of air carrier seatbelt installations To FAA Oct 13, 1965 6-RE-20 Alert all owners and operators of Piper PA-30 existence of fuel To FAA Oct 20, 1965 injection vapor problem. 6-RE--21 Examine and reevaluate lifejacket provisions of PAWA now and in To FAA Oct. 22, 1965______ time all air carriers. 6-RE-~22 _____ Give additional cnsideration to requiring installation of sound To FAA Oct. 29, 1965 transmitters on flight recorders. 6-RE-23 _____ Require improved inspection of impeller assembly or limit service To FAA Nov. 2, 1965_______ life, Martin 404. 6-RE--24 _____ All F-27A aircraft incor. Fairchild SB. 27-26; provide more ade- To FAA Nov. 18, 1965~_____ quote landing flap warning light test circuit, etc. 6-RE-25 _____ Rerouting fuel lines Boeing 727 and similar aircraft To FAA Nov. 30, 1965______ 6-RE-26 Require emergency lights be turned ou during all takeoff and land- do ~___ . . ing operations of Boeing 707, 720, 727. 6-RE--27 _____ Action be taken to modify Hughes 300AG electrical wiring to pre- To FAA Dec. 2, 1965 and vent shorting magneto leads. Feb. 21, 1966. 6-RE--28 ___.- Inspect all 2d stage P/N 421602 fan disks on JT3D-1 engines for To FAA Dec. 3, 1965.____._ radial cracks. 6-Rl--29 ___.~_ Recommend maximum age requirement be considered for pt. 135 _____ do_~___~______~___..~ operations. 6-RE-30 ___-- Suggest exploring overtemperature problem, GTC-85 auxiliary To FAA Dec. 13, 1965 power unit as installed inGrumman Gulfstream. ~ * ~ 6-RE-31 _____ That combustion testing of materials used in aircraft interiors be To FAA Dec. 16, 1965 expanded to provide for testing of various combinations of materials. . 6-RE-32 .___. Installation of additional spacer under pawes to arrest runaway To FAA Feb. 15, 1966 stabilizer in brake assembly on B-727. 6-RE-33 _.__- Inspection of quality control procedures in instrument overhaul of To FAA Feb. 21, 1966.____. vertical gyro assembly (AAL-B-727). 6-RE-34 _____ Appropriate action be taken to prevent used connecting rod bolts To FAA Feb. 24, 1966 being installed in Lycoming engines (Brantly). 6-RE-35 ___-_ Investigate quality control procedures of EAL regarding altimeter To FAA Mar. 7, 1966_.~.___ installations and maintenance. $-RE-36 ___-_ Action be taken regarding fatigue failures in Bell 47 tail rotor To FAA Jan. 18, 1966, and blades in grip section. ~ ~ Apr. 21, 1966. 6-RE-37 ____. Require precautionary inspection for cracks in vertical stabilizer To FAA Mar. 29, 1966.____. ~ rear spar attachment fittings; B-707, B-727 aircraft 6-RE-38 _____ Speed restriction and flutter charaOtthstlcs of Piper PA-30 __~~_ May 2, 1966_ _ ~ __..~ 6-RE--39 _____ Improved detection methods for cardiovascular disease be em- May 5, 1966 ployed during airmen's medical examidation. 6-Rl-40 ___.__ That air carrier pilots receiveinst~uction on hazards of aquaplan. May 11, 1966 ing and techniques to use when encountered. ~-Rl--41 __~__ Amendment to FAR pts. 23 and 135 to provide for wing~flap~ May 20, 1966___.~__~___._ actuated gear audible warping device for general aviation air~ craft. ~ 6-Rl--42 _.____ Amend pt. 23 to specifically provide fuel selector control must be May 25, 1966 located in fuif view of pilot and accessible to him. * ~ ~ ~ 6-RE-43 _____ Revise FAR pt. 23 to aid in prevention of ground loop type accidents. ____ do 6-RE--44 _.___ 1 he recording of additional flight data parameters through use of June 1, 1966 __.~_. ~ improved flight records. 6-RE--45 ___-- Improve drive coupling assembly of Thompson Products model June 9, ~ TF-1900 fuel pump. Beech G-35 aircraft. 6-Rl-46 ______ Evaluate Piper PA-24 and PA-30 landing gear systems ye electrical ._.~_do ~ ~_..._ current load and rigging. SAFETY RECOMMENDAtIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1965 Reference No. Recommendation subject Submitted Page No, 5-RO--1 __~_ Clarification of language of FAR and FIM __~~_._. To FAA July 10, 1964 5-RE-2 _____ Make appropriate inspections. on all. Beech 18 wing spars as To FAA July 13, 1964__.~.. rapidly as possible. . . . 5-RO--3 _____. Provision of adequate number of visiLnili~y reference poiiits and To USWB July 20, ~ maintenance of durrent visibility reference charts. ~ 5-RO--4 ____. Clarification of special weather observation criteria-Tahoe Valley To USWBJuJy 23, 1964___.~ Airport. ~ . 5-RO--5 _~_~ SAWRS imprqvement program ~-~---~.- ~ ~ do ..~.__________._ 14 5-RO--6_ -__~--- lmprovemenf of comnlunlc'ation of Tahoe Valley obsdrvatlons _______ do _._._____...___.. 17 5-RO-7 __._ Review of operatioqs. similar to Paradise Airlines. .~._____.~___ To FAA July 24, 1964 _____. 20 5-RO-.8 ~_~_ Emergency smoke-reIflovillg procedures .______.___:_____ To FAA July 30, 1964 _____. . 24 5-RO--9 ___. Modification of air traffic control procedures re transmission of To FAA Aug. 4, 1964 ___._. 30 flight identification. .57 60~ 65 69 73 77 81 85 88 92 96 101 107 113 117 121 123 127 133 136 140 144 151 157 159 163 174 177 185 189 193~ 197 202 4 8 11~ PAGENO="0094" 90 S1~FETY RECOMMEftDATIONS SUBMITTED DURU'IG FISCAL YEAR 1965-Continued Reference Recommendation subject No. Submitted Page No. 5-RE-lO ___._ Reevaiutation of tail rotor service life on Bell 47 To FAA Aug. 17, 1964 35 5-RE-il Improve accuracy and survivability of flight recorders To FAA Aug. 21, 1964 38 5-RE-12 Installation of lowercoupling drive shaft on Hughes 269 helicopter_ To FAA Sept. 1, 1964 45 5-RO--13 Depiction of towers and obstructions in attention-drawing manner~ To FAA Sept. 9, 1964 50 5-R0--14 Designation of Alpena, Mich. control area extension on year- To FAA Sept. 23, 1964 52 round basis and provision 01 ATC services. 5-RE--15 Advise owners through FAA general aviation inspection aids to To FAA Sept. 28, 1964 56~ insure proper cleaning oil filter cover on Cessna 205 aircraft. 5-RE-16 Reassess structural integrity of Hughes tail rotor drive shaft in To FAA Oct 1, 1964 5~ models 269A and 269B. 5-RE---17 Modification to fire extinguishing system for lower cargo compart- To FAA Oct 9, 1964 71 ment. 5-RA--18 Transistor watches-Potential source of interference to aircraft To FAA Oct. 15, 1964 76 navaids. 5-RE-19 Action re self-sealing fuel tank cells Convair PB4Y-2 and World To FAA Oct 20, 1964 79 War II aircraft. 5-RO---20 Charting of Navy student jet training areas do 82 5-RO-21 Correction of USAF flight information publication (approach chart) To USAF Oct 23, 1964 85 5-RE-22 Evaluate adequacy of S-62A fuel quantity gaging system design To FAA Oct 26, 1964, Dec. 88 30, 1964, and Feb. 17, 1965. 5-RO-23 Team aerial agriculture application by 2 or more aircraft To FAA Oct 29, 1964 98 5-RE-24 Require use of shoulder harness and crash helmet, agricultural To FAA Nov. 3, 1964 99 flying and other operations involving low and slow flying. 5-RE-25 Review maintenance and inspection procedures of Hawthorne- do los ~ ~ Nevada Airlines. 5-RO-26 Standardization of in-runway lighting at John F. Kennedy Inter- To FAA Nov. 5, 1964 lit national Airport 5-RE--27 Study be initiated to determine defective weld inspection method To FAA Nov. 17, 1964 113 in center section truss assembly, Bellanca aircraft 5-RO-28 Use of smoke masks in Viscount aircraft To FAA Nov. 16, 1964 118 5-.-RE--29 Require suitable modification for Brantly B-2 helicoptershock strut To FAA Nov. 18, 1964 120 design. ~ ~ 5-RE-30 Reevaluation of icing of Kollsman pitot head To I~AA Nov. 19, 1964 123 5-RE-31 Effectiveness of FAA's surveillance pol~c~esofair carrier operatgrs To FAA Nov. 20, 1964 127 and methods of certificating approved repair stations. 5-RE-32 Appropriate inspection and rework procedures for B-707 main To FAA Nov. 23, 1964 133 landing gear aft axle be made mandatory. 5-RE-33 F-27 emergency exit door, aft right side, require compliance with To FAA Nov 24, 1964 136 regulations; also establish inspection schedule to detect fretting ~ of Wing. 5-RO--34 That the depiction of altitude restrictions on the plan view of ap- To FAA Nov. 25, 1964 143 ~ proach plates be included on the expanded profiles. ~ 5-RE--35 Determine possible use of reinforced polyesters for protection in To FAA Dec. 1, 1964 147 commercial aircraft and feasibility of such material. 5-RO-36 Revision of Jeppensen approach chart To Jeppensen Dec. 24, 1964. ~ 148 5-RE--37 Consider a ~ redesign of B-707 electrical system to prevent pro- To I~AA Dec. 30, 1964 159 ~ ~ longed interruption of essential power- ~ ~ ~ 5-RE-38 Modify Lockheed Jetstar landing gear emergency extension system. To FAA Dec. 31, 1964 164 5.-RE-39 Advise operators Bell 47G-i3 rq power lag in Fraoklin 6VS-335 en- To FAA Jan, 8, 1965 170 gines. 5-RE-40 Reevaluation nose gear mechanism design of emergency system To FAA Jan. 15, 1965 173 B-720 and all other aircraft usingsimilar systems. 5-RE-41 Use of lift strut as a step undesirable re Cessna 140, 150 170, 180, To FAA Jan. 27, 1965 178 ~ 210- ~ . ~ ~L* ~ ~ ~ ~ 5-RO--42 Hazards to air carrier personnel during handling of large jet air- To rAA Feb. 2~ 1965 183 ~ ~- craft. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5~RE43 linprovem~nt in fuel systems Convair~3k0 airccaft To FAA Feb. 9, 1965. * 187 5-RE-44 Modification of Brantly B2A fuel pump drain I me To FAA Feb. 18, 1965 192 5~-RE-45 _ _ -_ Formatton~6f indIjstry-governmevtt task force to reassess cprrent do 197 passenger safety procedures. . 5-RO-46 Markings on aerónauticatchartslo f wire installations pver land or To C. & G. Mar. 4, 1965 201 water. . 5-RQ-47 Promulgation of information.onlocation of emergency exits To FAA Mar 12, 1965 202 5-RE-48 Issue AD re B-727 inboard trailing edge flaps To FAA Mar. 18, 1965 ~ 204 5-RE--49 Equip l-~ugties~69A havingVertx ll-lPQsfiray kitwith baffle.~ ~ . To FAA Mar 22, 1965 210 5-RO-50 Radar air traffic control procedu~ds ~ ~ To FAA Mar 30, 1965 213 5-RE-51 Improvements `in'service time for R-2800 cylinders-Allegheny To FAA Mar. 31, 1965 222 ~ Airlines. ~ ~ 5-RQ-52 Installation of computer-based digital displays of RVR informatlon To USWB Apr. 1, 1965 229 5-RO--53 Revision of pt 3 of the CAR's with record to landing gear visual To FAA Apr. 5, 1965 232 . position indicator and stallwarning aural signal. ~ 5-RE-54 Changesinfuel selector system, Lockheed 18 To FAA Apr 8, 1965 250 5-RE-55 Expedite FAA~approvaI arid mandatory req~uired fuel surge, tank do 255 detedlion, and suppressIon s~Pstem for B-707; reorient FAA~s ~ ~ ~ lightning groapp. ~ ~ ~ . ~ - , ~ . ~ ~ ~ 5-RE-56 Require mandatoiy installation of reverser in transit light to 4sslst To FAA, Apr. 21, 1965 259 crew detect~p~u~of hazardous asymmetriç'aJ thrust condition, . ~ 5-RO-57 :::.: Revision of flight madual for Hughes helicopter to include informa- do 265 tion on `low fqel" warning light. 5-RE--58 Conduct fleet campaign to determine if contaminated Ledex relays To rAA Apr 22 1965 269 are installed mother 1-10491-I aircraft. ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. 5-RE-59 Classify certatn sprays as hazardous both in general and alt ro t~AA Apr 26 1965 276 carrier aviation, PAGENO="0095" 91 SAFETY REC MMENDATIONSSUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 196~-Continued Reference Recommendation subject No. Submitted Page No. 5-RO--60 ___~_ Revision of Hughes 269A helicopter preflight inspection checklist. To FAA Apr. 26, 1963 279 5-RE--61 Spectrometric oil analysis To FAA, Apr. 27, 1965 284 5-RO-62 Modification of Brantley B-2 helicopters ~ . To FAA, May 4, 1965 287 5-RE-63 Action to insure good security of spacer block of Schempp-Hirth To FAA, May 17, 1965 292 models S, SH and SH1. ~ 5-RE-64 Inspection requirement for J-T3D 2d-stage fan dIsks; revise over- To FAA, May 25, 1965 296 haul manuel. 5-RO--65 - _~ Minima applicable to special VFR To FAA, June 3, 1965 302 5-RO-66 Revisions of pilot examinations re human oxygen requirements_ To FAA, June 14, 1965 324 5-RE-67 Redesign of the stator vane pilot valve assembly on General Electric To FAA, June 18, 1965 327 CT-58-100 engines. 5-RO-68 Require carriage of a battery-powered transceiver on all air-carrier To FAA, June 22, 1965 332 aircraft. 5-RE-69 Mandatory inspection of Piper aircraft To FAA, June 29, 1965 342 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1964 Reference No. Recommendation subject Submitted Page No. 4-RF-1 That steps be taken to advise flight service To USWB July 5, 1963 1 personnel In regard to use Of the term VFR. 4-RF-2 Development of a standard means of making do 5 and maintaining a record of information provided pilots in weather briefings. 4-RF--3, M1A63-114 Provisions to include weather radar informa- To FAA July 5, 1963 7 tion derived from W/B WSR-57 equipment in ATC facilities. 4-RF-4-FTW63--119 Provide for establishment of minimum alti- To FAA July 17, 1963 11 tudes for air carrier training maneuvers. 4-RE-5, MKC63-85 Design rear spar upper plant fitting and To FAA July 12, 1963 14 quality machining L1049G be reviewed. ~ Determine extent corrective action neces- sary. 4-RE-6, NYC63-189 All CV 240, 340, 440 operators be required to To FAA July 24, 1963 20 perfprm one-time inspection landing gear, to insure proper length screw in locking ~position ~l~nd nut. 4-RE-7, Cll163-182 Immedia~e arid recurring in~pectfon of Corn- To FAA July22, 1963 25 mingyand SenderS CS-9400 segt belts. ~ ~ 4-RE-B, DCA63-8 Overhaul facilities be alerted to potential dan-, To FAA July 30, 1963 29 ~ ~ ~ ~ gers improper piagnaflux techniques. ~ 4-RE--9 Recodimend issuance AD on connecting rod do 32 bolts, Lycomipgengipe, model VO-540. 4-RE-b, FTW63-159 Modify Beeôh 3~ to incsrporate 4 removable To FAA~Aug. 8, 1963 _ 34 inspection pan~Js. ~ . 4-RE-li Care n use c~f 4340 hteel used in main landing To FAA Aug. 21, 1963 37* gears. 4-RF--12 Gover,nrpentresponsibility for private naviga- To FAA Aug. 22, 1963 45 . . tional facilities. . 4-RE-13, SEA62-12 Reevaluate front seat safety belt attach- To FAA Sept. 18, 1963 47 ments, Cedsna 172 and 182. . . ~ 4-RE-14, MKC64-20 More extensive mandatory inspections on To FAA Sept. 19, 1963~~_ 54 Hiller UHI2 D an~l E rotor blades. 4-RE-i, CH164-32 . Reduct~or~ of . in~pection time Cesspa 195 To FAA Sept. 26, 1963~~_ 57 . . main spar from 450~ hóurs to 1000hoUrs. ~ ~ . . - 4-RE-16, NYC63-159 Investigate leading edgefa~ilure trendpossi- ~ 60 bility of Aero Commander, ~ . ~ ~ 4-RE-17, FTW64-1~. Issue AD or alert to replace OIl She. Piper, do 65 . PA23 from engine to cooler ` with more . ` durable type. , ` ., 4-RE-18 FAA r~quire all mo~l~s of Ae'to Commander To FAA Sept. 27, 1963 67 with ~uel booster a'nq prime,r sy~tem con- trol switches be retrofitted. ~ 4-RF-19, DCA64-1 Revision of dispatch regui~tions To FAA Sept. 30, 1963 7Z 4-RF-20, M1A62-56 Early consideration be ~iyen to requiring the . To FAA Oct. 3, 1963 75 ~ installation of. runway distance mariners a~ , all äir~arrierairportC. , ~ 4-RO-21 Recording of in-flight briefing ~ To FAA Oct. 8, 1963 7& 4-RE-22, M1A64-36 AD do HS JFC25 fuel controls rdquirliig. re~ ~ do 83 design of throttle yalve asse~db1~r plus interim improvements. , .~ . , . . . , , ,,. . 4-RO-23, MIA63-fl4 Amendment of inptnictionp rethsuahce' ~t"To IJSWB Oct. 17, 1963 92 . SIGMET àdvisO~ies. ` ` : . . 4-RE-24 ~ Improvepients of e~nergency,rqdio sigda1ih~ TQFAA Oct. 17, 1963 9~. devices ~ ~ ` ~ ~ . ~ 4-RE--25, DEN62-39 Discrepancy in Cessna 310C owner's manual To FAA Oct. 21., 1963 101 be brought to attention of FAA. 4-RO-26 Revision of regulations regarding wearing of To FAA Oct. 25, 1963 104 seat belts. PAGENO="0096" 92 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR i964-~C6n1inuèd Reference Nô~ Recommendation subject Submitted Page 4-RE--27, LAX64-2L .~. Pneumatk~ lockingof extended ejector To FAA Nov. 4, 1*63 4-RO--28, CH164-46 _________~ Hazards involved with use of plastic sheeting To FAA Nov 6, 1963 ~ in vicinity of aircraft operations. ~ 4-RE-29, DCA64-2~ ~ ~ ~ .Conditiofls for ungrounding Vertol 1O7~ ~ re- . do view procedures for establisbing overhaul . time& ~ : ~ 4-RE-30 _____-_____-____.______ Review maintenance and inspection depart- To FAA Nov. 27, 1963_~~_~_ ~ ~ ments and procedures in order to improve . airworthiness standards. 4-RE-31, LAX64-33 ---_-_-------~ Navion Rangemasterwlngflutter To FAA Dec. 12, ~ 4-RO-32 Discrepancies in weight and balance data do . contained on the repair and alteration form 337. 4-RE-33, DCA64-3 ________-_---_ Provide protection from igniting turbine fuel T~ FAA Dec. 17, 1963 vapors. 4-RE-34, DCA64-3 __-_-___----__ Improved crash resistance of flight recorders __~~ do 4-RO-35 _--~_~___-_-_-___-~-___ Rescheduling of general and business aviation To FAA Dec. 20, 1963~_~._~ flight activities. 4-RE-36, 0AK64-28 ___~~_ Review maintenance procedures policies of To FAA Dec. 27, 1963~_~~_~ AAXICO Airlines. 4-RE-37, NYC64-56 __-____~_-_-_ Improvement of emergency evacuation pro- ~ do cedures and stowage of carryon baggage. 4-RE-38, FTW64-51 Incorporation of strengthened compressor ____ do spacers. 4-RO--39 ~ Misleading climb instructiohs issped by To FAA Jan. 9, 1964~____~_ Great Falls Center. 4-RE-40 __*_____~~______-__*_____ Fire hazard Boeing 707/720, quicker .com- To FAA Jan 20, 1964 pliance requirement for proposal AD. 4-RE-41 _______________-_______ Inspection schedule for Boeing 707/720 at To FAA Jan.24, 1964_~_~__ early date re cracks In wing spar. 4-RE-42 _________-__________-__ Inspection and overhaul procedures at Pacifit To FAA Jan. 30, 1964___~__ . Airmotive. 4-RO-43 Departure procedures authorized due to To FAA Feb. 4, 1964 terrain clearance considerations. 4-RO--44 Removal of IFR traffic from and publicity To FAA Feb. 11, ~ aboUt area of parachute jumping. 4-RE-45, 0AK64-47 FAA evaluate integrity of the 47-620-485-9 To FAA Feb. 24, 1964 . shear screws on Bell helicopter. 4-RE-46, NYC64-97 Interim inspection be performed of com- To FAA Feb. 25, 1964 pressor exit vanes on JT-4 engines prior to overhaul. 4-RE-47, M1A64-70 Redesign fuel selector cockpit control to To FAA Feb. 27, 1964 preclude inadv. oper. modify aux. fuel tank filler to~eIiminate water seepage into tank. 4-RE-48, ANC64-12 ~ Fix for landing gear warning system on C-46 To FAA Feb. 28, 1964 - . aircraft. 4-RE--49 . Boost system filter caps be changed from do . . ~ . aluminum to steel 4-RE-50, MKC64-55 Redesign of landing gear position Indicafors do . .. to pteveiitfalse indication of gear position to crew. , 4-RO-51, M1A64-75 Reevaluation of regulations concerning air do taxi certification and operation. 4-RE--52 Revise AD 59 14-2 to include recutring in- To FAA Mar. 30, 1964 spection of, ~valve core on fuel selection valVe at deaignated periods on Mooney . M-20--A. . 4-RE-53 Additional measurements qeóossary on 0/H To FAA Apr. 2, 1964 for pr*per . Clearances between * turbine discs and Inner aealtng ring assenib~ies. S S S 4-RO-54 Revisionof ~ero Commander Flight Mapuals To FAA Apr. 3, 1964 4-R0-55 Ground.resti~eriods and duty time limitations To FAA APT; 22, I~64______ forillglit crbws. . S 4-RE-56 .. _~_~ _, Pertinent5 maintenance and overhaul , pro- do S ~ cedUres be reviewed iffdus~rywide fqr adéc~uacy of inspectiqq ~ and assembly regulation. ~ ~ S S 4-RO-57 ~. Adequacy of nighttime ylsibility reference To USWB `Apr. 23, i964~__, S. markers and' charts depicting same. * S 4-RO-58 Specific responsibilities for ~o~ilots durjng To FAA Apr. 23, 1964____~_ S instrument approaches. 4-R0-59 _________:~___.~_________ Modification of instructiônC re dissemination To FAA Apr; 24, 1964______ ofStGMET's . `S 4-R0--60 Formulation 01 ~riteria re time r~terence and `Fo USWB Apr. 27, 1964_ - - .cooclinationwjtI~ FM~ - 4-RO--61 Restrktion of InteOtional parachute jumping To FAA Apr 29 1964 ope~atjons 4-RO--62 _________-______ tipdatina 1~1O0's' supply of USGS ~uàd'raagle TbFAA May 6, 1964 charts. ,. 107 110 113 119 123 132 137 144 149 158 162 170 175 180 188 193 197 202 206 221 225 230 237 241 247 250 255 258 264 265 268 273 276 282 288 290 \ PAGENO="0097" Reference No. Recommendation subject Submitted Page No. 4-RO--63 Amendment of WB Form 652-16A To USWB May 6, 1964 4-RE--64 Fleet assembly inspection on all DC-8 stabi- To FAA May 6, 1964 lizer drive assemblies to assure proper as- sembly. 4-RE--65 _______________________ FAA change procedures to prevent SIC with To FAA May 8, 1964___~___ back-dated effective date; FAA change procedure to prevent installation of in- compatibleSTC's; change in CARto prevent certifying aircraft having dangerous loading characteristics. 4-RE-66 _______________________ Inspection and protection of landing gear To FAA May 13, 1964______ skids. 4-RO--67 Relocation of sensing equipment at Hilo, To USWB May 22, 1964 Hawaii. 4-RE-68 _______________________ FAA consider modification of B-720-B hon. To FAA May 27, 1964______ zontal tail to preclude stick force lightening. 4-RE-69 Recurrent structural lnspections of Mooney do e~~Ji M18C. 4-RE-70 ___-___________________ 1,000-hour retirement life on idler pulley, do Hughes 269A/B, be reduced. 4-RO--71 Replacement of control valve on crew oxygen To FAA June 5, 1964 bottles. 4-RE--72 AD be issued for immediate inspection of To FAA June 12, 1964 S-1OK Fafni r bearings. 4-RO-73 Change in wording of par.265.12 of AirTraffic To FAA June 16, 1964 Control Procedures Manual re special VFR operations. 4-RO--74 ~ Equal application of VFR landing standards To FAA June 18, 1964~_____ to all carriers. 4-RE--75 Periodic inspection on crankshaft of Piper To FAA June 19, 1964______ Twin Comanche. 4-RO--76 Maintenance of Navaids in condition existing To FAAJ une 22, 1964______ at time of accident 4-RO-77 Briefing on location and operation of life rafts - - _do and preservers. 4-RO--78__~_..__.. Inclusion of appropriate provisions of pt 42 To FAA June 26, 1964__ in air taxi operators' operations specifica- tions. 4-RE-79 ___ ____~. Helm rod end failures on Cessna 310 airplanes do - 4-RE-80 ____~~ Landing par failures, Cessna 120/l40aircraft do 4-RE---81 _ ______~~ FAA review quality of work performed by _do certified repair stations. Recommendation July 3, 1962 To FAA: Compliance with service bulletin A-Ty 79-15 at an early date be made mandatory to guarantee an ample warning margin in operating engines. (B-96)__~ July 20, 1962 To FAA: Advising FAA of the engine overhaul irregularities found during our investi- gation and recommending that the overhaul practices and procedures of the Pacific Airmotive be reviewed by FAA. (B-96) ~_do _~____ To FAA: FAA conduct survey to determine number and type of old emergency escape slides in service and to require removal of such slides from service within a reasonable length of time. (B-96) To FAA: Recommending correction of discrepancies in flight information publications and charts. (B-93) To FAA: Advising them that the detailed examination of the landing gear fitting die- closed that the source of the fracture was fatigue Require routine engine instrument logbook entries at WAL be considered; examine WAL procedures and practices with respect to EGT indicating system checks Reduce current overhaul period at Avalon Air Transpwrt from 1,500 to 600 hours; conduct field check of blade slippage within retaining clamps; reevaluate clamp design for retaining and indexing blade in subject model of Hartzell ~ Call attention of the Administrator to need for design changes in landing gear door ard hinge beyond the manufacturer's change to steel replacement hinge Calling to attention of Administrator failure of section of anti-ice air duct in fuselage near aft baggage compartment which was weakened by severe intergranular corro- sion caused by improper pickling 1-time inspection be made of all Cessna CH-1C tube braze assemblies and if FAA approves new design AD be issued requiring new assembly on all CH-1C's Consideration be given to establish shorter periods between inspections and between parts replacements than previously established for such components as landing gears and flaps - Page No. 93 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1964-Continued 293 295 301 309 312 314 320 325 329 332 338 342 344 349 352 356 359 363 368 Recommendation No. Date SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1963 63-1 63-2 63-3 63-4 July 21, 1962 63-5 July 24, 1962 63-6 Aug. 10, 1962 63-7 ~do 1 8 63-8 63-9 63-10 63-11 Aug. 14, 1962 Aug. 22,1962 Aug. 23, 1962 Aug. 24, 1962 9 12 13 15 20 25 29 31 34 92-715-68-7 PAGENO="0098" 94 Recommendation No. Date SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1963-Continued 63-12 Aug. 24, 1962 Recommendation 63-13 63-14 Aug. 28, 1962 Sept. 5, 1962 63-15 Page No. Sept. 11, 1962 63-16 Sept. 24, 1962 37 48 54 58 63-21 Oct. 11, 1962 63 66 68 72 63-22 Oct. 18, 1962 63-23 Oct. 24, 1962 63-24 Oct. 25,1962 63-25 Oct. 29,1962 63-26 Oct. 30,1962 74 63-27 63-28 Oct. 31,1962 Nov. 5,1962 77 82 86 89 92 63-29 63-30 63-31 63-32 95 99 Shifting system be revised to allow operation of bypass valve before mechanical control linkage is shifted Conversion to `frequency recording" as opposed to `position recording" at ATC facilities FAA take a look at configurations to be used in new 3-class passenger service in Boeing 707 type aircraft to assure that proper access to over-wing exits is main- tamed Review quality of welds by manufacturer to insure that other Mooney aircraft are not being operated in an unsafe condition Operators of C-46 aircraft be required to inspect, lubricate as necessary and make functional checks of the fire extinguishing system at intervals of approximately 6 months 63-17 Sept. 25, 1962 AD be issued requiring temporary deactivation of the Spartan electric trim system_ 63-18 Oct. 4, 1962 That action be taken by Administrator to assure that radar personnel and facilities atShemya meet FAA standards 63-19 Oct. 8, 1962 That the term "true bearing" be substituted for "true radial" in designation of airways, based on true north reference 63-20 ----- do _____ FAA investigate accident procedures, alarm system, fire fighting, rescue, and medical facilities at McGhee-Tyson Airport. Also FAA provide technical assistance and cooperation to fullest extent possible at said airport _~____ . Recommend design change in fore and aft cyclic system, Bell 47G--2, and subsequent models. Conduct 1-time inspection of fore and aft cyclic as interim safety pre- caution Inspection procedures Flying Tiger Line be reviewed and improvements be required to eliminate fuel contamination FAA examine maintenance and operating practices, Flying Tigers, in detail to assure acceptable level of airworthiness~_________________--_________-_--_~_-----_--- Recommend FAA expedite matters to issue official stand at earliest possible date re recap requirements either by a ISO or MSO CAB endorses FAA efforts to develop flight recorders, measuring added parameters___ Recommend FAA conduct research to determine proper operational height for anemometers, preferred location(s) of wind measuring equipment on runway complex Pilots' examinations relative to flight characteristics and emergency procedures- single-engine, high-performance aircraft Abbreviated departure message be transmitted by service B teletype on all nonair carrier a/c for delivery and action required by ATS facilities serving destination airport -__ _do FAA req4jire repetitive special inspection, Bell P/N 47-642-020--i blade - _- do Mandatory corrective action be taken to modify door hinge mechanism Nov. 7, 1962 Consideration be given during FAA study of flight time limits to need for clearly defined criteria in adequacy of airbOrne rest facilities and duty time limits Nov. 8, 1962 Weather Bureau consider revising delineation system, aviation forecast areas to facilitate proper interpretation of forecasts 63-33 ----- do __---- Improvements be made in area of liferaft stowage, lights on rafts and jackets: TSO- C13 be reviewed; adequacy of seat tiedown; emergency information be issued 63-34 Nov. 15, 1962 FAA provide that data re effective altitudes on this airway be displayed more prom- inentaly on all aeronautical charts. Provide special Notams and alert bulletins as means of alerting unsuspecting pilot of danger in this undesignated airspace___~~_ Nov. 20, 1962 Appropriate procedural documents of ATC be amended to require ARTC radar con- trollers indicate positively to pilot when radar handoff is to be employed in connec- tion with his flight _________--_---__-___-__-___________-_____ _ Cited approach plate remarks be amplified to include statement that no centerline guidance may be available during final stages of approach. See LTR Sept. 9, 1963 ATC personnel be authorized to refuse approach clearance to aircraft in weather conditions below lowest minimums applicable to requested approach FAA arrange with DOD to provide periodic scheduled lectures by FAA ATC personnel re ATC operating procedures at military bases where undergraduate jet~flight training is conducted Immediate action be taken to effect changes outlined in letter. Discrepancies in Airman's Guide, ILS ATS procedures be revised to require operationally significant weather information pertinent to approach areas involved be transmitted routinely to approaching air- craft. Study be made by FAA of physical layout of RVR readout displays at Idlewild and other locations where PAR installed 63-42 do ~_-_- Runway visibility observing program be initiated at such locations when measure- ments not available and prevailing visibility or pilot reported visibility is 1 mile or less. Runway visibility observers should be certificated by USWB 63-43 do Consideration be given to development of staffing plans and work schedules so de- signed that during periods of adverse weather, one of the observers on duty at airport stations is relieved of all responsibility other than that of maintaining con- stunt watch on weather and recording observations. That Weather Bureau consider revision of current aviation weather observing in- structions regarding ` `partial obscuration"_ Duplicate letter to FAA urged matter be discussed jointly by Weather Bureau and FAA. Representatives of BOS will be available for consultation Recommend current airworthiness requirements for automatic flight control systems in sec. 4b.612 of CAR and related CAM policy material as applied to high-speed swept-wing design turbojet aircraft be reevaluated for establishing realistic-per- formance criteria 63-35 63-36 63-37 125 130 132 135 138 140 Nov. 21, 1962 Dec. 19, 1962 63-38 Nov. 28, 1962 63-39 63-40 145 Dec. 13, 1962 Dec. 19, 1962 63-41 148 152 154 Dec. 26, 1962 162 165 171 175 63-44 63-45 Dec. 27,1962. Dec. 26, 1962 63-46 Dec. 31, 1962 177 179 181 183 85 PAGENO="0099" 95 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1963-Continued Recommendation Page - . - Recommendation No. No. Date . . 63-47 Dec 31 1962 Recommend that newly designed bellcrank (steel) be evaluated and, if found satis. factory, its use be made mandatory on all existing and future Brantly B-2 hell- copters 193 63-48 Jan. 4, 1963 Recommend bird strike be reviewed for information to expand general background on bird ingestion and for data which may warrant revising the tentative programs of FAA currently scheduled bird ingestion tests 198 63-49 do Recommend FAA seriously consider conducting tests on stabilizer surfaces of aircraft of manufacturer other than the Viscount 745D's, one of which was in subject accident 202 63-50 Jan. 18, 1963 Evaluation be made structural integrity latest configuration main rotor blade Brantly B-2 209 63-51 Jan. 16, 1963 Action be taken to assure written record is made of all tower visibility observations and effective means of coordination and centrol be established assuring responsible units at A/B are recording and reporting the same values of visibility at all times_ 212 63-52 Jan. 18, 1963 Equivalent level of protection be afforded users of areas having FR approach pro- cedures as is provided to designated airspace 215 63-53 Jan. 24, 1963 Consideration be given to amending pts. 40, 41, 42 of CAR to require flotation devices on overwater flights 225 63-54 ~ _do FAA thoroughly evaluate interference to glide slope reception at airports and take whatever steps necessary to preclude this possible hazardous condition 227 63-55 Feb. 4, 1963 That the term "forecast" as used in pts. 40, 41, 42, and 60 be defined so that the paragraphs wherein this term is employed will become truly regulatory in nature _ 231 63-56 Feb. 14, 1963 To Administrator, FAA: DC-8 operators and FAA maintenance inspectors be alerted to corrosion and lubrication problem DC-8 bogie beam 234 63-57 Mar. 5, 1963 FAA consider modifying alert bulletin to require immediate inspection bolts and flap track area; magnaflux inspection or replacement of bolts below torque; check for excessive clearance due to wear in bolt holes 237 63-58 Mar. 7, 1963 That joint review referred to in Mr. Thomas' letter (Jan. 8, 1963) (encompass the areas outlined in our letter of Mar. 7, 1963, and that consideration be given to consolidating FAA procedures governing radiotelephone dissemination of aviation weather information by ATC personnel into one area of FAA internal procedural publications 240 63-59 Mar. 11, 1963 Recommended that the USWB in cooperation with FAA arrange to provide appro- priate means of measuring cloud height at New Orleans Airport. Also recommended that provision of suitable visibility reference marker charts for use of observers at that location be made 241 63-60 Mar. 12, 1963 Recommend action to eliminate apparent ambiguity by amplifying SR-445 to include all IFR operations wherever they may be initiated 246 63-61 Apr. 9, 1963 Consideration be given to promulgation of procedures advising controllers to with- hold information re turbulence when providing services outlined In ATF 7110.1A, par. 352.1, except that reported by aircraft traversing same route 248 63-62 do 1-time inspection carburetor air duct actuating arm all MK-20--B aircraft. Review fabricating and brazing techniques, Mooney aircraft, where necessary require improvements 250 63-63 Mar. 19, 1963 Recommend that maintenance and overhaul procedures of Trans Air Lines be reviewed 254 63-64 Apr. 24, 1963 Recommended that phraseology sequencing beestablished to identify the fix, inbound course and direction of turn, etc, ; that such standardization would reduce the prob- ability of ambiguous interpretation, more likely when the reciprocal value of the inbound course is given or reference to cardinal points of the compass is made~~ 257 63-65 Apr. 24, 1963 Recommended that in order to enhance safety in operation of such aircraft the manufacturers furnish an FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual with all future certificated aircraft 259 63-66 Apr. 24, 1963 Convene FAA/industry meetingtoexplorecauses of and corrective measures for false fire warnings on turbojet-powered aircraft; require compliance with Boeing S/B 1788 263 63-67 May 3, 1963 Flight recorder installation approvals for United Data Control and LAS be reevaluated 270 63-68 May 2, 1963 Immediate inspection be made of elevator hinge bolts all CL-44 273 63-69 May 8, 1963 That the Flight Services Quality Control staff be alerted to the situation outlined above and that appropriate corrective action be initiated 276 63-70 May 14, 1963 DC-8 main landing gear design be modified and adequate inspection system be set up. 279 63-71 May 15, 1963 Conduct reevaluation shimmy dampener and nose wheel fork design Cessna 285 63-72 May 22, 1963 Require 1-time mandatory inspection Hiller UH-12E4 tail rotor drive assembly; continue frequent inspections until modification or other permanent corrective measures established 288 63-73 May 24, 1963 Consideration be given by FAA to establishment of restricted airspace within boundaries of existing caution area, coordination be effected with U.S. Air Force to determine mutually acceptable ceiling on this extension to avoid unduly penalizing other users of the airspace 294 63-74 May 29, 1963 Require compliance with Piper service letter No. 356; FAA initiate study to consider relocating circuit breaker and identification panels 300 63-75 .~.__do 1-time inspection of scissors arm assemblys; retirement schedule for swashplate scissors arms and link assemblys after accidents on Bell 47 310 63-76 ~_.do Establish operating rules to assure ground personnel are aware materials being carried aboard which could be hazardous to persons on ground in event of an accident 313 63-77 June 10, 1963 Maintenance and overhaul procedures and practices ofStanclard Airways be reviewed~ 321 63-78 June 14, 1963 Mechanical low pitch stop assembly be incorporated in Curtiss electric propellers as expeditiously as possible 323 To achieve the desired improvement with respect to methods for observing and re- cording visibility and clouds and the operational use of such information, following actions are recommended: 63-79 _--- -do (a) Locate a ceilometer in the approach area to each instrument runway and whenever practical at middle marker 333 PAGENO="0100" Recommendation No. Date Recommendation Page No. Mr. FRIEDFL. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. ROGERS. Yes. Don't take all my time. Mr. FRIr~ni~i~. I just want to make a statement here. I remember back when General McKee issued his orders for Washington National. And he did order a lot of flights out of Washington National, and diverted them to Dulles and Friendship. And then there was a howl- not by the public, by the Members of Congress, who wanted the con- venience of using National to go to their homes regularly, and under that pressure the order was changed. I hope that the Members of Congress will realize they are going to have to go a little bit farther to get to the airport, if Washington National is to be safe for all people. Mr. ROGERS. If the gentleman would permit me, I don't agree with him. I think the Washington National Airport should provide service other than just a shuttle service to someplace close. I think it should be a terminal where you can go to Florida, or California, or somewhere else, and properly so, so long as the safety is concerned. Now, let me ask for the record, too, for a list of cities which do not yet have radar, if we may have such a list furnished for the radar. I realize you wouldn't have this now, and also a list of the cities, of airports, that do not have the control towers, and then a list, if you would, of those which have qualified for radar or for control towers, under the criteria set by FAA, so that we may compare those, ILS, lighting, or whatever safety features that they may qualify for, but do not yet have them. General MCKEE. I will be happy to provide that, Mr. Rogers. (Information requested follows:) FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION COMPILATION OF AIRPORTS WHICH ARE SERVED BY COMMERCIAL AMICRAFT WHICH Do Nor HAVE RADAR, CONTROL POWERS, ILS, LIGHTING; AND AIRPORTS WHICH HAVE QUALIFIED FOR THESE FACILITIES UNDER FAA C~cITERIA BUT Do No'r HAVE THEM Submitted herewith areS lists of such airports as follows: 1.-Airports without r&1~ar. 2.-Airports without control towers. 3,-Airports without an ILS. 4.-Airports without approach lighting. 5.-Airports qualified for, but without radar. 96 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1963-Continued 63-80 June 14, 1963 63-81 do 63-82 do 63-83 do 63-84 do 63-85 June 17, 1963 333 63-86 June 26, 1963 (b) Provide transimissometer at end of each instrument runway and at center of runway complex (c) Report cloud heights in terms over a specified time interval with an lndica- tion of significant variations from the average or, as a preferred alternative, report "Approach light contact height" (d) Report runway visual range or runway visibility in a manner similar to that described for cloud heights (average and significant variability over a specified time ~ (e) Employ runway visual range or runway visibility as a sole criteria for estab- lishing airport meteorological minimums (f) Rely upon separation from cloud criteria and height of terrain criteria in the establishment of VFR flight conditions Consider requiring placard to alert pilot to possibility of fuel-tank outlet becoming uncoveredonCessna2lO That renewed emphasis be placed by FAA on compliance with the provisions of AF1O supp. 11, by Air Defense Command personnel and that this document be updated to reflect current situation and procedures applicable in the upper airspace 63-87 do That a requirement for communications recording equipment be established, appli- cable to those military facilities responsible for the control of aircraft operating in accordance with the joint FAA~USAF agreement for fighter interceptor operations (AF1O) 333 333 333 333 341 348 358 PAGENO="0101" Community Anniston Decatur Dothan Gadsden Huntsville - Muscle Shoals Tuscaloosa ALABAMA Airport Municipal. Pryor Field. Dothan. MunicipaL Huntsville-Madison County. Muscle Shoals. Van de Graaf. Annette Island - Clear Corclova - Homer Juneau - Kenai Kodiak - Kotzebue McGrath Nome Unalakleet Yakutat - Flagstaff Grand Canyon Kingman Page Prescott - Winslow Yuma Annette Island. Clear AF Auxiliary. Cordova Mile. Homer Municipal. Juneau Municipal. Kenai. Kodiak NAS. Ralph Wein Memorial. McGrath FAA. Nome. Unalakleet. Yakutat. Pulliam. Grand Canyon National Park. Kingman Municipal. Glen Canyon. Prescott Municipal. Winslow Municipal. Yuma International. Goodwin Field. Fayetteville-Drake. Municipal. Boone County. Memorial. Municipal. Grider Field. Municipal. 97 6.-Airports qualified for, but without tower service. 7.-Airports qualified for, but without ILS. 8.-Airports qualified for, but without approach lighting system. 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport surveillance radar, calendar year 1966 ALASKA ARIZONA El Fayettev11'~ Fort S-~- Harrir--- Hot 5r~fno~ ARKANSAS PAGENO="0102" Comm~4nity Arc~t~~ B1ythe~. Chico- Cresent City Fresno Imperial Inyokern Lancaster Marysville Merced Modesto - Monterey Oxnard Palm Springs Paso Robles Reddine~ - Santa Barbara Santa Maria - Santa Rosa Stockton Tahoe Valley - Visalia - San Bernardino - Alamosa Aspen Cortez Durango Grand Junction Hayden Lamar Montrose - Pueblo Arcata. Meadows Field. Blythe. Chico MunicipaL Jack McNamara Field. Fresno Air Terminal. Imperial County. Inyokern-Kern County. Gen. Wm. J. Fox Airport. Yuba County. Merced Municipal. Modesto City-County. Monterey Peninsula. Ventura County. Palm Springs MunicipaL Pasco Robles County. Redding Municipal. Municipal. Santa Maria Public. Sonoma County. Stockton Metropolitan. Lake Tahoe. Municipal. Apple Valley. Municipal. Aspen-Pitkin County. Cortez-Montezume. Durango La Plata County, Walker Field. Gunnison County. Yampa Valley. Lamar Municipal. Montrose County. Pueblo Memorial. Bridgep~ Groton_ New ~ CONNECTICUT Bridgeport Municipal. Trumbull. Tweed-New Haven. DELAWARE Greater Wilmington. Daytona Beach Fort Lauderdale Fort Myers Gainesville Key W1~t Panama City Sarasota Municipal. Fort Lauderdale. Page Field. Municipal. Key West International. Cape Kennedy RegionaL Ocala International. Panama City-Bay County. Sarasota-Bradenton. Municipal. J~glin AFB. Municipal. Palm Beach International. 98 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport surveillance radar, calendar veer 1966-continued CALIFORNIA Airport COLORADO FLORIDA Tallahassee_________________ - Vero Beach West Palm Beach__~~________ - PAGENO="0103" 99 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport surveiflance ratiar, caZendar year 1966-Continued Community Albany - Athens Augusta - Brunswick uolumbus Rome Waycross Airport Albany Municial. Athens Municipal. Bush Field. Malcolm-McKinnon. MuscQgee County. Moultrie-Thomasville. Russell Field. Waycross-Ware County. Hana, M~i 111 TTilim HAWAII Hana. General Lyman. Molokal. Kahului. Kona. Kamuela. Lanai. Libue. Boise Burley CoeurD'Alene - Hailey Idaho Falls - Lewiston Twin F'~11~ Boise Air Terminal. Burley Municipal. Coeur D'Alene Air Terminal. Friedman Memorial. Fanning Field. Lewiston-Nez Perce. Pocatello Municipal. Twin Falls Municipal. ILLINOIS Bloomington-NormaL* University ocf Illinois-Willard. Vermilion. Decatur Municipal. Galesburg Municipal. Williamson County. Coles County Memorial. Quad City. Mount Veriion-Outland. Greater Peoria. Quincy Municipal Baldwin Field. Greater Rockford. Capital. Whiteside County. IN~~ANA Monroe Clonuty. Dress Memorial. Kokomo MunicipaL Purdue University. Marion Municipal. t~elaware County-Johnson Field. St. loseph County. Hulman Field. GEORGIA Kailua, Kona Kamuela, Hawaii _______ Lanai City, Lanai____________ Lihue-~~-_-----___-_-_~_~___ IDAHO Decatur__________~__________ Galesburg Marion Mattoon-°'~ ~ -~ Moline Mount ~ Quincv Rockfov~1 Sterling-Rock Falls l~bransville__________________~ Mun~ South Ben~1 Terre T~T~~iitc. PAGENO="0104" 100 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport surveillance radar, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Burlington Cedar Rapids Clinton - Dubuque Fort Dodge Iowa City Mason City Ottumwa Sioux City - Waterloo Dodge City Garden City Goolland - Great Th~iit1 TiI-~....1 Parunriu Salhm Airport Municipal. Cedar Rapids Municipal. Clinton Municipal. Dubuque Municipal. Fort Dodge Municipal. Municipal. Do. Ottumwa Industrial. Municipal. Do. Municipal. Garden City Municipal. Remier Field. Municipal. Hays MunicipaL Hutchinson Municipal. Liberal Municipal. MunicipaL Tn City. Sauna Municipal. Phillip Billard. Bowling Green Lexington London ~wen~boro KENTUCKY Bowling Green-Warren County. Blue Grass. Corbin-London War Memorial. Owensboro-Daviess County. Barkley Field LOUISIANA Esler Field. Ryan. Lafayette. MunicipaL Fort Polk AAF. Monroe Municipal. Auburn-Lewiston_____.._._____ - Augusta__________._______~_ Th. Bar ~ ..A Presque Isle________________~ Rockiand Aubunn-Lewiston MunicipaL Augusta State. Dow AFB. Bar Harbor. Portland Municipal. Presque Isle Municipal. Rockiand Municipal. MARYLAND Hagerstown Municipal. Salisbury-Wicomieo County. MASSACHUSETTS Municipal. Martha's Vimeyani. Nantucket Memorial. New Bedford Municipal. Worcester Municipal. IOWA KANSAS fl~fiv~i I?Aiio'~ Lake MAINE Martha's Vineyard New BeforiL.____._________. PAGENO="0105" Commuwity Alpena Battle ~ - Benton Harbor DetroiL Oadttllac/Reed City - 1~)scanaba - Flint Grand Rapids Hancock Iron Mountain Lansing Manistee Marquette Menominee Muskegon Peliston Saginaw Sault Ste. Marie Traverse City Bemidji Braineird Fairmont - Hibbing International Falls Thief River Falls Winona Worthington - Greenville Greenwood Gulfport - Hattlesburg Laurel Natcbez Oxford Pascagoula Tupelo Vicksburg Cape Girardean - Columbia Jefferson City Joplin_ Kirksville Moberiy St. Joseph SpringneluL. Airport Phelps-Collins. W. K. Kellogg Regional Airfield. Ross Field. Pontiac. Munidipal. Escanaba Municipal. Bishop. i~e~t~unty. Iloughton Cuunty Memorial. Ford. Gogebic C~mnty. Reynolds Municipal. Kalamazoo MunicipaL Oapital City. Manistee.Blacker. Marquette COunty. Menominee Chunty. Muskegon County. Emmet County. TuE City. Sault Ste. Marie Municipal. Traverse City Municipal. MINNESOTA MunicipaL Brainer&Crow Wing County Municipal. Municipal. Ohishoim-Hibbing. Falls luternatlonial. Mankato Municipal. MunicipaL Do. W!nona Municipal-Max Conrad. MunicipaL MISSISSIPPI Columbus-Lowr~des COunty. Greenville MunicipaL Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Hartly-Anders. University-Oxford. Jackson County. Municipal. Vieksburg Municipal. MISSOURI Cape Girardeau MunicipaL Munidi~aL Jefferson City MemoriaL Joplin Municipal. Clarence Cannon Memorial. Omar N. Bradley. Roseerans MemoriaL Springfield Municipal. Forney AAF (Fort Leonard Wood). 101 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport surveiliance radar, calendar year 1966-Colitinued MICHIGAN PAGENO="0106" Havre~ - lTelena_ Ka1~spe11~. Lewistown Miles City Missoula Sidney West Yellowstone Wolf Point Logan. Gallatin. Silver Bow County. Glasgow International. Glendive. Havre City-County. Helena. Fli~thead County. Lewistown Municipal. Miles City. Missoula County. Sidney-Ricliland Municipal. West Yellowstone. Wolf Point. Alliar'~ ~hadrnn Columbus. Grand Tc~1~mt1 HasUr"~ Kearne~ Norfolk North Platte - Scottsbluff - Sidney - Alliance Municipal. Municipal. Columbus Municipal. Municipal. Do. Kearney MunicipaL Lincoln MunicipaL MunicipaL Karl Stefan Memorial. Lee Bird Municipal. Municipal. Do. Elko Ely Berlin. Keene Laconia. Lebanon. NEVADA Elko Municipal. Ely Yelland Field. Reno Municipal. NEW HAMPSHIRE Berlin MunicipaL Dillatit Hopkins. Laconia Municipal. Lebanon Regional. Grenier Field-Manchester MunicipaL Prenton WiidWood Alamogordo _________________. ~ Clovis______________________~ Farmington _______________ Hobbs Santa ~ -.. Silver City____. NEW JERSEY Mercer County. Cape May County. NEW MEXICO A1a;mogordo Municipal. Municipal. `Olovis Municipal. Farmington Municipal. Senator Clarke Field. Lea County. * Roswe1I Municipal. Santa Fe Couut~ Municipal. Silyèr City-G~ant County. 102 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport ~ sw~vei1laacc radar, ca'endar year 1966-Continued Community Bfflir:~ Butt'~ MONTANA Airport NEBRASKA PAGENO="0107" 103 1.-Air carrier airports w~tho~t an airport si~rt'eiZlance radar, caIe~dar y~ar 1966-Continued NEW YORK Community Airport Elmira - Ohemung County. Glens Falls Warren County. Isliip Long Island-MacArthur~ Ithaca . Tompkins County. Jamestown Jamestown MuniQipal. Massena Richards Field. Ogdensburg Ogdensburg MunicipaL Oiean Olean Municipal. Plattsburgh Municipal. Pough1~eepsie Dutchess County. Saranac Lake Adirondack. Watertown Municipal. White Plains . Wes~chester County. NORTH CAROLINA Asibeville Asheville. Eiiza~eth City CGAJS. Fayettevillie Grannis Field Munic4pal. Goldsboro . Seymour Johnson AFB. Hickory ilickory Municipal. Kinston ~ Stailings Field. New Bern Simmons Nott. Rocky Mount Itocky Mount Municiipal. Southern Pines . Pinehurst-Southern Pines. Wilmington New Hanover Clounty. Winston~Salem Smith Reynolds. NORTH DAKOTA Bismarck Bismarek Municipal. Devils Lake . Devils Lake Municipal. Fargo Hector. Grand Forks . Grand Forks International. Jamestown . Jamestown. Minot * Minot International. Williston_ Sloulin Field Intiertnatiomal. OHIO Lima Allen Oounty. Mansfield - Mansfield Municipal. Portsmouth - lSeiOto County. Zanesvilie Zanesvllle Municipal. OKLAHOMA Bartlesville - Frank Phillips. Duncan Halliburton. Enid `Woodring Field. Guymon - Municipal. Lawton . Do. M'dAlester Do. Muskogee Davis. Ponea City `Ponca `City Municipal. Stillwater Sea'rcy Field. PAGENO="0108" 104 Community Astoria - - Baker- Oo~aiis Eugene Medford - North Bend - Ontario Reidmond RosE~burg Saleni Du Bois - Erie - FranJr'~ Laneaislter Martinsbu'rg Phi.Itiptburg - Reading Wihiamsport OREGON Airport Olatsop County. Munieipal. Do. Mahlon Sweet. Municipal. Do. Ontario MunicipaL Pendirton Municipal. Roberts Field IRoseburg Municipal. McNary Field. PENNSYLVANIA Alieritown-Bethleilem-EaStOfl. Btrandford-MeKeafl `Oounty. Du Bbis-Jefferson County. Port Erie. Chesu-LaaniertOfl. ilazieton Muniolpat. Johnstown~Oamhria County. Lancaster. Blair County. Mid-State. Cen. Carl A. Spaatz. Williamsport-LyComing County. PUERTO RICO Mayagnez Pence Mayaguez. Mercedita. Columbia - Crescent Beach Florence SOUTH CAROLINA Anderson County. Coiumbitt Metropolitan. Myrtle Beach. Municipal. GreenWood County. SOUTH DAKOTA Aberdeen Brookings Pierre - Rapid City Sioux Falls - ~TatertO%vfl Yankton - Agana, Guam - Wake Island - Olarksville Aberdeen Municipal Brookings Municipal. W. W. Howes Municipal Mitchell Municipal. Pierre Municipal. Rapid City Municipal. Joe Foss Field. Watertown Municipal. Chan Gurney Municipal. SOUTH PACIFIC Agana NAS. Wake Island. TENNESSEE Outlaw Field. MeKellar Field. Bonier Field. 1.-Air carrier gArports without an airport surveillcrace radar, caiender year 1966-Continued PAGENO="0109" Oommuaity Beaumont- Big ~p~ring~. Borger Brownsville Brownwood College Station Galveston Harlingen Laredo Longv1ew Lufkin MeAllen - Midland Paris San Angelo - Temple - Tyler Victoria Waco Wichita Falls Cedar Cfty Moab Vernal Barre-Montpelier Newport Rutland Charlottesville - Danville Dublin Hot Springs Lynchburg Newport News Staunton Charlotte Amalle Christiansted Ephrata - Hoquiam Olympia - Pasco Port Angeles - Pullman - Seattle Tacoma Walla Walla Wenat~hee Yakima TEXAS Airport Jefferson County. Howard County. Hutchinson County. Rio Grande Valley International. MunicipaL Easterwood Field. Scholes Field. Harlingen Municipal. Municipal. Gregg Oounty. Angelina County. Miller International. Midland Air Terminal. Ccx Field. Mathis Field. Draughon-Miller Municipal. Pounds Field. Victoria County-Foster. Municipal. Wichita Falls-Sheppard AFB. Cedar City Municipal. Oanyonlands Field. Vernal. VERMONT Barre-Montpelier Municipal. Newport Municipal. Rutland Municipal. VIRGINIA Charlottesville-Albemarle. Danville Municipal. New River Valley. Ingalls Field~ Lynchburg Municipal-Preston Glenn. Patrick Henry. Shenandoah Valley. VIRGIN ISLANDS Harry S Truman. Alexander Hamilton. WASHINGTON Ephrata Municipal. Bowerman. Olympia Municipal. Tn-Cities. Clallam County. Pullman-Moscow RegIoi~al. King `County-Boeing Field. Tacoma Industrial. Walla Walla City~County. Pangborn Field. Yakima Municipal. F 105 1.-Air carrier airports without an airport sttrveillanoe radar, c~endar year 1966-Continued UTAH PAGENO="0110" i06 i.-Mr carrier ct'irpo'rt$ without a~ itirport 8urveillance radar, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Beckley Bluefield Clarksburg Elkins huntington - Martinsburg ~\horgantown - Parkersburg - Wheeling - Eau Claire Green Bay Janesville La Crosse Land O'Lakes - CiintonvHle Madison - Manitowoc_.. Oshkosh - Rhinelander Stevens Point Wausau WEST VIRGINIA Airport Raleigh County Memorial. Mercer County. Benedum. Elkins-Randoiph County. Tn-State. Martinsbung Municipal. Morgantown Municipal. Wood County. Wheeling Ohio County. WISCONSIN Eau Claire Municipal. Austin Straubel. Rock County. La Crosse MunicipaL King's Land O'Lakes Municipal Clintonville Municipal. Truax Field. Manitowoc Municipal. Winnebago County. Rhinelander-Oneida County. Stevens Point Municipal. Municipal. Caspr~~ Cheyenne Cody - Jackson Laramie____~_________~_. Powell Riverton Rock Springs Sheridan Worland Casper Air Terminal. Cheyenne MunicipaL Municipal. `Jackson's Hole. General Brees Field. Powell MunicipaL Municipal. Do. Sheridan County. Municipal. Community Decatur____________________~ Dothan Muscle Shoals Tuscaloosa Clear________-_------~------. Coruova ________---~----__-- - Homer __~---.------------- KenaL__~---------------- Kodiak - ALABAMA MunicipaL Pryor Field. Doth'an. Municipal. Muscle Shoals. Van do Graaf. ALASKA Clear AF Auxiliary. Cordova Mile. Homer Municipal. Kenai. Kodiak NA'S. Ralph Wein Memorial. McGrath FAA. Nome. lTn'alakleet. Yakutat. WYOMING 2.-Air carrier airports without an eccisting airport traffic control tower, calendar year 1966 Airport Nome ~- TJnalakleet PAGENO="0111" 107 2.-Air ca'rrier airports without a~ e~tiist4~ng airport traffla control tower, calendar ~ year 1966-Continued AEIZONA Co~nmunity Airport Flagstaff Pulliam. Grand Canyon Grand Canyon National Park. Kingman Kingmau Municipal. Page Glen Canyon. Prescott - Prescott MunicipaL Winslow . Winslow Municipal. Yuxna Yunia International. ~ ARKANSAS El Dorado ~ Goodwin Field. Eayetteville . Fayetteville-Drake Field. 1-larrison Boone County. Jonesboro ~ Municipal. Pine Bluff - Grider Field. TeKarkana ~ Municipal. CALIFORNIA Arcata Arcata. Blythe ~ Blythe. Chico Chico Municipal. Crescent City Jack McNamara Field. Imperial ~----. Imperial County~ Inyokern Inyokern-Kern County No. 8. Marysville - Yuba C~unty. Merced - Merced Municipal. Oxuard . Ventura County. Paso Robles Paso Robles County. Bedding - Redding iViunicipal. San Bernardino . Apple Valley. Santa Maria . Santa Maria Public. Visalia Municipal. COLORADO Aiamosa . Municipal. Aspen - Aspen-Pitkin County. Cortez ---. Cortez-Montezunia County. Durango . Durango La Plata County. Gunnison - GUflfllSOll County. Hayden Yanipa Valley. Lamar Lamar Municipal. Montrose Montrose County. CONNRCTIC~JT Groton Trumbull. New Haven TWO~dNOW Haven. FLORIDA Fort Myers - Page Field. Gainesville Municipal. Ocala Ocala MunicipaL Panama City Panama City Bay County. Vero Beach . Municipal. GEO1~GIA Albany Albany Municipal. Athens Athens Municipal. Brunswick . Malcolm-McKinnon. Moultrie . Moultrie-Tbomasville. Rome Russell Field. waycross . Waycross-Ware County. PAGENO="0112" Community Hana, ~ 1? Kailua, Kona~ - Kamuda, Hawaii Lanai Ctity, Lanai Lihue Burley Coeur d'Alene Hailey L*ewiston Twin Fails - Hana. Molokai. Kona. Ka.muela. Lanai. Lihue. Bloomington - Danville - Galesbur~ Marion - Mattoon-Oharleston Mount Vernon - Quincy Sterling-Rock Falls .bIooImng:Lon - Kokoino LaLrayette Marion - Burlington Clinton - Fort Dodge Iowa City - Mason City Ottumwa - Bloomington-Normal. Vermilion County. Galesburg Municipal. Williamson County. Coles County Memorial. Mount Vernon Outland. Quincy Municipal Baldwin Field. Whiteside County. Monroe County. Kokomo Municipal. Purdue University. Marion Municipal. IOWA Municipal. Clinton Municipal. Dubuque Municipal. Fort Dodge Municipal. Municipal. Do. Ottumwa IndustriaL Dodge Oity - Garden City - Goodland - Great Bend Hays Liberal___-_------------------ - Parsons Bowling Green London____----------~------ - Owensboro KANSAS MunicipaL Garden City MunicipaL Renner Field. Municipal. Hays MunicipaL Liberal Municipal. Municipal. Tn-City. KENTUCKY Bowling Green-Warren County. Corbin-London Memorial. Owensboro-Daviess County. Barkley Field. LOUISIANA ~sler Field. Fort Polk AAF. 108 2.-Air carrier airports without an euisting airport traffic control tower, calendar year 1966-Continued HAWAII Airport IDAHO Burley Municipal. Coeur d'Alene Air Terminal. Friedman Memorial. Lewiston-Nez Pence. Twin Falls Municipal. ILLINOIS INDIANA Alexandria Leesville PAGENO="0113" Community Auburn-Lewiston -~ Augusta Bangor Bar Harbor Presque Isle Rockland - MAINE Airport Auburn-Lewiston Municipal Augusta State Dow AFB Bar Harbor Presque Isle Municipal Rockland Municipal Hagerstown Salisbury Martha's Vineyard - MARYLAND Hagerstown Municipal Salisbury-Wicomico MASSACHUSEPTS Martha's Vineyard Alpena Benton Harbor Cadillac/Reed City Detroit - Escanaba - Hancock Iron Mountain - Manistee Marquette Menominee Peliston Sault Ste. Marie Traverse City Bemidji Brainerd Fairmont - Hibbing International Falls - Mankato Thief River Falls Winona Worthinston Columbus Greenville- Greenwood Hattiesburg Laurel Pascagoula Tupelo Vicksburg Cape i*iraraeau_~-------.---- - Columbia - Jefferson City Joplin - Kirksville Moberly MICHIGAN Phelps-Collins. Ross Field. Municipal. Pontiac. Escanaba Municipal. Houghton County Memorial. Ford. Gogebic County. Manistee-Blacker. Marquette County. Menominee County. Emmet County. Sault Ste. Marie Municipal. Traverse City MunicipaL MINNESOTA Municipal. Brainerd-Crow Wing County MunicipaL Municipal. Chlsholm-Hibbing. Falls International. Mankato Municipal. Municipal. Winona Municipal-Max Conrad Field. Municipal. MISSISSIPPI Oolumbus-Lowndes County. Greenville Municipal. Municipal. Do. Do. Hardy-Anclers Field. University-Oxford. Jackson Oounty. Municipal. Vicksburg Municipal. MISSOURI Cape Girardeau Municipal. Municipal. Jefferson City Memorial. Joplin MunicipaL Clarence Cannon Memorial. Omar N. Bradley. Forney AAF. 109 2.-Air carrier ~ airports without an ecoisting airport traffic control tower, calendar year 1966-Continued 92-715-68-8 PAGENO="0114" Community Bozeman - Butte- Glasgow - Giendive Havre - Kalispell Lewistown Miles City - Sidney West Yellowstone - Wolf Point - Airport Gallatin Field. Silver Bow County. Glasgow InternationaL Glendive. Havre City-County. Flathead County. Lewistown Municipal. Miles City. Siciney-Ricliland MunicipaL West Yellowstone. Wolf Point. Alliance - Chadron - Columbus Grand Island - Hastings Kearney McCook Noreolk North Platte Scottsbluff Sidney Berlin. Keene_ T NEW HAMPSHIRE Berlin Municipal. Dillant-Hopkins. Laconia MunicipaL Lebanon Regional. NEW JEESEY Cape May. Clovis ---- -. Gallup Silver City Glens Falls - Ithaca - - Jamestown - Massena Ogdensburg Olean plattsiburgb Poughkeepsie - Saranac Lake - Watertown NEW MEXICO Alamogordo Municipal. Municipal. Clovis Municipal. Senator Clarke Field. Silver City-Grant County. NEW YORK Warren County. Tompkins County. Jamestown Municipal. Richards Field. Ogdensburg Municipal. Olean Municipal. Municipal. Dutchess County. Adirondack. Munitipal. 110 2.-Air carrier ~ airports without an evisting airport traj~1lc control tOwer. calendar year 196W-~Continued MONTANA NEBRASKA Alliance Municipal. Municipal. Columbus Municipal. Municipal. Do. Kearney Municipal. Municipal. Karl Stefan MemoriaL Lee Bird Municipal. Municipal. Do. Elko. NEVADA Elko Municipal. Ely Yelland. PAGENO="0115" Community Elizabeth City- Goldsboro Hickrn'- New Bern Rocky Mount Southern Pines OGAS. Seymour Johnson. Hickory Municipal. Stallings Field. Simmons Nott. Rocky Mount Municipal. Pinehurst-Southern Pines. Devils Lake Grand Forks Jamestown NORTH DAKOTA Devils Lake Municipal. Grand Forks International. Jamestown. Minot International. Sloulln Field InternationaL Lima Portsmoutn Zanesvme Bartlesville Duncan Enid - Guynion - McAlest~r Ponca City Stiliwater Allen County. Scioto County. Zanesville Municipal. OKLAHOMA Frank Phillips. Halliburton. Woodring Field. Municipal. Do. Davis Field. Ponca City Municipal. Searcy Field. israuioru - Du Bois FranEnu Hazieton Martinsburg - Philipsburg - Clatsop County. Municipal. Do. Do. Ontario MunicipaL Roberts Field. Roseburg Municipal. MeNary Field. PE]~NSYLVANIA Bradford-McKean County. Du Bois-Jefferson Cbunty. Qhess~Lamberton. Hazelton MunicipaL Johnstowri-C'ambria County. Blair County. Mid-State. PUERTO RICO Mayaguez Air~leld. Mercedita. SOUTH CA~ROLINA Anderson County. Myrtle Ueach. Municipal. Greenwood County. 111 2.-Air carrier airports without an ewisting airport traffic cOntro' tower, caZendar year 1966-~Continued NORTH CAEOLINA AirpOrt OHIO OREGON Astoria Baker - Corvallis North Bend - Sn1i~m Crescent F1orenc'~ PAGENO="0116" 112 2.-Air carrier airport8 without an eceisting airport traffic control tower, calendar year 1966-Continued SOUPH DAKOTA Community Airport ~berdeen~ Aberdeen Municipal. Brookings Brookings MunicipaL Huron . W. W. Howes Municipal. Mitchell - Mitchell MunicipaL Pierre . Pierre Municipal. Watertown Watertown Municipal. Yankton . Ohan Gurney Municipal. SOUTH PACIFIC Agana, Guam ~ Agana NAS. TENNESSEE Clarksville - Outlaw Field. Jackson . McKellar Field. Shelbyville Bomar Field. TEXAS Big Spring Howard County. Borger * Hutchinson County. Brownwood Municipal. Galveston - S~holes Field. Harlingen Harlingen Municipal. Laredo ~ Laredo Municipal. Lufkin ~ Angelina County. Paris - Cox Field. Temple Draughon-Miller Municipal. Victoria Victoria County-Foster. UTAH Cedar City ~ Cedar City Municipal. Moab - Oanyoniands Field. Vernal . Vernal. VERMONT Barre-Montpelier Barre-Montpel'ie'r Municipal. Newport - Newport MunicipaL Rutland Rutland Municipal. VIRGINIA Charlottesville Oharlottesville-Albemarle. Damrille - Danville Municipal. Dublin . New River Valley. Hot Springs Ingalls Field. Staunton Shenandoah Valley. WASHINGTON E~phrata Ephrata Municipal. Hoquiam Bowerman. Olympia Olympia Municipal. Pasco . Tri-Oities. Port Angeles . Olallam County. Pullman - Pullman Moscow Regional. Tacoma Tacoma Industrial. Walla Walla * Walla Walla City-County. Wenatehee - Pangborn Field. PAGENO="0117" Community Beckley -. Bluefield -. Ciarksburg Elkins - Martin~burg Morgantown Parkersburg Clintonville - Eau Olaire La Crosse Land O'Lakes - Manitowoc - Rhinelander Stevens Point - Wausau - WEST VIRGINIA Airport Ra1eigl~ County Memorial. Mercer County. Beneduni. Elkins-Randoiph County. Martinsburg MunicipaL Morgantown Municipal. Wood County. WISCOIISIN Clintonville Municipal. Eau Claire Municipal. L.a Crosse Municipal. King's Land O'Lakes Municipal. Manitowoc Municipal. Rhinelander-Oneida County. Stevens Point Municipal. Municipal. WYOMING Cody Jackson Laramie - Powell Riverton - Rock Springs - Sheridan Worland - Pago ~°~" Municipal. Jackson's Hole. General Brees Field. Powell Municipal. Municipal. Do. Sheridan County. Municipal. AMERICAN SAMOA Pago Pago International. 3.-Air carrier airports withoat instrument landing systems, calendar year 1966 Community Anniston Decatur Dothan Gadsden Huntsville Muscle Shoals Tuscaloosa ALABAMA Airport Municipal. Pryor. Dothan. Municipal. Madison. Muscle Shoals. Van De Groff. Clear AF Auxiliary. Corciova Mile No. 3. Homer MunicipaL Juneau Municipal. Kenai. Kodiak NAS. Ralph Wein MunicipaL McGrath FAA. Nome. Unalaklett. Yakutat. 113 2.-Air carrier airports without an ecisting airport traffic control tower, calendar year 1966-Continued ALASKA Clear Cordova Homer - Juneau Kenal Kodiak Kotzebue McGrath Nome Ijnalakleet Yakutat PAGENO="0118" 3.-Air carrier airports without instrument landing systems, calendar year `1966-Continued ARIZONA Airport Pulliam. Grand Canyon National Park. Kingman MunicipaL Glen Canyon. Sky Harbor Municipal. Prescott Municipal. International. Municipal. Yuma MCAS/InternationaL El Dorado Fayetteville Harrison Hot Springs Jonesboro - Pine Bluff Texarkana Blythe Chico Crescent City Imperial Inyokern Lancaster Marysville Merced Modesto Oxnard Palm Springs Pasco Robles Riverside Redding Santa Ana Santa Maria Santa Rosa Tahoe Valley Visalia Alamosa Aspen Cortez Durango Gunnison Hayden Lamar Montrose Bridgeport Groton New Haven ARKANSAS Goodwin Field. Fayetteville/Drake. Boone County, Memorial. Municiptd. Grider Field. Municipal. CALIFORNIA Blythe. *Chico Municipal. Jack McNamara Field. County. Inyokern/Kern County. Gen. William 3. Fox. Yuba County. Merced Municipal. City~County. Ventura City. Municipal. Paso Robles County. Municipal. Do. Orange County. Santa Maria Public. Sonoma County. Lake Tahoe. Municipal. Municipal. Aspen-Pitkin County. Cortez-Montezume. Durango-LaPlata. Gunnison County. Yampa Valley. Municipal. Montros~ County. CONNECTICUT Municipal. Trumbull. Tweed-New Haven. 114 (lomnwnity Flagstaff Grand Canyon Kiugman Page Phoenix Prescott Tucson Winslow Ynma COLORADO PAGENO="0119" 115 3.-Air carrier airport8 without instrument ktnding sys.tem$, eaZen~ar year 1966-Continued Community Fort Lauderdale Fort Myers Gainesville Key West Melbourne Ocala - Panama City Sarasota Vero Beach Airport Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood. Page Pield Municipal. Municipal. InternationaL Cape Kennedy Regional. Municipal. Bay County. Sarasota-Bradenton. Municipal. Municipal. Do. Malcolm McKinnon. Moultrie-Thomasville. Russell Field. Municipal. Waycross-Ware City. HAWAII Hana. General Lyman Field. Malakai. Kona. Kamuela. Lanai. Lihue. Bloomington - Danville Mattoon-Charleston Mount Vernon Sterling-Rock Falls Burley Munb~ipaL Coeur U'Alene. Friedman MemoriaL Fanning Field. Lewiston-Nez Perce County. Twin Falls Municipal. ILLINOIS Bloomi~gton-Normal. Vermilion County. MunicipaL Gale~burg Municipal. Williamson County. Cobs City Memorial. Mount Vernon-Outaant. Whiteside County. FLORIDA GEORGIA Albany Athens - Brunswick Moultrie Rome Valdosta Waycross Hana, Maui Hilo Kaunakakai (Hoolehua) Kailua, Kona Kamucia Lanai City, Lanai Lihue IDAHO Bur1"~ Cocur ~ Halley Idaho ITh:~11~ Lewi'st~ Twin 1~'~.11~ INDIANA Bloomington - Kokomo Lafayette1 Marion - Muncie - Partial ILS. MonroeOount~y. Kokomo I~iunicipal. Purdue University. Me~ion~lu*jpal. Delaware County-Johnson Field. PAGENO="0120" Community B~r1ing~n~. Clinton - - Di~buque~ Fort ~ - Iowa City Mason City Ottumwa IOWA Airport Municipal. Clinton MunicipaL Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Ottumwa Industrial. Dodge City Garden City Goodland - Grt~t Rt~nd Libei'~ Man1"~ KANSAS Municipal. Do. Renner Field. Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Tn-City. Bowling Green London Owen~boro Paducah Alexandria Leesville Aubuirn-Lewiston Augusta Bar Har~bor Presque Isle Rockland KENTUCKY Bowling Green-Warren. Corbin London W~tr Memorial. Owensboro-Daviess Clounty. Barkley Field. LOUISIANA Esler Field. Fort Polk AAF. MAINE MunicipaL Augusta State. Bar IIai~bor. Municipal. Do. MARYLAND Municipal. Sali~buny~Wico~mico. Hyannis1 Martha's Vineyard_~.__.____ Beaten Harbor______________. Hancek~_..... Iron Motain_~.~. - Ironw~o& - Jackson Manistee MASSACHUSETTS Barustable-MunicipaL Martha's Vineyard. MICHIGAN Pbielps~Oollins. Ross Field. MunicipaL Houghton Cowity Memecial. Porci. Gegebic. Reynolds Municipal. Blacker. ~ Marquette County. Mencndnee. Emmeit County. Tn-City. Municipal. Do. 116 3.-Air carrier airports witiwut instrRment landing syttems, calendar year 1966-Continued Peirston___~~_______________~ Saginaw____________________. Sault Ste Marie_____________ Traverse ~ 1 Partial ILS. PAGENO="0121" Community Bemidji Brainerd Fairmont Hhbhing Initeri~ationa1 Falls Mankato Thief River Falls Winona Worthington - Columbus Greenville Greenwood Hattieshurg Laurel Natchez Oxford Pascagoula Tupelo Vickshurg Cape Girardean - Columbia Jefferson City * Kirksville Moberly Tribune Bozeman Butte Glasgow - Glendive Harve - Helena Kalispell Lewistown Miles City Missoula Sidney West Yellowstone Wolf Point Alliance. Chadror Colunib Hastings. Kearney,~ McCooL Norfolk_ North p~a+4*~ 1966-Continued MINNESOTA Airport Municipal. Brainerd-Oow Wing. MunicipaL Ohishoim-Hibibing. Falls International. MunicipaL Do. Max Conrad Field. Municipal. MISSISSIPPI Columlbus-Lowndes County. Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Hardy-A~ideTs. University-Oxford. Jackson County. Municipal. Do. MISSOURI Municipal. Do. Memorial. Clarence Cannon Memorial. Omar N. Bradley. Forney AAF. MONTAI~A Gallatin Field. Silver Bow County. InternationaL Glendive. Harve City-County Helena. ~Flathead County. MunicipaL Miles City. County. Sidney-Richmond Municipal. West Yellowstone. West Wolf Point. NEBEASnA Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Karl Stefan. Lee Bird MunicipaL Municipal. Do. NEVADA MunicipaL Ely-Yelland. McCarran. 117 3.-Air carrier airports without instrument landing systems, calendar year Elko. E1y - Las `~`~"~ PAGENO="0122" 118 3.-Air carrier airports without instrument landing systems, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Berihi Kee~ Laco~ T ~ Wildwood Alamogordo Carlsbad Clovis Farmington Gallup Hobbs Roswell Santa Fe Silver City Glens ~ Ithr'~" Jamestov-- Massena Og~'~ O1e~ Poughkeepsie. Saranac Lak~~ Elizabeth City Hickory Kinston New Bern Rocky Mount Southern Pines Devils Lake Grand Forks - Jamestown Minot Williston Lima - portsmouth Bartlesville - Duncan Enid Guymon - McAlester Muskogee Ponca City Stillwater Lawton -- NEw HAMPShIRE Airport Municipal. Dillant Hopkins. Municipal. Lebanon RegionaL NEW JERSEY Cape May County. NEW MEXICO MunicipaL Do. Do. Do. Senator Clarke Field. Lea County. MunicipaL Do. Silver City-Grant County. NEW YORK Warren County. Tompkins County. Municipal. Richards Field. MunicipaL Do. Do. Dutchess County. Adirondack. MunicipaL NORTH CAROLINA Coast Guard Air Station. MunicipaL Stallings Field. Simmons Nott. MiuiicipaL Pinehurst-Southern Pines. NORTH DAKOTA Municipal. ~ International. Jamestown. International. Sloulin InternationaL O~Io Allen County. Scioto CGunty. Municipal. OKLAHOMA Frank Phillips. Halli Burton. Woodring Field. Municipal. Do. Davis Field. Municipal. Searcy Field. Municipal. PAGENO="0123" 3.-Mr carrier airports without instrument landing systems, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Asoria Baker - Corvallis North Bend Ontario OREGON Airport Clatsop County. Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Roberts Field. Municipal. Bradford DuBois Franklin Hazieton Johnstown - Lancaster Martinsburg Phillipsburg PENNSYLVANIA Bradford-McKean County. DuBois-Jefferson County. Chess-Lamberton. Municipal. Jolinstown-Cambria County. Lancaster. Blair County. Mid-State. Mayaguez Ponce San Juan Anderson - Crescent Beach Florence Greenwood Aberdeen Brookings Mitchell - Pierre Rapid City - Watertown Yankton - Agana, Guam Samoa Wakelsland' - Olarksville - Jackson Shelbyville 1 Partial ILS. PUERTO RICO Mayaguez Airfield. Mercedita. Puerto Rico International. SOUTH CAROLINA Anderson County. Myrtle Beach. Municipal. Greenwood County. SOUTH DAKOTA Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do Chan Gurney Municipal. SOUTH PACIFIC Agana NAS. International. Wake Island. TENNESSEE Outlaw Field. MeKeiler Field. Bomar Field. I 119 *1 PAGENO="0124" 120 3.-Air carrier airports without instrument landing systems, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Big Suring - Borger Brownwood~ - Galveston_ Harlinger Houston - Laredo - Lufkin~ McAllen - Paris Temple - Victoria Cedar City - Moab Vernal TEXAS Airport Howard County. Hutchinson County. Municipal. Scholes Field. Municipal. Intercontinental. Municipal. Angelina County. Miller International. Cox Field. Draughon-Miller. Victoria County-Foster. UTAH Municipal. Canyonlands Field. Vernal. Barre-Montpelier - Newp.rt Rutland Charlotte Amalie - Christiansted VERMONT Barre-Mon'tpelier. Newport Municipal. Municipal. VIRGIN ISLANDS Harry S Truman Alexander hamilton Charlottesville1 Danville - Dublin Hot Springs Staunton - Roanoke - Olympia Pasco Port Angeles Pullman Tacoma WallaWalla~ Wenatchee VIRGINIA CharlottesVille-Abeman. Municipal. New River Valley. Ingalls Field. Shenandoah Valley. Municipal. WASHINGTOX Municipal. Bowerman. Municipal. Tn-Cities. Challam County. Pullman Moscow Regional. Industrial. Walla Walla City-County. Pangborn Field. Beckley--_~-_____-_--_~__~~_. Bluefield___~_____________~__ Clarksbur~__________________ ~ gt1 ~ Morgantown Parkersbur~ _______ ~ WEST VIRGINIA Raleigh County Memorial. Mercer County. Benedum. Elkins-Randoiph. Tri-State. Martinsburg Municipal. Municipal. Wood County. I Partial ILS. PAGENO="0125" 121 3.-Air carrier airports without instrument lan,ding systems, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Eau Claire Janesville La Crosse Land o' Lakes - Manitowoc Rhinelander Stevens Point Wausau WISCONSIN Airport Eau Claire Municipal. Rock County. Municipal. King's Land o' Lakes Municipal. Manitowoc Municipal. Rhinelander-Oneida County. Stevens Point Municipal. Municipal. Cody Jackson Laramie Powell Sheridan Worland ALABAMA Airport Municipal. Pryor. Dothan. Municipal. Madison. Muscle Shoals. Van De Groff. Clear Cordova - Homer Kenai - Kodiak McGrath Nome Unalakleet Yakutat - Clear AF Auxiliary. Cordova Mile No. 3. Homer Municipal. Kenal. Kodiak NAS. Ralph Wein Municipal. McGrath FAA. Nome. Unalakleet. Yakutat. Flagstaff Grand Canyon - Kingman Page Phoenix - Prescott - Tuscon - Winslow Yuma Pulliam. Grand Canyon National Park. Kinginan MunicipaL Glen Canyon. Sky Harbor Municipal. Prescott Municipal. InternationaL Municipal. Yuma MOAS/International. WYOMING Municipal. Jackson's Hole. General Brees Field. Powell Municipal. Sheridan County. Municipal. AMERICAN SAMOA Pago Pago - Pago Pago International. Community 4.-Air carrier airports without approach lighting systems, calendar year 1P66 Decatur Dothan Gadsden Huntsville Muscle Shoals Tuscaloosa ALASKA ARIZONA PAGENO="0126" Uo~mmunity El Dorado~ Fayettevi11e~. Harrison Hot Springs - Jonesboro Pine Bluff - Texarkana Blythe Chico Crescent City - Imperial Inyokern Lancaster Marysville - Merced - Modesto Oxnard Palm Springs Paso Robles Santa Ana Santa Maria Santa Rosa Tahoe Valley - Vis~ilia Blythe. Chico Municipal. Jack McNamara Field. County. Inyokern/Kern County. Gen. William J. Fox. Yuba County. Merced Municipal. City-County. Ventuçra City. Municipal. Paso Robles County. ~`1'icip'~l Do. Orange County. Santa Maria Public. Sonoma County. Lake Tahoe. Municipal. AlamoT Aspen Cortez Durango Grand Jur-~--- Gunniso Hayden Lamar -*-`-`~,` Brideport Groton New Haven Fort Lauderdale - Fort Myers - Gainesville Key West Melbourne - Ocala Panama City Sarasota_ Valpariso Vero Beach CONNECTICUT Mt~nicipal. Trumbull. TWeed-New Haven. Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood. Page Field MunicipaL Municipal. InternationaL Cape Kennedy Regional. Municipal. Bay County. Sarasota-Brandenton. Eglin AFB. Municipal. 122 4.-Air carrier airports without approach lighting systems, calendar year 1966-Continued ARKANSAS Airport Goodwin Field. Fayetteville/Drake. Boone County. Memorial. Municipal. Grider Field. MunicipaL CALIFORNIA COLORADO Municipal. Aspen-Pitkin County. Oortez--Montezume. Durango-La Plata. Walker Field. Gunnison County. Yampa Valley- Municipal. Montrose County. FLORIDA PAGENO="0127" 123 4.-Air carrier airports without * approach Zighting systems, calendar year 1966-Continued GEORGIA Community Airport Albany Municipal. Athens Do. Augu~sta Bush Field. Brunswick . Malcoin-McKinnon. Moultrie ~ Moultrie-Thomasvffle. Rome Russell Field. Valdosta ~ MunicipaL Waycross * Waycross-Ware City. . flAWAII Hana, Maui . lana. Hilio ~ General Lyman Field. Kiaunakakaj (Hoolehua) Molokai. Kahului, Maui K'ahului. Kailna, Kona Kona. Kamiieia Kamuela Lanai City, Lanai Lanai. Lihue Lihue. IDAUO Burley Burley Municipal. Ooeur D'Alene Cocur D'Alene. Hailey Friednian Memorial. Idaho Falls . Fanning Field. Lewis1~on Lewiston-Nez-Perce County. Twin Falls Twin Falls MunicipaL ILLINOIS Bloomington . Bloomington-Normal. Champaign University of Illinois-Willard. Danville Vermilion County. Decatur . Municipal. Galesburg Galesburg Municipal. Marion . Williamson County. Mattoon-Charleston Coles `City Memorial. Mount Vernon Mount Vernon-Outland. Quincy Quincy Municipal Baldwin. Sterling-Rock Falls Whiteside County. INDIANA Bloomington - Monroe County. E~ansville - Dress Memorial. Kokomo Kokomo MunicipaL Lafayette' . Purdue University. Marion - Marion MunicipaL Muncie - Delaware C'ouiity-Johnson Field. Terre Haute - Hulman Field. IOWA Burlington Municipal. Clinton - Clinton Municipal. Dubuque MunicipaL Fort Dodge - Do. Iowa City Do. Mason City - Do. ()ttumwa - Ottuniwa Industrial. PAGENO="0128" 124 4.-Air carrier airports withont approach lighting systems, calendar year 1966-Continued Community Dodge City - Garden City Goodland Great Bend - Hays Libera' - Manhattan Parsons Bowling Green - London Owensboro Paducah Alexandria Baton Rouge Leesvflle Auburn-Lewiston Augusta - Bangor Bar Harbor Presque Isle Rockland - Hagerstown Salisbury Hyannis Martha's Vineyard Worcester Alpena - Benton Harbor Escanaba Hancock Iron Mountain - Ironwood - Jackson Manistee Marquette Menominee Peliston Saginaw Sault Ste. Marie Traverse City Bemidji Brainerd Fairmont - Hibbing International F'alls - Mankato Thief River Falls Winona Worthington -- KANSAS Airport Municipal. Do. Renner Field. MunicipaL Do. Do. Do. Tn-City. KENTUCKY Bowling Green-Warren. Corbin London War Memorial. Owensboro-Daviess County. Barkley Field. LOUISIANA Bsler Field. Ryan. Fort Polk AAF. MAINE Municipal. Augusta State. Dow AFB. Bar Harbor Airport. Municipal. Do. MARYLAND Municipal. Salisbury-Wicomico. MASSACHUSETTS Barnstable-Municipal. Martha's Vineyard. Municipal. MICHIGAN Phelps-Collins. Ross Field. Municipal. Houghton County Memorial. Ford. Gogebic. Reynolds MunicipaL Blacken. Marquette County. Menominee. Emmet County. Tn-City. Municipal. Do. MINNESOTA Municipal. Brainerd-Crow Wing. Municipal. Chisholm-Hibbing. FRIIM international. Municipal. Do. Max Conrad Field. Municipal. PAGENO="0129" Berlin -- Keene - Laconia Lebanon Manchester Gr~ 125 a4rports wit1vou~t q~pproac1?~ ~ig1j~t~n~g SyS~em8, çaZencZat~ year 1966-Continued 1 MISSISSIPPI A~rpor~ Columbus-Lowudes County. Municipal. D~. 1)0. Do. Key Field, Hardy-Anders. University-Oxford. Jackson County. Municipal. Do. ~oula vicks ~g Cape Girardeau columbia Jefferson City Joplin Kirksville Moberly Tribune MISSOURI Municipal. Do. Memorial. Municipal. Clarence Cannon Memorial. Oinar N. Bradley. Forney AAF. Bozeman Butte Glasgow Glendive Havre Helena Kalispell Lewistown Miles City Missoula Sidney ~West Yellowstone Wolf Point MONTANA Gallatin Field. Silver Bow County. International. Glendive. [lavre City-County. Helena. Flatbead County. Municipal. Miles City. County. Sidney~Richland Municipal. West Yellowstone. West Wolf Point. Alliance ____~____________~.,~ ~Chadron Columbus flastings Xearney McCook Norfolk North Platte________________ SeottsbThff Sidney NEBEAS~A Municipal. Do, Do. Do. DO. Do. Karl Stefali. Less i~ird Municipal. Municipaj. DO. NEVADA Municipal. Ely-Yell~nd. McCarr~tn. Elko Ely Las `~`~`~ ~Wildwood 92-715-68---9 PAGENO="0130" Lhnfl Port~inoulf NEW T~4K Warren C~nty~ Long Island MeArthur. Tompkins County. Municipal. Richards Field. Municipal. Do. Do. Dutches~ County. Adi~oxic1ac~, Municipal. *NOkTH. DAKOTA ~w~iicipa~1. International. Jai~to~~. International. Sloulin International. OHIO Allen Oo~ity. Scibto C~u~I1y. Mui~ipaL OKI4AHOM4 Frank Pbiflips. Haffi Burton. Woodrthg Field. Munthe~aL. Munietpa~.. MunicIp~L Davis Field. Mi~pa~. Searuy Field. OREGON Ol~ts~p Cou~ity. Mun1ci~âl. Mi~wi~aL Mumapat Ro~órVs FIeJiL' MunietpaL 126 4.-Air eói*~#E~r a~rpd~ts wit1trn~t approte~ ~çj1tting 8y$tem$, CaieMdar year i9~6-~Cbntlnued Cotnmunity Alamogordo Carlsbad Clovis Farmington Gallup Hobbs Roswell Santa Fe Silver City imw ~tis~xco Airport Municipal. Do. Do. Do. Senator Clarke Field. Lea County. Municipal. Do. Silver City-Grant County. Glens Falls_________________ Islip Ithaca Jamestown Massena Ogdensburg Olean Plattsburgh Poughkeepsle Saranac Lake__~___________~ Watertown Elizabeth City_______________ Goldsboro Hickory ______-~._______~.___ K~inston New Bern Rocky Mount_____~_________ Southern Pines NQRT}~ OAEOI~INA Coast Guard Air S~ation. Seymour ~ohnson AFB. Municipal. Stallings Field. Simmons Nott. Municipal. Pinehurst-Southern Pines. Devils Lake__~__~_________~ Grand Forks_______~________ Jamestown Minot Williston Enid______________~_________ ~ Lawton~~_---_-~-----___-___. MeAlester Muskogee___________-_______. Ponca City______.~___________ Astoria~-------__-----------. Baker-~______-____--_-~-_-_~- Corvallis North Bend ~ PAGENO="0131" 127 4.-Air carrier airport8 without approach l~ighting 8y~tem8, caiendar year 19fJ6-~Continued Agana, Gi~am - Samoa Wake Island1 PENNSTLVANLt A~rport Br d-MeKeian Corunty. Dii Bois-tefl!ers~n Oounty. Oh'es~L~unberton. Mun~ieipai1. Jotstôwn-Oani~rIa Oounty. I~a~ic~ster. ~ia4r ç~eirnty. Mid~State. Gen. Oart Spaatz. ~U~RTO EIOO Ma~aguez Airfield. Mercedlita. Puerto R1~o International. SOUTH RQ~N~& Anderson county. Myttie Eeaitth. Municipal. Greenwood ~unty. SOUTH OAI~ODA Municipal. MunicipaL W. W. wes Municipal. Muulcjpal MunicipaL MunicipaL Municipal. Chan Gurney MunicipaL TENNESSEE Outlaw 1~1iei~1. Mc~eJ~r ]~`ielc1. Bomar l~ielcL ~ HowaPd * County. Thitchin~on County. £1L~ . , R1& Grarsie Valley InternationaL ~ `~. Mun1~aL ~- .,- ~- ~ Meacitarn. Scholes E~ieid. uariinger . Municipal. Houston - Intercontinental. Laredo MunicipaL Lufkin Angelina County. McAllen - Miller International. Paris . Cox FIØkL Temple - Draughou-Mill~r. Victoria V~ctqcia county-Foster. Cedar City . MunicipaL Moab Canyonlands Field. Vernal Vernal. 1Partial ILS. Community Bradf~~w~ Du Bn~ 1~~ii,ii~~ Johnstown - Lancaster Martinsburg Philipslsirg - i~eading - Pono'~ San Anderson Crescent B~ach Florence Huron Mitchell Pierre Rapid City Watertown Yankton SOUTH PAOITIQ Agaua ~AS. InternationaL Wake Island. Clarksvllle Jackson Shelbyville Big Spring Borger Brc~wnsv~'1~' Brownwoed Fort W~~vth Galveston. UPAH PAGENO="0132" 128 4.-Air carrier airports without approach llghting systems, calendar year 1966-Continued VERMONT Airport Barre~Montpelier. Newport Municipal MunicipaL VIRGIN ISL&ND Charlottesville1 - Danville - Dublin Hot Springs Staunton Roanoke Charlottesville-Abeman. Municipal New River ValleLy. Ingafla Field, Shennndoah Valley. M~inlcipal. Ephrr~' PaSc( Port Angeles Pullman Tacoma Walla Walla~-~ - Wenatehee WASHINGTON Municipal. Bowerman. Munieij~aL Tri..Oities. Ohaliam County. Pullman Moscow Regional. Ii~dnstVial. Wailla Wathi City-County. Pangborn Field. Beckley Bluefield Clarksburg Elkins - Huntington' Martinsburg Morgantown Parkersburg Eau Claire Janesville La Crosse - Land 0' Lakes Manitowoc - Rhinelander Stevens Point Wausau Cody- lackson - WEST VIRGINIA Raleigh County Memorial. Mercer County. Benedum. Elkins-Randoiph. Tn-State. Martinsburg Municipal. Municipal. Wood County. WISCONSIN Eau Claire Municipal. Rock County. Municipal. King's Land 0' Lakes. Manitowoc MunicipaL Rhinelander-Oneida County. Stevens Point MunicipaL MunicipaL WYOMING Municipal. Jackson's Hole. General Brees Field. Powell Municipal. Municipal. Sheridan County. Municipal. Community Barre~-~--1~-- Newp Oharlotte Ama1te~ Ohristiansted Eai~ry `S. Truhian. Alexander Eaaiilton. VIRGINIA Laramie - Powell Rock Springs Sheridan Worland - `Partial ILS. PAGENO="0133" 129 4.-Air Car~'ie~ airports without approach lighting systems, calendar yea~ 1~6e-continlied AMERICAN SAMOA Community 4i~port -. Pago Pago Pago Pago International 5.-Air carrier airports with traffic counts equal to or greater thM the airport sur'reillance radar criteria establishment minimums ALABAMA West Palm Beach Columbus. South Bend Lexington PAT~A 71-.~4-~. t~1,.. CALIFORNIA Monterey Peninsula. FLORIDA Palm Beach InternationaL GEORGIA Muscogee County. INDIANA St. Joseph County. KENTUCKY Blue Grass. NEVADA Reno Municipal. NEW YORK Westchester County. Community Dothan SOUTH CAROLINA Columbia Metropolitan. WISCONSIN Truax Ji~ield. Kenai. ARKANSAS Payetteville-Drake Field. Grider Field. Municipal. Community Airport Huntsville-Madison County. 6.-Air carrier airports without tower8 which have met the criteria establish- meut miuimums ALABAMA / AirpOrt: Dothan. ALASKA Pine Bluff~ PAGENO="0134" .-#~ New Haven Fort Myers Gainesville - Panama City 130 6.-4ir ~ar~i~' ~ tow~ zvkiok have met thç critør4i~ ~8t~blish- ~ ~ ment rniwinutn~-CGntinued OAUFO1~NIA Community 4irport ImperiaL. ~ ~peri~U ~uuty. Marysvi11~ Tuba County. Trwnbull. Pweed-~Tew Haven. Page FtelU Municipal. Municipal. Pitnarna Otty~Bay Cewity, Municipal. GEORGIA Albany _____________________ - Albany Municipal. HAWAII Lihue ~ Lihue. INDIANA Lafayette ___________________ . Purdue University. KENTUCKY Owensboro __________~ ~ Owensboro~Daviess County. MAINE ~oW AFB. MICHIGAN Ross Field. MISSISSIPPI Greenville Municipal. MISSOURI Municipal. NEW YORK Dutchess County. NOEP~ CAflOLINA Hickory Municipal. NORTH DAKOTA Grand Forks..._____..~___..__ Grand Forks tnternat!onai. PUERTO RICO Ponce_.______....____________ Mercedita. SOUTH CAROLINA Crescent Beach______________. Myrtle Beach. Benton Harbor_~..._..._______. Greenville Columbia Poughkeepsie Hickory PAGENO="0135" Community ~ Parkersburg_ ~La Crosse Oomn&un~ty Dothan Huntsv111e~~. - ;i~~tusc1e Shoals ~___~__ Juneau - ~Tucson Albany Bib Louisville Benton Harbor - ~J~ackson t'ontiac Saginaw - Colum us1 ~u1fpc~ 1 Programed for a partial XLS. )~L 131 ..1 ~6.-Air carrier a~rports~i$thast towers whick 1&ave met ~the crit~ria establis1~ ~ ~ ~4n~ m1ninwms~-~Conthutei~ WEST VIRGINIA Ai~~~port ~1orga~ow~ Municipal. Woo~l County. WISCONSIN La Crosse Municipal. `1.-Air carrier a~rport8 witl&outinstrument landingayatem8 but wMcl& meet the etabUshrnent c~Uerta ~L&BAMA 44rport J~than. `Madison. Muscle ~S'hoais. At)A~SKA Ju~a~i Mttn4~fpal. ~ ~ iner~a~1k~M:t. ARKANSAS Hot Springs . I~enióf~al. ~Texarkana . Mnni~ipal. * CALWOWIA Paimoaie - ~ ~ AF13~. Santa Ana - Orange County. CONNECTICUT Bridgeport * ]Th~t~Ll. ~Groton Trumbull. GEORGIA MunicipaL HAWAII General Lyman Field. . ~E~UO]~Y Bowman. MI~GAk Ross Field. Reynolds rield. Municipal. Tn-City. MISSISSIPPI Oolumbus-Lowndes County. Muilleipal. PAGENO="0136" 132 7.~L~Aircarri~er airports `Uiitho~1,nstrvmentZa4zdin9j~/$temg ~t which ~ncet th~ est~bli~h~ient OriteHa~!Oo11tiflned NE\kADA Community Las Vegas ~ ,McCai~an Field NORTH OAROLINA Hickory' MunicipaL NORTH DAKOTA ~ %~ ~ Grand Forks `IhteriiationaL\ NItW YORK Farmingdale Ithaca North Bend' Bradford San Juan Rapid City - ziouston Republic. Tompkins Gounty. OREGON MunleipaL * PENNSYLVANIA. Bradfoi~d-McI~ean Oounty. PUERTO RICO Puerto Rico International. SOUTH DAKOTA Municipal. T~xAS Intercontinental. VIRGINIA MuniëipaL Shenandoah galley. WASHINGTON IndustriaL WEST `VIRGINIA' c3larksburg Benedum. MunicipaL 8.-Air carrier airports without approach lighting system but meeting the establi~hmeiit criteria ALABAMA Roanoke________~. - Staunton' Tacoma Community Dothan - Huntsville Musetle Shoals Juneau Airport Dothan. Madison. Muscle Shoals. ALASKA Juneau MunicipaL ARIZONA International. Tucson `Programed for a partial ILS. PAGENO="0137" COLORADO Walker Field. CONNECTICUT MunicipaL Trumbull. FLORIDA Eglin AFB. GEORGIA Municipal. Bush Field. HAWAI]~ General Lyman FMd. Eahuiui. ILLINOIS University of IUinols-Wlflai~d. Quincy Municipal Baldwin. INDIANA Dress Memorial. KENTUCKY Mulman Field. LOUISIANA MAINE Dow Field. MASSACHUSETTS Municipal, MICHIGAN Ross Field. Reynolds Field. Municipal. Tn-City. 133 I Community Uot'Springs 8.-Air carriez~ airport~ without approaQh ~ig1~ti~g sy~te~ b~t~eetisg t!~e eétal)Ushme.nt cr#eria~Qi1j~tu~.il ARKANSAS Airport Memorial. Municipal. CALIFORNIA Edwards AFE. Orange County. Puhlic. Palmdr1~ ~aiita Ailio Santa Maria - I Orand J"'~44"~ Bridgeport 1,-.... -~ Albany Augusta Ililo Kaliulul, Maui `Terre Iioiifa Baton Rouge I~yaai. Worcester r~-~-~--~ Barbor___~ PAGENO="0138" MISISSIPPI Air~bo,~t - )lurnbus- Munleipal. Key ]~lield. MISSOURI MunicttpaL NEVADA M~Oarran ~1E~kL NKi~ HAMPs1rnu~ Gi~enier Ptel&Mm~icfpaL NEW t~ORIC Republic. Long Island-MdArthur. Tompkins. NORTH CAROLINA Seymour Johnson AFB. MunicipaL NORTH DAKOTA International. OREGON MunicipaL PENNSYLVANI4 ~ County. (`en. Carl Spaatz. PUERTO RICO ~u~rto Rico International. SOUTH DAKOTA MunicipaL Muuicj~pa1. TEXAS. Rio Graude Valley InternationaL Mea~hah~i. Intercontinental. VIRGINIA Municipa1. Shenandoah Valley. WASHINGTON Industrial. WEST VIRGINIA Benedum. Municipal. WYOMING Municipal. 134 ~:-Air carrier airporis wU1&oa~t approa&b I,tgh~tin~, ~istein bat meeting tha Community Ooilumimr Gulfport Field. Las ~ Far IsiJip.. T~4hn~ GotLd~bor Grafld F'~-1-'~ North Bend Brai&'~'1 D,~. ~ San ~ Huron Rapid `Guy Brownsville. Fort W'~ Boane1- - Tacoma Olarksburg Morgantown Rock ~ PAGENO="0139" 135 Mr. Ro~ns. Thank you, Mr. Qhairman. The CITAIRMAN. Thós~ ha~r~ been requested before, but L am sure they will comply with ~ that request. Some other m~mb~rs have re- quested it. Mr. R~ii~s. Thank you. The 4~I1AXRMAN. M!r. Devthe. ~ Mr. DEviNL Thank you, Mr. Ohairma~. General McKee, I am not ac~using you or your organiza~tiofl of dere- liction of anything, I would join in yoii~ remarlçs of commendatioii, particularly for your air traffic controllers. I would ask you or any men4er on the panel right now if you wouldn't agree that in the in~ t~rests of air safety, and the interesth of the public, and of the public understanding, might be well served if we would have additional pub~ lie hearings in which we gave the representatives Qf the Air Line Pilots' Association, Aircraft Own~s & Pilots' Association, air traffic controllers, perhaps members of the public, an oppQrtunity to testify and air this thing ~ ~ ~: Do you think you could gain any infô~ination or insight by such hearings ? ~ ~ ~ General McKi~. Well, as you knOw, we certainly have no objection to any hearings the committee wants to hold. But as you know, w~ have frequent meetings with the Air Line Pilots' Association, and with all these associations, and I have urged, for example, the Air Traffic Controllers Association, these other a~ociations, to giv~ us their ideas, any ideas that they have Qnimproving safety. , ~ ~ ~ A lot of their recommendations we take, ~ and some of them are just impracticable to take for one reason or another. They are beyond our capability. , ~ . . ~ Mr. DEVINE. Yes ; but that is true of y~u as the Administrator and within your organiaztion ; but' 1 am conceri~d with' the public im~ge of comnier~iai and general ~viation. I' think there ar~ to~ rnany mis- understandings. I think if these `things are aired, that maybe th~ public would have more coñfideh~.. ` , ` ~ ` `~ ` ` ` ` . ~ ~ ~ We a~re told every time there is an air crash, whether it is a midair~ collision, or something else, there are i~nmediate cancellations of reservations, and then `these people get courage again, and 2 or, 3 days later, they start flying again. , ~ ~ ` General MoKEc1~. That is tri~e ; but th~i~ they pi~ckup' next week. The thing keeps ~ growing. I am concer~ied about the ~a~idity with which air traffic is growing. It is fantastic. ` ` Mr. DEVINE. Again, talldng about lack of faç~ilities, when these jumbo jets like the 747 come in, I understand `that you are not as eon- cerned with the air safety problem as you are with how you are going to handle them when they get on the ground, with parking ` facilities, both for the aircraft, haMling the bags, and thing's like that. Isn't that a great problem ? ` ` General ~foKi~. Froi* the ~ir ` safety point of view, we can handle th~ juz~~ j'~t just as ` easily as we ~an handle present airplanes. Ob- vio~is1~i, if~u happen to be sq unfortunate as to ha~è an accident, in one ~cid'ent,' you obviously would kill more people; hilt the big prob~ lern confi~ou~ing th& avi~tioii ~ommiinity and various ~omrnunities in the country is providing the facilities at thC airport to handle that many people. PAGENO="0140" 136 Yo'u*c~n imagine wha~t woi~id happen to New York if at 5 o'eipok- and this is one of our problems, again-~three jumbo jets oame in from Paris or London. And this is a problem they have got. Mr. DIWINE. That is true. Let me put an unrelated question to that. Is drinking by ~pilots in general `aviation at this time considered a major air safety hazard? Ha$ it grown to any proportions that you have . great concern about this problem? ~ General MOKEE. I don't think, Mr. Devine, that it is major, but we do have a problem there, and I think that everybody recognizes it, and that it is the reason that we are oonducting, and so are the various* associations, a very vigorous ~duca1tionai eampaig~ as to what is in- volved when a pilot `takes a drink before he takes off, or a few hours `before he takes off. We do consider it a problem. ~ Mr. DEvINE. Not a major one at this time? `General MCKEE. I will say it is a significant p call it a major problem. Mr. DEVINE. Finally, recognizing that th lisions, one at Urbana, Ohio, the other one lina, did nc~t occur in a hi 1 1 ~sted ~ that I recall was United and . proaching JFK-what one thin panel suggest `or r~cmmend as a ing midair coliisiou~s ? Is there ~ General MoKm~. The one p this morthng, and I think it problem, ~a.n effective, anticollision `C Mr. DEfiNE. On the aircraft. General MoKi~E. On. the aircraft. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, `Mr. Chairman. General MoKi~E. And I think we have to drive as fast as we can to get it. First on all the commercial airliners, airplanes carrying pas- sengers ; and then we have got to drive at getting ~o'me kind of a device that is economically feasible for all the general aviation aircraft. it would be the biggest breakthrough we could get. `Mr. DEVINE. Thank you. General MoKi~,. And we need the help of all of the industi getting this done. Mr. DEVINE. That is in a public hearing, maybe with all good intents, that might show up here. ~ General MCKEE. I would sure like to see them. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kornegay. Mr. KORNEGAY. Thank you, Mr. Ohairman. Mr. MCKee, is it an FAA. rule that small passenger commercial air- craft have been equipped with radar on the plane? General MCKEE. Will you answer Mr. Moore? Mr. GEORGE S. MOORE (Associate Administrator for Operations, FAA). All aircraft that were certificated after a certain date. To give you an example, the DC-3, or C-46, being manufactured sometime back, do .not have to have airborne radar; but all of your modern equipment today, your turboprops and your jets are required to have airborne radar. PAGENO="0141" 137 Mr. KORNEGAY. ~ A lot of planes ~ do have it now. Is that radar equipped to aid tim pilot in determining `altitude, weather, other air- craft, or what? What can he see on that radar, in other words? Mr. MOORE. it is primarily a weather avoidance device. In other words, it keeps him from flying into- Mr. KORNEGAY. In other words, he can see a thunderstorm up ahead. Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir. Mr. KORNEOAY. Now, could he see any aircraft out there, 10 miles, ~ miles? Mr. MOORE. No ; it is not designed for that, sir. Mr. KORNEOAY. Ill other words, insosfar as collision, air collisions are concerned, this is not any real help to the navigator or the pilot. Mr. MOORE. It is primarily a weather avoidance device and you can, of course, use it for picking up land masses, and things like that, when you are approaching a mountain, or something of that sort, yes, sir. L Mr. KORNEGAY. A mountain. Do you foresee now an instrument, radar instrument that could be used, adapted to pick up other air- cra~ft? Mr. Mooin~. No, sir ; as General McKee pointed out, the way it looks to us the `collision avoidance device as such, as a separate unit, is the best hope for avoiding other aircraft. ~ Mr. KORNEGAY. Now does that collision avoidance system send a signal out 360 degrees, in other words, in all directions ; or will it be funneled out as a radar beam goes? Mr. MOORE. As Mr. Thomas mentioned this morning,, it is a time fre-. quency proposition, using what is known as an atomic clock. It is a cooperative system. It would require all aircraft to be so equipped, be on exactly the same time and, in that way, be able to exchange intel- ligence with those equipments on aircraft in the system. Mr. THOMAS. It does cover the complete volume, there is an antenna on top, and an antenna on the bottom. For all practical purposes, it is like a basketball, complete volume around it. In all directions. Mr. KORNEGAY. In all directions. Now, I noted in the press that they speak particularly of the collision at .llendersonville, N.C., that the Cessna 310 was 12 miles off course. Now, has your investigation got to the point where any statement could be made with reference to why that airplane was that far off course, and if anyone in the system knew that it was off course? Mr. ALLEN. Sir, I don't think that we have said that the aircraft was off course. Mr. KORNEGAY. No, sir ; I didn't say. I said it was reported in the newspaper, and it was not according to the FAA officials. Mr. ALLEN. Well, going back to the transcript I read this morning, I think that the following summary could be made in that transcript. The information, from the information, we determined that .3121 Sierra was under radar surveillance from the time of departure from Charlotte to within 10 miles of Asheville VOIR. And the clearance was to the Asheville VOIR, and Nan 3121 Sierra reported "21 Sierra just passed over the VOR. We are headed for-nh-the Asheville now." And that time was at 1558 hours and 19 seconds. I PAGENO="0142" 138 Mr. KORNEGAY~ Well, that was some 3 minutes before the collision. Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir ; the collision occurred at 1601 and approxi- mately 15 seconds. We know that the Piedmont flight 22 departed Asheville airport approximately 1558, and 40 seconds, and shortly thereafter, was observed by two control towers about 5, approximately 5 miles south on the southeast heading. Now, after impact, the aircraft came to rest on the ground at a~ point approximately 10 miles southwest of the Asheville VOR or about 10 miles out on the 230° radial of the VOR. Now, after collision, your aircraft becomes a free-falling object. We do not know at this time whether impact occurred precisely over the impact spot or not. I think that during the course of the inirestiga- tion, we will run a trajectory analysis, and this will tell us more precisely at what point displaced from the VOR, such as the case where the actual midair collision occurred. Mr. KORNEGAY. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Broyhill. Mr. BR0YrnLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKee, has the FAA considered, and if so, would it be practical to require that all aircraft who operate under IFR conditions be equipped with transponders? General MCKEE. I don't think so. I would like to ask Mr. Thomas. He has been into this at some length. I asked him the same question. . Mr. THOMAS. No~ sir ; we do nGt. In the so-called positive control air space, air space high altitudes `occupied by the fast aircraft and. the heavy aircraft, we do require it. At the present time, we do not find it necessary for all aircraft op- erating IFR to be so equipped. The cheapest installed version now is about $5~500, and much of the IFR operation occurs in areas where it would not normally be considered necessary. We may at some time require this for operations in very high density areas, but we have come to no such conclusion yet. Mr. BROYJJrLL. I want to ask one other question, concerning the pro- cedures of your controller. Now, Mr. Allen, read the transcript. I don't remember which controller it was, gave `the pilot of 3121 Sierra an instruction, and then said "Correction," and made a correction in this instruction, and as I recall in reading this transcript~ the pilot ac- knowledged that with his number.~ Now, is it usually the procedure followed that he acknowledges his instruction this way, or would he be required to repeat this instruction, or make sure that he has it correctly? Mr. THOMAS. He normally would read it back. Mr. BROYHILL. But there is no- Mr. THOMAS. They are encouraged to read back. There is no ab- solute requirement to read back. . Mr. BROYHILL. Would this- Mr. THOMAS. That is, repeat the clearance instruction he has been given. Mr. BROYHILL. Would this be something that could be done, to re- quire that they read such instructions back, clearances? Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Broyhill, the problem that we have had, and we have discussed this at quite some length, in the very busy locations, such as Chicago, or New York, we could completely congest the radio PAGENO="0143" 139 frequencies, and if there is any requirement to read back, it would be more urgent in those locations than any other locations. It is normally a better thing to read back, because then there is some assurance that the pilot and the controller have the same ideas in mind. Mr. BROYHILL. I might ask one oti~er question. Your. agency, the FAA are both in the Department of Transportation. Your agency has the ~responsibility for inve~igating air accidents. Is your agency inde- pendent of the FAA, or do you have, are you under the FAA control, or what is the exact status? Mr. O'CONNELL. Well, we are very pointedly made independent by virtue of the statute under which we operate. We inherited the Civil Aeronautics Board function of investigating aircraft accidents, but in the Transportation Act which created the National Transportation Safety Board, there is specific provision requiring that we exercise our responsibility and duties independent of the Secretary of Trans- portation, or any of the administrators, so that we are directed to op- erate independent of General McKee and of the Department as a whale, in our responsibilities of investigating accideiats. That is a continuation of the longstanding separation that existed between CAB and FAA in the same area. Mr. BRoi~iiILL. You also have authority to investigate the near~misse~ which we have been talking about today? Mr. O'CONNELL. Yes, yes ; we. do. Mr. BROYHILL. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee. Mr. K1JYKENDALL. General McKee, I want to follow just for a mo- ment the line of questioning of Mr. Devine, in the matter of holding extensive public hearings. In my~ very short tenure on this committee, it seems that in the witnesses from the various technical~ and I believe three or four gentlemen have described your function a~ primarily technical, it seems to me that the function of the committee; among many other things, has been largely one of, should I say, translation from technical into more layman's terms. I find that many times, the supposed superficial misunderstanding between you a~d one of us is only a matter `of the difference between your technical terminology and our layman's terminology. i: know this discourse between you and Mr. Sprh~ger a fe~ momenits ago, pretty well brought this out. Would you not. think, if for no other r~ason excepts to bring this whole problem out `into the public into the language which ~e as Con- gressmen `speak, which obviously, has to be the lan~age of the gen- eral public, if for no other reason, don't you thi~k that would be advantageous? General MoKE~. I am not sure whether it would or not. Lots of times, in these things, a lot of misconceptions and misunderstandings occur, but we h~e ncthing to hide, and before `any bearing that this committee wants to hold, we will sit up here and tell you the truth the best we know it, a~ long as you want to hear it. Mr. KUYKJ~tDATJL. I realize this, but I k .. no~r that~-~I am not ~en going to ask you the qnestion~ I will niake the statement-~-yo.u are not impervious to public opinion. I know that. General MoKEE~ Oh, no~ no. Mr. KUrKENOALL. And I was just suggesting an idea. I know that the few times I have heard you testify, there are cases where the public PAGENO="0144" 140 had misunderstood you, and this committee did understand you, and 11 think it would have been better off if there had been this under- standing all along. This was my only statement. I know you feel the same way. General McKi~. I certainly do. The GEJAIRMAN. Mr. Ottinger. Mr. OrrINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think our last exchange generated perhaps more heat than light, and I wonder if you could answer a few of the specifies that I raised. I will just pick ~ out two or three that I think are of most concern that haven't been covered by the committee. I am told it would increase safety substantially in the northeast corridor from Washington to Boston, if pl~anes were under continuous control of the towers. I understand they are not, `at the present time. What are the disadvantages or difficulties in instituting that kind of control? Second, is there a three-dimensional radar ~vailable ~t less than $2 million as E]ecitronies magazine states? General MCKEE. This question of three-dimensional radar has come up a number of times, and I believe `this committee, I am no expert in three-dimensional radar, but I have asked that this be looked into, because it has been raised a number of times, and I would like for Mr. Thomas to talk to the three-dimensional radar, and maybe shed a little light on this great thing that is supposed to solve all the problems. Would you talk to the three- Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, L Hughes and I.T. & T. efforts. We 1 City. I have seen the Hughes system with with the I.T~ & T. system. The object of al radars is to get altitude information into the The military services ob~ I with a doen ype an esti- ~rceptor, 17 precise is one `of just geometry. In the `air traffic con- ___1 the lower air space 1,000 feet of vertical `separa- ird, and in areas close to the radar antenna, we if we are more than 40 miles from the radar miles `as the lateral separation standard ; that is, ` 1 not be closer than 5 miles, not because the wing eoause this is the resolution of the radar. If we ion `in the horizontal plane `and put it on end in nen we would deal very well with airplanes that ~ration at 40 miles and 25,000-foot separation at . - we used the same standards. ~ ~ ~ ~pts to do something `about this, and in the since ~ the one we bought, it was a series of anten- ., `one s~a ked upon the other, varying from each other by `a fraction and then the radar will look at `all these `antennas, `select ut it thought had the strongest return, make `a calculation - centroid would be, `and then estimate this a's `the height. seek ou't `a ~ormati'on interc it. trol s' tion use 3 mil `antenna, ) airpli s and PAGENO="0145" 141 i~. THOMAS. It O~ have a transmitter th~ obviously, you can't the wrong information is to write technical si ployed; as a matter of fact, tI This works pretty good, within very short ranges, but it is a corn- plicated sort of device. We had a Presidential committee look at this whole problem, about 5 or 6 years `ago, its name was Projec4 Beacon, and they came up . with a `contrary recommendation, and we have been embarked on its recommendation since. And that is, we would like a rather constant measurement of alti- tude, and not dependent upon a fraction of a degree resolution of radar, which is not available either in military or civil. And the sim- plest thing would be, since the altimeter measures altitude regard- less of its distance from an antenna, is simply to have it broadcast what that altitude information is. We had another fortuitous circumstance going for us, because we were then using, as was mentioned earlier, the grandson of the old World War II 1FF in the radar beacon, which would reinforce the target. This was susce one couldp~ radar s plane.] and dis ~ iden ItheaL 1r~ has no ~ ~ttions in i~ vertical separation t we can use, and If we put in c~. ~s-ii radar to cover the'. know at one time i it would cost, we would 40-, 50-mile intervals in order to get the accuracy tha~ Now, the military have quite a different problem. ~ with a cooperative environment, one where you want t sion, one that ~rate with don't quite a number of c ~o we went the route o * off a beacon on Dn, one a, pc Piedmont I 1flfl( ~itii~iuchm~,~ ¶12-715--68----1O PAGENO="0146" 142 tró~ics ` industry in this area `than with almost any other thing in the past ~ years. , ` ~ And mtüth o:f the general aviation equipment now coming off the line is ofexcellent quality. But we do have minimum standards for the performance. of the ai~draft. This is uot how you build it. That is their problem. But how it operates, within the system. Mr. OrrINGER. What is the situation with respect to air taxi? Why don't you have the same kInd of severe controls on them as you do on carriers? Mr. THoMAS. There is confusion over `the air taxis, even in our statistics. We categorized them as general aviation, but as a matter of fact,. they `are common carriers. I would `suspect the air taxi opera- tors would tell you we have quite severe controls over them. We have even tighter control's under a notice of proposed rulemaking that is out for public comment right new, but we have some real difference's in the operation that we must recognize. Many of them `are small, three, four, five place aircraft, `operating with `a single pilot under visual flight rules, that is good weather conditions, and iiever under instruments. Some of them actually operate heavier aircraft with two pilots, and essentially under the same type of rules. But fundamentally there are difference's in `their operating environment, `there is a difference in their capacity `as to where they go, and we try to apply the most rigid safety regulations that we can to them, but obviously, we do not want to destroy that industry. If we required them to have dispatchers, two-way radio ground sta- tions, two pilots, this `sort of thing, we could put them out of business, real quick. Mr. OTTINGER. You are sure it would put `them out of business ? They are in the business of `carrying people for pay. That i's the basis. General MCKEE. Well, we wouldn't mind putting them out of busi- ness, if we thought it wa's necessary from a safety point of view, but we are tr~ying to get the equivalent safety with the requirements that we do put on them without it being identical to the same require- ments for the big airplane going between New York and Paris. Mr. OTTINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brotzman. Mr. BROTZMAN. Thank you. Having listened to about 4 or 5 hours of testimony, I am impressed by the fact that you `have some very great problems, and I say, I think we have some very great problems. ` .` I certainly look charitably upon the comments of the gentleman from OhiO, Mr. Deviiie. I think a broad gage type of inquiry would help to resolve some of these problems. When I say that, I don't be- lieve we can resolve these matters by turning the faucet on and off, and I think that we in the Congress have a need for `more expertise and knowledgeability about the specifics of `these prc~blems to enable us to work with you and carriers, and the pilot's association and the various people that are concerned with air traffic safety, in the interests of the general public. I certainly feel this has been a very beneficial day, to hear these matters discussed, but I don't think it has gone far enough. I PAGENO="0147" 143 I might say one thing, Gen~ra1,. That ~y clqsest ~ ~Qeiation with your agency happens to be w~tli the group oJ~; people that operate the air traffic control center, the Longmont, Cob., and I would be remiss if I didn't say publicly that they are a dedicated, har4-work~ ing group of people, and I think they doan excellent job.~ . : ~ Certainly, all of us can improve in the performance of the tasks we assume for this Government, but I want to clearly be on recor4 ~ that I think they are doing a good job there. I have taken the time `to go and inspeottheir operation, and to find out what kind of people they really are. ~ ~ ~ ~ If you will recollect, the last time we ~ea1iy got together which un- fortunately, once ~gain, was at the time of the major c~tastrop~ e in New Orleans, and I think we ought to be getting `together in between times. General MCKEE. I agree. Mr. BROTZ~&AN. We get together after something tragic has hap- pened, but I think thei~ should be continuity of purpose here, on all of our parts, and certainly, when I say that, 1~ am talking about our committee, but if you will recall, as a result of the Delta crash at New Orleans, I made a suggestion relative to your checking upon the possibility of acquiring surplus Air Force bases in remote areas, as sites for emergency training exercises. I think you made some progress on it. ~ Is that not correct ~ General M0KEE. Some. Not as much as we would like, but as yoi~ remember this morning, we covered what we had done as a result of that accident, to try tc ensure that we didn~t have a similar recurrence in terms of maneuvers, where they would be conducted, and as I said~ we went into some detail, in a letter to the eommittee as to just what we had done. I pointed out in a letter to you what is being done at surplus air- fields, or airfields that are becomingsurplus. Mr. BROTZMAN. The reason I suggested that, of course, was that often in this Government, one hand doesn't know what the other hand is doing. We have surplus Air Force bases that might be in a good spot, to augment training exercises, taking them out of areas of congestion. I think we should be moving on that, prior to the time that we dispose of them. General M0KEE. Well, we are certainly `aware of anything that is surplus that comes up through GSA. We work very cl~sely with GSA. Obviously, Mr. Brotzman, you hare a problem. You take a huge miii- tary installation that becomes surplus, just to operate that military installation costs a tremendous amount of money, and then you are asked to settle the question, "Well, would you like to use this for training purposes ~" Who is going to pay for it ? The Federal Govern- ment is not ~orng to pay for it. There is nothing in our funds to pro- vide for training bases, and so you go to the airlines, and they say, "We are going to do our training down iii New Mexico, because we have `a base down there, and we can't `afford t~ do this." On the other hand, we try to ~noourage the airlines, and we `are do- ing it in `a couple of oases right now, where there are facilities that have become available, to use them, and some o~ them are, For ezample, P~n American is very interesthd in training at one PAGENO="0148" of the bases in the southwestern part of the United States that is be- coming `surplus, that has fine runways and fine facilities. Mr. BROTZMAN. Well, these are practical things that must be con- sidered. General MCKEE. I think that if you look- Mr. BROTZMAN. And we would understand the whole situation. General MCKEE. If you look over the record of this particular corn- mittee over the ye'trs, I think this committee has made an outstanding and sigrnfioant contribution to the advance of commercial aviation in this country. And I agree with you. I would like to get together more frequently. We need help in lots ofareas. We do need understanding. Mr. BROTZMAN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Van Deerlin? Mr. VAN DEERLIN. Thank you. You testified, General, that the utilization of Bolhng and Ana. costia strips would relieve the congestion `at National Airport, but it really wouldn't do anything, would it, to relieve the congestion and the backup airspace overhead ? Wouldn't the problems-wouldn't the major problems that you have in parking space remain with the use of those nearby fields? General MCKEE. This is true, Mr. Van Deerlin. Actually, we could have used An'acostia on a limited basis, as we said, but that is not the solution for the Washington area. Washington needs, I am not pre- pared to state how many, but at least several well-located general aviation airports. And I would hope someday we will be able to get them. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. But they shouldb&- ~ General MOKEE. Anacostia, even if it were to be used, is a poor solu- tion to the problem. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. So I take it your overall recommendations would be against their utilization for as an adjunct to National Airport. General MOKEE. Well, certainly not as an adjunct. The only purpose it would serve would be to take some of the light airplanes off of Wash- ington National. And we suggested it last year, when we were having the crisis in congestion, as one action that might tend to some extent to relieve the congestion at Washington National. But for a sensible, long-term answer, we needed adequate, general aviation airports in the Washing- ton area, to handle not only these light airplanes I was talking about, but also the tremendous amount of business aircraft that come in, heavy piston-planes, turboprops, and jets. They are going more and more and more to jets, so this whole fleet of business aircraft is very rapidly changing into a jet fleet, and if you could take those airplanes into a convenient airport, other than National, I think we would be that much better off. Mr. VAN DEERLIN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keith. * Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I haven't been able to be here, General, for most of your testimony. Over the weekend, I had occasion to enter into a dis- cussion with somebody about the overall safety of flying, and p~rticu- larly commercial flying. 144 PAGENO="0149" to be proud regrettable as ti Mr. THOMAS. `~ Aviation Organizai ones that you just read, countries, the accident r e the international - ~e no acc 145 internation~ ~rab1e statistics ~verage of all the rate is one~ country' any other country. Mr. KEITH. I am far fr I-fl m satisfied, Iwas - Neve -mu~ Congress. olli-sions in PAGENO="0150" 146 of your personneJ iiith various ~ areas of study, including structures, systems~ powerp1a~ts,'flight recorder, i~aintenánce records, operations, air traffic control, andtliese human factors. Now I would like to ask you a similar question to one that was asked earlier. this afternoon, and tha~t is, don't you feel that this committee would benefit from testimony from those organizatipns which you have listed as being ttwited to participate in the irn~est~tion, and perhaps some others, mt~mifactur~, ai~id so forth, relating to struc- tures, systen~s, and the like, ~ to see if th~y might ha~ anyti~ing to contribute to this que~tion of air traffic safety, or air safety ? * Mr. ALu~N. Mr. Brown, I ~Wott1d i~t be so ~pi~esumptiioüs as to pre- dict what benefit might accrtte to the committee. I make `i~ a practice to visit safety forums wherever they are conthicted, and I have attended them in the past from ~rari$s organizatiOns and ~iidustri~. ~ Mr. BRow~. Well, I wOüiti høp&that the committee and the FAA would both benefit from thi~ kind of testimony, and as the general has testified, the FAA has the opportunity t'~ hear from these people from time to time. ~ However, we don't always have that opportunity, so `I think that some benefit might accrue to us. Let me ask you, Mr. 4ileft, again with reference to the human factors involved here, do you do any ps~çhological evaluation after an acci- dent of the air traffic control personnel, as you do with the pilots ii~ volved in an accident ? ~ ~ ~ . , Mr. ALLI~N. I can't recall of an instance~ where we have conduoted psychological tests. ~ ~ ~ Mr. BROWN. I math that, ~rhen you~aid that you did an evaluation of ~sycho1ogical f~ctdrs, I would presume this ~woul4 iiicludè. whether or not the pilot had ~ somp. reason. to' b~ ie~s th~n safe in flying his airplane. ` ` ` ~ ~ " . ` :~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ ` . ~: * ~ `~ Mr ALLEN What I had reference to in that partit~ilar instance, Mr. Brown, was the number ~ ~thcidents ~ in the past ; ` it has come ` to our attention that the pilot ~s're'ceiving ps~hiatric tr~tment, and we proceeded to that phase of investigation. , ~ Mr. BKOWN. My' qu~stion includes air traffic control personnel and the other personi~eI iuvotved in this whqle fabric of air safety. Do you do any evaluation of `the air traffic ` control personnel, ` whether the guy was at an all-night party b~fore, or anything of that nature? ` Mr. ALLEN. We h~venot. Mr. BRowN. And I make tio implication, general, because ~ I have great admiration for the air traffic control personnel, too, but they aie part of this scheme a~d in some instances have greater control ovei the, circumstances than the individual' pilots' might have. ` Mr. ALLEN.' I tbi~k, sir, that I would `respond `to' that b~fr saying that we go where the investigation leads' us. J~f, `during the course of an investigation, ~e.~fi~deviden~ that this `faótor n'~ight be. involved, we would purs~ it. ` ~ Mr. BROWN. Let me ask you one other question related to a question asked earlier, and that is on the matter of alcohol. In the case of the Hendersonvilie or Asheville crash, how are you , going to' find out if alcohol was'a factor~ DOestl~i~- Mr. ALLEN. Ate you relating this to crew members, sir? Mr. BROWN. I' am relating it to `anybody who `might be involved in the significant safety aspects of this' e ccident. PAGENO="0151" 147 Mr. Au~EN. The only time that we conduct tests t~or alcohol is in the ~L~se of a ~1eceased pilot, ~r~w member,~ a~id. we do not obtain blood samples from people who survived an a~cide~it. Mr BROWN Is there any way that in the policing of J~'AA regula tions, that such fa~tOrs ar~ checked oi~ a regular or ~t~rmittent or spot-check basis~ Mr. Aip~N. I am not sure I understand your question. ~tr BRoWN Such factors as the he~dth factor, po'~sibi1ity cf flying while under the influence, and so forth ? Are there regulations which prohibit this ? . ~ ~ ~ Mr. ALLEN. Well~ the regulation, .1 think, as Mr. Thomas pointed out earlier, is prohibiti~ against flying under the influence. Mr. BROWN. That is right. New, how do~s anyone know whether there are any pilots in the air at the. n~Oment flying under the influence, unless they have a o~ash ? ~ . Mr. Ai.ra~N. I ddn'1~ think that y~u would know, sir. Mr. BRowN. There is no way of policingthis problem? Mr. ALLEN. Poliáing of that particular type of regulation would be a tremendous task. Mr. BROWN. The health factor? ~ ~ . Mr. ALLEN. Their health factor, too; yes, sir. Mr. BROWN. That js a precheck or a postcheck. In other words, that is the pilot's certification program in comthercial airlines, butnot in the noncommercial or the o!en~al. aviation. ~ ~ . . Mr ALLEN %Vell, ~f~'T understand your question coi r~tly, sir, we have had accidents in the past where pilots have suc~cessfu11y concealed me4ical deficiencies during the course of their periodic i~iediqa1 exami nation, and as I understan& it, they are as such, that tliese deficiencies can't be d~tected, and uñ1es~ the pilOt reveals it, ~ou *&~E have no way of.knowing, and th~ pilot will continue to fly with that ~fioiency, until something happens to him Mr BROWN, W~l1, I would like to return to General McEe~ with that safue questiôñ; b~it before I 1~w~ M~. Alien, I would like to ask ~ruc- tural factors Is there a way we c~in build airplanes safer ~ ror instance, w~hen a sthall plane hits one of these )ets tlmt is c~iF~y mg, however many people we are going to have in the maximum size jet, is there any way we can build that big plane so that it will not explode in the air, or will not completely consume itself in flames, whefl It crashes ? ~ . . .. . Mr Ai~r,i~iN Mr l3rQwn, you have posed a very difficult quesiion I suppose you could say that you could build an airplane like an anvil and it ~vc~ouldn't disintegn~te, but then I doi~bt very seriously that it would get off the ground. . . ~ ~ Mr. BROWN. Well, I don't want to build one like an anvil, but I would like one that isn't ~oing to be an incinerator when it lands. Mr. 4r.u~. I rnisun~Ierstood your question. I thought tha1~ you had reference to midair collisions rather than emergency evacuations. Mr BROWN I do have reEerence to midi~ir collisions, to this extent If a small plane brushes a big plane, I would hope that~ perhaps the skin of that plane might be such that the small plane might not make it, but th~t th~ big one would, but I am talking about such accidents as we have `had in the aircraft, or the airlines in recent years, where PAGENO="0152" of ~ state of art, w the control surfaces o~ the aircraft would then lose its c demic whether it crashes as it is, out of control ~nd I just don't believe it i~ Mr. BROWN. Now we Ii engine, and so forth, a~ bringing the plane into a My question is, is there any likelihood of the plane bursting passengers can be reduced by any structurs I only mentioned this because you menti investigation. Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. Well, I think that structures in this ~articular acc as you know, they have to have *e to meet very high standards. rogram of certificating general avia- a medical examination. ~ subject of alcohol, which is a problem, Tto lipe it. We do. have ocoasional. reports from rule has been violated, and upon getting reports; we make an investigation, but it is a very hard thing to 148 Lt might, ae whether or systems e maneuvers. uy,questiQn on we are trying Well, first I rcraft control scherne - you ~ been VE been subjecte~ we are vei icerned about t. mental well-boin they have in the' autho PAGENO="0153" t to ~ a to duty, ~ iat h come 149 . Mr. 13i~ow&~ Some effort. wa~ appaieiit.ly ma(Ie to 1)OliCe the two Navy 1)ianes, to find out about the two Navy phuies, but there is no spot check done of general aviation. General MCKEE. `IOU mean, when we have an accident ~ Mr. BROWN. No ; under normal conditions, routine procedures, occa- sional spot check of either. General MoK1~E. Go up to, say, Mr. Brown flyinga pri vate airplane from Dayton, Ohio, to Washington, and what do you think would happen if I sent an aviation nispector out to find out if Mr. Brown had been drinking before flying his airplane? Mr. BROWN. You do on an airline pilot, don't you? General MckEE. No, we don't.. Mr. BROWN. I thought you had FAA inspectors occasionally ride planes? C ~ral MCKEE. Yes, occasionally ride planes; but we don't go up - LL -i alcohol test. ~. Gentlemen, this completes this phase of the e~that ~u have served the a a little more quickly,] ngress have to go back ~ ye an - for your patE t and )eneu, ana ~s nappening, PAGENO="0154" 150 of the committee want to. thank all of you, and say that I think you have done an excellent job. General Mc1~. Thank you. Mr. O'OoNrn~u4. Thank you very much, sir. The O~I~JIRgAN. That ends this pIi~se of the hearings. Tomorrow morning, this committee will begin executive sessions on other busi- ness. Mr. BROWN. ~tr. Chairman, will we have a chance to resun~e with other witnesses at a later date on this subje~~t ~ The CHAIRMAN. I will talk to you about that. The committee will stan4 adjourned at this point~ (Whereupon, at 4 :~35 p.m. the committee adjourned.) PAGENO="0155" AVIATION SAFETY MONZ~AT, AX~G~1S~ 28, 1967 HouaF~ OF RFAI~RESEN~ATIVES, Sui~coMMrm~ ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERONAUTICS, Co~1Mrrri~E ON INTERSTATE AND FoREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D.C. `flie subconiiriittee met at 10 a.rn., pursmtnt to notice, in room 2128, Rayburn House Offlee Building, Hon~ Samuel N. Friedel (ohair- man of the suboommitt~e) presiding. Mr. FRIEDETA. The subcommittee will be in order. Today the Sub- committee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the Committee on Interstate and V'oreign Commerce resumes hearings on aviation safety. These hearings oorn~nenced earlier in the session by Chairman Staggers, before the full committee. From the list of organi~ations and persons who have indicated their interest in these hearings, it is apparent that there is ~ great deal of concern and effort in the pursuit of maximum aviation safety. The unachievable goal is a 100-percent assurance of safety in flight. The closest realization of that goal is the desire of each one of us who has an interest a~nd responsibility in aviation. lTe have earlier heard from the Administrator of the Federal Avia- tion Administration, Gen. William F. McKee ; his deputy ; and other experts in the FAA. We have also received testimony from chairman .Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., of the National `IFransportation Safety Board and the Director of the Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety. The National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Avia- tion Administration are the two Federal agencies primarily responsi- hie for aviation safety. Safety is their duty every day. It is the func- tion of the Committee on Interstate and F~oreign Oomm~rce, and this subcommittee, to consider proposed legislation in the field of aviation safety. It is also our function to make ~ertaiu that the Fed- eral Aviation Administration and the National Trai~sportation Safety Board are carrying out their present legislative duties in cotnplete ac- cordance with their mandate under the Federal Aviation Act and the regulations issued pursuant to that act. It is apparent that the numerous organizations with interests in aviation safety can lead to some duplication and controversy. Just from the witness list that we have for Monday and Tuesday of this week, it is obvious that there are many separatc interests in aviation which have given rise to associations and organi~at~o~is to foster sometimes conflicting programs. But, I believe that nil of these and the numerous other ones would do well to coordinate their safety e~orts. An increased communication between industry and private organi- zations and the Federal agencies should be encouraged. An example (151) PAGENO="0156" STATEMBNTS O~ CHARLES RUBY, ASSOCIATION; TED LIN~fl~RT, SAFETY DEPARTMENT; AND ilots Association ry. We do, from we get an accomplish- I 1_~ .v can ri of i new and present airports? The best ~stimate from people who are knowl- 152 of this came out when changes in flight training procedures were effected, by the prompt cooperation of the air carriers, the airline' pilots, and the FAA as a direct result of the earlier hearings held by this committee. As we proceed, I would like all of the responsible parties to consider furthwir~g their efforts to attain a higher degree of safety through cooperative effOrts rather than through any single- minded approach to the problem. The organizations which will appear as we carry these proceedin~s forward should cover the entire spectrum of aviation interests in safety. I would hope and expect that individuals who have similar interests would communicate their interests through responsible rep- resentative~ Organizatk!n5. I will have to guard againstundue repeti- tion in oi~der to complete the recordin a reasonbie time period. Our first witness this morning will be Mr. Charles Ruby, president, Air~ Line Pilots Association. Mr. Ruby, I see that you have a lengthy statement and some charts. If you wish, you may `summarize it, and your `full statement will be included in the record. PAGENO="0157" 153 of our summary you w: dules2 train I Francisco is I remembe ment ma r from: `~ passer is toda~ t t tion ~hat~s~. approximatei PAGENO="0158" 154 We are not opposed to adv~ncernent. All we are saying Is that with the apparent increase in total aviation tra~fllt~,, we must come up with a better mousetrap. it is going to take time to do it. The total flow requirements far exceed ou~ capacity now in the high-density areas.. It will get worse, gentlemen, before it gets better. Now we have also gotan werlapping situation in terms of collision avoidance equipment as opposed to the air traffic control system. We and no one else that I know of advocate that the collision~-avoidance system will displace the air traflic control systeni. C olhsion avoidance would simply be a supplement to the air traffic control system. So we cannot under any circumstances consider that we can rest on our oars with the present air traffic cohtrol syst~th and depend on a collision- avoidance device to make up foi~ the deficiencies, ~ Now the collision-avoidance system, which is item 3 on the index on page 1, the present estimates are that thi~ system after it is developed and is proven sa~é will cost appr~xirnately $30,000 to $~O,OOO per air- craft. Now the airlir~es and some of the business aviation can probably afford this có$t. Thl~ dissertation is found on page 1". However, to make this system re~liy do the job that it must do~ we must talk about all aircraft beiiig so equipthent-military, gent~aI aviation, an~d commer- cial airlines. ~ ~ . ~ It goes witho~it sa34ng that gei~rai aviation cannot afford a device that óosts $30,000 to $~iO,OOO. A man cöulcjbuytwo or three airplanes for that kind of thoney. So, we must pi~o~id~ some means of develop- ing a ccvllision avbidai~ice sysC~rn that is either from ~ coat standpoint acceptable to gen~ra1 aviatio~i or provide somç~ means of a lease for the equip~ent ~er ñight-hoür on ait~ as-needed basis. I cjo not profess to stfl~te; `wh~i~h is the more likely or possible solutio~i t~ the problem,. butT ~th~yitigthat you canii~t have a portion of the aircraft equipped ~with co~llithon avoidance system and have full effectiveness from the standpoint `of its total utilization and maximum results in terms of safety. W~ must exert enough effort to develop this system to have it work. This `Is one Of *~ our big rroblerns today. There is no question about it; I ~ thhik every pilot ~itthig~h~ tW ~oôm can' verify this, probably with experieñ~ofhisdwi~afid iirrn~y ~asE~s of rather recent origin. . . . ~ . .~ I ~ ~ . : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~` ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ Also on page ~ t'oferr4ng to tbe ti4nsport aircraft crew require- ments, we have made ~ pre~ntatio~i to the Federal Avbttion Adminis- tra,tion on~ this subject. We h~e delivere4' a copy of a book with a~ blue cover. ` ~ ~ ` ~ ~ (The publication referred to, "The Need for a Three-Man Crew on~ Jet Transports," has been placed. in the committee flIes.) Mr. RUBT. Wehave deliveredoôpics to the Air Transport Associa- tion and th~ Aircraft I.ndustr~ Association ; we are making no secret of our viewpoints. We do *n~t contend that a three-man crew can eliminate all accidents, midair colIisioii~. We are making no such contention. We are, however, stating that we do believe that a three- man crew is an essential element to help minimize this exposure. Why i~ this so~ As we get into high~speed airpl~es that operate short. d~stances, the major portion of the operating life of this airplane will be consumed in takeotF, climb, descent, and landing. We do not have a displacement yet for the see-and-be-seen principle, even though that PAGENO="0159" 155 is a poor crutch. Somebody has got to be looking outside when the weather is such that you c~'ua see other airplanes. With a two-man crew, you simply cannot attend to the inside of the airplane including the checklist items and look out at the same time. WTe are not stating that positive control is a possibility at tins time, because in our judgment the air traffic control system simply could not take on this total requirement because they simply don't have the capacity. So, you are going to have to depend on the see-and-be-seen principle for some time to come. This is only one link of the total chain. We fully expect other segments of the industry to disagree with us, either in whole or in part, but we are prepared to stand up and be counted with. respect to the problem. . Now on paoe 8 you will find a heading entitled, "Communication Fa- cilities and 1~quipment." This also ties in very directly with the air traffic control requirements in this particular aspect. At the busy terminal today the utilization of time on the communications fre- quencies are such that you `simply cannot handle the communications requirements for the total number of airplanes that are trying to use them and complete the communication. For example, many clearances ~vill bg~ issued and the receiving pilot will not be able to repeat back the clearance to assure the traffic controller that the proper airplane has received the clearance and, if he has, that he has received it correctly. Wh~t we are stating is that there must be a considerable reduction in voice communications. This will require some additional research and development tQ reduce the voice communications, and it will re- quire the implementation of facilities and equipment that will provide certain information to the ground controller and to the pilot in the air that does not require voice communication on the radio. Now the evolution of this industry started back in the days when the radio communication was handled by Morse code. You can readily understand that ~f today we were trying to handle communications with Morse code we couldn't handle one-tenth, probably not even one- hundredth ~ of the traffic that we do with voice communications today. What I am now sayin~ i~ that the voice communications have reached the saturation point in the liigh-de~isity areas, so we must develop a system to impart certain information that does not require voice communications. We simply must do this, if we are going to accom- modate the traffic demand that e~ists today. ` On page 9, the heading entitled ` "Weftther Minimums," you will find' a position taken by the member~hip of this associatioti with re- spect to the reduction in operating minimums. They have taken a stand that they do not wish to oo to 100-foot decision height and 1,200- foot runway' visual range at t~is time. They take the strong position that we should stay with the 150-foot decision height and the 1,~l00- foot runway visual range t~nti1 we have acquired enough experience and competence at that setof minimums to then consider going lower. Now why is this a situation that takes considerable time ? Gentlemen, the answer is really quite simple. Tip to this point we do not have simu- ]ation that accurately simulates these restrictions in visibility. I think this is coining, but it is not here as of this instant. Secoiid]y, the actual experience is quite limited, because there are very few times that any sizable number of crews can actually operate the airplane with this PAGENO="0160" 156 e record so far, ~dicates that the ithet""~ power ~h does it cost to get you turn to page is really what Bennett J ~aphica11y alone, to ~ air traffic controi ~tuation. Someday, somehow PAGENO="0161" 157 to become federalists rather than States righters in terms of the avia~ tion business. Now if you ~ drive an automobile today cross-country . you probably violate a hundred laws a day. Why ~ Because every hamlet, county, city, State has some variation in its traffic rules. We simply cannot permit this to develop in the aviation business because, unless w~ have one total system to operate under, one set of rules and one entire philosophy, all we are doing is building complete chaos; and we are also going to develop a built-in accident system the likes of which no one will be able to overcome. Now I have talked to some of the people who operate in Western Europe and the individual countries there are spaced geographically as close or closer than. many of our States, and the conglomerate rules that apply in Europe are one of the greatest headaches. They have finally come up with a device called "Eurocontrol," which is a ` corn- mon air traffic control system which is going to be inipléi~nented,. that will cover the Western European countries. The problem really is this : With the jet transport or jet fighter you can cross some of these countries in less than 2 rninut~s, others in 5 to 10 minutes. It is obvious you cannot have a different set of rules for an operation of this kind, or a different air traffic control system. What I am saying, gentlemen, is that we must have standardization and the same rules apply all over. If we do not, we are missing the entire boat. Now this will take `a pretty bold approach ; but if we are unwilling to take the bull by the horns, all we have done is perpetuated a bad situation which will become worse. So, let us develop a system that applies to everything from an airport on up. ~ We no doubt are going to have to depend ~ on the individual cities to handle their ground transportation problems. Thatis a little diffi- cult for the Federal Government to get into, but you will find a copy of a map (see p. 15) right behind the page numbered 18 entitled "Conclusions," which shows the Interstate Highway System which is a 9O~percent Federal `and 10-percent local government. Gentlemen, this is `something that we are for and for 100 percent. If this had not been started 10 years ago and the accomplishment as it is today, we would have chaos on the ground much worse than we have now. What we are really saying is, that the airpoi~t system is going to have to get into the sam.e bailiwick but more so. The interstateHigh- way System is a shining exanipie of what you are going to have to4o for a system for aviation, and if ~ve do not do ~t this way we are destined for more trouble than *e can solve. ~ ~ Essenti~dly that covers the high spots of the conclusion portion. We could spend a week on this subject. I do not expect to take your tjme or the other's here in going into greater detail, but ~ve will be pleased to an'swer any questions that we possibly can. We have included two previous appearances that deal with this same general `subject, and they `are attached, so that your reference material will be readily available tO you and you won't have `to hunt it up. (The material referred ix~ has been placed in committee files.) (Mr Ruby's prepared statement, with attachments, follO~Ws) 92-715-65------11 PAGENO="0162" 158 TII1~ AIRPOET STATEMENT OF CHARLES H. RUBY, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTEENATTONAL . The Air Line Pilots Association is grateful for the opportunity to appear before you to express our views on matters involving air safety which we strongly feel must be considered if all areas of flight safety are to be improved. We believe ALPA's interest in air safety is well known. It has existed since our organization was first formed which is somewhere in excess of 36 years ago. To coorthnate the air line pilots' activities to increase air safety, the Associa- tion employs a professional staff in Its Engineering and Air Safety Department. We believe "ALPA's Organization for Safety" is well-known on the Congressional level and, in order to save time, therefore, will not go into further detail, although additional information can be readily supplied if it is desired. In the past, we have appeared numerous times before various Congressional Committees on essentially the same subject matter. The statement we are present- ing today is essentially an updating of our previously expressed views and covers the following subject matter: 1. The Airport. 2. Air Traffic Control. 3. CollisIon Avoidance Systems. 4. Transport Aircraft Crew RequIrements. 5. Communications Facilities and E~uipmeiit. 6. Weather Minimums. 7. Pilot Training. 8. The Systems Approach. The Nation's airports have not kept'pace with the public demand for air trans- portation be it private or corporate flying or commercial public carriage It has been estimated that approximittely $ bil1ioi~ would be required to' enabletthis important link in the chain to just adequately meet present requirement and current demands. Obviously this sum of money. cannot all come from the United States Treasury nor can it come entirely from pnivate sourc~s or local governments. To further substantiate our commentu on the need for airport improvement, there is attached a copy~of our olatem~nt to the Senate Aviation Sub-Ctmmittee on May 3, 1966. We are éonvincedef the continued validity of that testimony. (Tue material referred to has been pla4~ed in committee files.) Thefñncling for the airport and its related facilities in all probability will. have to come from a number of combined ~oprces, but it is essential that an adequate system for this funding must be found very promptly if we are to avoid complete ehaQs. Positive action was required to realize the U.S. highway and road building program. Ninety per~ent of th~i.s program is funded by. the Federal GOvernment as approved by Congress. As attached map ~attachment A) illustrates the extent and importance of our highway system which at times required ruthless action for successful implementation. Asimilar apprsech Is needed jf an adequate safety updating of the airport system is to be realiaed. ~ ~ . .. . The airports of this . nation~ must haverunways that will accommodate the largest and heaviest type of aircraft that will be using the facility ip both fair weather and foul within the foreseeable future This means adequate weight bearing strength of the runway surfaëe ij~eif, adequate leu~th with compacted underrun and overrun ares,'thad wilP extuhdbeyo.nd the runway ends fOr a dis- tance of at least a thousand feet. It als~ meahs that instrttment landing systems, including appropriate approach lighting must be ~provided In addition, there must also be suitable terminal facilities to acôommodate passengers as well as cargo and mail. And last but not least, there must also be ground transportation capable of handling the traffic to and from the airport to one or more city ~enters and their environs. This Is all urgently necessary because of the increasing reliance being placed on air transportation as the primary means of moving people and things from place to place. Long-haul passenger trains are diminishing at a rapid rate and the demand fer medium to iong~haul bus service is not what Is oSce was. This leaves essentially two methods of passenger transport: personal automobiles or airplanes, with the time element creating a public preference for flying The fol- PAGENO="0163" 159 lowing is a representative comparison betweeti train, bus and air travel times and costs : . ~ ~ TRAIN ` Chicago-Miami Washington, D.C-Los Angeles New York-San Francisco $48. 32 108. 14 114. 55 ~ 31 hours. 53j/~ hours plus 6 hours con- necting time=59~ hours. 623'~ hours plus 6 hours con- necting time=683~~ hours. .... ~ ............... BUS ...,..~.....,........, ~ .~. ..~ .... ~ .,. ....... -... 1-way fare Approximate time Chicago-Miami Washington D.C-Los Angeles New York-San Francisco $42. 90 84. 65 88. 35 35 hours. 73 hours. 73 hours. AIR . , 1-way (jet coach) Ajiproximate time Chicago-Miami Washington, D.C.-Los Angeles New York-San Francisco $78. 44 144. 11 152. 36 23~ hours. 4 hours 48 minutes. 5 hours 37 mInutes. International surface transportation has lost its attraction for passengers who are turning to flying as witness the fact that the Cunard Line is removing the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth from passenger service by the end of this year. Air freight likewise faces a rapid growth because many items that in times past were normally warehoused are now shipped by air with overnigbt delivery in many cases. As the aircraft manufacturers develop aircraft that are more attractive from a ton mile cost standpoint, the growth of air freight ~an be ex- pected to multiply at a rapidly increasing rate. . This all boils down to the fact that an explosjve growth itt air transportation is not soi~aethlng that is stiI~ on the horizon, but is something that we must recog- nize as being with us now; If this nation is to continue its p~rogress, we must gear o~.ir services to the demand which is already an accepted fáct~ . . . . , AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Air traffic control is the second aspect in this over-all requiñ~ment for ex- pansion of services if any acceptable semblance of air'safety is to be `maintained. The noise abatement procedares are still with us around certain airports and contribute materially to the problems of air traffic control. ` Only recently have the Federal Aviation Administration, `the Air Transport Asso~iation and the A~ir~ Line Pilots Association, reached tentative' agreement on `a standardized noise abatement take-off procedure calculated , to produce ~ the least possible amount of objectionable noise to ~ommunities On the ground, It will, however, -probably' create son~e problexn's in the air traffic control system In terms of routing flexibilities and theeflicient utilization of limited airspace. ~ . Present requirements for 5,000 feet mhiimuiñ separation'. between parallel i~unways where simultaneous instrument ` approaches and' landings are occurring create certain restrictions from an air traffic control standpoint, but this too is the best that can be done at the. present time. This all means that the location of airports must be geographically compatible with airspace limitations and navigational facilities for aircraft using that specific aia~port as well a~ those over flying it. ` ` Much research and development has been done but much more will be required if we are to attain an efficirdit and safer air trathc control system. With the advent of total radar coverage, the enroute portion of the air traffic control system has shown `some improvement over the past few years. However, in many areas of the country this system is now reaching its peak load capacity PAGENO="0164" 160 and, if the forecast of aircraft utilization Is anywhere near accurate, will soon be in a saturated condition. The most critical areas of the enroute functions now appear to be in the hand-off from one fadlity to another. Although many others will disagree, we do not believe that the addition of the alpha r!umerics and altitude reporting beacon can provide as much relief as is necessary by the time it is implemented. These systems to give a perhaps overly simplified explanation of the reasons for this belief, produce on the controller's radar scope light, small block numbers and signals wbjch identify the aircraft radar target. At the root of the problem is the fact that radar scopes are actually cathode ray tubes very similar to your television screens with the aircraft target being a source of light as is the alpha numerics grouping. In high-density areas, these sources of light tend to conflict with one another and may, in fact, obliterate necessary intelligence. There is little doubt that in the future the demand for air service by the citizens of the country will, in and of itself, create press~ure for some reduction in separation between aircraft being flown under instrument flight rules. In fact, such pressures have already been created but `the air line pilots have success- fully resisted efforts by some segments of the industry to reduce separation until adequate safety devices are available. One example of this was the effort to reduce lateral separation over the North Atlantic last year. Another example is the current effort `to reduce separation between aircraft approaching parallel runways during low visibility conditions in the same airport. The speed of today's aircraft, to say nothing of the future supersonics, is such that it just isn't possible to make significant reductions in IFR radar separation and still be able to avoid collisions should something untoward occur. This is due to the physical aspects of the current radar program under which a controller on the grdund must first observe some deviation, then evaluate it and trau~init infer- mation to the pilot of the aircraft who in turn must evaluate it and take appro- priate action. When we are operating airplanes a mile or ~o apart at 150 knots, there simply is not time for two independent minds to assimilate information and take appropriate action. The Air Line I'ilots Association has, therefore, con- eluded `that we must have an electronic or other automatic device which is able to perform the function of extending the pilot's normal vision to a point where an aircraft on a potential collision course can be noted in time to execute an avoid- ing maneuver. The device must provide warning sufficiently in advaiice to avoid injuring passengers through abrupt mane~ivers or~ entering the vortices wake of the other aircraft. In addition to the preceding the Association J~as long reeonunehded increasing the safety alid eflidiency of air traffic centror by more thstkllatións and commis- ` sioning of facilities such as : (a) ILS's, (b) ëontrol zones, (c) control towers, (d) other approach facilities. The foregoing are broad areas each o~ which could be gone into In considerable detaiL No research is required to gain the, safety provided by the preceding items, ` but additional funds are vitally needed to expedite action for installing them. We do not feel that we can stress too strongly that with the increased use of the common airspace by transport and military aircraft~ as well as all types of general aviation aircraft, It is clear that air traffic cotitrol problems and the collision threat are on the increase. Again, funding to make immediate use Of all ~kneimv ways and means to improve air traffic control will help, but fundingfor research and development is also required to complete the job of providing safe air traffic control. The foregoing draws. only a broad general picture of the over~all air traffic control problem. We have not attempted to set forth specifically . detailed solu- tions to all aspects of it for ` the simple reason that no one knows all of the answers necessary to' provide `the solutions. Advancements must come' necessarily through evolutionary rather than `revolutionary processes. COLLISION AVOIDANCE " The industry has spent considerable time, money and effort to try to develop a collision avoidance system. It appears' that such a system can bear fruit in the foreseeable future (approximately three to five years) for those who fly ~nd can afford equipment costs t~iat are estimated to' `range from $30,000 to $50,000 per aircraft. Obviously, such ~ sys'teni is beyond the,re~ch~of the general aviation segment of the indu.~try . with the possible exception of some corporate users of the airspace. Much more development is required-first, to prove the system \and second, to develop a system that will meet the economic level for general ~iviation. It may be possible, once a collision avoidance system Is developed and ~roved satisfactory to wire all airdraft to utilize the system and then rent the PAGENO="0165" 161 "black boxes" to general aviation at so much per flight hour on an "as needed" basis. It goes without saying that ~ colljsion avoidance system must be available and in use for all aircraft if we are to really acc~omplish the ultimate in air safety. &ich a system though must he considered as supplementary to an emcient and competent air traffic control system and not a replacement for it. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CREW REQUIREMENT The Air Line Pilots Association at its November, 1966 Board of Directors Meeting adopted a resolutiou which in the main stipulated that a minimum of three flight crew members are needed for flying twin-engine jet airline aircraft in order to assure safe operation. One of the greatest areas of safety concern is the workload within the flight compartment distracting the pilot and prevent- ing him from. scanning the skies through the windshield to minimize the possi- bility of mid-air collision. In its evaluation of flight crew workload the Association has pointed out that the new twin-engine jet airplanes have essentially the same number of flight controls, instruments, systems, switches, etc. as the three and four-engine Jets which have a minimum crew of three pilots. Furthermore, these twin-engine jets have approximately the same cruising speed and maneuvering speed. Be- lieving the Committee will benefit from ALPA research which resulted in the Board of Directors' resolution on the minimum flight crew complement, a copy is submitted as attachment B for ready reference. Another concern relating to flying twin-engine jets with only two pilots is incapacitation of a pilot due to a number of known causes not necessarily either fatal or of long duration, none of which c~tn be forecast by the medical profession. In the event of incapacitation of one of the two pilots on a twin-engine jet, the remaining pilot may not be able to safely operate the aircraft, particularly when pilot incapacitation may occur undetected close to the ground during a take-off or landing. How to prevent a humanbeing from becoming suddenly incapacitated is something which is not known and which is not likely to ever be. Proper crew complement requirements, flight compartment design and operational procedures, can in combination minimize or eliminate this hazard. Flying as a mode of public transportation which operates In the third dimen- sion and at high speed requires "fall safe" human and mechanical redundancy to provide for an acceptable level of public safety, both in the air and while the airplane lain motionon theground. On June 29~ 19fiT, and Augast 8, 1987, the Association made a presentation to the Federal Aviation Administration on this subject. This presentation, in book form, Is supplied and considered a part of this stntement. We think you will find this to be of more than passing interest. (The publication referred to, "The Need for a Three Man Crew on Jet Trans- ports,~r has been placed In committee file.) COMMUNICATIONS FAdUiTIES AItD EQUIPMENT With the rapid expansion in flying, voice communications have overloaded the available frequencies to the point where it is practically impossible to assure timely communications requirements being accompliah~d between the pilot and the air traffic controller. The foregoing, it should bepoiniedout, isnot true in low density operational areas but Is a glaring fact in high density area~. It Is essen- tial that considerable research and development be . instituted immediately to provide ether means of displaying infOrmation, both in the cockpit and on the ground, Which will reduce demands far voice communications and operational control can be maintained on a safe level by direct reading ipformation air-to- ground as well as ground-to~air. This would leave the voice communications chan- . nels open for the operational areas that require clearance modifications or changes assoclal*d `with traffle conflicts, change~ In altitudes, ~reather detouring and. for thos~oceasióI~wheii radar veetortng may~become anec~git~ As I pointed out in respect to some of the previouS subjects, the foregoing does not represent the entire scope of the sUbje~t but does point out some examples. PAGENO="0166" 162 Taking this industry back to the day when Morse Code was used as the corn- munications medium, imagine, if you will what would have been the state o~ things if it hadn't been replaced by voice communications. If we were still obliged to conduct~our communications b~ Morse Oode we could not accommodate one- tenth of the traffic that is now being handled. Relatively speaking, we're about at the stage we were when Morse Oode b~eame autonloded only now it is voice communicaUon~ ~ whIch are becoming too ` laborious and slow. It is, therefore, obvious that imagination, associated with serious research and development, must be used immediately. ~ WEATIfl~R MINIMUMS ALPA representativesand All-Weather Flying Committee have worked diii- gently ` over~tha ..~ years with induatry: tc~ help e~t~blish safe ~rocedures for ~tab- lishing ~1oWer minimumsc * ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . We strbngly recornthend that approving operations to the lowest Category II minimums be delayed until the Interim OAT II miliimtims of 150' ceiling 1600 RVR have been in effect for an extended period of time to gain service experience. The present FAA minimum rec~uired period of si~ months is considered tota~ly ipadegnate. A more realistic requirement would be approximately two yeara-or more. In this. way publie~ safety would be served~ At its Fotirteenth Air Safety Forum ALPA safety representatives adopted this resolution: Whereas several air carriers have. been ~approved for operations as low as a decision height otl5O feet and an RYR 1600 feet for over a year ; and Whereastlie number of actual approaches.at theseininima have been very few, and little practical exposure and operatienal experience has been gained in this low visibility environment ; and . . Whereas these carriers contemplate further. reductiOn of these minima as low as a decision height of 100 feet and RVR 1200.feet; and Whereas, in . addition to flight operation problems, there exist many serious unsolved problems, such as ATO, trainingycoti~imunications, simulation, human factors, ~ etc~ Tberefo~e, be it . . ~ ~ . . . . . .. Resolved, That it is ~the cQnsensus 01 1thE~ delegates to the ` Fourteenth ALPA Air Safety Forum, that landing operatiot~s with less than a decision height of 150 feet and an RVR of 1600 feetwonid be premature at this time ; therefore be it further ~ . ~ , Resolved, That thedelegatesto `this Forumstrongly~recommend that no' ALPA member s~a1l conduct any approach to minima lower than a decision height of 150' and an RVR at iflOOfeet, at.this time. . . ; ~ ~, `~ ` .. There are extreme hazards associated with premature operatiOns at . low minimums which wakes~t prudept not to hu~rry the acceptance of lower mini niums until everyone is entitely comfortable conflde~t itnd ready ta tise them This will assure progre~~ while th~use of~the available imp~oved*atd~ at present ~~eather miiilmums for an extended pe$od. of time will assure safety and schedule i~eliability. . ,, , ` . .. , ` ~ Probing into the Oategory II area must be done with more safety than hereto- fore, not less. We must have fewer, not more, missed approaches in Category II weather. If equipment and aids,will not pi~ovide this safety factor, we should not be conducting the approaches. . . . . PILOT ~FRAINING ` . . ` : ` ~ . ALPA has long s~ssed the concept~of "traiping to proficiency rather, than checking fo~proflcieney~'. 4~pparent1y~w~ are pot in accord on this i~ia;tter with the FAA who regards recurrent: assessn~ient of an airline pilot's proficiency as being in the public jnterest and essential t~ the proper ~iseharge of FAA's statutory responsibility. Wa do not 4isagrne with this In principle, but rather in the manner ~t is implemented FA~& s fiuieton is to assure safety in the public interest and this can b~ assured J~y spo.t~cbecking and monitoring of the airlines' flight and ground sebeol training prog~'ams. We contend. that this is the FAA and the air carriers' responsibility. by ~egi~la.tion. * . ` Most professional , people In a certain . field of endeavor attend formal aca- deniic courses in preparation for their final examination . or "check", and sucess~ ful completion will terminate their expo~ureto a~y. additional type of "checking during the remainder, of their professi~nai career. They are never reqwtred to again demonstrate the level of knowledge and skill which they had attained at the completion of their training. The professional pilot is unique in that he is constantly reqv~ired, by current regulatory language, to suceessfuUy comp1et~ the equivalent of another "check" or final examination every 6 months for the PAGENO="0167" 163 captain anct 12 months for the c6pllot. The regulatory language should be revised 111 a mauner which will eliminate the adverse psycho'ogical effect created by such a ehe~k' Consideration mt~t be give~i to the number oi~ times an airline pilot is i~equired to succes~ftlly complete this check during his career 1~ or example; assume a pilot jointh an airline at age 23 and is advanced to Oaptain btatns at age 80 If he is only qualified on one type of equipment he will. have completed 97 "cheeks" diiring:Iifs. career. ~ We point out that funds are greatly needed to improve other areas of aviation safety and that the public interest would best be served by so ut~lizrng the money now spent on excessive and unnecessary FAA air carrier flight inspection activi ties We stress this because the next ten years will indeed see great expansion in airline ~perations and certainly it is hot necessary or iii the public inteiest to increase FAA flight thspectlon activities ~omme~urate with such airline in- dustry expansion. We emphastze that the industry requires o~t~y that J~AA pro- ~ ide surveillance and moilitoring to assure that regulatiOns are complied with by the airlines. This procedure is approved~ by FAA aud. i~ sittisfactorily practiced by using FAA deaignees in many other ciltical areas of FAA responstbility for safety of airline `operation, as well as idr~lané manufacturing and jnaint~nance Our position on this matter is shared by other segments ~ the industr3t. Another problem which must be faced is that accidents ~ontinué jd occur during pilot training which shows the need for an immediate rO~riew to assure that this training is realistic, meaningful and conducted without undue exposure to hazard by occupants in the airplane or people and property on the ground. Over the years the ALPA has participated with the industry to provide the airline pilots' contribution in regard to training requirements and to assure that the pilot can cope with normal and expected emergencies. Some progress has been made in updating pilot training regulations recently. However, further and continuous review is in the public interest. The state of the art of flight simulators has progressed to the point where virtually all in-flight emergencies can be practiced and demonstrated in this ground installed training aid. The maneuver to a landing with 50 percent of the airplane's engines inoperative can 1e safely practiced in an approved flight simulator and several airlines are proving this during the current 6-month mora- torium on the two engine out asymmetrical landing maneuver on 4-engine airplanes. TIlE SYSTEMS APPROACH If you were to drive your automobile from New York to San Francisco or Chicago to Miami before the interstate highway system was developed, you could probably have broken a hundred laws a day for several days. Why? Be- cause every Village, Hamlet, State and County had a sizable variance in their local traffic laws. Highway design was not necessarily realistic from the stand- point of accommodating low-speed, automotive traffic, much less high speed. Intersections were loaded with obstructions, the surface constr~uction may have been extremely slick when wet, now warning signs existed in most instances, turns were sometimes flat or banked away from the turn rather than into it. It was not uncompion to come around a sharp turn obstructed by hills or buildings and immediately cross one or more railroad tracks, bridges were commonly narrower than the highway itself, and we could go on and on. To a degree, our airports and related aviation facilites have grown like Topsy, too. This cannot be permitted to continue unless we wish to build-in accidents, inefficiency, general chaos and delay. The entire aviation system must be ~ust that : A SYSTEM. This runs the entire gamut of the industry, starting with the airport, followed by the navigational facilities and equipment, the air traffic control system, registration and licensing of aircraft, registration and licensing of airmen, and, above all, standardized traffic rules of the air, the latter of which, incidentally, should be international In scope by agreement with the other States of the world. The foregoing may sound quite Utopian and it is. On the other hand, If we are unwilling to think, act, plan, construct and implement realistically, then we are, in fact, preparing for calculated chaos and not too well calculated risks from here on out. CONCLUSION The foregoing remarks constitute a cursory evaftiation of a few of the safety problems we and the Industry face in an era of growth which is staggering to the imagination. There are many problems which this Association has docu- PAGENO="0168" 164 mented for FAA and Congress over the. years. Problems in airworthiness, per- formance crashworthiness rescue and fire aeromethcal flight time/duty time aircraft instruments fuel explosion fire prOtectio~i and powerplazits are a few that affect the overall safety o1~ pilots and the flying public Of all of th~ problems, prevention of the mid-air ~Ollisioñ is fór~nost in the minds 0± the air line pilot as well as other pilots and the industry Expeditious solution of this problem mflst not be hampered by lank of funds At ALPIWs i967 Air Safety Forum In Washington June2O-21, mid-air collisiOn prevthtiói~, airport development and pilot trainingwere featured panels. . Panelists were the most knowledgeable and experienced representatives O~ndustry and ~&LPUA. ALPHA shall continue to press fOr improvements in all these areas Many of them do not require research Or develQpnient The ~ol~ttioiis are well known t~nd can be attained at a minimum cç~~ Several sub~eets j~eferred to in this state ment fall In this ~atego~,y Air Safety Is the pri~a~,y respon~ibi~ity of every aii~ line pilot and Is therefore a principal concern of the Air Line Pilots Association The air line pilots by the very nature of their contimlous uaer' experience provide an input of I~nowledge to the aviation Industry w~leh cannot be 4uplie~ted. We offer this knewledge.and experience to your Committee and will be pleased to thipport or assist you In any manner that will accelerate Implementation of the many safety programs we have strived to attain. PAGENO="0169" p-s C) {ATTACHMENT A] c rma tiNt *1 stmaism S lbs tN Gossbs Cs t nsa ~Nt c ITMCa 1St PAGENO="0170" 166 [ATTACHMENT B] RESOLUTION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS I Whereas current trends in . turbinepowered transport *desigii indicate there is virtually no limit to the size, weight, speed or passenger capacity of future designs, and . Whereas the trend in the industry is to fly transport aircraft ~ to ever lower weather minimuws as evidenced by the Oategory II progHtin nOw inaugurated and the planned Category III A and B and Category IV programs and Whereas t~ramc congestioft in the low and intermediatá levels will increase at an extremefr~igh rat~ and ~ ~ ~ Whereas the inadequacy of radar coverage at these flight le~ el~ will not permit reUef ~frcST1 the necessity ~ to . rely on the "see and be seen" principle for traffic and collisiOn avoidance in~t1ie~foreseeable future, and Whereas tile operating experience of two pilot crews flying turbine-powered transports indicates the need for a continuing review of Association philosphy on minimum crew requirements, and Whereas a definite guideline for the. benefit of the aircraft manufacturers and the air line companies would enable them to design aircraft and specifically cockpits to a well-known parameter thus benefitingthe pilots as well as the manu- facturers and aii~ line companies ; therefore be It Resolved, That~t1ie following shall become mandatory policy of the Air Line Pilots Association as such policy relates to crew complement and crew require- ments on turbine-powered fixed wing transport aircraft: :1. That all mómbers of the flight deck operating crew excluding navigators shall be pilots except that job protection may be provided for currently employed non-~llot operating crew members; 2. That all future turbine-powered transport aircraft certificated after the adoption of this policy, excluding "stretched" basic models of turbine-powered, twin-engine aircraft presently certificated, will be manned by a minimum crew of three pilots; 3. The third crew member requirement on present aircraft shall be continped and nothing herein shall prevent the addition of pilot crew members to presently certificated aircraft. Mr. RuBy. Miss~Peterson has a statement that she will summarize. If you have questions on what I have stated, either I or any of the working pilots here will be most happy to try to answer them. Mr. FmEDBL. Miss Peterson, you may proceed. STATEMENT OP IRIS PETERSON Miss PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Friedel. My name is Iris Peterson I am a vice president of the Air Line Pilots Associated Steward and Stewardess Division, currently em- ployed as a flight a~ttendant for a~ large U.S. carrier. * This statement has been prepared fromexperience as a flight attendant, a~ a safety repiesentative for my turline, and from experience in accident investi- gation. In addition, for t~proximately 3 years I have been a member of the Society of Automotive Engineers ~ a flight attendant repre- sentative on the A-200 Committee and in that capacity have con- tributed a great deal of wdrk towaM th~ goal of successful passenger evt~cuation from disabled aircraft Based on this background the foIio~ing statement is submitted in the interest of safety for the airline passenger. The flight attendant's job is multifaceted and has been defined to include responsibility for the comfort, enjoyment, and safety of the passenger. Of the three, the most important element is that of pas- senger safety. Toward this goal the training of the flight attendant is focused and during conditions of emergency, if lives are to be saved, PAGENO="0171" 167 not oniy must procedures be known, but the means must be pro vided for their immediate and effective implementation. Successful handling of an emergency and successful evacuation depends upon many facets. Among others it, depends Oil fire and toxic fumes being kept at a mini- iiium, and there being sufficient lightino so that crewmeinbers can properly use emergency gear. * Sufficient Tighting is also necossary to permit the passenger to orient himself both in terms of danger and in terms of lifesaving equi~pment. Historically, approximately 80 to 90 percent of all aircraft acci- dents occur without warning during either takeoff or landing, with no t illie for the crewmembers to prepare the passengers to survive impact.. Yet, surprisingly, most of the passengers do survive impact, with I he vast majority of loss of life occurring from other accident-associated causes. This paper is directed toward care of passenger and crew during times of emergency and for simplification of the overall aspects of accident survival which has been divided basically into three cate- gories: ( 1 ) Cabin lighting and electrical equipment; (2) Cabin environment as it applies to safety ; and ( 3) Emergency evacuation. Lighting during normal flight can be categorized as the general overall illumination within the confines of the cabin, including illumi- nation of emergency equipment location areas. Light during an emer- gency can be categorized as the amount of light that is "necessary" to permit the flight crew to perform required functions in the imple- mentation of egress systems, to permit the passenger to oHent himself with means of egress from disabled aircraft, and that amount of light that would be required to adequately illuminate the emergency equip- mont, emergency equipment location, and emergency equipment in- struction placarding in order that rapid and efficient passenger evacua- tioiTl would be possible. General cabin lighting needs in the primary areas of the cabin and the secondary areas of the small enclosures or semienciosures such as the galley, closet, and lavatories, should provide sufficient candlepower to permit the reading of instruction placards and to permit vtsual aids in the handling of unlocking devices on all emergency . equipment lo- cated in these areas. ~ . Emphasis isplaced on adequáte lighting of the exit areas wit~h special attention given to increasing that light should an emergency arise. This aspect of cabin lighting will be discussedin more detail later. Area locations for ~mergency equipment such as the slides, fire ex- tthguish~rs, axes, toggle switches for the ~ main oxygen supply, life- vests, liferafts, lifera~ft compartment lock, and frrst aid kits should be illuminated sufficiently to permit rapid handling and use. ~ The sur- rounding area should be well lighted without the light shining directly into the eyes of the passenger attempting to use these items. Yet it should be located between the item and the, person so ~ as to avoid causing either crewmember or passenger' to be working in his own shadow. There should be sufficient ,bri~htness to permit visual aid in handling as well as in reading the operational instructiotis. Regular or normal lighting of the cabin during a routine flight does nOt provide sufficient lighting for~ai~ emergency. Because of the proba- I PAGENO="0172" 168 bility of heavy smoke within the cabin. during an other-than-normal landing, it is felt that consideration should also be given to a low- level mounted dual or multidirectionál type of,light, one that is both self-actuating upon failure of the main power supply and one that can be manually controlled from either the cockpit or ffi~ht attendant area. The light might also be operated from a self-sustaining rechargeable power unit or battery. of a type similar to the present-day recharge- able-type flashlight. This low-level location of light could come from under the seats ~nd could be either of the type mentioned abOve or it might be the new much high~ light le~el radioactive type of light that will be visible at all times. The location of the light under the seat would definitely aid passengers who would be either bending over or crawling along the aisles toward an exit area through dense smoke. These lights, if they are to serve any useful purpose, must survive im- pact and operate during emergency. These lights should be armed to an "on" position prior to each take- off and landing regardless of time of day. They should be so designed that they will operate in spite of cabin breakup. The light available from this source might or might not be used as part of the general overall cabin lighting. However, because of the necessity of light dur- ing an emergency, it should be available. Because of the importance of being able to locate exits in an emer- gency, it ii suggested that action be taken to provide additional light in the exit areas so that the exit will be visible during an emergency in which smoke is pi~se~t rn the cabin. This would mean that there be sufficient light so that the directions for operation of the doors and slides will be readable and that the handles on the doors and the activa- tion levers on the slides would be visible. In addition to the regular light, it is suggested that a chemical light stripping be installed as an outline aronud each exit. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ Additionally, as a further means of identification ofthe exit area, the strobe or flashing light should be used in conjunction with a constant light located at the exit and focused outside the plane when the door is open. It is believed that the passenger, once within visual range of the light, would be drawii in:that, direction. The function of these iights is not only to guide thepassenger. once outside,a~way from the plane, but to serve as a beacon for would-be rescuers. Because of its intended dual function, the light placement:should be such that it would not be submerg~d in ~ w*at~r landing and such th~t it would be above tl~ generalinud and dirl spatter level duriu~ a ground ernerg~ncy. Because of the second ~spèct of serving as a guide to rescue teams, thelight should have a life expectancy of no less than 36 hours in order to cover two nighttim~ periods. These lights could be armed on a block-to-block basis so that if any landing or takeGif were other than normal, the light would be actuated simply by the cabin attendant opening the door or exist. If the plane is carrying an auto- matic radio direction fhider, then perhaps a 36-hour light life is not necessary. Further, it is possible, upon requirement, that the strobe light can be equipped with a sonar sounding. device that will operate if the plane is completely submerged during a water emergency. The ground area at the bottom of the slide should be well lighted to prevent passengers from stumbling on rough terrain and to enable \ PAGENO="0173" 169 them to get away fron~ smvke ~rnci Th~e cb~u~ger zpi~es.. This c~xi be ac~ complished p~rtia11y by the strobe and constant light, and parti ~11y bythe use of a them .. ical light strippiug on t~ie slic~s. AJ1slides should be securely, but not perman~ntly~ anchored to the exits, as they float and can be used in water emergencies as liferafts, If the design of the slides is such that it has to be inverted to be us~cl as a~ raft, then the chemical stripping should be visible on both the underside and . the top. As a matter of standardiz~tiqn, each emergency equipment item, including the slides, that ~ is designed for passeflger use in a water landing should be equipped with ~both a battery-sustained light and the chemical stripping. These items include the liferaft, baby bassinet, seat and seat cushion. Having two systems of light would provide means of backup in case one or the other failed. If the plane does not carry a radio directional finder, then these lights, too, should have a 3~-hour life. * In addition to the above, the cabin environment must be such that both passengers and crewmembers can survive the rather violent kinematics leading to impact and immediate poaterash circumstances. The following suggesticms are made: All fabrics in the cabin area should be of the most fire-resistant ma- terial available. All lighting: and electrical circuits used in equipment storage areas, passenger coatroom, and overhead bin should be so installed as to prevent them from coming in coutact with the garment bags, clothing, and other fabric items. There should be a lifejacket under each seat with a supply of infant jackets on board. These infant lifejackets should be given to the mothers prior to takeoff. It is recommended that a. built-in coutainer be installed under each seat constructed in such a manner that the passenger may enclose his baggage under the seat in front of him. Baggage that will not fit into this space or other specific contained areas should not be in the cabin, Presently, hand baggage is so excessive that it might easily block evacuation. ~ It is suggested that there be no overhead rack baggage storage, as twisting of the fuselage can snap restraining bars and break locks, thus causing heavy cases to fall from the racks, onto the passengers with resultant serious injuries. . It is recommended that a study ~ be made to determin~ a ~ realistic width of cabin aisles in order that there be a steady flow of passengers to each exist. A great deal of effort has gone into the production and installation of the 42- by 76-inch exit to promote rapid evacuation without an equal amount of concern being given to the provision of aisles that would permit sufficient traffic to fully and effectively utilize the large exit. A suggestion is made for a minimum aisle width of 24 inches ; however, it is suggested that so~iie realistic planning be done. It is further suggested that partial seat rowe u~ be installed ad- jacent to the large exits, thus reducing the value of such exits.~ Engineers are busily engaged in trying to design. the fuselage of tomorrow's aircraft in such a manner that even at maximum altitudes a pressure leak will not deve]op to such magnitude that the'cabin pres- sure would rise above 12,000 feet before descent would be made to a livable level of oxygen in the atmosphere. Should this prove possible and hence result in such fuselage structure, then there is no need for PAGENO="0174" 170 the elaborate oxygen system used in the present-day jet, although first aid oxygen-for medical purposes-would still be required However, until such time that the fuselage structure fulfilling the above specifi- cations has become a reality and ~ long as there can be decompi~ëssion that would result in oxygen loss below a livable level, the following is submitted for consid~ration : ~ , There be an oxygen system in all future aircraft similar to that carried on the present-day jets with the addition of a light locat~d in each oxygen housing compartment that will be automatically actuated by the opening of the cômpartmeiit. This light would serve to get the attention of the passenger and would also aid him in getting the mask into operation. It is suggested that a design of overhead racks be such that they will contain items stowed therein during the unusual motion of the aircraft during an emergency landing. Present racks are so designed that blankets and coats fall from them, covering the passengers, thus causing unnecessary and perhaps fatal delays in evacuation. The large exits are extremely heavy and it is suggested that a power type of gear be installed in the opening mechanism-one that is sirni- lar to the power steering of an automobile. Without a power unit to assist in the opening of these exits, it is quite conceivable that valuable time needed for evacuation will be used in the opening of the exit. The aircraft manufacturers report that numerous exits or openings in the fuselage weaken the structure. A means of obtaining the neces- sary exits may be the explosively created passenger egress system. It can be armed by the cockpit, activated by the cabin crew, works with almost 100 percent reliability, deploys a slide as it is activated, can be replaced by a simple and foolproof method, and does not compromise structural or aerodynamic integrity. An explosive-powered implement cuts an exit in a prescribed area, following a prescribed outline, and as the newly cut out exit falls to the grOund, the slide is activated. This system would seem to be worthy of investigation and study. It is suggested that fabrics used for crews' uniforms, both pilot and flight attendant, be made of the clothing fabric that is the most fire resistant obtainable. This is important not only for the crew survival, but for passenger survival, as the passengers must look to the crew- members for directions. Additionally, suchiterns as fireproof gloves for the erewmembers should be considered, as well as other late develop- ments in this area. It is felt that crewuniforth fabric is so important that if need be perhaps uniform ~fabrics should be regulated to the same degree as cabin in%erior fabrics. . Based on the following, suggestions are made for more realistic evacuation plans alid crew coordinatidn : ~ Currently, plans are to have 10 exith 4~ by 70 on a htrge aircraft that is soon tO be in operatio .. n. Also, curtent plans are that the plane will carry ~; maximUm~ of approximately 490 passengers plus a crew of 15 to ~O. Based ~DT~ present thinking and past experience, during an emergency appro~i~mately one-half ~of the exits will~be unusable. Con- sidering this craft and th~ probable availaliility çf exits, this sets a probable number of ~ëvacuees :frbffi e~tch exit at somewhere over 100 peopl~ in 90 seconds.~he 90 seco~id~ mi~stinclude siid& inflatiOn tin~e- ma~imum ~f 10 ~e~ondsçpliis an allowable time Of'5 tO ~ sOconds ~or the flight attendant to get out of her seat, open the dooi ~nd activ'ite the PAGENO="0175" 171 inflation meehanisth, This allowable time will appreeiably increase if the slides are not hooked up on a block-to-block basis. Depending on where the slide is loca ted, it would take an additiohal 5. to 1~., se~nds to get it into operation. This wGuld leave ~ maximum of `75 sé~cqnds for th& aettial evacuation, and a minimum of 60 seconds, necessitating an average rate of evacuation of 1% passengers t~ 12/3 passengers. per slide per second in order to meet the 90-second stafidard. Thisdoes not seem possible. ~ : ~ The doors and slides on this aircraft are designed t~ accommodate two rows of passengers at the same time, which possibly may reduce the number of exits needed, provided the aisle width will permit the steady and rapid flowof passengers to the exits. It should also be borne in mind `in attempting an evacuation in this area, that it will be al- most an impossibility for one flight attendant at one exit to keep two rows of passengers evacuating at a time; As a further consideration, evacuation based on DC-8 tests have shown that it takes approxi- mately 90 seconds overall to evacuate 122 passengers from four exits. As it is possible for aircraft to burn through in from 10 to 12 5cc- onds up to 60 to 70 seconds, it seems that the 90 seconds allowable for evacuation should not be extended for a longer period of time. Per- haps consideration should' be based on a more realistic evaluation and thought should be given to getting the passenger load evacuated in even less time than the 90 seconds if our goal is to prevent loss of life and serious injury. It is suggested, however, that before final approval for the number of exits being made on any type of aircraft, a series of evacuations should be conducted using the FAA recommended per- centages of an old-young, male-female simulated passenger'group. It is further recommended that no employee `be used of either an airframe manufacturer, an airline-except the crew members-or any Govern- ment employees who might be more knowledgeable as to aircraft nomenclature and egress systems than the average passengexs: of an average passenger load. Perhaps in this group there might be con- sideration given to using some simulated incapacitated passengers or foreign-speaking passengers who do not understand English. If we do not run realistic demonstrations, we prove only that a healthy group of industry-knowledgeable people who are ready' to go and are~aware of all facets of the experiment can, on a partial load basis, evacuate the aircraft in 90 seconds or less from partial allowable `number of exits. This proves `little other than that , perhaps we have devised a paper-approved way of permitting circumstances to exist that would possibly Fesult in unnece~sar~7 injury or ` death. It "does not promote rapid nor ~ efficient actual passenger `evacuation during serious emer- genciea ` As a point of further c~onsideratioi~,: may I ~here note that during all evacuation tests that are run t~ evaluate the plane and the potentiM for evacuation, the entire flight crew-~both ~ pilots and cabin attend- ants-are alerted to awing into action ~t a gis~en signal and the entire crew complement is used to run the evacuation proce~drng This is far from fact in an act~ai `émcrgencyevacuation. Byfact, part of the crew may be completely incapacitated and be iii need of assistance thefa- selves It is also possibh~-and has happened on a number of occasions in the past~-4hat fax~ from being alerted ~to act simult~ously, the entire crew was not evexj aware of tho existence o~f~ an ~m~rge~icy n~r PAGENO="0176" 172 of the need for immediate implementation of the evacuation pro- cedures. on th~ larger aircraft of the future, picture if you will, a plane the 1&igth of a football field, tho~h some will be longer, with a wing span equal to the approxirnale width c~f the football field, while the fuselage is ~O feet or more in diarnetör. Then compartmentize this 20- ~foot wide and 200-foot length and you can perhaps have some idea of crew communication problems once the main power supply has been cut, should they tryto coordinate evacuation procedures from exit and off the wing tail assembly. Emergencies have arisà on the comparatively small present-day jet equipment where ~ only a part of the flightcrew knew of the need to evacuate the plane. On the ktrger aircraft, th~ . possibility, and more specifically probability, that a similar condition of emergency might arise in one are~L without being lthowiito all flighterew members simul- taneouslyincreases i~' direct proportion to the increase in size o~ the aircraft. Because of the probability of a situation of this type, it is suggested that a crew emergency signal be installed on all future air- craft. It can be any type Of sund the Government, airframe manu- facturer, or air carrier should want. A signal serving the above function can be and has been developed. It can be triggered from any crew station to sound an alarm at all crew points. it can be radio contro1led~ sonar controlled, or operate on an interconnection 28-vblt closed line that when broken actuates the signal. Disruption of power due to plane breakup would also acti- vate it. It can be operated independently on any of the systems de- scribed above on it can be tied into the passenger alarm system and *be either battery op~rated or operated from a self-sustaining power unit, rechargeable from the main powerplant. A signal of this type would opera~te instantaneously under conditions of emergency when the' main powerplant is inactiv~ated, though it `could be tripped by the pilot so that it wouldnot `aotivate ex~ept by manual tripping. Or~e of the two main functions of this signal would be to alert the entire crew that aui emergency ~had ariseti and that everyone was to leave the air- `craft. , ` ` As a second ftmetion, this signal could further be tied into the open- ing of tiheexits along ~with the strobe andc9nstarit light and with an amplification of tone would then serve as `ant important means of fur- thering passenger exit awareness. The sigiial would automatically stop at those exits that were not open. A signal of this description should, in the opinion of this `witness, be a standard part of all types of futnre `~ireraft ahd should be con- sidered as a "no-go" item meaning that if, on the preflight check of the aircraft it did not work, the trip would be delayed until `the malfunc- ti'on was corrected. The sig'nai `should be armed or set in the ready po- \ sition on a block-to-block basis on each flight segment. Signals fitting the above description are "a~iailable and' unless the \`aircraft of the futtire are equipped with just such a warning signal to alert all crew' members simultaneously of ` immediate danger, it is ~aImost a foregone conclusioii that the aircraft of the f~ure will never `be successfully evacuated. Because of the si~ of future aircraft and the complications of getting passengers froth the fuselage on to the ground, this signal is cori~idered an absolute must.' PAGENO="0177" 173 . You will note that no specifics of evacuation for the supersonic have been given. Due to the structure of the plane and partiou1a~r1y of the wing tail area, and due to the height of the fuselag e frOm the ground, the subject has proven to be too complicated ~ to develop in a statenient such as this. However, extensive work should be done and comprehensive procedures est~biished while remaining practh~able of accomplishment. . In summary, the aircraft needs fromthe flight attendai~ts' point of view are: 1. Provision of adequate and~ dependable lighting sufficient for im- plementation of an effective emergency evacuation system. *2. Passengers must be given effective orientation prior to each take- off wilih possible use of placarding in the cabin interior. 3. The interior design of the cabin and exits must be such that passenger egress to and through the exists is r~ot in any way hampered. 4. Cabin environment sho~ild be given careful consideration. Cur- rently much emphasis is put on kindness to the passenger to the extent thathe is permitted to practice many hazardous pursuits. 5. Cabins must be kept free o~potential baggage missiles. 6. Endeavors directed at keeping fire, lioxic fumes, and superheated air at a minimum should be ix~iplementhd. 7. Flight crews must be adequately protected from physical harm or death-no one else can direct effective evacuation. 8. A crew signal such as describe4 herein should be a standard part of each plane. I offer my sincere thanks in having `been given the opportunity of presenting this statement. Mr. FiuDDEL. Thank you, Miss Peterson, for a very fine statement. Mr. Ruby, you mentioned in-flight training procedures and the use of simulators in some detail. You said that has been greatly improved. Was that at the direction of this committee? . Mr. Ruirr. I can't answer whether or not i~i was at the direction of this committee. The FAA, the Air Trai~port Association, and the re- spective pilots associations. had ~evertti meetings in which~a~ working group was set up th ~try to estt~blish a~ soi~ttion to this pi~oblem, and in fact a working group is still functioning and will continue to re- view and set out solutions to the problems. So, I can't tell you personally ~ whether or not what occurred be- tween this committee and the FAA, because I don't know, Mr. Fiinr~EL. You remember the heai~ings we had after the Delta accident in New Orlea~iis, I think it was at that hearing that we sug- gested:it andlater it became effective. . ~ . ~ ~ . Theother thing mentioned w~s~that this was on a trial basis. What i,s the basis of the trial? What time do they have on. it? Mr RUBY It was set up ~o run for a 6 month period in which each carrier would develop a training program that w~s to be used in the case of the two engines' out on a ` side or a 50-percent power loss on a side, so that this would either be dOne in a simulator or would b~ `done at altitude, and that during the `transftion training for a pilc~t that is coming' from one type of aircraft to another, then the instructor would be permitted the latitude of selecting the. airport `he was going to use, the wind conditions of the pa~rticular~day, in order for the instructor to have the pilot make at least one such approach and 1anding~ 92-715-68-12 PAGENO="0178" 174 But the purpose of t~isw~s~ ~o that you wotild not, through i~he press of time, be con~rônthd *ith ~ttémpting to do this f~rtype-rath~g purposes in the most adver~ ~*~si'b1e condition, beèatis~ `if the pilot enoounters jh'is kind M! situation he is going to~ seleot the airport in whioh he is going to attemptto htnd, whie~h is going to be s~rnething befter than the poorest possible: conditions, suth ~ts 1c~w~ ceilings, slick runway surfaces, crosswinds, et cetera. ~ ~ ~ Mr. FRTEDET~ Wasn't one rec&miuendation a proposed requirement that training flights be kept away from heavily populated areas? Mr. Rm~r. Yes. However, aga~in one of the purpc~ses in going to simulators is because you can do thTh in'heavy populated centers close to the ground and in fact on the ground, and it creates no risk to anybody. Those who are equip~d to do this with simulators can, in my judgment atleast, do ~ better job ; they exp~se nobody in the air, and in a total concept of this thing they have removed a loft of traffic from any airport area in t~rm~ of trainin~. ~ Now those who don't have simulation capability obviously are going to have to do this in the actual airplane and at ~airports tha~t canmore or less accommodate training operati~ns. ~ ` Mr. Fnn~nr~i~ ;J have one other question. As you mentioned, the col- lision avoidance systems are tinder ~tive discussion. Can any sub~ stantial improvement be made in ~hisarea at this time? Mr. Rrn~y. Not on an instantaneous :basis~ no ; because the research and development work has been dOne to a point. Now the actual breadboard `hardware is going to have to `be built and put on a few airplanes to determine if this thing can actuidly work under highS density conditions, `after which then you can start building the hard- ware, that is as an available product. And the best guess estimate is 3 to 4 or 5~ years before you have any `appreci~ble segment of the equipment ~nstalled in `thrlin~ aircraft: and military aircraft. Mr. FRIEDEL. I know `for ft fact we `have been stndying this fOr over 7 years. They'were e ` xperimentingon it 7 years ago in Atlantic City. I'think they httve been slow and l~x on this. ` Mr. ` Rtm~. To be honest *ith you, some `of the best brains in the electronic' field started researching the so~-caiied ~ proximity warning system, and' their conclusion was that you could not build such a device and have it work. Then wegot into the space business and~we can get to the moon, but we still can't land under zero-zero conditions. So, there ar~ a lot of things' that dDn't `really make sense as far as research an'cl development ~rs concerrted. On ~ the other hand, ~ with enough per~e~tterence we ~an finally `aeco rnp l'ish it, I believe. As I said, the best brains in the electronic industry statedno less than 10 years ago that you couldn't bt~ild a pro~imity `warning system that would be successful. Now, there is a device that at. ~least looks like it has the capthility of handling collision av~idance. 1 think at least the airline pilots are much more interested in a collision avoidance systeim than they are in a proximity warning indi~ator. The difference is that the proximity warning indicator can light a light or start a klacker going, or buzzer, and tell you that you have a risk of an accident. or a con- ifict with another a~irplan~. `The ooilision avoidance system i's designed for thepurpose of ib~ing able to~h~ve an arrow show you turn right, turn left, climb or d~~cend.~ Thi~:eMcui~t.ion'is then supposedto elimi- nate your confliot with tbe other~ traffic, `where~ the p~o~imity warn- PAGENO="0179" 175 ing system just tell you th&e is a pot~utia1 accident or conflict. It does not tell you what direction or ~hich way to go. rFh1~s is why I say the airlitLe pilot would prefer the avoid~nce system rather than the prox- irnity warning indication. Mr. FRIEDEL. What aibout the cockpit ? Do they have enough~visi- bility in the present pJa~nes ~ ~ , ~ ~ Mr. Rui~. No. We do not at this moment know how to do. mudh better. You cannQt even see the hemisphere in front of you.. You can see nothing behind you. The cockpit ~ cutoif is a fairly narrow range of vision. It is almost a physical impossibility to improve this. to any great degree. ~ Now there has been some slow evolution in. this and the cockpit vlsi- bility is better today, at least on some airp1a~es, than it was, on an earlier vintage, but you still are quite limited in the angles of vision thatyou have available to you. Mr. FiuEDEL. I want to say that we have our chairman of the full committee with us, and I know of no one who is more interested in air safety. I would like to kno~y if he wishes to say anything at this time. Mr. STAGGERS. ~ No, Mr. Friedel, except to thank Mr. Ruby. .1 re- member when he was before our committee previcmsly that he is a very good witness. I agree with ~him on the use of training simulators. I remember during the Second World War the~ use of Link trainers; and having had some training in them myself in navigation and flying, I know they were exceptionally good. ~ . ~ I certainly agree with you on that. As I understand your testimony, and Miss Peterson's., there is nothing the matter that money, research, and training won't cure. Mr. RUBY. Almost this is true. The cockpit visibility,. I don't know how to cure that one, I will be perfectly honest about it. We can stress improvement, but to get full spherical vision is almo:sta physical im- possibility. On the other hand, it is tru~e that research, development, and money will handle many of these things ip a complete fashion. For example, we know, ourselves, that the airport has not up to now kept up with the design of the airplane. We knowthat if:we had enough runway and enough navigation facility we would eliminate a good bit of the incidents an~d accidents that occur by overruns, underruns, and drifting off the sides of the runways. We `think that the collision avoidance system can certainly be developed. While it is extremely expensive at its outset, sooner or later we will come up with one that works and does the job. This means money, researdh, and development. I agree with you a hundred percent. Mr. STAGGERS.. I remeniber'that following your last appearance be- fore the eoiumittee some changes were made in flight training. Mr. RUBY. Yes. ~ ` . ` . ` Mr. STAGGERS. That was a help atleast. We hope thatithese hearings- that is the reasoi~ ~ they are being held-we hope. they will increase safety for all the people. We are not experts ourselves. We are hei~ tQ g~t ~igge~tlQnsfrcm experts and tp seethat they are doing their job. I thi~ik the FAA is try~n~g to d~ the. job as aU the other agencies are, but they need help and we need to get mo~ moiley for, the ~irports and. for the~ research and all the other ~hing~ that need to h~ ~d~iie. It is a hard thing right now, but we realize the impoi tance ç~f air `safety for the entire public. ` PAGENO="0180" 176 We thank you, Mr. Ruby andMis~ Peterson. Thank yøu, Mr. Chairnian. Mr. FRthnEL. I am going to h~ve to invoke the 5-minute rule be- c~ause we have three other witnesses that we want to hear before 12 o'cloek. Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being recognized under those eonditions, but 1 do understand ~nd will not impose on the time. I would like to~ ask either Mr. Ruby or Miss Pete rson this question, in view of the fine ~testimony you have given and very thorough rec- ommendatiôns, whether you think that either the commercial airlines, operators, manufacturers~ or FAA, are being derelict in the recom- mendations they are making? Do you have a defference of opinion in what you have recommended than what we are trying to do now? Mr. Ruar. That is a fairly broad scope. Of course, I. do not know what their statements are going to be at this hearing, so I would not be in a position to judge whether we differed or agmed, or what. I would say `that in the past there has been what I ~ would classify as probably 80 percent a~eement on even how to go from A to B, and in some ~ ~ses we will differ on how to get there. But generally the objeetives are either similar or the same. Mr. ~ PICKLE.. You are saying thei~ that perhaps 80 percent of what yotL are recommending will be probably what they would recognize as our problems and that they will ~com~end? Mr. RUBY. I would guess this is probably true, yes. . Mr. PIckLi~. Are `either one of you saying that the lighting in the present cabi~ of eommercialairlines is totally inadequate? Miss PETERSON.. I would not say they were totally inadequate, but I would like to se~~ a great deai of improvement in that area. Mr. PICKLE. If we were to improve otir road systems to the airports, and I think this is desirable, what would be your feeling-this would be a congressional determination-if we were to earmark funds under our legislation that would require certain preferences given to roads to airnorts ? Sort of a `~trust fund." Mr RUBY. In my judgment, this is going to be a matter of äJ~oIute necessity. I know of at least one personal exposure and another which has been brought to thy attention, which is the Los Angeles situation prior to a football game, where the traffic was backed up for miles. I myself, out here at Washingtbn National a year ago got out of a cab about a half mile from the terminal building and walked the rest of the way so that I would not miss the flight. So, in substance we still have to look at this thing as an entire sys- tom, and the ground ingi~ss and egress is just as important as the air- borne. ~ If we don't have the whole thing, we have a complete break- down. So all links of the chain have to haul the same load. Mr. PICKLL I assume, Miss Peterson, that when you Say that 90 seconds is needed for evacuation is not enough in the jumbo plane-is that what you were saying? Miss Pi~rsnsON. No, sir ; I was saying if possibM we should reduce the 90 seconds because of the fire and the smoke and the toxic fumes being around the aircraft. Mr. Prdi~L~. This is to be desired, but aren't we almost getting to the point where it is impossible when we are talking in terms of four hun- dred people? \ PAGENO="0181" 177 Miss PETERSON. I am sorry, I did not hear what you are saying. Mr. PICKLE. Aren't we reaching the point where it will be difficult to reduce below . that period of time, when we are flying some four hun- dred people hi asingle plane. . ~ ~ Miss PETERSON. Perhaps it would ; but I think if. we are going to get the people out, it is almost necessary. Mr. PICKLE. I agree with that. Perhaps I missed part of your testi- molly. Did you tell us how we could do that ~ Miss PETERSON. By increasing the number of exits per number of passengers. I thihk trying to evacuate100 passengers from one exit' in 90 seconds when this 90 seconds must include operational time, is not a very realistic number to attempt. I did mention this, you perhaps will recall it, explosive exits.' I haven't delved into it too much, but I do think it has lots of poten- tials. You could cut out as `many sectioñ~ of the airplane as you like and have your slide inflated with the cutting of the. exit. Mr. PICKLE. In that connection, when you say sliding doors, you are trying to avoid this sliding aspect and would prefer an explosive type of mechanism that would open up an exit? Miss PETERSON. There is a need for a number of prescribed exists or exits to be precut in the fuselage for entry and exit and servicing, and so on. However, if itwould weaken the structure of the fuselage too much to have an adequate number to let `the passengers out, then this could be `an alternative. Mr. PICKLE. Thank you. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Devi'ne? Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruby, I n~*iced that you had an air safety forum here in June, your organization did, and you sugge.~ed ` yó~i would niake `available to the committee the results of the forum, especially on midair colli- sions. How soon do you anticipate that' will `be in our hands? Mr. Rusr. That is a fairly thick book. It takes crn~sider~ ` ble time'to assenthle it and print it. Maybe Mr. Linnert can give you an intelli. gent guess when it will be available. " ` . . Mr. LTNNRRP. It is in curprintshop:now. I think,*e c~m bréakit' loose in about 2 weeks. ` ` Mr. DEVINE. Fine. `I am' sure you' redOguize these hearingstoday and those we had a month or so ago were' `pretty well trigg~r~d by recent midair collisions, not only over H~ndersonvill'e, N.C., but in Ohio. Our purpose, of course, is to `receive th~'b~iefit of the knowledge of these people who `sit in the cockpits, and' other knowledgeable people in the air safety field, including the air traffl~ controllers. Now you suggest that something over $~ billion, Mr. Ruby, will be necessary tQ update the airports to handle today's traffic. In your more recent remarks, I think in response to Mr. Pickle, you sug- gested that would i~iclude the overall picture of the airports, such as the road's 1eadin~ to and from, and I suppose baggage handling facili- ties, and evei~ythingelse. Mr. Ruirr. No, it would not include the ingress and egress roads or rail systems. If I got his question correcitly, I thought he was referring to the highway program; have certain parts of it earmarked for this type of installation, such as highway ingress to the airport' or rail or whatever means can be developed to reduce that bottleneck. I PAGENO="0182" 178 I If I read his question correctly, at least that is the way I an- swered it. ~ Mr. Th~vn~. When we talk about congestion, ~ay at Washington Na- tional, I know we have planes stacked, considering weather and `other things of that nature, but the congestion is also' in the terminal build- ing, the airline ticket counter, at the baggage area and ramp. As presi- dent of ALPA and as a pilot, d~ you consider Washington National Airport an area of high danger? Mr. Rtmr. That is a hard' question to answer with a true sense of balance, because there was a period of time in which the traffic con- gestion on the ground was worse tMn it was in the air. By the same token, the Wii~hingtonNatiotia1:Airpo'r~ by size `alone limits the type airplane that can operate into and out of this airport. Now the real answer to `this question goes beyond any specific airport in this respect. There is a day coming, and it is certainly here in a few places now, where someone is going to `have `to limit the number of operations per hour that `any particular airportcan accommodate. Mr. DEVINE. This is your system plan, to federalize rather than "States rights"? Mr. Rtmy. That is right. Mr. DEVINE. Let me put it' this way'. Would you consider the safety situation in Washington National more critical or less critical than that, say, at John F. Kennedy, O'Hare, Los Angeles, or Atlanta? Mr. RUBY. I think one of these pilots flying in and out of this air- port can come closer to answering that on a current basis than I can. Does anyone of you gentlemen operate in and out of this airport? I know there is one that lives here. I STATEMENT OP DAVID J~ONES, UNITED' AIR LINES PILOT Mr. JONES. I' wil1~be glad to make comment. My name is Dave Jones. I am a .TJnited,pj~Qt based here at Washington, fly ~27's Qut of Wash- ington NationaL~ ` `: , ~:; My comment on the airport, to answer your question, would be that the airport is somewhat unique in its traffic pattern, because we do have the proximity problem of the city of Washington and the Govern- ment buildings, and the restrictions that are imposed ~ thereon, and that this imposes an operational problem with certain weather con- diti'ons. ` ` . ` As i~ar . as the' overall s~ety of the airport, I laave no doubt in my mind that it meets. the min~imum safety requirements as prescrib~d by FAA and the air carriers. .. , ` Mr. FRI1~DELØ Will the gentleman yield.? . Mr. DEVINE. Yes. , ` , , , . ` ` ` Mr. FRrEDBL. How does it. compare with Frie~idship Airport and Dulles? , ~ ` . .. . .` . ` ` Mr. JbNES. That is an'~sy comparison. I think Dulles is undoubted- ly one of the finest airports in the country, operationwise and facilities, anciso forth. , `. Mr. FRIEDEL. What about Friendship ? . , ` * M~. JQNE5. I enjoy flying out of ~`riendship and from a pr.~fessional StandpQint it is a, very fine operational airport. * " Mr. DEVINE. As a,pilot I know you fly into. O'Hare and also JFK. PAGENO="0183" 179 Would you consider t&se two facilities . more "hairy?' ~ from a pilot standpoint than coming into DCA ~ . ~ Mr. JoNEs. Didyou say more hairy ~ ~ . Mr. DEvINE. Yes. Use your own term. . Mr. JoNEs. Air traffic controlwise and approach controlwisc, the high-density problems are very similar ~ in all these operations. You have an extremely r~pii4 movement çf events in the coordination be- tween the air traffic control and operating your own flight, so I think they are very similar inthat respect. ~ . ~ Mr. DEVINE. I~ wantøcl tO touch oi~ one other aspect very briefly. Mr. Ruby, underyour three-man crew concept of course I under- stand the position of your organization. I also understand this is the subject of rather intense lthor rel~tions negotiations. I don't thmk this subcommittee should be used as a forum to settle labor-manage- ment matters. So, I am not goinginto that problem. Mr. RUBY. 1 can state without eqivocation that this is not the intent, because normally the crew . requirement is established by the FAA. The mere fact that this particular airplane is coming up for certifica- tion now, and we are not limiting it to any one airplane, we are sim- ply stating., and .1 stated this to the FAA, first we have absolutely no desire or intention to, what some people refer to as, fe~therbed the cock- pit. The professional pride of the pilot is that he does not want some- body in his way that he does not have to have. We are stating flatly that a three-man crew is not going to eliminate all midair collisions. We are ~ convinced that it will help eliminate some, not all. Mr. DEvINE. You made that in your formal statement. Of course, I don't think we should get into that too deeply. I know the 727 at Hendersonville did have the third pilot in it. The BAC-lil and DC-9's, two engine jets similar to the 737 coming up, are not equipped to handle other than two-pilot operations. Again, this is something that is subject to your negotiation on one particular type of aircraft.. ~ , ~ Thank you. S ~ ~ ~ Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. TCuykenclall ? Mr. KUYKENDALL. For the sakeof the record, the answer to a ques- tion that relates to ~ the New Orleans accident and as relates to the simulator in the h~h. hazard area of training, ho..w long have we had four-engine jet airccaft on the .air1i~ies.~w ? Mr. RtJBY. They started in ~95g~ 1952. ~ ~ ~ Mr KVY1UJNDAJL Eight to nine years ~ Mr. Ri~JBY. Yes. ~ S ~ ~ S ~ ~ S ~ ~ S Mr. KUYI~ENDALL. As to yOur knowledge, . anU, I might ask every pilot to join in on the answer ifhe likes, to your knowledge has there ever been a landing of an actual four-engine jet aircraft with two en- gines out, both of them on the same side ; actuai airline landing? Mr. RUBY. Yes. In fact, I can think of one right ofl~ the top of my head that occurred less than 2 years ago in which one engine~ started disintegrating, and it thi~~ bite ai~c~ pieces. i~to the other engine and of course knocked it out, with the end result that the pilot or in fact the crew got the airplane around th~ field and J~nnded.And, at least so I am told, the manufacturer could not uuders'taud how this ~ as done, because the speeds involved at the time the engines began to disin tegrate were below what the~ considered capable of accomplishment. PAGENO="0184" 180 I guess, like the hummingbird, not knowing he has insufficient wing area to fly, flies anyway. Mr. KUYKENDALL. I had occasion `tO go ~ut in a B-25 and have an engine go out while 10 feet in the t~ir arid we circled the field and landed o~i one, and it was not supposed to b~ possible. I was an air cadet at the time. I did not know it was possible. ` Would you classify this particular training procedure in the area of an event that. is so rare that the danger of training is much greater than the danger of the event actually happening. Mr. Rtnn~. I would say that i~a correct statement, but I do believe that in* the present sophI~ti&tted design of airpla~es that it well be- hooves the cat~rier to invest his money in simulators that will do a good job of fidelity and then he c~an train people in things that he would not dare do in the airplane, and you have an end result of a better per- forming crew. Theyare then prepared to handle emergencies that you could not possibly train for in~the airplane, because in most cases you have used the crew in ~the.airplkne up trying to train them. Mr. Kunui~NDAu~. ~ J would like. to ask you, if you will, to help us and this committee in discussing matters of priority. I don't think you have suggested an area here of concern that we don't agree on with you, but certainly here in Government we have to recognize priorities. . . ~ Now you mentioned two ~ brOad ar~s, one of safety and one of convenience. Personally, I am not going to be greatly concerned. about convenience before safety is taken ~kre of. At least the guys whd didn't make the `airplane because of crowded traffic to the airport are alive. They may have been late, but they are alive. So we have a definite matter of priority. ` In the collision avoidance, is any work being done on a collision avoidance system that is not reciprocative ? In other words, one air- plane reacting on the other without ` the other airplane having the collision avoidance? Mr. RUBY. Yes ; some work is being' done in this area, but a ~reat portion of the development that is. being done now deals with the so-called compatible system, which means both airplanes have to be equipped. Now the other problem i~ `a.inu~h more serious problem in terms of trying to do the job, becaus& if you, fOr example, use a radar principle, or laser, or infrared~ the other airplane has got to produce a reflection of the transmitted si'~nal fór,the one transmitting the signal \ to receive the reflection back.' Th~~re are some airplanes that simply \ don't produce a reflective target. ~Thi~ is trne even with ground radar ~ today. I am speaking of the smaller airplanes that in some cases have fabric covering. They don't present much of a radar target. Mr. KUYBENDALL. You are certainly aware of the' fact that recently Orly and Le Bourget have closed' both airports to afr~raft other than those that have two pilots and compatible electronics, but by the time they got ready to make this decision they had satellite fields equipped with ILS, and so forth. I think we must recqgnize the fact that private aircraft~ at least the smaller `ones, are going to be a long: time coming with any kind of ~ollision avoidancee device. For this reason, I was hoping when you ~aid there is work being done, thaton~, of our goals would be a colh- ~ion avoidance device that would not require reciprocation. Because, PAGENO="0185" 181 after all, if you have two' airplanes, only one of thernhasto avoid the collis~ion, only one of them has to turn to. avoid a collision. I would hopethis would be in this area. ~ Would you get for us, ` for the record, .: the tot~1 amount of ticket revenue in the United States for c1om~stic flights ? Could you get that figure for the record? ~ ~ . ~ . . ~ . Mr. Rim~r. I don't know, but I think `the ATA would have this more ready available than we would,: Mr. KTJYKENDALL. I want ~ to be sure we have this. I think we all recognize the fact that~ this system similar to th~ trust fund of the Interstate Highway System is probably gQing to be our only answer, and some sort of revenue production from ticket sales would have to be probably the answer to it. ~ ~ ,~ Mr. FRIEDEL. I want . to thank y~u- ~ ~ Mr. DEviNE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Brown came back here for these hearings. If we are going to sacrifice the meetings for a 5-minute rule, there is no use having any hearing. Mr. Brown came by. He is not a member of thesubcommitte~, but he is a member of the full committee. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, do I understand; then, that my trip to Washington was futile in terms of participation in any way in this hearing? Mr. FRIEDEL. I don't think your trip is futile. Mr. BROWN. I certainly came back for this `purpose and this pur- pose only.* Mr. FRIEDEL. This is a subcommittee hearing and only members of the subcommittee and the two ranking majority and minority mom- hers are allowed to ask questions. Otherwise, it would be the full com- mittee. Mr. Di~vINE. We are here for one purpose. Mr. FRIEDEL. If you have any questions, you may present it to one of the members. Mr. BROWN. I have three pages of questions written down so far. Mr. FRIEDEL. We have many witnesses and we are going to meet this afternoon and we are going to meet again tomorrow morning. Mr. BROWN. With these particular witnesses, Mr. Chairman? Mr. FRIEDEL. No other than subcommittee memb~rs can be heard in asking questions. * Mr. Di~vINE; ~ LOt usnot sacrifice the witn~s~s. Let us keep on with Mr. Ruby until we have exhausted our own questions. Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. FRIEDEL. You can't do that, I am sorry. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask questions through you or another member of the subcommittee? ~ Mr. FRIEDEL. You can ask questions in writing and we will submit them to the witnesses and let them answer them for the record. Mr. BROWN. But they can't be followed up. Mr. FRIEDEL. We don't have time for it. We have other witnesses. The meetings~are only this~morning,~ this~ afternoon; and' tomorrow. Mr. Bi~owN. You have no objeetiou to my listening to what they say? Mr. FRIEDEL. None whatsoever. That is why I suggested your trip was not futile. If you want to submit the questions in writing, I will submit them and have them included in the record. Do you want to be heard again? PAGENO="0186" I 182 Mr. Th~VTNE. Yes. Mr. FRIEDEL. I have one question. You were speaking about the federal system approach. You would like to see a federal system instead of States rights. Do you find different limitations as to ap- proaches to different airports ? Doesn't Washington National have only two corridors ? Is there any restriction at Washington National? That is the first question ? Mr. RUBY. Yes, there are restrictions at Washington National, as there are differing re~trictipns, at other airports, some ~ of which at least are set up by local authorities. It has only been recently that the Federal Aviation Adrninisti~ation and the Air Transport Association and the Pilot Associations have r~ched an agreement for a standard~ ized noise abatement take off procedure where noise abatement tak~off proceduers are required. Now this, ~ if we finally accomplish this, will be a great step in the right directi9n, because we won't be having pilots trying to accommodate to a different rule at each airport which involves a different type of flight technique, * either on takeoff or landing. If we do not sti~ndardize these things, we are simply building in trouble thatthere is no solution for. If each town or each State or-as I say in Western Europe, each country-has a different set o~ rules, you. finally bog it down where you can't operate or, if you do, operate with a risk element that is far too high. What I am rally saying is the nec~s4ty for standardization. I don't see how this can be done on a State-by-State basis ; that is what I am s~tying, from a practical standpoint. ~ Mr. Fim~nTEL. This is clone forsafèty reasd~i~ ? Mr. Runy. Right. Mr. FRIEDEL. And for noise abatement. Do you find any different regulations in takeoff and landing ~t the~ New York airports? Mr. Rum~. Yes; beèause where the Port~Anthority, for example, in New York deals with Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark, they cati establish what i~ required by them at those airports Then we will assume , that soth~ particular : city h~s ~ an airport someplace else, whether ~it ~ Los~ngel es ~ Sai~ ~`ratieisco, th~y ~an set up ruled that they:w~tnt to apply to their ~aiirp6i~t. If they th~i tell the air car- rier, "We are gOing t~ caiicel~your Tea~veif you do not~dd as we say,'! then what is the air carrier to do ? He has no alternative btit to con- tinue operation and say t~ the pilot~ "Yrni ck~ it this way or we get thrown out." ~ ~ , ~ ThIs i~ aplace where we rebel in i~o. smalI~fa~hio±i~ because we simply are not going to go out and take undtie r~sk~ ~ accommodate ~a io~cal situation if in fact their proposala~ t~d howi to, do it gets into the undue risk level This is why I am saying we must have some stand ardization on an ov~raIFbasis. Gentiemen,*by .~ negotiai~ioi~is this is go~n~ to have to apply world~4ile, as ~ per~onally have be~n shook up ~ a couple of times on `i takeoff otit of London, I suppose because I know enough to know whew to be ~cared ~nd I w~s a bit ~ shook ~rp I just don't go for this. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ Mr. FRn~DEL. Are the restrietloiis severe in LôndÔh? Mr. ~Rmñ'~. Yes; theyare. They ~ire.~juith ridictilnous in sortie part~u- Tar dir~ctkns. You take off with ali. airpThne that is loaded to the gunwales because it is going across the North Atlantic, and you are supposed to take the airplane off, make an abrupt turn, reduce power PAGENO="0187" 183 and still fly this' monster' with all this load. You simply cannot defy the laws of gravita'tioia to that extent `and expect to survive. , ` Mr. FRIEDEL. Those restrictions evidently are for noise abatement, not for safety. ` ` ~ Mr. Ruwr. That is exactly it ; they are anything but safe. All I am saying is `that we simply are not going to buy this ; we are not going to be out here in the business of killing ourselves and people who ride with us, plus those on the ground. , ` Mr. FRIEDEL. Do you'have any restrictions over Friendship that you knowof? Mr. Rur~y. No. . . ` Mr. `FRIEDEL. Do you have, any restrictions over Dulles? Mr. RUBY. No ; i~ot to my knowledge. These,. gentlemen who are fly- ing out of there can verify this. ` . ` ` . Mr. JoNEs. No restrictions at Dulles or Friendship. Mr. FEiEpEr~. Mr. Pickle ? ~ Mr. PICKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the pilot in the audien~e, Mr. Jones, this question. I have had different pilots on occasion make the statement to me that we ought to have a national campaign that says "Don't fly to New York." I know my friends from New York would not like this advertisement, because New York is one of our great cities and ~t is the heart, of a great amount of our business and our recreatloimi visi- tation. The point was that most of our airport congestion, ti lot of it, is caused by the fact that congestion is, created. at either Kennedy or La Guardia, that once it bogs up There, there is a natural flow, all over the United States and you never catch up. ` , " In my judgment, most `of the congestion is caused by the fact it is so intense in New York' that this affects Washington, this affects Atlaiita, this affects Dallas, Chicago, and so forth.. Is there substance to. this? I am not being critical in asking the question, `but is this, not a funda- mental problem ? * . ` ` ` ` ` , ` ` ` . ` ` ` Mr. JONES. I think it is definitely a problem. I think, it relates to~a comment made earlier by Mr. Ruby on, the, proximity' ofairports, and getting the over-all' plan, the system pian. Of eoui~se, the three-airport operation at New York `City is a part of this, and it. undoixbtedly, is a large , oon'tri~uting factQr. As to how it affects the' air traffic out of Washington or Cleveland or any other traffic going toward New York, your observation is correct hi that. An' overflight J~rom Washington to Boston would be affected `by it. I believe it relates to the over~all system problem as Mr. Ru'by:p~ointe.d out. , ` ~ ` . ` ` ` Mr. PICKLE. Thank you. I would like. to ask' ou~ `more question to anyone. I believe under present regulatLons a pilot coming into a reg~ ular airport can land under VER' conditions. This r~ile `was established, as I understand it, rn earlier days primarily~ for pilots `who could not land on instruments and it was an accommodation t~ them as much as anything else. ` ~ ` ` Now we have ` reached a rather sophisticated' stage in our flying. Should we abolish V~R and require that a pilot must. come in on IFR? Mr. RUBY.' You can't do it for one reason at.least, The air traffic con- trol system `cannot accommodate the demand. If you had every airplane that was available to fly `today that' wanted to fly, the air traffic control system simply could not accommodate them. PAGENO="0188" 184 Again, we should not be dassifi~d as having conflicts with general aviation. We don't. General avia~tion wants to fly in any airport. You can't blame them for that. All we are saying is that you should not put a student driver out on the expressway at 5 o'clock in ~ the afternoon with an automobile that has not got all the acoutrements it takes to drive on an expressway. Mr. PIciitE. Are you saying that the plane should have IFR equip- ment even though you permit them to land VFR? Mr. RUBY. If you are going into high density operation, then you should operate all of them under the same rules. That is what we are saying, under control. Mr. PIciciE. I won't ask further questions in deference to time. It seems to me when we are faced with the prc~blem of determining what aircraft can use the big airports that are so congested now, at what level you cut them off, what level you let them cOme in, it seems to me their ability to meet a minimum safety requirement is probably the best test we could use. Mr. RUBY. I would not disagree with that, because this is probably the only rule of thumb you are going to be able to start out with to develop it. Mr. DrivINE. Mr. Ruby, we~can't lose sight of the fact that there are over 100,000 general aviation aircraft and less than 2500 commercial aircraft. We of course can't exclude all the folks for a benefit of a few that make money in an operation. Mr. RUBY. I am not proposing that. Mr. DEVINE. Again we must weigh whether all airports may be in- volveci in this. I would like to get into a specific case. I have no intention to em- barras~ anyone. The pilot I make reference to did a magnificent job. I would like to ~kyou as representatives of your association how this situation developed. Irefer to wh~t ha~ppened in my own community in Oolumbus, Ohio, on tl~~ Fourth of July when a TWA 707 pilot brought dawn his aircraft with a load of passenger's at Don Scott Field with ~a 4,4OO-fo~t runway, thinking he was landing at the Columbus International Airport with a 10,700 foot runway. He landed and did a beautiful job. Now wi1~b allithe sQphist4ca'ted. e1ectronic~ d~vice.s a~d equipment in aircraft and on the ground, how could a situation like this occur? Mr. RUBY. It occurs in rare instances. Unfortunately there `are cer- tam geographical situations in which an airport can look identical to another airport. I must confess that in years past I have had to look twice, myself, to keep from getting on a wrong `airport where they were not geographically spread a great distance apart. In recent times those who ~re equipped with ILS that is operative caneasily avoid this. But I flatly state it can happen `although it hap- pens very rarely. That is not the only time it has happened either. Mr. DEvINE. `Do a~y of the pilots here have a comment on a situa- tion~ such~ a's this? This particular pilot brouglt. it in in good shape and had some runway left. Theoretically, I think a 707 is not sup- posed to stop in 4,400 feet. Mr. RUBY. It is about the maximum or I should say the minimum length runway you can get a*ay with, if everything is done up to ~nuff. PAGENO="0189" 185 Does any one.haye a comment? Mr. FRI~L. They don~twant to try it. ~ . Mr. DiVINE. Let us g~t into another area. Mr. Euykendall touched on this. A lot of people have the mistaken belief that the black nose on. the front of the aircraft is radar for. everything and not just con- fined to weather radar. Is your answer to Mr. Kuykendall the fact that it will not pick up other approaching aircraft or objects because it is not equipped to do so, that they don't throw enough target back? What is the answer to that? Mr. RUBY. There are two answers to it. One, it is a weather radar. That Is its primary purpose. But the ~ergy cone thatis transmitted by C band radar is a 7½ degree cone. On X band radar, it is a 3~t/2 degree energy cone, As the antenna rotates it ~s sweeping with either `T1/~ or 31/2 degree cone. Any airplane that is any distance away, the slight tilt of the antenna can completely miss that airplane. So it will not show up as a blip on your radar scope unless perchance you have your antenna tilt set where it will pick up. this other airplane, and then the blip is mighty small. You have almost got to know what you are getting a blip from before you know you are getting it from another `airplane. Mr. DEVINE. Do you know whether radar research is moving in that direction where they will have a cofte type that will detect other air- craft in the area ? I recognize the closing speed of the jets. Mr. Rtm~. Unfortunately there is not much point in going into this type of collision avoidance system, because you are vulnerable to collision from aircraft below you, above you, behind you, on the sides, and the nose type of antenna system simply cannot deal with any- thing that is behind you or below and behind or above and behind. `So there is no point in spending money on researching that for collision avoidance purposes, becatise you have to cover practically a sphere instead of a limited hemisphere in front of you. Mr. DEvINE. I have one other question. Again maybe some of the pilots here can answer this. Do you consider the noise abatement regulations at Washingtoii National to be. a safety hazard? Mr. Ruer. They were. These boys that fly out of here are certainly better qualified than I to answer it. 1 state at least on climbout, to try to follow the river, with a nose that has the entite ground mass hid- den from view, this is a tricky operation. If any of you fellows would like to coinmenton that, you may. Mr. DEVINE. They fly the river course both north and south to 1,500 and level off until they are 10 miles out. What is the regulation here? ~ Mr. JONES. There has been a recent change in it. One of the things that we the pilots were glad to see was an ability' to clean up the airplane and get it into flying speed rather tha~ keep the airplane dirty, so to speak. This was alargeirnprcweinenti; My, `criticisn~i of thesystem now -~.vould be that we htwe to loaf for 10 miles under the preseiit poli~y, regardless of ~the altitude attained, we are to fly at redttc~d thrust until 10 miles from the airport. We may have attained 5,000 feet, but we are going tokeep it quiet out over the woods out there anyhow. Mr. DEVINE. Do you consider this a safety hazard? Mr. JONES. It is not a safety hazard per so, but generally speak- ing any reduction in `thrust is going to reduce' the ~performance of the aircraft. PAGENO="0190" 186 If you take off, as I did the night before last, with thunderstorms and potentia1~ turhu1en~e facing you immediately after takeoff, it could be a hazard because of the speed~ Mr. FIUEDEL. Mr~ Kuykendall. ~ Mr. KUYKENDALIJ. For the sake of the record-and this is to Miss Peterson-may I suggest that the recorder check carefully her use of the word "possibility" throughout her testimony when the transcript said "probability." You interchanged thesetwo words throughout your testimony. This can make considerable difference in our reading the testimony. There is a lot of difference between possibility and prob- ability. I believe you interchanged the two words throughout your testimony. ` So, will you and the ~ reporter check this out to be sure that your meaning is 4~1earhere? Miss PETI~RSON. Yes. ~ Mr. KTJYKJ~NDALL. Following up on the radar, Mr. Ruby, what is the timing of a revOlution of a typical radar weather cone ? Mr. Rur~y. At the moment I have forgotten. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Approximately? Mr. ~ RUBY. If I remember right, it is somewhere in the order of 15 to 18 revolutioi~per minutes for the entire rotation and, of course, the insulation bkmket on the bulkhead bloeks off a portion of it, so there is nothing happening. Mr. KUYKENDALL. So WC are saying now at a closing speed of two head-on aircraft at 1,200 miles per hour, which isabout 11,4 miles in 5 seconds, it means these airplanes from the time you left him on the sweep until you got bac1~ to him on the sweep, you could very well have gone 3 miles toward each other? Mr. Euwi. Yes, because in the first place the weather radar is not a continuous energy flow ; No. 1, it is pulsed at the rate of 400 pulses per second in order to get high-energy output. This is a constant 400 pulses per second flow out of th~ antenna, but it is in a rotational sweep at the same time. Mr. KUTKENDALL, The point I am making here isto show, by talnng your testimony, . that ~ the typical ~ old-fashioned-type radar simply would not serve ~t all at the rate of closure and time, `and that is one typical reason it will not serve. Mr. Rui~y. It will not. Mr. KUYItENDALL. The typical old-fashioned radar operation will not servethis purpose? Mr. Rtrny. Na Mr. KUYKENDALL. Second-I have called it profile radar which would givG `the elevation-what is your t~rm for the new gadget that will.give not only. the location `but the altitude ? What is your descrip- tive term for this system ? Alphanumeric system? Mr. Rui~r; The alphanumerics by itself is not technically ` what we are talking airóut today because the altitude ~nooc1er is taking a traxis- miitted signal from the airplane `that is read off the altimeter and it is printing that on the videoscope in terms of altitude that that air- plane is flying. Mr. KUYKENDALL. You~said something a while `ago that really leads us here tO take `a new look at a lot of the testimony that we have had. We have been led to believe by a lot of' the former testimony that this system of the altitude on the radarscope was an answer to a lot of questions. PAGENO="0191" 187 I had questioned in .my own mind sorn~thingyqu broug1~it upa few m~meMs.. ago, and that ~ is. ti~t in tI1e K ., ew~edy are.~; let us say, this screen would be so cluttered that you could not read any of it. Mr. RUBY. This is exactly what I had reference to. The size of the scope face, whioh is the video tube, has to keep increasing in size in order to accommodate the total number, of airplanes that can be pro- vidiug the a1phanume~ics information on the scope. Now if you get so many together, they will begin to overlay each other so that you cannot read any of them. There is only one solution to that. That is a huge scope. And those get a little hard to handle from a technical standpoint. But a small scope can clutter so badly that you cannot read anything. Mr. FRIEDEL. Don't they have large scopes in the towers? Mr. RUBY. They are installing larger.soopes. What I am really say- ing is if you take New York, for example, three airports, brother,you are going to `have some trouble keeping this stuff sorted out where you have radars picking. up this stuff for the whole area shore of encoding, so that the receiver, for example, that is picking up Kennedy informa- tion is not picking up Newark and also La Guardia. But then when you do that, you run the risk of getting `conflicts that are unacceptable because the man who is dealing with the Kennedy scope is not aware of an overfly of a fellow from the La Guardia or Newark scope. What I am saying is that in a muitiairport system, to keep them sorted out and separated, you have to have one scope that covers the whole area. Mr. KUYKENDALL. We have gotten the illusion here of a slight panacea that maybe we are too optimistic on. Mr. RUBY. All I am trying to do is put in a word of caution and let us not be overly optimistic on something that will not do the job with real high-density traffic. ~ Mr. KUYKENDALL. Do all of the major airports such.as Washington National have backup power sources and. backup facilities or equip- ment for their radar ? We have had a couple of instances, I believe just this year, of radar failure in the Washington area. Mr. RUBY. I can't answer that per Se, airport by airport. I think most Of the FAA facilities, and the~y are better prepared to answer this question than I, do have `backup power sources. For example, if an antenna system becomes inoperative, there is not a standby antenna system, `at least not `to my knowledge. Mr. KUYRENDALL. Lastly, the North Carolina,, accident, of course, from what~ we know about it we know they `` were outside the surveil- lance radar ooveri~ge, and `I was told by a gentleman from FAA, either General McKee or one of `his assistants, that the surveillance radar installations are now down to airports of approximately 65 transactions a day Would you feel that. the lowering of this ~ppreciahly down to maybe 25 transactions a day for the installation of surveillance radar would be an appreciable addition to safety? Mr. RUBY. I can't answer that off the top of my head except' in a speculative way. This is really not total speculation. Anything that we do that will afford radar surveillance will help. But bear in mind again some of the small airpl~nes do not present a good radar target. So without a transponder, `it is possible to have certain airplanes in the air that the ground radar won't see. PAGENO="0192" 188 Mr. KUrKENDALL. Mr. Ruby, as the good politician that you are, and we try to be, we seemingly, all of us, continu~l1y skirt around this business of general aviation because of the nun~bers that Mr. Devine mentioned. I am wondering if you are not going to have to face up to some alter- native to accommodate this problem and yet recognize the fact that the vast majority of our aircraft are in the field of general aviataon. Mr. RUBY. Yes, there is a large number, there is no question about that. In a discussion with the Administrator the other day we were posing the question, should we not try to again institute a research program to see if we could find some device that can be cheaply installed on general aviation aircraft that will make them a good reflective radar target without their having to' go to the expense of buying transpon- ders. We realize that they can't afford transponders. But if there were some development that could be' forthcoming that would provide a reflectiOn capability that was relatively theap to buy, then this would serve the purpose of making them easily deteota)ble on the ground radarscOpe which they are iiot ño~. So, I am not now really classifying myself as much of a politician. Mr. KtTYKENDALL. I ëlasthfied you as a pretty good One. Mr. Thjir~r. On the technical side we have to find a better mouse- trap. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Thank you. Mr. FiuEDiri~. Thank you, Mr. Thiby a~d Miss Peterson. The meeting is recessed until 2 p.m. today at which time we will hear first Mr. Victor J. Kayne, vice president, policy and technical planning, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association. Then the next witness will be Mr. Stuart G. Tiptoh, president of the Air Transport Association. ( Whereupon, at 12 :05 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.) AFT1~fl REC1~SS (The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Samuel N. Friedel, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.) Mr. FRn~DEL. The subcommittee will be in order. This is a continuation of the hearings we had this morning with re- ference to air safety. Our first witness this afternoon will be Mr. Victor J. Kayne, vice president, policy and technical planning, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association. ,` Mr. Kayne. STATE1VIENT OP'VICT'OR r. KAYNE, VICE P~ESIDENT, POLIcY AND TECHNICAL PLANNING, AIRCRAPT OWNERS & PILOTS ASSOCIA- TION; ACCOMPANIED BY ROYS C. ~`ONES, DIRECTOR, AIR TRAPPIC CONTROL DPIEARTMENT Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. ICayne, I understand you have a lengthy state- ment' and we have quite .a few more *1~n~ss~s. If you could try to con- dense or summarize it,, your full `statement would be in~luded in the record. PAGENO="0193" 189 Mr. I(A~Ni~. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will endeavor to do that. I am accompanied by Mr. Roys C. Jones, director, air traffic con- trol department. I might state that Mr. Jones and I both are acti~ pilots. We both are ox-air traffic controllers having spent some years with the Federal Aviation Agency and its predecessors before going with AOPA. Also, Mr. Chairman, I wish to apologize for the fact that we were not able to furnish the committee with advance copies ofour statement due to the short notice. We just finished them up Friday night or early Saturday morning. Somewhat to our embarrassment, I have just discovered that some of the copies that were made available here were improperly collated. I think we have a sufficient quantity so that if you do find a deficient copy, there are others available. We did find some that had a page missing or others with extra pages in them. .1 do apologize for that. Mr. FiUEDEL. Be certain that the statement for the reporter is complete. Mr. KAYNE. Yes, sir. I checked his first. Mr. Chairman, before I started into AOPA's statement, I want to say that after listening to Captain Ruby's statement on behalf &f the Air Line Pilots Association this morning, I think that Captain Ruby made a fine statement, and he made a nu4er of poh~its that ~ emphasized the fact that all pilots, whether airlin~ pilot~ o~ ~ei~ral aviation pilots, have. safety as a common.objective. I want you to know that AOPA would support the maj~rit~r.pf the statements made here by Captain Ruby this morning on behalf of the Air Line Pilots Association. . I am going to skip over the first part of my written testimony in the mte~st of expediency, which details the nature and scope of general ~a~iation,how many airplanes we have, how many pilots and how many hours we fly, and how many airports we use. That will show in the record, I am sure. So I will just pass that, to help conserve time. I would like to proceed to page 3 of our testimony. This deals with accidents and the safety record. This is a ~fety hearing. General aviation last year suffered ovØ 5,000 accidents, according to the figures of the CAB. We did want to point out t~hat the so-called accident is something that causes $800 or more worth o~f damage to the aircraft, and for airplanes that cost $30,000 and upward quite fre- quently this is nothing more than a minor ini~iiap that you could compare to a dented fender on an automobile. It is quite true that, of the total numl~r of a~idents, we had 538 fatal accidents. These resulted in the dea~s ~, ~1,069 peopIe~ That included passengers and crew fatalities. . . .. Frequently we do find the general aviation fata1f~sy .recQrd bthnt ~n- pared with that of the airlines. But. also quite fque~tI~ ~e flir~.that. the aij~ljne figure includes only pasaeii~rs. It does n~ ~n~lude crews, training flights, peQple killed on th~5 g~q~d and so ~ $~.when you take the total figure for each, you will ~ I ~ that the corn- parison is not a bad one. ~ ~ . The total general aviation rate for ~ in 1966 was roughly ~5 per 100,000 flying hours. This is the b~ i~rd to date for geAeral aviation and compares with higher rat~ ~uu~i~g up to 45 per 100,000 flying hours in 1951. . 92-715----68--.--18 PAGENO="0194" 190 Also, we have cornputed,based on the figures provided by the CAB, our fatality rate for each 100,000 flying hours, the number of people killed per 100,000 flying hours, and we find that for general aviatiOn this again was at an alitime low in 1966 with 5.085 per 100,000 flying ~ hours and was lower than the 5.323 of the U.S. scheduled airlines, based on CAB figures. On pages 3 and 4 we detail some information about AOPA's training programs having to do with upgrade training of pilots in the courses we sponsor. That speaks for itself. To date we have trained over 18,000 pilots in these courses. We made a number of recommendations to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, on August 23, just last week, deal- ing with prevention of collision. I want to review a few of those briefly foryou here today, Mr. Chairman. Over the years there have been a number of collisions between van- o1,ls combinations of airline, military, and general aviation traffic. These last two collisions brought what we think is undue emphasis on the general aviation-airliner type of collisions, although past history shows that this kind of collision h~s not been particularly disastFous to the airlines, prior to this time, with respect to passenger fatalities. To think ba'dk th~ most disastrous collisions that we have had have been bétw~uit~h~drlines themselves. For example, the Grand Canyon and the New~ ~r~rk collisions between TWA ~nd United killed more people hi each case than the last two collishms at Urbana and Hendet~- sonville ~o~M~iñed. . To reView brieffv, starting on pag~ 6, our, recommendations that we forwarded last week to the FAA Administi~tor, the first `was to rigidly enforce present general standard& for ëockpit visibility `and establish more detailed and definitive minimum stanthtrds for cockpit visibility for ai~ civil. aircraft. , ~ ~ ~ ~ ` ` , ~ ` ~ ~T emphasize all because `we are `thlking here nOt only of the new ~jets and the airline aircraft but also general aviation aircr~ift. We want to bê"abl~ t&see `bet~te~out ~fthê front of~those airplaI~s~ ,` ` , , , , `~ Briefly, the background on this goes bark a long time I ha~ at tadhèd as an ~tni1ex to this sthteinent~a copy of a petition that AOPA filed ~with the Civil AerO~riaut1cs Bôar~1 in M~r~h 19V56 for the e~t~blisiI mëiit~ ~ betterkcbè~pit ~ Tb'~tate w~ do iibt' ~ha+e thôs~ M~. ~ ` ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ` ~ We make' these r~cômmendatioñs i!ñ t'hë'fa~ o~f~ fafrly ~hb~i~i~ftthl nun~ber of our aircraft t~d~a~y flythg mlder WE ~ule~ ot rn~a~r%h'e ~ont~o1~ of the grOund syst~n, ~f yOu ~a~t to pi~ti~ that *~ M~cii ~f `this isdOne iii ~6od~we~tther.Bi~t ~ Ôf~h~ t~a'ffic operat~s under the IFRrul~, ~ ma~örity of flyifig~i~ ~tiii'~dh~e in VFR weather, alid even th~ IFR flikht plan traffic' r~ist M~1V back on visual obser~at~ion o1~ other~ traffic 1i~trin~ dç~rt~ih phases bf tlidlr operation ~ c ~ Mast States ~ ill hbt hcense an automobile that has an obst~iictiOh to the' driver's vision. The' `Distrqci~ `of COlumbia, ~ôr ~xam~1é,go~'so far as to reject a, car th~t has any small dec~tF,Or ~tieker' c~n `One' Of~ il~s windows, the windshield, or the rear w~imd~ow Yet' the Federal Government continues, to cettifi~ate aircrafr ~ift~h much higher speeds, with greatly redheed vis~~m frOm within~, t~e cockpit. PAGENO="0195" 191 Our second recommendation is to institute rulemaking to require specifically a lookout for other traffic when flying in VFR~ weather conditions. Mr. Chairman, at one time there was just such a requirement in the civil air regulations, but it was dropped out somewhere along the line as they were revised over the years. The last time I could find. it was about 1949; We do not have this now, although it is implied in several parts of the regulations. We think this should be reinstituted,, just as we have a requirement for a lookout on ships at sea. Our third recommendatibn is to impOse a speed limit of 250 knots~ in the airspace belOw 10,000 feet MSL. We also think that a study should be initiated with regard to limiting vertical speeds, climb aiid~ descent; in this aii~spnce, and ai~o in connection with the present i~eg- ~lation regarding the 2~O-knots speed limit below 10,000 feet with~n~ 30 miles of destination. ~ I may point out that departing and en route aircraft ~re not cov~ ered by the latter regulation As background for this, Mr. Chairman, we have supported the present speed limits. According to the best figures that we can as~ ~emble, approximately 96 percent of all general avi~ttion ajrcraft fly- ing is done below 10,000 feet. This includes: aircraft that are in slow flight configuration for arrival and departure from airports. ~ Many thousands of airports do not have airport traffic areas which automatically impose a speed limit. We think that it makes no sepse to permit aircraft. that are designed for operating at . higher speeds at the highei altitudes to be op~rated down in th~ area where y~u find aircraft landing and taking off and where the slower traffic usu- ally mu~t operate. . : Our r xt recommendation is to i~aise - req'~ bs to 5 miles foi~ ~aircraft operat~g above spe oess of 25C ( 1_ *i~... *.~- .1. ove 14,500 1 PAGENO="0196" 192 . So we think that this concept of the restricted climb corridor for high-performance aircraft is one that should be studied arid estab- lished by the FAA without delay. As far as our kind of traffic, general aviation slow traffic going through these corridors, we would use the same procedure we now use with the military climb corridors, where a simple call to controller on the radio will give you permission to transit the corridor if it is clear. Otherwise, we would avoid it. This may, Mr. Chairman, cause some comment from some general aviation pilots, but we think this is all to the good. It has been recom- mended to our staff here by a number of our members throughout the country. Our next recommendation is to assign a high priority to improved conspicuity of aircraft. In other words, let's speed up this process of making airplanes easier to see. When you know traffic is near sometimes, even when the radar con- troller tells you you have traffic in a certain direction, it is difficult to see, and sometimes it is so high or so low you can't sceit. But we think we need increased effort on reflective paints, distinctive painting schemes, high-intensity lighting, and any other means of enhancement that can be devised to make aircraft more visible to the naked eye. Some of these ideas have been explored partially in the past, but the emphasis seems to have fallen by the wayside. We would like to see that revitalized. Our next recommendation is to increase the availability of radar advisories from FAA facilities for the benefit of all traffic. Right now mostgeneral aviation pilots know that they can get radar advisories in a terminal area where radar coverage is available. Most of them do not know that they also can get radar advisories while they are en route under certain conditions. We hope that the FAA will make this service available to more aircraft and a greater part of the time. Our eighth recommendation was to assign high priority to the devel- opment of a proximity warning indicator that is operationally and economically suitable for use by general aviation aircraft. There iyas quite a bit of discussion here this moniing on the matter of a collision avoid~.nce system with Capth~in Ruby,~ and it brought out that this is more or less a sophisticated, high~priced system, ~id \ it takes equipment in both airplanes, what we call a cooperative sys- \ tein-I think he termed it a compatible system-before it will work. \ We think there is a legitimate requirement for that s~phi~ti~ated systern~ particularly. in the airline aircraft, b~cause we are coming up nt~w~with stretchedjets, 741's, SST's, and two of thescairpianes with ~ ~OO peoplecach al~ard certainly needsom e kind of a backup device, you might say, to pi~otect them fromthemsei~ves. From our point of view, we also need a simple device that' will warn us at least of the proximity of another airplane to us, if~someone is in iiur vicinity, a kind of heads. up, alert device, so that the pilot will be e~tra sharp in looking for other traffic. ~There is pretty ample evidekllce over the years that some of the col- li~ions that have occurred hav~ ~n in elear weather, or at least where th~ two pilots could have seen each other, and one or the other of the pilots possibly, in most cases, most ~oertainJy could have seen the other airplane. \ PAGENO="0197" 193 In the ease of the Grand Canyon eollisioh the c1osur~e rate was on the order ofthout 4~O miles per hour. We think t1~at if thereis some kind of device that alerts the pilot that there is some other aircraft in his vicinity-that is, a potential collision, this would go a long way to pre- venting collisions. ~ We have recommended to the Administrators of FAA. and NASA that they initiate a jQint or cooperative pro)eet on the development of this warning device. We feel that by pooling the expertise, the man- power, and taking advantage of the research and development authori- zations of the twO agenoies, that they sho~1d be able to come up with something in a relatively short period of time that is usable, and that we can carry in th~ airspace without, you might say, a prohibitive pen- alty as far as cost, weight,and so on, are concerned. I would like to make a general comment with respect to the fore- going recommendations : There has been a considerable amount of pres- sure from some quarters for so-called positive control of all aircraft around majorterminals and `in the lower airspace along busy airways. This would require the pilot to have an instrument rating, the aircraft to ha~ie a transponder and IFR-type equipment. Positive control is not a guarantee against collision. All the ele- ments of positive control were present in the collision over Staten Island, N.Y., on December 16, 1960, between two airliners in which 134 people were killed. The FAA currently has proposals outstanding for lowering positive control to 18,000 feet and instituting controlled VFR in such airspace. AOPA is on record as opposing the former and encouraging the latter, although we do not completely agree with the rules proposed by the FAA, particularly with respect to the requirement for a radar trans- ponder in the aircraft. We also understand, ~Mr. Chairman, that the FAA has a number of in~house proposals that they are studying at the present time for, you might say, measures to bring forth, as .~ a result of the public furor created by the A~hevilh~ and Urbana collisions. We have had access to some of these proposals. Informally, I might add. We have not yet seen any that would have prevei~t~d the Ashe- vill~ collision, where' both aircraft were on IFR flight plans and were under the control of the Asheville ATO facility. I might add that the Asheville tower has neither primary nor secondary radar. A trans- ponder would have done no good there, though primary radar may have helped the controller spot the situation that was developing just prior to the collision. ~ ~ ~ The current in~house proposals which are being considered by the FAA, among other, things, contemplate lowering of positive control down to some fairly low altitudes along the main airways in parts of the country. ~ These, in effect, would build a series of fences across the country, if you can visualize them as such, and they would impose extremely bur- densome restrictiQns on general avitaion aircraft, and I suspect also on some military aircraft, for the use of `this airspace, or even to be able to get from one side of the fence to the other. What is even worse is that proposals of this type would add a great burden of additional traffic and workload on the controllers at a time when testimony before committees of this Congress, by the FAA~ has PAGENO="0198" 194 indicated that they do not hav&en~ughcothoI1ers and they ma~ have to curtail services if the FAA appropriations request suffers any sig- rnficant cutbacks. ~ How this great additional workload would be absorbed in centers, towers, and ifight service stations w~ have not yet heard from the pro- ponents of these informal proposals in the FAA. . We prefer, Mr. Chairman, that the colIision-a~oidance propo~als be aimed at measures which will help the piiot help himself. We can't put everything on the ground to lead each pilot around by the hand. We mtist provide the pilots wjth better mBans so that they can s~e out `of thecock~pit better, so that they have radar advisorieson a rnore timely basis, so that other aircraft are easier to see, so that there are reasonable speeds at the lower airspace, just as we have speed limits on the high- ways. . We think this is a better approach ai~d it certainly is one that will be less costly to th~ Federal Government and the taxpayer, not only for operating cost, but also from the viewpoint of liability. This lat- ter point i~ not to be lightly dismissed. As of April 30, 1967, there were 433 suits outstanding against the Government -for claims totaling $203 million as a result of aviation accidents. That was prior to the last unfortunate jnbi;dent. Almost $16 million was paid out to ~ebtle su~ch claims in the pre- ceding 9 years, prior to the rash of suits that came about as a result of the NewYork collisions, and so on. We also have several other recommendations, Mr. Chairman, which begin on page 15, that are no~t directed' to the prevention of collisions, but they are related to aviation safety. The first of those is to improve the quality, quantity, and scope of the aviation weather program. A little-known fact is that the Federal Aviation Administration is respon~ible for providing aviation weather requirements to the Environmental Science Services Administration, which includes `the U.S. W~ather Bureau. General aviat~on spokesmen `have been trying, without success, to convince the FAA and the Weather Bureau `that the present aviation weather services are inadequate to `safely fulfill the needs of general aviation. We need regular weather observations from more locations, with greater frequency. I say that because some locations `have only a few observations a day as required to get one or two airline schedules in or out of that particular airport. We. need greatly improved forecasting. The latter is particularly critical since much of the forecasting now is done by computer on a probability basis, and the hapless pilot all too often finds that the actual conditions encountered in flight have no relation to what was forecast before he took off. With that, our next recommendation goes hand in glove. That is to provide better accessibility to weather information, both to pilots in flight and to pilots on the ground for flight planning purposes. A's it now stands, the pilot has direct contact available with the Weather Bureau station and its trained meteorologists at all-too-few locations. Pilots obtain most of their' aviation weather information from FAA flight `service statio~is, and even thes~' are insufficient in number to adequately service all areas where needed~ PAGENO="0199" 195 I think it is history in this committee; Mr. Chairman, that the FAA tried, severad years ago to reduce the number of these facilities, flight service stations, rather unsuccessfully, I might say. They have curtailed weather broadcasts in many areas, which is compounding the situation ~s far as the pilot is concerned. The transcribed weather broadcasts, which are on low frequency and are used by many pilots, particularly in outlying areas, at home, the ranch or the farm, to obtain preflight weather information,. have been reduced despite pilot objections. There further at the moment is a program underway to additionally reduce the scheduled broadcasts on our omni or VOR facilities. We are watching this very closerly . and. we hope this will not further derogate the weather services to the pilot. Several years ago the FAA made a test of a direct pilot-to-forecaster radio link so that the pilot who was in flight and encountered some un- usual weather conditions could call to the ground and talk directly to the forecaster in the Weather Bureau and then get some advice as to what this condition was that he happened to see ahead of him or that was coming up On him. That was a test. The test was terminated, and despite the fact that the overwhelming consensus of pilots was that this was a worthwhile service in the interest of safety, we have not got- ten it back. Until recently it looked as though the FAA had developed a scheme whereby the pilot could call the flight service station and the flight service station would plug him through to the forecaster on what we call a patch cord arrangement through a telephone line. Even this idea ha~ been allowed to die on the vine, despite the fact that we have a frequency that could be used for this by both the airline pilots and ourselves. So we do need action on this. Our. next recommendation was to improve pilot briefing facilities so that pilots have access to this information at more locations. There has been a program worked out jointly between industry and the FAA for a better network of flight service stations designed to provide essential services, including weather briefing, to pilots on a much wider and much more effective basis. They would consist of ~t basic network of full-time stations, supplemented by a number of sma1lei~ ~art-time stations located on the busier general aviation airports. We have seen nothing in the way of action to implement this pro- posal, even though apparently it has agreement within the FAA and has the wholehearted support of the general aviation industry. Our last recommendation, Mr. Chairman, has to do with the need for general aviation airport facilities. I stress the word facilities be- cause I am talking more than just the airports. We recommend that the emphasis of the national airport pl~. be redirected to provide adequate facilities for general aviation, includin~g short parallel runways on major airports, good satellite airports in major metropolitan areas, and an improved system of general aviation airports and facilities in areas where the need exists. To briefly summarize the need for this, a general aviation aircraft quite frequently iu~s need to use a major airport. This need can arise from a number of things. He may have connecting passengers for the airlines-and one airline has estimated that 30,000 of their passengers last year were brought to the airport or taken away from the airport PAGENO="0200" 196 by air taxis or other geiieral aviation aircraft. He may have business on that airpc~rt or near thai airport. This may be the only airport in the vicinity that has adequate faoilities for servicing, taxis, food, weather, communication's, rental cars, and other things of that nature. So we find that quite frequently the general aviation traffic must use the major airport. They have no other choice. In many cases, this is not so. If there is an adequate airport some- where else in the vicinity, if it is convenient, I, for one, for example,. would prefer to land on that airport where I am not mixed up with the wing tip vortices and turbulence left by the big jet, where the serv- ice is tailored to my needs2 and so on. So we have come up with these recommendations and I think, from the discussion I have had, for example, with some of the representa- tives in the Airline Pilots Association they also support this, that on some of these major airports if we could put a short parallel run- way to one side, a general aviation airplane can use it. It only needs~ about 3,000 feet of runway and it need not be as wide and not as thick as the 12,000 foot concrete runways needed for the jets. This will expe- dite traffic. It increases the capacity of the airport. It keeps us out of the turbulence and vortices created by the larger aircraft. Above all, for the taxpayer, it provides full utility and greater ad- vantage for the facilities than the Government has put on that airport in the way of radar, communicatio'n~, weather services and so on. So there is a great need for this. Along with it, we would like to `see some good satellite airports,. such as were put in, I think, around Minneapolis, that will drain off traffic that does not have to use the major `airport. We recognize that some have to use it, but you can drain off a consdierable amount of it if we `have good facilities for those people who do not `have \ to go to the major airport. We are `~t t~is time, Mr. Chairman, also \ about to testify before Senator Monroney's committee on airports.. ~ We will see that your committee is provided with copies of our testi- mony there. ` ( Statement referred to was subsequently submitted and has been placed in committee files.) Mr. KAYNE. We `have noted that the legislative history of the Fed- cml Airport Act talked at great length about encouraging private flying through a nationwide system of good airports. Over the years,. \in fact, about 20 years since the Federal Airport Act was first passed, \sve are just about reaching the `dollar volume of expenditure for ~ irports originally envisioned in tl~se earlier se~sions of Congress. flowever, the money has gone for oniy 2,300 airports instead of some 6~OOO as originally talked about back in the legislative history ` D~spit~ all the emphasis on general aviation airports, or private flying, as they termed it then, 83 percent of the total `expenditures under the Federal Airport Act have gone to airline airports. This is why we say there needs to be a `redirection of emphasis under that program. One additional point I would like to clarify. On t'he recommenda- ti'oi~s I `have outlined, because I was `smum'arizing and not reading my text specifically, the first thght recommendations were in the letter tha1~ we sent to General McI~ee on August 23. The additional four PAGENO="0201" 197 reoommendations were not in that ie~er to .~enera1 McKee. We have added them for the purpose of this testi~nony. We realize that the FAA has not had time to study oi~r reeoi~irnendations in d~pth, even though some of them were imown to their staff for sQ'me time before this. We do expect `to be working with the FAA and with others in the aviation community, as `time goes on, since we, like all other pilots, have `a vital h~terest in safety in the air. While the Government `has the responsibility for safety programs in the public interest, the pilots `who fly have a much more personal and compelling interest in this stthject because the life that they save may `be their own. On behalf of our association of 138,000 members, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express our apprec~.ation for your courtesy in hearing our views. Thank you. (Mr. Kayne's full statement follows:) STATEMENT OF Vic~roit J. KAvNE, VicE PRESIDENT, POLICY AND TEcHNICAL PLAN- NING, AIRCRAFP OWNERS ANJ~ PILOTS ASSOCIATION Mr. Chairman, my name is Victor J. K'ayne. I am Vice President, Policy and TechniCal Planning, of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, eo~nmon1y referred to as AOPA. AOPA is a service association comprised of over 138,000 `meiubers who own or fly aircraft for personal, business or plea;sure purposes:. A summary of the nature of our organization is contained in Annex A to tb~s statement. My personal qualifications are outlined in Annex B. We appreciate the oppoi~tun~ty to present our views on aviation safety. WHAT IS GENERAL AVIATION? Our type of flying encompasses all civil flying other than that done by the airlines and is known as general aviation ` It is the fastest growing segment of the aviation community. The active fleet of general Wviation aircraft numbered more than 104,000 planes at the beginning of this year and our airplane manu- facturers are turning out new planes at a rate that exceeded 15,000 last year. The average list price of these new aircraft was over $37,000. These aircraft are :flown by approximately 500,000 pilots for personal transportation and a large variety of business reasons. By comparison, the total airline fleet numbers slightly over 2,000 aircraft. ~leneral aviation is playing an increasingly impor- taut role In our national economy through the flexibility and utility that It ~offers In a vast number of industrial, agricultural and other business appli- cations. It is a modern day tool that serves farmers, foresters, salesmen, engi- neers, executives, scientists, doctors ajid a host of other occupations in addition to its lesser use ~ for personal transportation for pleasure and recreation. Ac- `cording to FAA statistics, general aviation flew some 21 million hours in 1066. ~This was divided as follows : Pleasure flying 24% ; Business flying 34% ; Com- mercial 16%, and Instruction 26%. With regard to the future, the FAA has predicted that the general aviation `fleet will number 180,000 aircraft by 1977. However, they also forecast only 17.5 million hours for 1966, whereas general aviation actually flew 21 millIon hours. This is consistent with a past history of the FAA to underestimate general avia- tion activity, and we think that the forecast of 180,000 aircraft by 1977 also may be understated by 20,000 or more units. To round out this picture of general aviation, there are some 9,600 airports In the United States that are used by general aviation. The airlines serve only ~600, in round numbers. Air service to the remaining 9,000 airports is solely gen- eral aviation. One ` airline alone has estimated that 30,000 of its passengers last year connected at the major airports by air taxi or other general aviation air- ~eraft. `At the 304 airports Where the FAA has control towers and a record is ma~1e of aircraft operations, general'avlation accounted for more than 33 million land- `ings and takeoffs in 1966, or 74 percent of the total operations at these airpOrts. PAGENO="0202" 198 AOCI~ENTS AND PHD SAPETY RECORD Accordir~g to the figures that we have received from the FAA and the CAB, general aviation suffered 5,425 accidents in 1966. An accident is counted as such When damage to the aircraft is over $300. Quite ofte~n, the so-called "accident" is nothing more than a minor mishap quite like minor auto accidetts resulting in bent fenders and the like, Of the total number of accidents, 538 of these resulted in fatalities, killing a total of 1,0G9 people, which includes passenger and crew fatalities. We mention the latter because the general avia.tion fatality record often is compared to air carrier passenger fatalities, without counting air carrier crews or oth~r persons. The total general aviation accident rate for 1966 was 2~.5 per 100,000 flying hours. This is the best record to date and compares with 1905 ~it 31.4, 1964 at 32.2, 1963 at 31.0 and 1951 at 45.2. Fatalities for 1966 in general aviation reached an all-time low of 5.085 per 100,000 flying hours and was lower than the 5.323 of the U.S. scheduled airlines. Annex 0 details the record back to 1950. PILOT TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY Private pilots are quite often the subject oi~ criticism because they dO not have the proficiency and knowledge of the professional pilots who man the airlines and the large corporate and business airp1anes~ However, professional pilots are not born or produced fully experienced by some magic process. They all start as student pilots and progress through the private pilot stage while learning the professional skills that will enable them to make a living as a paid pilot. Last year, the FAA issued approximately 128,000 new studenl~ certificates. While there are many dropouts along the way to achieving the necessary training and passing the FAA written and flight examinations, many of these students even- tually will be released by their instructors and become private pilots. Recog- nizing that many private pilots, and even some commercial pilots, may have been flying for some time since they last brushed up on their technique~ AOPA has developed a series of upgrade training courses and has sponsored flight training or refresher clinics around the nation for the past several years. These clinics are manned by some of the natjon's finest flight instructors, including some airline captains who have maintained their instructing proficiency. To date, more than 18,000 pi'ots have been through the various flight and ground school courses of these clinics. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS The AOPA `staff ha~ a number of safety programs under study, some of which have been informally discussed with the various FAA staff ecl~ieIons, while other recommendations bad been formally proposed to the various responsible agencies over the years. Last week, on August 23, 1967, we sent a letter to General McKee, the FAA Administrator, urging action on a number of these items. I will briefly review them here for you. AVOIDANCE OF COLLISION The recent collisions at Urbana and Hendersonville have focused attention on the midair collision problem. Over the years, there have been a number of colli- sions between various combinations of airline, military and general aviation aircraft. These last two collisions have brought undue emphasis on the general aviation-airline type of collisions, although past history will show that this type of collision bas not been particularly disastrous to the airlines with respect to passenger fatalities. The most .d:jsastrous collisions have been between the airlines themselves. For example, the Grand Canyon and the New York colli- sions between TWA and United killed more people in each case than the last two collisions combined. A recap * of the midair collisions back to 1955 is con- tamed in Annex D. The present trend of design and manufacture of airplanes for the airlines is toward "jumbo" and "stretched" jets that will bold ~tp to 500 passengers. With this kind of a human cargo, it is obvious that the airlines, above all, mnst take additional steps to protect themselves from each other. General aviation also has a~ grave concern with the matter of avoiding Collision, primarily from the viewpoint of self-preservation. We worry about being hit from the rear or in some other blind spot by one of these giant jets in which the pilots are pro- PAGENO="0203" 199 occupied with in-cockpit procedures and do not have a good view out of the cockpit, even when. t1i~y do have time to look out for other traffic~ Aèco~,~ing1y, we have made the following ~ec~mméfldatioflS ~o the ~AA Administrator: (1) Rigi4ly en~ore~ present general sta~idards ~for ~ockp1t visibility and estab1i~h more 4eta11e4 and definitive minimum st~ndards for cockpit visibility for all civil aircraft. Background ~ ~ ~ AOPA's active interest in this subject dates back many years. In an editorial in the October 1941 Pilot, we ~ stressed the limited visibility from the average mllitar~ aircraft cockpit and urged our members to be alert for other traffic th~t might not have good visibility from the cockpit. In :t9'49, AOPA brought thE~ limited cockpit visibility of some airline air- craft to light in testimony hefore the CAB accident Investigating team concerned i~vith the collision between a P-38 and Easterft ~ Air Lines at Washington National Airport. The CAA Experimental Station at Inifianapo- us worked on this subject for several years, making studies and surveys of cockpit visibility. Little was done to incorporate ~ rea1i~tic standards in the airworthiness requirements, although general standards . now exist in Parts 23 and 25 of t~ie Feder~U Aviation Regulations (Annex ~) . AOPA formally ~pet~itioned the CAB. on March 19, 1956, for the estab1i~liment of realistic cockpit visibility standards in both Part 3 and Part 4 of the Civil Air Regulations (Annex F) ~ Strong objection from the airframe ~ mann- . ~ facturers pre~enj~ed ~ny effective ~ action and thi~ ~ problem is still ~ with us ~ ~ iu the face o~ ev~r-iucreasing traffic. Regardless of how much of the traffic ~ ~ ~ operates under the I1~R rules, the great majority of flying is still done in VFR weather and eyen the IFR flight plan traffic must fall back on visual observation of other traffic during certain phases of their operation. Most states will not license an automobile that has any obstruc1~ion to the driver's vision.. ~ The District . of Columbia, for example, goes so ~ far as to reject a ~ar that has any small decal or sticker on one of its windows, the windshield or the rear window. Yet, the Federal Government con- tinues to ~ certificate aircraft, with much higher speeds, with greatly re~ duced vi~ion from within the cockpit. ~ . (2) Institute rule maldng to specifically require a lookOut for other ~raffic.wh~r~ flying in VFR we~tth~r conditions. Baokgro~oui ~ Over the yé~trs thdie have been a number of collisiOns wherein the ~ aircraft were operating in VFR weather and the closure rates were relatively ~ low. In many ~ of these cases, ~ there exists a good possibility that the ~ collision could have been avoided if the pilots of the aircraft ~ were main- taming a l~okout for other traffic. Until a few years ago, the. Civil Air Regulations, Part 60, indicated that on~ example of careless and, reck- less operation was Lack of vigilance by the pilot to observe and ~tvoid ptber air iraffic~" This was in . a l~49 edition of Part 60, yet was, dropped despite gn increasing population of aircraft in . the airspace. Avoidance of other traflic is impUeçZ. in Parts 91.6~ and 91.67 of t1~e present Regulations. A specific requirement should be reinstituted. ~ (3) Impose a speed limit of 250 knots in the airspace below 10,000 feet MSL. Initiate a study with regard to limiting vertical speeds in this air- space and also in connection with the present regulation regarding the 250- knot speed limit below 10,000 feet within 30 miles of destination. Depart- ing and en route aircraft are not covered by the latter regulation. J3ackground ~ ~ ~ ~ AOPA has supported the present speed limits in airport traffic area~ and . below 10,000 feet ~ for arriving aircraft. Approximately 96. percent of all gener~l aviation aircraft flying is done below 10,000 feet MSL. This includes aircraft that are in slow flight configuration for arrival and departure from airports. Many thousands of these airports do no~ have airport traffic areas. Tl~e ~iigher speed aii~craft, particul~trly those. with turbine , power, Uf~ually are designed for greater operational efficiency at tht~ higher altitudes and it makes no sense to permit these aircraft to operate at high speeds in the lower `airspace, which must be used by the slower traffic, `inëlbdthg air- craft iandh~g `and taking oL ` ` " ` ` ` ~(4) Raise fh&VFR'fiight visibility requirements to~ five mil~s~for aircraft iperating above 10,000 ~eetMSL at speeds in excess `of `250' knots' ` PAGENO="0204" 200 Background There has been a eo~istder~bie au~ount of ~1i~cu~sion and study over the years with regurd to praposals to raise the prè~ent th1~ee-mi1eVFR visibility requirement to five xx4~es. Tjiis was done lii lhe, continental control area above 14,500 feet on the basis of high-speed aircraft operating h~ the upper airspace. Three miles remains an adequate visibility requIrement for the slower speeds of 250 knots and below in the context of our recommendation for a speed limit below 10,000 feet. In the airspace above 1O,~X~O feet MSL, where higher speeds would be permitted, increased visibility would appear to be a valid requirement for those aircraft that are operating at the higher speeds. (5) Establish climb and descent corridors for high performance alrcrift ~nd require such aircraft to use these corridors unless adh~r~ng to the speed limits recommended in 3 above. Not more than two corridors should be established at any airport. The applicable rules would be essentially the same as those for military climb corridors. There would be no speed re- strietions in the corridors. Background The airlines and the operators of general aviation turbine-powered aircraft are not able to utilfze the maximum climb and descent capabilities of their aircraft with complete safety today because of the inability to see and avoid other aircraft or to take evasive action on a timely basis under conditions of high rate of climb or descent. This is especially true of many aircraft that have a high deck angle during such maneuvers. The climb corridor concept would expedite traffic safely and would permit better utilization of the characteristics bf t~hese high performance aircraft during climb and descent. Other aircraft would be permitted to transit or cross the corridor by means of a simple radio call to the traffic controller for transit permission. Two cor- ridors only would be needed at each major airport, serving the most used directions of appr&áeh and departure. The needs of other runways not aligned with the corridor cduld be served by a combination of the airspace in the corridor and that of the 2,000 feet of airport traffic area extending at a five- mile radius around the airport, wherein communications with the tower al- ready are required under most circumstances. Speed outside the corridor, but within the airport traffic area would' be subject to the existing speed `limits with authortiy for ATO to waive it if traffic conditions perzaitk (6) Assign a high priority to improved conspiculty of aircraft. Background A considerable amount of effort has been expended in several different fields with respect to making an aircraft easily discernible to another pilot in the air. The efforts in this field have included reflective paints, distinctive painting schemes, high-intensity lighting and other means of enhancement of conspicuity. Several of these ideas have been partially explored, but the development efforts seem to have tapered off due to some of the difficulties encountered or to a degree of indifference with respect to activities In this field as compared to more glamorous devices for detection of other traffic. (7) Increase the availability of imda'r `advisories for all traffic. Background Most pilots know about and can get terminal area `radar advisories. How- ever, many pilots do not know that they also can get radar advisories `while en route under the V1~R mba Fnrther, the provision of this service is at the discretion of the controller and many times a pilot is ,recftised service bec~ijise the controller is "too busy with IFR flight plan traffic." This tends to discourage VFR pilots from even trying `to use the en route `radar system. The FAA must take positive `steps to make this traffic ad- visory service available to all users of the airspace where radar coverage is `available. (8) Assign high `priority to the development of a proximity warning In- dicator (PWI) that is operatIonally `and economically `suitable for use by general aviation aircraft. Background The AOPA staff has participated in the deliberations of the FAA~spon- `sored Oofll'sion Prevention Advisory Group for some eight years in review- lug all proposed developments In the collision prevention field. Our ob'jec- PAGENO="0205" 201 tive ~s to ~ee `that any system adopted `for i~ationai use, and parlicularly one thai may becon~e a regulatory requ'i~'eiment for ~1y~ng In eert~fn airspace, ~s operationally and ecoilornieally accept~ttb~e to gener~U aviation. AO'PA's stated~. c~bjective is for the develQpsment ~ a simple pr~x~treity warning de- vice that could become a building block for a sophjsticated collision avoid- snee s~stem (CAS). The PWI wo~1d merely ghr~ the pll~t warning of ~2ie pre~ence of another aircraft, whereas the OAS would also &ndieate ~o the pilot what evasive action ~hould be taken. Obviously, the C~ must In- corporate a highly accu~ate detection `and ranging device, coupled with altitude information, and lhen process this thr&ugh a co~nputer to give the pilot evasive instructions. The airlines currently are pushing a cooperative ~ which would work only with othhr aircraft having the same equip- ment Essentially, this is the system developed by Mct~onnell AIrcraft With ~ a current price tag ef $60,000 per installatiGn. The production price has been estimated from that figure downward to ~3O,OOO. We recognize th~tt the air- lines must have so~ine system to protect them from themselves in order to ~tvoid a monstrous catastro~he snch as a collision `between `two 747's with four hundred passengers each. However, it Is also ebv&ous that there could be some misguided action `to try to `force general aviation into using any basic system adopted by the airlines. A $8O,OQO~p1us device certainly is not suitable for general aviation. We have recommended to the Administrators of the FAA and NASA that the two agencies initiate a joint or cooperative project for the development of a proximity warning device that is economically and operationally suit- able for use by all civil aircraft. This would be done through cooperative use of the expertise, manpower and R. & D. authorizations of the two agencies. NASA In particular has a rather large budget for aeronautical research. Congressman Fascell has introduced a bill, H.R. 1~77, directing the FAA Administrator to research the development of such a device. GENERAL CO~ME5T There has been a considerable amount of pressure from some quarters for "positive control" of all aircraft around major terminals and in the lower air- space along busy airways. This would require an insttument rating, a trans- ponder and IFR type equi'pthient in the aircraft. Positive control is not a guar- antee against collision, since all the elements of positive control were present in the collision over Staten Island, N.y. on December 16, 1960, between two airliners in which 134 people were killed. The FAA currently has proposals outstanding for lowering positive control to 18,000 feet and instituting controlled VFR in such airspace. AOPA is on record as opposing the former and eiicouraging the latter, although we dO not agree with the rules proposed by the FAA, particularly with respect to the require. ment for a radar transponder on the aircraft. We now understand that a number of in-house proposals are being evaluated by the FAA staff with regard to Imposing positive control down to the lower alti- tudes on some of the thore heavily traveled airways and possibly in some of the busier terminal areas. These proposals are a direct outgrowth of the public furor created by misleading reports on the Asheville collision. However, they still would not have prevented the Asheville collisslon where both aircraft were on IFR flight plans and were under the control of the Asheville ATO facility. Ashe- yule has neither primary nor secondary radar, thus making the addition of a transponder requirement irrelevant. Likewise, these proposals would not have prevented the Dayton collission. In fact, they would not have prevented any of the most disastrous collisslons over the last few yeai~, such as TWA and United over New York Oity or Eastern and TWA over Long Island. The current in-house proposals ~ being considered by the FAA would, in ef- feet, . build a series of fences across the navigable airspace and impose extremely burdensome restrictions on general aviation aircraft for the use of this air- space, or to even be able to get ~bro~gh1t~ ~rorn one side of the fence to the other. They also would add a ~eat buz~de~ of additional traffic and workload on the controllers at a time wheu te~tlmony before committees of the Con- gress indicates that the FAA does not have eu4ugh controllers and may have to curtail services if the FAA appropriation request suffers any significant cut- backs. How this great additional workload wO~ld be absorbed in the air traf- fic control centers, towers and flight service stations has not yet been de- veloped by the proponents of these proposals. PAGENO="0206" 202 Tn surnma~, AQPA~ believes th~it~ measures ~to~ enhañ~ the avoidance of ~ic9W~ion thot~1d' b~ dirk~te~1 prtnffir41~ at ~ h~ipiflg th~ .pF1~t through improved vi~1bi1ity o~it of thk~ &x~kpit, a i~quirement to watt~h~for other traffic (just as we ~h~ve `at sea), warnftig devices ~to a1~rt the ~l1~t as to the proximity . of other ~ tra~1c, ~~sib1è ~peed 1i~mtts in the airspace (ju~t as we have on the highways), ~b~tte~ traffic ~ informatlöfi and enha~need ~oñs~féuIty of aircraft. Some of the :approach~ being con~idered by the ~FAA:wou1d not significantly help the situa- tion, wt~u1d plaëe grave restrictions on. generalav4ation and would gather to the ~overnmei1t a tremetidous liability and re&~ron~ibi1tty in connection with a many- sold increase in traffic under the contrOl of the Federal controllers. The impact on the Federal b~idget would b& severe, just for operating cost alone, not even const4ertng ,tI~ liabiIil7 factor. The ll~tter is not to be lightly dismissed~ As of April `30, 1967, `thër~ *ere 433 suits Outstandiiik against the Government for claims tothi~ig $203 million as a, result of aviation accidents. Almost $16 million was paidout to settle such claims in the p~eeeding nine years. * The foregoing reçonitnendations hav~ béeñ dii~ected at the prevention of collisions, There are other' areas wherein act1on~ is needed by the FAA to im- :prove safety and these are detailed below. AVIATION wEATHER SERVICE (9) Improve the quality, quantity and scope of the aviation weather program. Background The Federal Aviation Administration is' .responsible for providing avia- tion weather requirements to the Environmental Science Services Ad- ministration, which ii~clu~1es the U.S. Weather Bureau. Gener~U aviation spok~s~nen thave been trying, witliont success, to convince the FAA and the Weather Bureau that the present aviation weather services are in- adequate to safely fulfill the needs of general aviation. Senator Peter Domi- nick, himself an experienced pilot, spoke to the needs of his own state of Oolorado `ill this respect on the floor of the Senate on August 18, 1907. The needs of his state are reflected in almost all other states and the Civil Aeronautics Board has listed weather as a cont~u~ing factor in a sig- nificatit number of general aviation accidents. We need regular weather observatiOns from more locations, with greater frequency (some locations have only a few observations a ~[ay' as required to get on~ or two airline schedules in and out), and improve'U forecasting. The latter is particularly critical since unuch of the forecasting now* is done by computer on a probability basis and the hapless pilot all too often finds that the actual conditiOns encountered in flight have nç relation to whet was forecast. PILOT ACCESS TO WEATEER INv0RMATI0N (jO) Provide better accessibilitY to weather information, `both to pilots in flight and to piiots~on the ground for flight planning purposes. BaokgrOu~id The ~4lot has direct contact available with the Weather Bureau ` station and its trained meteorologists `at all ` too fe* locations. Pilots obtain most of their aviation weather information frOm `FAA flight setvice stations and even these a~e insufficient, lii number to adequately service all areas where needOd. The FAA has tried tO reauce the number ef these facilitieS, and has curtailed weather `broadcasts in many areas, thus compounding this situa- tion. ~rhe transcribed weather broadcasts on low frequency stations, which are used by many pilots, particularly' in outlying areas, to obtain preflight weather information, have been reduced despite pilot' objections. Now, the FAA is emasculating the scheduled broadcasts on the VOlt facilities.. Fur- ther, the FAA made a test of a direct pilot-to-foi~ecrtster radio link so that th~e pilot in flight could"discuss his weather problems directly with the Weather Bureau forecaster, and d~spite the overwhelming consensus of pilots that this was a good ~afety prograth', the FIAA has dropped the idea. until recently, it looked as though the FAA had developed a scheme whereby the pilot could call the PS'S and be plugged through to the forecaster by a "patcheord" arrangement, but even this idea has `been allowed to die on the vine despite the `fact that `a frequency Is available and the service is much needed. PAGENO="0207" . ~ ~ ~ IMPROVED PILOT BRIEFU~G FACILITIES (11) Place into effect the new flight se1iri4~e ~ stntloh prog~m jointly workedon1~b~ industry and the FAA. ~ ~ ~ ~ Ba~ckground ~ ~ ~ AOPA and other aviation organizations have worked with the FAA In a series oi~ meetings for many months to develop a program for a better net- work of flight service stations designed to provide essential services, includ- ing weather briefing to pilots, on a much wider and more effective basis than t~he exi~tlng s3~stem. The new systetn would `consist of a basic network of full-time stations, supplemei~ted by a number of smaller part-time stations located on ~ the husler general nviation airports. We understand that this proposed new system has the approval of top F~AA echelon, but there is yet no evidenqe of it heing placed into effect. T'lie greatly incrensed briefing capabilities of the proposed ~system would make essential weather and other flight inform'atio~ avaiithle to ~ many mo~'e pilots than under the existing system and would greatly enhance safety. ~ T~E NEED TOR GENERAL AVIATION AIRPORT FACILITIES (12) Redirect the emphasis of the N~tional Airport Plan to provide ade- quate facilities for general a~riation, including short parallel runways on major airports, good satellite airports in major metropolitan areas `and an improved system of general aviation airports (and facilities) in areas where the need exists. ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ ~ \~ ~ ~ Ba~ckground ~ ~ ~ ` ` ~ ` ~ There has been much loose talk about banning general aviation from the major airports. This is not p~acUcal from either a le~ál or a practical view- ~point. These public airpo'rt~ mu~t ser~re all crnners and there are iuany general aviation flights that must use the major airports because ~ the nature of their bttsiness, w~h1ch ç~ulte fr~qhent1y consists of handling con- . ~ necting passengers ~ the airli~s, or the fact that no other , suitable air- j~ort exists. Short parallel runways will greatly expedite traffic handling and will enhance safety by allowing the general aviatibn aircraft to stay out of the area's of `dangerons vortices created by the larger aircraft. `~ood `satellite afrport~s, with adequate facilities, will `attract general aviation traffic that does not have to go to t1~e major airport. Most pilots wou]4 prefer such an ` arrangement, but go~od, ~aeil1'tles `generally d~ not exist today in many metro- politan areas, leaving the pilot no choice. In other areas, there is `a great ` needj~or `improv~d general avjation airports. T~i~ legislative history ~of the Federal Airport Act is crystal clear about the intent o1~ the Cpngress `being to encourage private flying through a nation- wide `system of good airports, reaching a total of some 6,000 airpo'rts in sever~ years at an expenditure of over one billion dollars~ The need for airports for private flying was recognized as a legitimate need `and the major thrust of the justification for the Act was oriented to this objective. However, over the years, the original intent ha's been `perverted to `the ~olnt that now, just~ tc~enty years later, ` the total program Is just reaching the billion-dollar level-and for about 2,300 airports instead of 6,OOO-~with 83 percent of `the total expenditures haVing gone to airline `airports. The present priority system of the FAA for Federal aid expenditures for air~o'rts further em- phasize,s this derogation of the original intent of the Act by placing top priority on the needs of the commercial operators to the detriment of the `need's of general aviation. AO'PA recommended `a revised schedule of priori- ties to the FAA Administrator in June of 1966 (Annex U) that more nearly meets the intent of the Federal Airport Act, as expressed in the legislative history. AOPA has urged the FAA Administrator to take action on the above recoin- mendations and we stand ready to assist the FAA in these programs in `every way that we can. We realize that the FAA has not bad time to' study our August 23 letter in depth, even though some of the recommendations were known. `to' their staff for quite some time. We expe'ct to. be working with them as time goes on since we do have a vital interest in safety `in the air. While the Government has the responsibility for safety programs in the public interest, the pilots who fly PAGENO="0208" 204 have i much more personal and compelling interest In this subject because the life that they save ~ay be their own. On behalf of Our assoeiation, I wish to express our appreciation for your courtesy in hearing our views on aviation safety. ANNEX A AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS AssocIATIoN The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association is an organization which provides services to. more than 138,000 members 1~cated in every state in the Union. It is a non-ppellt association incörperated under the laws of New Jersey. Purpo$e ~ It was formed in 1938 to promote, protect and represent the interest of its mem- bars in aeronautics and the pursuit of flying ; to promote economy, safety, popu- larity and use of airuraft by members. To accomplish these purposes, we seek several specific ohjectiv-es: maximum freedom of the a:irspaea for all users con- sistent with safety, improved aviation safety, an adequate airport system, an adequate system of air navigation aids, production of impro\red aircraft, reduc- tion of frustrations in aircraft ownership and use, facilitation of international travei by prtva~ aircraft and wider public support of general aviation require- meats. Mernber~sMp Half o~ ~ ~qttve general aviation aircraft In the United States are owned and opera~~~ ~ our members. Our 138,000 members comprise about 3Q% of all the active civil pilots In the entire country. Sixty-three percent (63%) of our members hold private certificates, 24% hold commercial certificates, 2% hold airline transport ratings, 8% hold student certificates and the balance are pilots in military service. OAPA. is not a professional or trade association in the corn- mon sense of these terms. The majority of our members are non-professional pilots and therefore do not join for the usual professional or commercial reasons characteristic of unions or business trade associations. AOPA is a service orga- nlzation more analogous to the American Automobile Association or the National Rifle Association. AOPA staff !ro serve our members, who fly for business, personal and 1,ecreatlonal pur- poses, we have `assembled a full-time staff of 127 people. Our professional staff is composed of specialists who are acknowledged experts in their respective fields. We cover virtually every field of sigllificant Interest to th~ owner or pilot of non-commercial aircraft. Many of these fields are also of interest to commer- cial operators. Our headquarters is located in Bethesda, Maryland. Metlwd of policy formulatiea You will recognize the Inherent problem in policy formulation In an organiza- tion with so large a membership. It is not unlike your own problems In repre- \ seating your constituents on specific Issues. Like you, we pay very close atten- \ tion to the substance and volume of mall from our members, as well as our ~ personal contacts with members throughout the country. AOPA policy is formu- lated, in the light of extensive member comment, by the professional staff mem- hers, who combine their knowledge, background and understanding of aviation problems. Our rapid growth in 28 years from zero to 138,000 members, is prac- tical testimony to the success of this method and the accuracy with which our staff reflects member desires-for our support depends upon voluntary member- ship. ANNEX B VIcTOR 3. KAYNE starting his career in aviation in 1930, Mr. Kayne worked in several phases of ~eneral aviation operations, including work as an A & E mechanic. He came into air traffic control as a member of the original staff of the control tower at the old Washington-Hoover Airport in 1935, when ATO was a municipal and private-industry operation. He was the first chief of the Washington National PAGENO="0209" 205 Airport Control Tower and was as~s1stai~1t &ief of the OAA headquarters, Divi~ sion of Airways Operations wb~u lie resigi~eç1 ~rom Government in 1954 to enter prh~ate business. He was the ~1rst controller to apply for a controller's license under the Civil Aero1~autics Act ~f 198& He assisted OAA in developing the flrst ~r~ort traffic control ~ manual, and wrote many of the procedures still in use today. . When the United States entered World War II, Mr. Kayne was assigned to as~lsting in the establishment of air traffic control facilities used by military and civil aircraft. In 1i~42, after serving briefly as ATO inspector at Fort Worth, Texas, he was called back to Washington and promoted to inspeetor~at-large for all CAA air traffic control facilities. Mr. Kayne beaded a mission to Brazil in 1944 to help the U.S. Fourth' Fleet establish air traffic control and air navigation facilities. Brazil's present airways system is an outgrowth of his extensive work with the Brazilian Air Ministry. While assistant chief of the CAA Air Traffic Control I~ivision, he was selected to act as U.S. spokesman on air traffic control at International Civil Aviation Organization regional meetings at Seattle, Washingto~i, New Delhi, India, and London, England, in 1948 and 1949. During the same period, he worked closely with the Canadian Department of Transport to standardize Canadian and U.S. air traffic control systems. While deputy chief of the Air Traffic Control Division in 1950, he established procedures for the control and protection of air traffic in the vicinity of the then ~ i~igbly ~creti atomic e~e~gy~tests about to be staged near Las Vegas, Nevada. Mr. Kayne has been with AOPA since 195~ and currently is Vice President, Policy and Technical Planning. In this position, he is responsible for AOPA policy in the fields of air traffic control, communications, airspace, airports, legislative and internatienal matters. Mr. Kayne Is a private pilot and formerly held second-class radio operator and Airframe and Engine mechanic licenses. He was among the group of con- trollers that founded the Air Traffic Control Association and holds membership number P-42 in that Association. Year AIr carrier General aviation - Total fatalities Total hours Rate Total fatalities Total Rate hours 1950 205 2, 561, 900 8. 001 871 9, 650, 000 9. 025 1951 323 2,799,900 11.536 750 8451,000 8.874 1952 246 3,030,800 8.116 691' 8,186,000 8.441 1953 312 3~71,900 ~.535 653 8,527,000 7446 1954 40 3,294,100 ~ 1.214 684 8,963,000 7.631 1955 27~ 3,672,500 7.179 619 9,500,00,0 6.515 1956 174 4,031,000 4,316 669 10,200,00O 6.558 1957 98 4, 44~, 500 2. 205 800 10, 938, 000 7. 313 5958. 160 ~ 4, 860, 000 3. 292, 717 12, 579, 000 5. 699 1959 ~40 5,060,000 6.719 823 12,903 000 6.478 1960 499 ~ 4,660,0110 10.108 787 13,121000 5.998 1961 311 4,190,000 7.422 761 13,602 000 5.594 1962 ---- 330 4,110,000 8.029 857 14,500,000 5.910 1963 264 4,1~O,000 6,392 893 15,106,000 5.911 1964 238 4,359,445 5.459 1,056 15,718,000 6.709 1965 261 4,743,533 5.502 1,018 16,733,000 6.083 1966 272 5,109,992 5.323 1,069 21,023,000 5.085 ANNaX C FATALITIES PER 100,000 HOURS FLOWN Average 6. 538 Source: FAA St~tisti~8l Handbook, 1966, except air carrier hours for 1950-57 from FAA, and include scheduled service only; nonscheduled not available; and hours for 1958-63 from CAB. 1 hours for nonscheduled operations were available the rate would be insignificantly lower. Rate calculated by AOPA. 6.181 92-715-68-14 PAGENO="0210" Date 206 ,ANNEXD. ~ .~ ~ ~ MrDi~I1~ COLLISTO~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Al R CARRI ER~QEN ERAL AVIAIflQN ~ MIDAI R COLLISIONS, 1955-67 Location 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 25 79 Date Location Fatalities Air carrier General . aviation January 1955 Covington, Ky July 1955 Kansas City, Mo August 1955 Hobbs, N. Mex June 1956 ~ Bartlesyille, Okia ~ April 1960 ~ Hickory, N.C Oclober 1960 Orlando, Fla Do McClellan AFB, OaliL~. . November 1960_ Denver, CQI0 June 1966 Columbia City, md March 3967 ---___-~~_-~----- Urbana, Ohio July 1967 Hendersonville, N.C AIR CARRIER-AIR CARRIER MIDAIR COLLISIONS, 1955-67 Fatalities June 1956 Grand Canyon, Ariz December 1960 New York, N.Y December 1965 - Westchester, N.Y ~. 128 `128 4 1 And 6 on ground. The above tabulation does nc~t include the accident off Jone8 Beach, New York, wherein an Eastern Air Lines DO-7 dived into the ocean with 84 person~ aboard as the result of an evasive maneuver to avoid a Pan American 707. This actually was not a collision, but the loss of life resulting from the attempt to avoid a collision is just as real as if Eastern had been struck down in a collision. It is interesting to note that in more than one-half of the cases cited above, at least one of the aircraft, and usually both of them, were under air traffic control at the time ~f the accident. ANNEX Jfl EXCERPTS FROM THE FEDE~RAL AVIATION REGULATIONS 2~.773 Pilot Compartmen.t View (G) Each pilot compartment must be free from glare and reflections that could interfere with the pilot's vision, and designed so that- (1) The pilot's view is sufficient extensive, clea; and undistorted, for safe operation ; and (2) Each pilot is protected from the elements ~o that moderate rain conditions do not unduly impair his view o~ the flight path in normal flight and while landing. (b) If certification for night operation is requested, compliance with para- graph (a) of this section must be shown in night flight tests. 25.773 Pilot Oo~npartment View (a) Nowpreoipit4tio'n~ condition~s.-For nonprecipitation conditions, th~ follow- ing apply: (1) Each pUot compartment must be arranged to give the pilots a suffi- ciently extensive, clear, and undistorted view, to enable them t~ safely per- form any maneuvers within the operating limitations of the airplane, in- cluding taxiing, takeoff, approach, and landing. (2) Each pilot compartment must be free of glare and reflection that could interfere with the normal duties of the minimum flight crew (estab- lished under 25.1523) . This must be shown in day and night flight tests under nonprecipitation conditions. 2 0 0 4 1' 2 *0 1 1~ 3 PAGENO="0211" `I ANNEX .F BF~ro1tE THE Civit AERONAUTICS BOARD, WASHINGTON, D.C. (flocket ~o. -) Aircra~ft Owners a4uZ Pi~ot~ A$sockttion, PetiUoiwrs v. UiviZ Aerona~ttics $oa#d, Respon4e~t PE~ITIoN To AMEND CIVIL AIR RRGtYLATTONS The Air~raft~ OWneri atid P11~ts Asso~iation hereby~ requests that the Olvil Aeronautic~ Board amend Sections 3.382 and 4b.351 of the Civil Air 1~egu1ationsto proVide Sp~1fiC measurable ~i~Ibi1it~ standards from the ~iot's seat *t~h respect to the following: ~ ~ (ti) Angle forward above the horizon unbrokem (b) Angle forward belowthe horizon unbroken. . (C) Aiig1~tbov~the horizon 9O~ toleft. (d) Angle below the horizon 9O~ to left. 1~e) Angle to tbt~ left. ~ ~ (1) Angle to the right, ~It is further reqi~e'sted that definite arid meastirable standards be fixed requir- ing Vi~ibility from the cockpit direct~ya'j~ove, i~elow and to the rear of the aircraft either by dire~t ~riew, by optical m~tn~or other de~nices. Phi's petition is based upon the following fael~s : ~ The present regulations Sectiont~ 3.38~ and 4b.351 ~bove specified are general in terths and do not pro~r1dé for adequate minimuni standards of eock~$t visi- bility. Air carrier aircraft which h~ve been1~ullt under the standards of Part 4 and `subsequently Part 4b of the ~ Civil Air Regulations are inadequate with respect to cockpitvl~ibffitV. Of six model's of air carrier aircraft examined, not one met the minimum standards recommended by Report No. 32 of Committee S-7 of the Society of Aut~mot~v~e~ Eflgin~ers, Inc., which is composed of twelve representativesqi ~Ui~1~ie an~ largeplane manufacturers. The record of aircraft colllsiohs demonstrates that ~n important factor com- mon to the collisions, which factor ~iused or contributed substantially to the cause of the accidents, was the limited vis~hUity from the cockpit of either one or both of the ~1anes involved. Respectfully submitted4 AIRORATT Ow~nns & PILOTS ASSocIATIoN By J. B. HARTRANFT, Jr. President-Petitioner. STATE OF MAEYLAND, County 0)' Montgomery, ss: J. B. Hartranft, Jr., being first duly sworn deposes nnd says that he is Presi- dent of Aircraft Owner's and `Pilots Association, Petitioner in the foregoing peti- tion; that he has read the foregoing petition and that to the best of bin inform~- 207 (b) Frec~i'ØKtion aQnditions~-~r~ precipitation conditions, tbe following apply : ~ ~ ci-) ~Pbe ;airp~ne must have a means to ma'intain a clear portion of the windshield, d~iring preei~itation conditions, sufficient for both pilots to have a sufficiently eR~tensiV~ vit~w along the flight jiathin noi~1nal flight attitudes o1~ the airplane. This means must be designed to function, without continuous attention un the part of the crew, in- (1) Heavy rain at speeds up to 1.6 VS1, with flaps retracted ; * ~ (ii) The icing conditions specified in 25.1419 if certification with ice protection provisions is requnsted.~ (2) The first pilot must have a windo~y that- (`i) When the cabin is not ~pi~ssurized, is openable under the conditions prescribed in subparagraph (1) of `this paragraph and provides the view specified in that pa~grap~h ; and ~ ` ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (ii) Gives ~uffleient protectioI~ from the elpments against impairment of the pilot's ~ PAGENO="0212" My comni1~aEon e~pire~ May 6, 1957. 208 tion and belief every statem~n% contained lii the petition i~ true and no statement in the petition is misleading. J. B. HAEtaANFT, Jr. Sworn to and subscribed before me thIs 15th day of March, 1956. CrAiu~rwn C. KmsEn, Notary, Public. ANrEX G AOP~ POSITION : F~ai' P1UORITIES 1. statutory Baeis.~!rhe ~ed~r~il AirpOrt Act pro~ide6. in S~. ~ 3 that the National Airport Plan is "to provide a s7stem of~k~bih~ atr~bris adequate to anticipate and meet the needs of civil aeronautics . . . and shall not be limited to any classes or categories of public airports" and that the Administrator shall "take into account the needs of both air commerce and private flying . . The Act provides in Sec. 4 that the Administrator may grant funds for ". . the establishment of a Nationwide system of public airports adequate to meet the present and future needs of civil aeronautics . . 2. Agency Policy.-Priorities for Allocation of Federal Funds are established byAC 15O/51OQ~-2 dated 5/9/66 and Policy Statement dated 5/24/66. 8. AOPA agrees tlzat.-(a) Requests exceed funds available ; (b) Priorities are necessary ; (c) Best use of available funds should be made. 4. AOPA disagrees w'itk.-(a) The priorities established ; (b) the under~ lying concept that funds should be concentrated at airports with a ` "significant volume of commercial air traffic" regardless of the fact that other airports needed to complete the s3~stem have not been established. 5. AOPA Reconvmesded Priority.-Reqnests for aid should be satisfied in the following order: (a) Initial purchase of land and initial development to provide a new public airport to complete `the National Airport Plan. ( b ) Provision of improvements to meet minimum standards for elementary (i.e., parking, lighting, etc.) airport facilities. (c) Provision or improvement of airports to relieve congestion at major airports in metropolitan areas. (d) Provision of Category I capability at airports without any Instru- ment capability. (e) Improvements to provide additional runway and ramp capacity at existing airports. (1) Provision of Category II capability. (g) Improvements to existing facilities by enlarging, strengthening or marking runways, taxiways and ramps. (h) Provision of Category III capability. REASONS FOR AOPA POSITION ON FAAP PRIORITIES (1) The primary purpose of the Federal Airport Act is to. establish a nation- wide system of airports to meet existing and future needs of civil aeronautics. All other considerations are secondary. (2) The best use of Feder&i aid is to encourage provision of fundamental and essential facilities. Improvements above this minimum level should take lesser priority in the order of their sophistication. (3) Loss of privately.owned, public-use airports due to tax and economic pressure is creating an airport shortage. The surest remedy is public ownership. (4) The ability of a community to survive depends on its ability to participate in the air commerce system. Carriage for hire is only a part of air commerce. Not-for-hire operation's are also vital to the economy. (5) Completing the `airport system will serve more additional people and `their communities than adding improvements to a few airports. (6) Meeting existing needs will pave the way for Satisfying more sophisticated future needs `by making more of the public aware of the benefit's of airport development. (7) AOPA's priority list Is more likely to generate broader public and congreS- sional support for airport `development `since it enables new service for new peo- PAGENO="0213" 209 pie and new communities instead o~ merely improving service for those. already served. (8) Theliigh priority projects: (a) Are generally low in cost and the~efore a great number can be under- taken. ~ (b) Will procure the moet time and cost critical item-land-which will increase in cost more rapidly than labor or material. (C) Will expand and complete the system, thereby making the aircraft and each existing airport even more useful and valuable. (d) Will not eliminate low priority projects `because the number and cost of high priority projects is unlikely to require all the funds, whereas satisfy- ing sophisticated requirements. first is likely to preempt most funds ; nor is there sufficient money to complete all such projects anyway. Mr. FitiEDEL. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Kayne. I will reserve my time. Mr. Dingell, have you quesitions? Mr. DINGELL. No que~tions, Mr. Chaiñnan. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Devine? Mr. DEvINE. I am glad you appeared here today. One, you are in a position to give us valuable information, and, two, I have had a good. bit of mail from the general aviation segment, which always seems to be in a defensive position. Apparently they feel they have `been badly handled by the press or someone because every time there is a midair collision there is an inference that it is the fault of general aviation. I think that is one of the reasons we asked the representative of AOPA to appear, in order that you may give your views on the subject and point out that all these accidents, of course, are not due to private aviation. You have a very rich background. I have read your biography that is attached to your statement. You are aware of all the problems of the air traffic controllers. I think that is one of the sensitive areas that has to do with air safety, particularly midair collisions. In going over your testimony, I would like to ask one question in the area of visibility. You point out in your statement that there is a strong objection `to increased visibility, or at least changing the air frame `structure by the air frame manufacturers. Would you t~ll the committee for the record why is there that objection ? What is the reason? Mr. KAYNE. Mr. Devine, I think you are referring to my statement which was oarried more or less in full stai~tingon page 6 of the written testimony. We did include a statement there. This is more or less his- torical `at this point. `There was a statement that `there was strong ob- jection from the airframe manufacturers with respect to imposing, you might say, rigid and detailed minimum standards for cockpit visibility. Captain Ruby. very competently touched on that `this morn- ing when he, in effect, stressed some of the difficulties that an airframe manufacturer has in increasing the visibility for the pilot from within the cockpit. Mr. DEviNE. He suggested decreasing, actually, in the ~iore sophis- ticated aircraft. In the SST when we saw. the mockup on the west coast, they have to drop the nose prior to landing `so they can `see when they come in. Mr. KAYNE. I believe there are some foreign moclel's'of the SST prorn jected that will `have a shield that wili drop in front of the windshield when they are at high altitude in flight, to protect the windshield from undue heat and pressure, and so on. PAGENO="0214" 210 In any event, obviously, as airplaims got faster and the ~r~ssure or stress on the hull of the airplane, including the windshield became greater, the tendenoy, of course, was to make. the windshield smaller and stronger. If you have a large expanse of glass, this means that the glass has to be much stronger to withstand the pressure over a larger area~. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ So there apparently has been some tendency to reduce visibility. I might stress again that our recommendation here is not directed par- ticularly at airline aircraft. It isairline aircraft, yes, but also we would like to see better visibility out of some of our general aviatioi~i aircraft. Mr. DEVINE. Are we getting to the point of no return on speed, perhaps~ ~ Mr. KAYNE. I would not try to minimize the difficulties, Mr~, De~ine, of the manufacturers or designers in jroduciñg high speed ~aircraft with better visibility from them~ Th& frd1it~ary ~t drie timb Or aiio~her have approached this by placing the pilots in, you might s~, a bubble configuration, so that he was elevatt~[ abOye the fuselage a little bit and could see out better. There have be~n a number of sehen~iës onthis. This is one that we would like tosee g~eater concentration on, ou the part of not only the manufactu~ers and ~se~rcthers,but we think pos- sibly NASA should be able to &ntribüte s&riè very gOod research worl~ i~ this field. ~ ~ ~ . ~ Mr. DEVINE. To get to another area, would it be your opinioii, Mr. Kayne, t~hat proximity warning indicators in general aviation ~tircraft, which would be perhaps within the financial means of sofrio o~ the pri- vate pilots, and collision avoidance systems on the commercial air- craft, the two devices, although having the same purpose but b&ng different in operation, do you think they wbuld help ~o1v~ som~ of these midair problems ? ~ ~ Mr. KAYNE. I think they *ould help greatly, sir. I know there has been some discussion informally between pilots. In fact, we have talked this over with some of the airline pilot group. There was some talk of that at their last safety forum here ih Washington. The thinking is that the airline~, and this is my personal opinion, too, must ha~e a col- lision avoidance system in their aircraft, for one. Two, we have conceived this proximity warning indicator, which I will refer tO as PWI, as a simple device, possibly on a noncooperative basis, so that this gives you warning of someone else in your vicinity.. We hope that could be a building block to go ir~to the collision avoid- ance system. If it would not be, then you coi~ild carry the two systems, say, in an airline airplane. We could carry one but they could carry both the sophisticated and the shnple' system and then they would have protection against themselves and protection against any rntruder of any kind that did not have a system or if the collision avoidance system was not operating. Mr. FmEDEL. I know back in 1957-58, an invention was placed on the dashboard of an aircraft ~nd there would be an indication that if \ a plane was coming from the right, t~he light would light, on the right side, or from the left on the left side, and at mileages that were in- dicated. The only thing you could rA~ot do with that was to tell at what altitude the plane was. I `believe this is a simple device and not very expensive, so far as I know. That wouid be a tremendous help te the general aircraft, the small plan~a Why that w'a~ not pursued, as PAGENO="0215" 211 I would like to see it pursued, I cannot understand. I think it is not expensive. This should be pursued iinmediat~ly. At least give them that much for the smaller planes. The others may have radar that would give altitude, but the small plane would know if a plane is to the left or the right, 5 or 10 miles away, and he would start looking for it. ~ Mr. KAYNL I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, we think this would be a great help. I did notice that Congressman Fascell has introduced a bill, H.R. 11677, dire~ting the FAA Administrator to research the development of such .a device. We ~ wholeheartedly in favor of this. We hope that thjs actioi~ will really be. pushed. . Mr., ,Em1~DEL. I think they have been really slow in coming to the co~ic1usions on this. I lçriow in 1957, and 1958 at Atlantic City we wit- nessed ~t and they w~re experim~ting with it then. I wotild like to see something move forward on this , inunédiatedy. I think this wa~ given to the Governme~nt for $1, `by aninventor from Baltimor~, Mr. Oharles Adk~r. I thinkhe deser:ves a great deal of credit. That isall I have to say rightnow. , ` Mr, DEvINE. , I have a question on your annex D to your statement, Mr.' K~a~y~e. You po'ixite4 out the number of cdllisions between com- mercial aviation and ge~rierai aviation, and the number of collisions between commercial and commer~ia~ ; but you do not have statistics ozi midair collisions between general aviation and general aviation. Can you provide such sta'~istics at a later time ? Mr. ` I~AYN~. Yes. I. n~ight sa~y that is a fairly siiJhstantj~1 number, without equivocation. I think it is easy to ~mderstan.d this because quite a few of those cOllisions incidentally result not in a loss of life but they happen between students who are training at a small airport and they are going around and around, shooting landings and takeoffs. In- variably one of them is concentrating so much on his ~irp1ane that they `brush wing tips. Mr. ~VINE. Would you pro~ride that information Mr. KAYNE. Yes; we will. (The. ~ollowing material was recei~red by the committee:) SUPPLEM~*TAL STATISTICS ON COLLISIONS BETW1~EN GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT, Str]~MITTED j3y AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS `ASSOCIATION Congressman Devine requested statistics on' collisions between general aviation aircraft similar to those provided i~a ~knnex D to AOPA's written testimony be- fore the Stibeommittee. Our source of information on these accidents has been the Civil AeronauticS Board and now is the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). We have queried the NTSB for the desired statistics, but they are either um able or unwilling to make this information available. We suggest that it can be obtained by an inquiry from the chaiTman of the Subcommittee. We do have partial information indicating the number of collisions between general aviation aircraft, but we are lacjdng the number of fatalities. The num- ber of collisiOns for each year is indicate'd'below and we believe that the number of fatalities resulting from these collisions in each year will be somewhat less than the actual number of collisions. We have arrived at this conclusion by a process of elimination applied to available statistics. For example, in 1963 there were :ti collisions between general aviation and two collisions between general aviation and military aircraft. These collisions produced a total of six fatalities. In 1964, the ratiO `was 12 general aviation and two general aviation military collisions with a total of 11 fatalities. Collisions between general aviation aircraft are as follows: PAGENO="0216" 212 195~ in~a I (~P~ 195~ 1 c~c~ 196'~ I ü~~i I (~IO 1964 1 ~bR~ Source of the above figures Is the Civil AerOi1autio~ Board. Bllreru ~. ~afety. Mr. DEviNE. In your statement, you suggest short parallel runways at your . main airports being helpful to general aviation. Would you make any suggestion on how far separated those should be from your main runways ? Are you talking about 5,000 feet ? Mr. KAmui. That is a hard question to answer specifically, Mr. Devine, but I think I can answer it enough to satisfy you~ In the first place, New York City, or the Port Authority of New York, for ex- ample, recently converted three taxiways on John F. Kennedy Airport to short runways for general aviation. Unfortunately, at least one of those, and possibly several of them, are so close to the main runway and placed in such a position so that if a fully loaded DC-8 going overseas, for example, takes off and rotates, his wingtip vortices and turbulence hits just about where you are over on the s~Grt r~fltWa~; It is so close that it gives you pause for thought before you use it. One of the others they have is so spaced that the taxi distance on John F. Kennedy makes i~ almost impractical to use it. We have just looked into this to see why these runways are not getting sufficient use and one of these is apparently that several of them are too close to the main runway. Mr. DEVINE. Would a separation such as the Potomac River ~ut here with Washington National and Bolling be adequate? Mr. KAYNE. That would be more than adequate. Mr. DEvINE. Have you made recommendations in that area? Mr. KAYNE. Yes, sir. As you probably know, we have been pushing to have a runway on the old Bolling-Anacostia complex used for gen- eral aviation. In fact, we could almost make parallel runways thiei~. O'Hare in Chicago has two parallel runways that ~ are about 5,000 feet apart and these are used for simultaneous IFR approaches by large aircraft with just a slight staggeDing of the altitude. For the general aviation part we could be closer than that. ~Ve can do a little research. I would hazard a guess that somewhere in the neighborhood of 700 to 800 feet between the runways would give us sufficient distance to avoid wingtip vortices except under the most unusual conditions where the witid ~ might be driftij~g slowly over toward the general aviation runway. Mr. DEvINE. Thank you very mach. Mr. DINGELL (presiding) . Mr. Kuykendall. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Kayne,.would a crop dusting. airplane with- out a radio and no flight plan be allowed to land at Memphis, Tenn., Municipal Airport? Year: Nw,n~bor of coilisions bctwcc~ generai aviation aircraft 16 14 10 12 10 19 20 14 11 12 24 PAGENO="0217" 213 Mr. KAYNE. I can answer that, but I would have to qualify my ahsw~r. Mr. Kunu~NDALL. I am waiting for an answer. Mr. KArNE. I am not familiar spe~ifical1y with the traffic at Mem- phis, but :i suspect that there may be some crop dusters landing there. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Yes. There ~vas a 727 that I was a passenger in forced to ~ go around the field by a `crop duster with no radio several weeks ago. Mr. KAYNE. There are many of our airports that are used by air- lines, and I will `avoid the term major airports because I don't think it really happens in the major airports, there are many airports used by airlines that also accommodate crop dusters working the local fields in that vicinity. There is a provision in the regulations to permit the control tower chief, `at his `discretion, to allow such aircraft without radio in and out. lie usually does this under, you might say, closely controlled conditions where he knows when they are going, when they are coming. They get a green traffic light from `the control tower to indicate that they `can `land or take off. These conditions `are closely monitored. We know that some of the crop dusters, particularly if they are `dusting, have an explosive combination in that dust, particularly if thebin is partly empty. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Forget about the fact that he is a crop duster. Make like he is `a cattle rancher. I am speaking of `the fact `that this airplane `has no `radio, `has no eight plan, has no weather report, and just came in and landed. He got a green `light, yes. I am sure he would have landed whether or not he got the green light. This is a `major airport, two 10,000-foot jet runways with ` probably 300 transactions a `day. Mr. KAYNE. When we say no flight plan- Mr. KUYIU~NDALL. He could not have a flight plan because h~ took off from hi's back pasture. ` Mr. KAYNL If he took off from `his back pasture and landed there without `advance coordination and `approval from the `control tower,, my answer to your question would be no, he should not be `allowed there. Mr. KIBrKENDALL. I know. `that this is' the extreme bottom of `the people you represent. `They own an airplane with `an engine `and a propeller, `one or two seats, a gallon `of gas and that is it. The other extreme is `the corporate' jet, whose pilot may have `as many hours, `Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Ruby. That is `the other extreme. I think we on this `committee are goin.g to have to differentiate betwe~n the crop `dusters with no radios and the corporate jets. It is my understanding that recently the authorities in Frauce, after having built a subsidiary field with GCA and ILS `have prohibited the use of Orly and Le Bourget by `any aircraft that does not have at least two pilots and compatible electronics. Have you heard `about this development? ` ` ` Mr. KAYN~. No, sir. I heard you spe'ak `of it this morning. Let me put it this way: I kn~o~ that Orly and Le Bo'urge't have re- stricted traffic. Mr. KUYKENDALLI They di'd `have the other equipment ready, the other strip ready and equipment ready, `when they made the decision. That is our understanding. PAGENO="0218" 214 `Mr. KAYNE. My underStandii~g of that, and maybe my info~n~ation is not as current as yours, is that the other airport that they n~iade ~wai1ab1e for general av~iatioi~ ~ was i!o;Oat~d quite some dista~ioe from the ~ity. I have forgotten what it ex~ctly is; but it is something on the order of ~3O miles. It was not really a well equipped airport, as far as general ~viationis concerned. . . ~ ~ As I say, `I think your in~ormationmay be more c~irren~t than mme. (The following information was received by the committee:) GENEEAL AVIATION USE O~' AIRrORT~ IN PU1~ ~AI~I$, ~RA&NCE, AREA, Su~ITTED BY THE AIECRA~r OWNERS & PILOTS AsspcIATIo~ ~ The following information concert~ing general ~tviation u~e of airports In the Paris, France, area is supplied in connection with a i~oint. raised by :Rep~resenta~ tive Kuykendall at the August 28 hearing on ayiatiori safety. ~ ~ Orly Field is the uiain airline terminal,fôr Paris and it is generally acknqwF- edged that general aviation operations are' discouraged at Orly. llöWei~êr, there are no restrictions indicated in the InternatiOnal Plight Information Manual published by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The Aeronautical Lni~or- m~ttion Services document (Due 738&-AIS/5O~/lS) published by ICAO also list~ n~b specific restrictions conc~rning private aircraft and m~ely indicates that prior permission is required. Apparently, a small numb~r of gétieral a~ation movements are permitted since some have been reported by our menlber~ in Europe. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Le Bourget airport may be~ compared with La Guardia Field ~n New York, since it accommodates. both general aviation ~nd domestic airline operati9ns. No restrictions on Le Bourget are indicated in either the US. or ICAO do~ument~. however, Le Bourget does charge an "Assistance tax" ~ of 65 Pr. ( about $13,00) for services rendered. This does tend to discourage general aviation traffic. Traffic figures furnished for Paris unfortunately lump all traffic fo~ both Orly and Le Bourget for a grand total of 191,O2~ plane movements in 19t6. This means that these two airports together handle a volume of traffic that is comparable to that handled by our airport at Nashville, Tennessee, which ranks #80 in the standing of traffic volume at U.S. airports. .~ There are two general aviaticni airports in the vicinity of Paris. One of these is at Guyancourt, which is a sod strip and which suffers from prolonged shut- downs during ~ winter months because of the, unsafe condition of the sod. The major general aviation airport is Tonssus-le-l~oble airport. This field is approximately eleven nautical miles airline distance ~ from the * center of Paris. It is the base for approximately 230 aircraft and has, in ~round figures, 200,000 plane movements a year. Current aviation charts and manuals do not indicate either radar or ILS at this airport. These publications indicate that the airport does have a control tower and VHF' direction finding service~ It did not have a night beacon until September 22, 19~6, at which time it was offi~l~Uly opened for night and IFR operations. . ~ The Paris Airport Authority indicates that 17% of the combined plane move- ments for Orly and Le Bourget are general aviation. It is also interesting to note that Poussns-le-Noble handles more operations than Orly and Le Bourget corn- bined. By U.S. standards Of traffic-handling, neither Oily or Le Bourget are oper- ating anywhere near maximum capacity. In fact, they can be. considered as be- ing very lightly used in comparison with the traffic at a large number of major airports in the U.S. The above commentary was prepared from a number of official U.S. and ICAO documents, together with letters from AOPA members in Paris, articles from 13~rench magazines and statistical information provided by both * the Erench and U.S. governmei~ts. ~ , ~ Mr. KUYTENDALL. I don't have information as to the proximity of the auxiliary airport. It seems to me that we are going to be faced in the long range with a great many of the suggestions that you made in your report having merit, but it seems that most of them are pv~tting a patch on a patch, that we are going to have a matter, let's say at N~ttional Air,por~, or at PAGENO="0219" JFK, that,. if you do i~iot cont~o1 the ~entrance of general aviation; and you limit th~ airpoi1~ to t1a~ number of transactions p~r hour, then the airliner will be edged out con~pletely. In other words, it does not reciprocate ~on~r~l. I notiee in using your ~Igures about the number of interested people involved in using the taxpayers' sup~ported facility you use only the owners as compared to the owner~oto speak. . Butusing your own figures here, thA number of passenger miles,and this is the people ~nvoived, the citizens involved, of the airline, accord- ing t, your own figi~~es;would b~ a~lmost six times as great for the air- lines . as it wotild be for private a~iai~ion. I don't think it is good to come here and have either of you against each other. I join in what . Mr. Deyine said. I ~1on't like to be comparing colli- sions. ~ iS just like some Vietnan~ pe~e people cqming to us and saying, "Your atrdcities are worse than theirs." I don't like either one of them. ~ I doft't like the idea p~f comparing th~ collisions as a means of comparing the validity of ~ the two c~tuses. I think both have good vaiidity.Thiø is a point I ~v~zit~tl to make ~iere That either party, because of the size of their business has certainly a valid use, one not ~mor~ than the Qther just because there are more private owners than there are commercial owners. There are many times more public passengers than there are private passengers. Do you think that there should be~ any airports today where non- commercial type aircraft-let~s go back to the same definition we used before, two pilots with compatible electronic's-do you think there should be any airports in America today that should not be allowed to be used by airplanes without this type of equipment and pilots? Mr. KAYNE. I don't know exactly what you are talking about in the way of compatible electronics. Mr. KUYKENDALL. ILS, GCA, and two pilots. Mr. KAYNE. The regulations require two-way radio communication with any airport with control towers operated by the Federal Govern- mont. That included Memphis. Mr. KUYKENDALL. What would be the penalty if he came in and landed without it? Mr. J~AYNE. I don't know what schedule of penalties are under the Federal Aviation Act. They would be subject to either fine or revoca- tion or suspension of certificate; or bøth. Mr. KLTYKENDALL. You say two-way radio is required on any FAA- supervised latiding facility? Mr. KAYNE. Any airport thathas a Federal control tower. It could be FAA or `a military field with control tower, this equipment is re- quired at either. ILS, of course, is an instrument landing system and this is something that you would not need in good weather. If you are going to make an instrument approach or flying IFR ~nd make an instrument approach I would say we would have it, whether general aviation or air `carrier. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Do you think a student pilot with full radio equipment should be allowed to land at National Airport? Mr. KAYNE. I would not rule out the student pilot with full radio equipment' landing at National Airport for several reasons. In the first plaice, before he lands there he has to `get a clearance. He is under control. The tower ~is watching him ~nd working him all the way. 215 `I PAGENO="0220" 216 This, inciden~aiiy, must be part of the trainiing ~f the student as he comes ailong. These studenth ~veintua11y become private pilots, corn- mercial pilots1 and then air1ii~e~ pilots. Th~t is the way we get air- line pilots. If you are asking this in the context of a brandne~w student who is just sciloing and so on, normally we would not encourage it at places like Washington National. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Can he land there now? Mr. KAYNFI. Washington National to my recollectkn has some re- striction against student ~perations. This is not true of all airports. Some airports do have it and some do not. We also hai~e found that there are some students who aretrained right on major airports because the schools are located there and they go out and they have instructors with them. This is done under carefully controlled conditions. Mr. KUYKENDALL. But they cannot control that young solo pilot on his first time out. Mr. KAYNL I would not recommend the young solo pilot in the con- ditions you are talking about, his first time out. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Would you prohibit him from doing that at National Airport? Mr. KAYNE. From my own personal opinion, I would say yes. But also I have to tell you that National Airportright now is not operating up to its capacity. It is conducting 4,000 operations a year less than it did in 1960. At the same time, we had Boiling and Anacostia operat- ing with more traffic in the air, so that the total operations at National and in the vicinity are down. National is nOt congested as far as air- planes on runways are concerned ; it is terribly congested so far as airline passengers are concerned in the terminal building. The air- line ramps are congested but the general aviation side of it and the run- ways themselves are not congested. The air traffic part of it is not congested. Mr. KrYKaiThALL. You are the first person who has even implied this may `be true. Most of the other witnesses have gone in the other direction but I won't get into argument about that. Mr. KAYN1~. Thi~~is rather~~kreli documented. T think I am very well qualified `to speak on this because 1 was the first chief controller. of the tower at Washington~Airport. I have followed that airport for many years. (The followinginformation wasreceived by the committ~e:) STATEMENT ON USE OF MA~rOR AIRPORTS, SUBMITTaD BY VICTOR J. KATNE, VICE PRESIDENT, AIRORAFT OWNEBS & PILOTS A8soci&TION Mr. Kuykendall d~seussed the use o~f major airports by various types of traffic and mentioned an tncident at Memphis wherein a ctop duster apparently landed with no clearance from the control, ~ower. . The current FAA regulations r~uire a radio clearance from the control tower prior to landitig or taking off from an~ airport with a Federal control tower. There also Is a provisiOn for the controller tO ail~W non-radio traffic to land or take off subject to prior approval from the tower. If this was not ~btained In the Memphis incident, then the pilot was ln violation of the regulations. When we are dealing with a pilot who will violate existing regulations', it obvion~ly would do no good to write additional regulations, since the pilot would also violate those rules. Our public airports accommodate all types of traffic, under reasonable rules imposed by the FAA, without discrimination as to whether the traffic is airline, military,. commercial, private, or any other category. An effort to distinguish. between some of these with the objective oJ~ restricting certain opEirations would PAGENO="0221" 217 be virtually impossible on ~ fair arid impartial basis. For exa~np1e, if we attempt to rule out so-called ~~1easure flying or transportation ~or perso~ia1 reasons in a private aircraft, then it also appears that we should rule out the airline trip that is carrying a cargo of vacationers or people otherwise traveling for pleasure. After all, the airline is a commercial venture for profit and has no greater entitle- ment to the use oi~ publh~ facilities than a businessman in his company airplane. Crop dusters usually do not operate from the major hub airports, although they do operate from many airports that also accommodate the scheduled air- lines. This usually is done through a mutual arrangement with the control tower and all operations are carefully controlled so as to avoid hazard to of~ier traffic. Reference is made to aircraft operated by cattle ranchers with the inference that such aircraft are usually poorly equipped, or as Mr. Kuykendall phrased it, with no radio, no flight plan, no weather report and representing the extreme bottom of the people in our Association. Our experience Is that some ranchers do own such aircraft for use on the home acres, but the aircraft that they use for travel away from the home rane~i Is exceptionally well equipped by anyone's standards. They certainly do not represent the bottom of AOPA's membership. AOPA's testimony before the subcommittee with respect to airports, and I refer specifically to recommendation No. 12 on page 18 of my prepared testimony, makes several recommendations with respect to provision for general aviation on m~jor airports and the establt~1~mentef other airports designed to draw general aviation traffic away from the major airports Insofar as practicable. We recognize the desirability o1~ this, but we also recognize that some general aviation opera- tions must continue to be accommodated at the ma3or airports used by the airlines. It would be Impossible to establish different categories of such traffic, because the need variee with tbe requirements of the aircraft operator In lIght of a variety of local circumstances, Further, it has not been established that general aviation use of major airports is a hazard to safety. There has been some discussion of Inconvenience to the a11,llnes, but no one has yet suggested that we ban private and business automobiles from our public superhighways In order to gtve prefereht.t~i treatment to the buses and other commercial motor carriers. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Let me close with this : You pointed out that there have been two disastrous collisions in recent months. Now, unless we do something as a Congress and as a people and we suddenly start out here with a rash of collisions at National and Dulles and John F. Kennedy, the hue and cr~y from the general public is going to be such that we are going to wish we had acted. I would like to see from your organization some categorization of your type of flying and some suggestions as to what can be done to regulate it for safety purposes. This is for the future. As a member of this committee I would like to have this from you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FwEr~. ~1r. Pickle, 4o you have any questions? Mr. PICKLE. I do not have aiiy questions at this paint. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Dingell. Mr. DINaEu~. Yo~ disouss i~i your comments, sir, the question of positive control. Yo~i indicate an opposition on the part of your organization to ~ redi~oing l~he leve4 of positive control of aircraft to 18,000 feet. i: wouk~ like to bow ~he rationsie, why you oppose that reduction ~ o~f~ posi1~iv~ ~control height. ` ~ Mr. KAYNE. Our reasons ~for oppos~ig i1 ~ra severalfold. Inciden- tally, this is a rnatt~er of proposed rulemaking. before the FAA and this is not the first time they have proposed it and it is not the first time we have objected to it. They tried this several years a~o and the re- sponse that they got bi~ck from their public rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act was so strong as to cause the agency to abandon the requirement at that time. Now we have a number of general aviation aircraft aria the number PAGENO="0222" 218 is increasing all' the time, that canop&rate at the higher altitudes, with pressurized cabins and turboeha~ged engines. Mr. DINGELL. Twin engines ? ~ ~ ~ Mr. KAYNE. Not only twins, but we have them coming ai~ng in singles, too. We have the better known general aviation jets; Lear Jets, Jetstars, and so on. ~ . ~ . . Mr. DINGELL. Was it one of those si~igle-enginc turbine jets that was operating at 23,000 feet a whi~ie back ~ when ~ National Guard plane flew inth its rear end ? ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Mr. KAYNE. I thought that w~s a single-engine Bonanza. I may be wrong. ~ ` ~ ~ *: ~ ~ ~ Mr. 13i~rn~i~i~. Single-engine p~'e~surized supercharged airoraft, single-engine, general aviation, up ~3;OOO feet, and a N'atioi~ai &uard aitcraft flew right into the rear end of it This is ~ vety, very good argumen4fór positLve control of ~á1~t at 20,000 feet. ~ ~ ~ . Mr. KAYNE. Sir, the i~aet thatpne airplane fli~w~ through another one, o~r ran over him, whu~he~ei~ ~way you wan~t to put it, does not really ~çiake ~i argument fo~ a~th~itional reguWtiotts there ~1.V[r PING~UJ In a1~ probahiJity ~ih~t~ a~ceiden~t wogl4 ~iot ha~ve oc curred if~ b~th!those a,ircraft:hadikfe~n undeii~.p~si:tive t~ontroL .~ ~ Mr KAYNI~ We have had `acc~de~it~ Whe~ eyerythin~ there Was under positive control, fulj traj~h con~o1, ~u~L~1 y~t the tWo I~t~L into ~ch Qther, Ii~As~heville~ twq ~u'pianes wits ATe ~lk~ng to them up to thela~trninute, th~y sf11 rah~togebher. ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~c . . ~ Mr. DTNiELt2. ~Tlia~t was ~ ~ ~O~ti~d1 ~i~ror,'I b~1ie~e, ~ in A~hevil1~, where one aircraft flew into th~ bottom of the other one. Mr. K~&i~n~ `~Phe~way W&~n~d~r~tQOdit h~did npt fly into the~bottom of~it;~Qi~~ pop~ ~ ~ lip 111 frbt~t O~f~i~he ~the~oi~ it was a imitter of one at ci~tiisin~g Ie'~t~I and~ th~ cther O~i!ie in ~ ~ climb It was a popup He hitth&botto~rñ ~!ll~ ~h~sid'e 4f tf~e~ge~. it;wat~ a in~tt~r of coming tt~infrontofMth. ~ ~ ~ . . ~ . ~ ~ ` ~ ~ ~ ~ Mr.. DiNoEri~. i~: ~ fai~ ~ ~ay~t~h~ Mö~ ~sitl~e coiitrçl ~u have ~ ~ ri~j~ of~coFFisMil b~Cau~etof ~ ~ ~ ~:/ ~Jfl ~ ~, ~ . M~r `KAYNi~ I~!1~1istioall~ ~ott~te~th~t I thmk~ Is ~tSt~nt1 Frim a practical application~rith~idi~At~ ~iW1~he~ ~ ~`tbd~ty~, ~ tI%~ is what I tried to bring out here and ~ br~in?gh~1i ~tit in response to e~a~riith! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Mr. DINGELL. When we get the new sy~{~!4~ln' ~ve~th~ ~bWin- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ `~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ hdl~ti~tjM~ffi~c tèr~t!P~ iTh~I ~ b~f~t~I~ got computers ~ ~ ~ fl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ``~ ~ ~Mr~~4k~! ~ ~ei~~i ~iii~~I have th!lkéd~t& ~5c~trôlIe~: ~ 1~ight ~.tow. théy~tei~1f; ~i~è ~h~tt ~thp~ters ~IÔs~ ~ñ*~thirig like ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ` ~ ~ ~ , (~ ~ . ~ PW~tht ~thi~t~S f~I1'th~Wll~ ~ d~gi~t~bii~øppbsed a really rn!eathngfttl ftè ~&th t~f ~o'~ii~ côiit~öi~ at~ 1bts~F ~1tit~d~s down to 18$JOO feet. You , YW~ia~&~ s~m~ dritici~th `of, th~ 1~AA; if %h ~ tü~& éliniiña~ed' then it becomes very clear that positive control can be had. So, let us assume PAGENO="0223" 219 that w~ eliminate the criticisms which you have of the Administration and buckle down to adequate administration. You indicate there is a lack of money.I suspect that that perhapsis Congress' fault, the Bu~ reau of the Budget's fault, ~ You have already con~eded ideally it is better to have positive control at lower heights. Mr. KAYNL I don't think I have conceded that. . Mr. DINGELL. You said idealistically. ~ Mr.KAYNE. Idealisti~a1lyin a sense. We have found out that we have collisions under a~r traffic control. Mr. ~ DINóELL. And you have collisions where they are operating ~vithout positive control ? Mr. KAYNE. That is right. Mr. `DINGELL. in theory at least, and ideally, there is much larger oppoi~tunity for i~ collision where aircraft are not under positive con- ti~l. Isn't that a fact ? Can youden~hat'~ Mr. KAYNE. Ill the limited ~ context you ask it, I would say yes, I agree with you. ~ ~ ~ Mr. DINGU~. Not in a limited ~Oñtext. Cold logic says if you have a~ircraf~ uMer positive control there ~wil1 be less chance of collision particularly when airoTaft now are operating at 300 to 1,400 miles an h~ôur instead ~ of the 180 or 250 miles * an hour that they used to Qper~te1n, because ~ visibility problems, reaction time, and the other ~roblerns*we face in this, area.Is that correct ? Mr:tKAYNE. Lam afraid this question is very much like : "Have you stopped b~atingybur wife ~ " ~ ]~1:~r. ~~p~qELL. No, it i~ riot. ~ ~ ~ ~I;r. ~ ~L ~an agr~ with you~nd I can d~sagreè with you. Mr. DIN~LL. It iscold,iogic. . , : * ~ ~ `Mr~ ~ 1 can agree ~ with you but 1 would have to qualrfy my ai~s~ver arid the chath~n is waving the gavel ~ DINO1d~L r suppose if I were ~pa Oldtime seat of the pants pilot iwould telik~that~too~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~MT: FnIEm~ri. I wil~l4ow you~to answer if you wish, but the4ime ofThe gentleman has ë~ired ~ KA~E.~ t~t i~ h~ke4 ~bi'ief öffér.We' wfll ~rcwi~de ä~ ~It~tailed ausw~erto~that;inwritin~g if that w~iH heip~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~ M~ ~Pn~a~s~u I have no objectiôiii ~ ~ c~'~ 1~o~w~i~ig ~Orr~tidn ~tah~g ~t~e AOPA position was re c~v~c1 kyktl~,e e~mic~tt~e~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ,L~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A~p]~6J~i~ OW~R~ 8~ i~ILO~1~$ A~SSOCI4~TION, ~ ~ ~? ~. ~ ~; ç ~ ` ~ <~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ Wa$kifl~7to~'i, ~ Jt~Zy, `~JP~7. FEr~AL ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . . ~ ~ ~ . ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *, ~ . ~ ; S~ ~ ~~`S5 * ~ S ~ ~, S~S5~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ .~ S~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ S ~ *~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S * ~ ~ ~ ~~TLEMw~: Rete~ernie isiflade to D~o1~et~ No~e7-W~--16 ~s~iec1 M~y tI~ 1967 eitit1s~I~"Po~1tiw Oc~fttr~1Axea~P ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ S ~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ..~ ~ ~ ~ S * AQP~Lst~organ4zatt~m ~nppro~dUiat~iy ~S,OOO members ~c~4io ope~ite air- eraft ~o'r busi~i~s~'piirposea, ~personattransportatto~i and for~p1easure. The air- craft flo~i~re beeomj~g ine~as~ngi~r ;~iOre sophh~ticated in design, instrwiaenta- tiOn2~nd~c~tpabiaity. More and ~iuoi~e.~of them, ine1u~j~g pressur4zed turtoicb~rged s1n~g1e~ei~gine.foiir-piace aircraft, have the ability to take advantage, of o~~Vlinuni i~ruising A1ti'tu~1es up tOt~i1id' above 24,000 feet MSL. In general;cruising speeds of such aircraft, excluding jets, do not exceed the 250-knot range `At such speeds the, see-and,1*~seen principleS fei~ collision avoidance are practicable. PAGENO="0224" 220 AOPA has been wcrking closely with the FAA for ten years on problems arising from high speeds in the airspace. With the introduction of jet aircraft into the air carrier fleet, the Agency placed certain equipmeut requirements on their high altitude operation, provided traffic ath4sory service to' them and designated positive control airspace on both a route and area basis. The optimum cruising altitudes for jet aircraft are above FL 240 and the closure speeds indicate that the pilot is not able to avoid collision satisfactorily without assistance from ground radar. AOPA supports this view. Since 1958, AOPA has consistently recommended to the FAA and to the Congress that ways and means be developed for control of VFR traffic in areas which might requiTe positive control for high speed aircraft. AOPA's position on this matter lijs not changed. Phis NPRM Indicates that this requirement for general aviation has been satisfied because a separate action proposes an amendment to Part 91 of the FARe which would permit CVF in positive cOntrol airspace. This action, however, gives only lip sei~vice t~ AOPA's requirements. The sole concession to the rigid requirements for LFR operation in positive eon~ trol airspace is that the pilot need not have a current~ ~nstrurnent rating. The aircraft itself must have all the s~phisticated operating equipment required for jet aircraft flight except a DME. AO~PA will have detailed comments on the Inadequacies of the proposal in its response thereto. The subject proposal states that the "FAA now has the capability to prQvjde positive control service in the proposed area with its present re~owrcc~ and without undue hardship to the nsers." It also states that "Because of the additlopal safety provided by positive control it is proposed to lower the floor of the positiv~ control area to 18,000 feet ~tSL within the airspace described herein." AOPA has streng douhts con~erning the vai~dity of both statements. Our reasons are as follows : (1) In 194~1, air traffic control operated 36 centers with 6~S49 controllers, 49 radars, 50 beacons and handled 9,69T,4~7 IE~R operations. This was per~ formed, so far as positive control was con~erned, along 7,~97 miles of 1nter~ mediate altitude positive control jet routes and 77,950 mtles of jet routes. Area Positive Control between 24,000 and 60,000 feet MSL was implemented in 1962 over practically all of the 48 Staten. In 1966, air route traffic control operated 2~ centers with 6,573 controllers, 88 radars; 89 beacons and handled 13,5~4$843 IFR operations. There were 96,935 miles of jet routes. This means that the number of control personnel b~s increas~ ~M~% ;~ the number of radar systems be has to ~atcb is up 79.5~% ; the beacons . by 78.00%; the overall IFE activity is up 89.57% ; the numbers o~ radar and beacons per controller u~ about 78.0% 13UT the IF~ activity per con~ troller Is up awhopping 35.84%. On the other hand the actlvlt3r per radar per controller Is duwn by 24.9~% wl~1eb means that as the radar' eover~ge went up and the traffic Increased, the control personnel were spread tMnne~ and thin~i~r and the cost of. each operation In terms o~ facilities mounted astronomically. The NPRM states, inter alia, "~ * * predicts a 61. percent Increase in sched~ uled air carrier aircraft and 504 percent increase in general aviation airera~t." The F4A publication "En route IFI~ Air Traffic ~u~~rey" for FY 196~ reports peak-day activity between 18,000 feet MSL and 8~,QQO feet MSL of 2,839 air carrier and 177 general avlatlo~i aircraft Projecting these flgui~es to 1970 by the ~3'AA S OWU prediction ~ou1d 1ndh~tt&an anuiial worklo*d~An ad4~14pn to ~ normal increases in other altitudes, of 15,608,120 more air carrier and9,27Z~ 730 more general aviation IFR operations In ~he positive coiitrol Syst~em, Or a total Increase of 24,879,850. ThIs is almost twice the thimbet' of IFR a1r~ craft handled during OY 1966 In the entire ATO system. These are peak.da~. figurOs and it Is welI-kEiownthat rIghtnowthepre~rit A'I'O systèni~beoornea overloaded with thiS amount of acttvity breakdowns frequently occ~ a~nd serious delays build up There Is no evidence extant of an7~B'AA p*n~fr~ ~ to handle air traffic loads of approxImately~ three times the volume of pf~es- ent loads within less than three years. There Is no evidence now that the FAA ATO system could cope with the traffic loads which would accrue . with the proposed lowerlugof positive control areas to 18,000 feet MSL. if the ~`AA takes on this task through arbitrary rulemaking, It must be prepared to assume the responsibilIties and liabilities which are Inherent to such an undertaking. In vfe'vrof thIs analysIs, it appears the wó~kload on the contilui personnel is reaching the breaking point. This Is a national figure. To add to this PAGENO="0225" 221 burden in the most heavily traveled area in the world by requiring all aircraft at 18,000 feet MSL and atove to be controlled could, have cata- strophic results. (2) There is no evidence on the record anywhere that positive eontr~l provides additional safety. On the other hand, there are abundant ree~rds that some of the most serious collisiofls in the history of aviation have occurred when all o~ the significant elements of pos~t~ve control huve been present. Both TWA and IJAL were on instruments un~er air traffic control on December 16, 1960 over Staten Island when they collide~l with a rusultant loss of 134 souls. Both TWA and EAL were under air traffic control north of New York recently when they collided. Both the Dove and Oherokee were under the control of the LaGuardia Tower recently when they collided. So-called "Positive" control would have added nothing that would have prevented these accidents. Further, the ~AA is unable to provide a~y instances whatever where positive control . has actually ~hiown where a near m14-air collision eo~ld and would have been averted. In fact, the FAA has not been able to show where actual near mid~air collisions in the airspace under discussion have occurred. In conclusion AOPA feels that there is no conclusive evidence that a valid requirement exists for lowering positive control airspace to 18,000 feet MSL. Neither is there any evidence that the FAA AT(J system is prepared or capable of handling the influx of mandatory IFR or OVF operations without imposing undue hardship, delays and expense to the users `of the airspace. AOPA strongly urges that the proposal be withdrawn. Sincerely, Roxs C. JONES, Director, Air Traffic Control Department. Mr. KAYNE. I just want to add one thing. It is very `short. The nuin- ber of passengers we are talking about and Mr. Knykendall referred to that, too, all available information we have now indicates that general aviation carries as many people in the air as the scheduled airlines do every year. This is a myth that the airlines are carrying the largest number of p~blic and general aviation is carrying one or two people. We are carrying more than one or two people, we are carry- lug them more times, more frequently in more airplanes. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, before you release the witness are you expecting to call a witness representing the air traffic controllers? If not, Mr. Kayne and his colleagues here are the best qualified in that area. Mr. FRIEDEL. They are on the list. Thank you, Mr. Kayne. Mr. KAYNE. Thank you, sir. Mr. FRIEDEL. Our next witness will be Mr. Stuart G. Tipton, presi- dent of the Air Transport Association. You have quite a lengthy statement. Do you wish to summarize it? STATEMENT OP ST1YART G. TIPTON, PRLSIDENT, AIR TItANSPORT ASSOCIATION; ACCOMPANIED BY CLIP~QN P. VON KANN, VICE PRESID'L~T, `OPERATIONS' AND' ENGI~lEE~ING; WALTER A. )EN- SEN, ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT, OPRRATIONS~ AND ENGINEER- ING; AND STANLEY L SELTZER, DIRECTOR, AIR NAVIGATION AND TRAPPIC CONTROL Mr. TIPTON. Normally I would very quickly agree to summarize this statement, Mr. Chairman, but I have been thinking about it all during its preparation. What the statement consists of is quite a detailed action program f'or improvement, and I can't really do it without taking more time than would be taken if I read it. 92-715-68-15 PAGENO="0226" 222 Mr. I~RtE~EL. You may proceed. Mr. TIr~roN. I appreciate that very much because I know how hard- pressed the committee and its members are. Before starting my testimony, I would like to introduce my asso- ciates here. On my right is Gen. Clifton Von Kanu, vice president of operations and engineering of the Air Transport Association, long familiar with military flying operations. On my left is Walter Jensen, assistant vice president of the as- sociation covering that same area. Mr. Jensen is an experienced air- line pilot and has spent a good part of his professional life in the study of the air traffic control and air navigatioii system. On my far right is Stanley Seltzer, the head of our air navigation, air traffic control group. Mr. Seltzer is an experienced air traffic controller. I think he was the third head of the Washington tower. With that, I would just state for the record my name is Stuart G. Tipton. I am president of the Air Transport Association, which in- eludes in its membership virtually all of the scheduled airlines of the United States. Last April, we appeared before the full committee to discuss several general areas of safety which we believed to be most deserving of the committee's attention. Today our discussion will largely focus on ways to reduce the risk of midair collisions and especially to bring before the subcommittee recommendations concerning those elements of the national airspace system which are the Federal Government's responsibility. PROBLEMS OF GROWTH The unprecedented increase in demand for passenger and cargo capacity is spurring a massive airline investment in new aircraft. Out- standing orders as of June 30, 1967, plus aircraft already delivered since the beginning of 1966, total 1,180 new aircraft valued at $7.7 bil- lion. Sizable orders have been placed since June 30. The airline fleet,. now some 2,000 aircraft, is forecast to grow to approximately 3,500 air- craft by 1977. The general aviation fleet, however, consists of some 104,- 000 aircraft today and is expected to increase almost twofold by 1977- to 180,000 aircraft. FAA expects at least 8,000 of these to be business jets. So business jets will outnumber airline jets by more than two to one. To relate this more closely to the demand for air traffic control serv- ices and facilities rendered by the Federal Government, let us examine the number of controlled aircraft handled at FAA air route traffic control centers. Last year, traffic under center control reached about 14 million : by 1971, FAA forecasts a figure of 22 million, climbing to 31 million by 1977. (See fig. 1.) A sizable portion of this increase is fore~ cast to be general aviation activity. A better overall perspective of the relative traffic demand upon FAA traffic control facilities is shown by the number of aircraft operations at airports controlled by FAA control towers because all aircraft landing or taking off from these airports utilize some portion of the services provided by the control tower. There has been a doubling of traffic from 1961 through 1966, with FAA controllers handling nearly 45 million landings and takeoffs last year. This traffic volume will again triple by 1977 when FAA expects controllers will be called upon to handle almost 140 million landings and takeoffs. By that time, gen- PAGENO="0227" TOTAL IFR AIRCRAFT HANDLED AT FAA AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS Millions I 30~ 25~~ I 20 223 15 10 5 GENERAL AIR CARRIER 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1971 1977 SOURCE: FAA Aviation Forecasts, FY 1967-1977 Figure 1.. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AT FAA CONTROL TOWERS Millions SOURCE: Federal Aviation Agency Figure 2a PAGENO="0228" eral aviation operations at FAA. controlled airports will comprise. over 85 percent of the total. (See fig. 2.) The prospect of such fantastic growth rates might well be considered cause for alarm. But with proper and timely action, steps can be taken to provide the level of safety and efficiency to which the public is en- titled. We have nothing to fear except indecision and inaction. I direct the committee's attention to figure 3 on page 4 of my state- inent. FAA F & E FUNDING vs. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS F F F Fux~ding Mi11ioi~s $ Afrcraft Operations Millions 160 140 120 100 80 60 21) SOURCE: FAA Annual Budget Data Figure ~3. FTYNDS LAG WHILE TRAFFIC GROWS While FFA funding for operation and maintenance of existing facil- ities has risen somewhat with increase air traffic, funding for new facilities and equipment has declined. This decline runs counter to the growth of air traffic that will use these facilities. From this we must conclude that only a greatly stepped-up effort by the Government can keep the airways and the air traffic control services from falling still farther behind. We do not expose these differences as any criticism-actual or im- plied-of FAA. or any other branch of Government. Rather, the air- lines feel it is their obligation to contribute to a reexamination of the national thinking with respect to the safety and efficiency of the na~ tional airspace system. We have no interest in finding fault ; we are merely interested in making air transportation safer, more efficient, and more reliable for all. 224 40 1960 `61 `62 `63 `64 `65 `66 `61 `68 `69 `70 `11 `72 `73 "14 `15 `76 `11 PAGENO="0229" 225 WHAT IS REQUIIU~D The air transport industry is of the firm convi~tion that the best overall method for collision prevention is a highly efficient and reliable air traffic control (ATO) system. Safety, reliability, and effithency are so interdependent that it is frequently difficult to identify any valid distinctions between them. An efficient system with a smooth flow of traffic capable of comforta- bly handling traffic demands, is inherently a sa'e system. The greater its efficiency, the greater its capacity ; and the greater its reliability, the greater is its safety. For this reason, we believe that the public inter- est will best be served by a vastly increased capability in the ATO system. But to have such a system is not enough. That system must be used, and its user~ must be properly equipped and competent to participate. In expanding the air traffic control system capability, it is impor- taut to recognize that there are two basic forms of flying-VFR and IFR. Although the airlines see the need for considerably more posi- tive control by ATO, they also recognize that there `are some areas wherein VFR flying can be accommodated safely without thefull rigor of IFR control. Nevertheless, a higher level of safety for both VFR and IFR traffic can be achieved by requiring more aircraft effectively to participate in the air traffic control system. Accordingly, our rec- onunendations, which follow, include those services and facilities which are concerned with VFR traffic as well as IFR traffic. These recommendations include provisions for- (a) Vastly improved AT'C capability. ( b ) Greater participation in the ATC system. (c) Improved aircraft and pilot capabilities. VASTLT IMPROVSD ATO O~PABILITY Control towers : One of the facilities serving both VFR and JFK traffic is the airport control tower. Of the 526 airports served by the scheduled airlines only ~34 have control towers. (See fig. 4.) Present FAA planning standards require that an ~ airport generate 24,000 itinerant aircraft operations per year before it can qualify for a control tower. These standards give no consideration to total traffic volume nor do they attach any special significance to the fact that the airport might have scheduled airlineservice. The number of aircraft operations is increasing steeply. More and more aircraft-both airline and general aviation-are high-perform- ance. jets and turboprops, which makes it more difficult for pilots to rely solely on the "see and avoid" principle for traffic separation. It is clear that with increasing numbers of general aviation and airline ~jets, even the smaller airports are beginning to face the same congestion problems as did the larger airports a few years back. Lack of a control tower at airports served by the airlines can no longer be set aside as a negligible lack. The airlines hold that scheduled pas- senger service, in itself, is enough to qualify an airport for a control tower. The airlines therefore recommend that FAA provide a control tower at every airport having scheduled airline passenger service. PAGENO="0230" 226 TOWERS, RADARS AND ILS AT A1RLINE~. SERVED AIRPORTS IN CONTINENTAL U.S. 526 AIRUNE- SERVED AIRPORTS SOURCE: CONTROL TOWER SERVICES A:r Transport Associatin~ RADAR PROVIDED AT LEAST ONE ILS Figure l~. TERMINAL RADAR SERVICE Although it was originally looked upon as an aid to IFR traffic, radar has become an invaluable tool in handling VFR traffic as well, ~specially in terminal areas. But onlyiO5Qf the airports served by air~ lineshave radar service. (See fig. 4.) ~ Without radar the higher speeds and growing volume of aircraft flying into and around airports make it increasingly difficult for tower ~ ëontrollers to visually observe and separate all aircraft. It is impossible ~ for controllers to provide pilots with traffic information concerning :0t11e1' aircraft which the controllers cannot see, or of which they have no knowledge. Radar displays in the tower, permitting controllers to observe all traffic operating within their area of jurisdiction, will im- provethe safety of airport traffic control service. In most cases, it will be necessary to install the radar at individual airports to provide this :d servicein the tower ; in some cases the proximity of airports may be such that one radar could be made to serve the displays in two or more control towers. .-~ The airlines recommend that FAA provide terminal radar service at every airport having regularly scheduled airline passenger service. INCREASING THE UTILITY OF ATC RADAR We have noted that because it provides precise, up-to-the-minute views of traffic movements in a given area, radar has become a funda- mental tool in our ATC system. Nevertheless, radar has many limita' PAGENO="0231" 227 itions which must be reduced so that ~ox~tro'1ièrs ~an ~use the radar more ~effective1y. ~ . , ~ ~ Altitude on radar. Among the most significant deficiencie~ of current ATC surveillance radar is its lack of altitude information. Without altitude information on the radar scope, it is exceedingly difficult for controllers to properly assess the collision poh~ntial between aircraft whose blips appear on radar. ~ *` If the radar display showed altitude information automatically tied to aircraft targets, more meaningful traffic information and' advisories would be possible. Furthermore, controllers and pilots would not be distracted by targets representing `aircraft already safely separated by altitude; thus they would have more time to cope with traffic de- serving their attention. The airlines recommend: Expedited installation of alphanumeric and automatic altitude read-out on all terminal and en route `facilities. `(Seefig.5.) MAKING BETTER USE OF RADAR Daylight ra4ar scopes. The high ambient light le~e'l in control tower cabs during da~ylight `hours can render a radar scope unusable unless some of light shield or cover is placed around th~ scope. Such shields themselves interfere with' th~ controller's ability to readily view the scope. Oonsequently, bright tube radar displays suitable for d.~ylight viewing have been de~eioped andare planned for those control towers which currently have radar. Because the bright~ tube ` display makes it possible for the tower controller to utilize his radar during daylight hours, it should become a standard installation in radar equipped control tower cabs. This would be of considerthl~Md to, the controller in the handling of both VFIR and IFR traffic. ~ The airlines recommend that: FAA provide bright tube radar dis- plays for all tower cabs at radar-equipped locations. Radar weather displays. Thunderstorms and other weather phenoni- ena containing heavy precipitation' introduce severe clutter on sOme radar scopes to the extent that the radar can become useless for ATC. `To offset such problems, circular polarization has been utilized, to PRIMARY RADAR SECONDARY RADAR `ALPHA-NUM~RIC Figtire 5. DISPLAY PAGENO="0232" 228 eff~Jcthr~A1y re4uce the~dispiay of the radar clutter often associated with severe weather. Where secondary radar is used alone, no weather in- formation is:seen on seo~es. As a ootflseqiieiice, radar cnntrolh~, h~ckin~ suffic~ent information on sto~'m celis~ within their ai~a of jurisdiction; may inadvertently direc4~ aircraft through an area of severe weather. With appropnate displays, controllers can : (1) avoid inadvertently directing air~ft through se'ver~ storm cells ; (2) aid pilots iii~ avoiding severe weather;: and (3:) a,ntieipate pilots' requests to alter flight paths because of se- vere weather~ makingappropriateadvaiiee plans for alternate routings. Th~ airlines r&~ornrnerid that : FAA provide improved display of weathe~r information on all airtraffic control radars~opes. Instrument landing system. The airport and its approach systems musi~ be conthder e dan integral part of the ATC system. ~ :I?ac)iiities use)d to improve the success of an approach and landing contribute to reliability and efficiency, as well as to safety. These facilities include the prek~ision electronic instrument landing system (ILS) , the visual appr~ach slope indicator, and approach lights W provide guidance during the final seconds of precision letdown in instrument weather conditions. The ILS has traditionally been considered necessary only to improve reliability of air operations because it provides the increased precision necessary tG permit a landing approach in lower weather minima with equal safety. Only 189 of the 526 airports now served by the airlines have ILS ; those communities whose airports lack ILS are often de- prived of airline service during reduced visibility conditions. Every community receiving scheduled airline passenger service should be entitled to an ILS to assure greater reliability of service. With. the introduction of jets, the ILS takes on a second role to~ hnprwG sahty, even in good weather conditions. Since the jet& came into airline service, a number of jet accidents have occurred in ap- proach and landing. There have been enough cases of undershoots and overshoots to convince the airlines that approa~hes with positive glide slope guidance will be better stabilized and therefore safer approax~hes. In our view, every runway used by airline jets should ~havc glide slope guidance, either eiectroiiic o~visuai~ TheILS; withdt~ ~lectronic glide slope, ~an fulfill this requirement in addition to the requirement for a precision landing aid for lower weather conditions. Where ILS~ is not a'~ailthle, visual ~ppro~ich sio~e iudicators (VAST) can meet the røqiiiremer~t of goodweather eonditions~ To reduce the need for circling appr~ache~, it is necessary to pro- vid~ landing aids which sersre at iea~t two b~sie approach directions,. eapecially for jet operations. Thus; some wirports will ha~e a need for twc~ or more ILS installations. The busier the airport, the greater will be the need for additional ILS facilities to service the traffic volume. Parallel ILS installations permit a significant increase in traffic volume during instrument weather conditions~ While there is a great need for ILS-with or without approach lights-to provide precision approach guida~ice for jets in both good and b~d weather, ILS does not yield its full value without approach lights. Approach lights at a price lower than the current $150,000 to~ $200,000 should be achievable. PAGENO="0233" 229 By an objectiv~ examination of actual ia~eds~ ~tr~4 by ai~. .en~getic ~cost reduction program, the cost of this eq~prne~tshoui~Ib~ 1ower~d ~substantia11y. We urge that FAA prornpt1y~eornplete ex~ünation of ~our prior recommendations (we believe a r~ducc~cI length ~ and. lower intensity lights will suffice) so that at least 150 approach ligl~t sys~ tem.s can be included in the fiscal year 1969 bu~ge~t request. The airlines recommend th*at~- (a) ILS and approach lights serving two basic directions of approach be installed at every airport receiving scheduled air- line service. . . ,... (b) Glide slope guidance-eith:er eiectrouic or visuaL-be in~ stalled on every runway used by airline jets. ATO AUTOMATION Proper application of automati~n to the air traffic control system should relieve controllers of many routine functions, .i~i~1uding nu~ `merous clerical ~hore~. Additionally, automation permits more ef~eo- tive coordination between controllers and control facilities. By re- lieving controllers of time-consuming tasks and by providing means for automatically processing and transmitting required flight data ;among control positions and control facilities, automation enhances the controller's ability to devote more time to the separation of air- vcraft. This promotes air safety. ~ ~ Theairlines therefore recommend that~- (a) FAA's curi~ent .automation.program ~for `all air route traffic .. control centers be completed .~ the. earliest possible date. (i,) Terminal area automation plans of FAA be vastly ex- panded and expedited. (C), Pending availability . of ~fuU~scale atitomation equipment planned for the New York, Chies~go, Washington, Los Angeles, `and San Francisco terminal areas, FAA install as `a first step at `least alphanumeric and automatic aIt~tude readout capability on `radardisplays in these terminei ~tacilities. (d) All terminai area radar facili~ties which do not receive full- scai~ automation systems at least have automatic altitude `read~ ~mt~oiaradarscopes. ` SYS5~1~M R1~LIABILITY . It.has beeei~ie i~cr~e~icngly apparent ~that ,redund~ut equi~pineut for such thiri.gs as standby electric power, coi~umunic~ti~ns, navigation aids, and radars are essential to insi~re the ,sa~ety, efik~iency . and integ~ rity of the national airspace system, particularly where tr~fflc den- sities are high. .." ~ ` . . . ~ Area ` eleotrica~i.powcr. ~ilures, rnover the past several years have `shown the need for standby electrical power generators that are inde- pendent of commercial power sources. A reeci* radar failure at Ken- nedy Airport resulted in air traffic delays of ~xio~e than 2 ho~ir~, and some 25 flights were `diverted to other airports. ,A. survey of the New York Air Route Traffic. Control Center recently showed that 102 communications outages, totaling about 83~ `hours, occurred in a little over a month. Lack of frequencies to use a's spares `and lack of spare telephone lines were contributing factors. PAGENO="0234" 230 Last year, FAA. air route traffic control centers handled over 14 million flights ; Chicago, Kennedy, Miami, and Los Angeles Airports each handled over 400,000 annual flight movements. The safety and efficiency of ~~ir commerce dictate the need for a reliable air traffic control system that will provide continuous operational capability. A breakdown in the air traffic control system at `any one of the major high-density terminals or air route traffic control centers disrupts scheduled airline `service throughout the country. The airlines, therefore, urge the FAA take steps to assure con- tinuity of service, despite equipment failure or malfunction, at high traffic density terminals and all en route centers. FAA is now procur- ing equipment for 50 selected `airports to provide standby electrical power supplies which will be independent of commercial power. A similar capability to survive radar and communications equipment failures should also be provided at key control facilities. The airlines recommend that: FAA initiate a program to assure that continuity of service despite failures of power, navigation, radar, and communications equipment be completed by 1972. NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL One important aspect of the national airspace system which can- not be overlooked is the need for `additional personnel to install' main- tam, and operate the various facilities necessary to handle the present and future volume of air traffic properly. Virtually every major FAA air traffic control facility is shoit of personnel. Shortages exist among controllers, maintenance technicians, and installation engineers. The shortages apparently stem from budgetary limitations of recent years. As a consequence, the efficiency of, the system has sufFered. Burdened controllers are unable to provide additional ATO' services which could enhance safety and cope with the growing traffic volume. Also affecting FAA's hiring practices is the hope that future automa- tion might reduce the requirement for added controller personnel.. While we share this hope, we consider it ill-advised to delay present hiring in the expectation that future automa~tiQn, which is still som.e 3 to 5 years away, will eventually reduce the requirement for addi- tional controllers. The demands of tra~1c gro~wth ak~e may absorb any potential reduction in future personnel requirements that might accrue from automation. Not only should FAA be grante4 a restoration of fiscal year 196~ funds requested for personnel, but additional funds should be provided to permit the hiring of still further personnel necess'aiy to provide the added safety services we recommend. The airlines recommend that- (a) FAA be authorized to acquire operations personnel corn- mensurate with the safety services required for the growing traffic volume. (14 Budgetary limitations not be imposed upon personnel pro~ viding safety services. Present Pace Won't Do. We have suggested in the past few minutes very extensive and expensive improvements' in the ATO system. Nothing that we have suggested is beyond the state of the art. }-Iowever, if our present pace in carrying out these plans is PAGENO="0235" 231 maintained, we will fall drastically behind the growth of traffic and real safety problems will arise. What is needed now is a real sense of urgency in carrying out new ideas an4 new tech- niques, and expedited procurement and installation. Obviously, cha~nges will be needed in the FAA's Airway Plarniing'Standards, which are used as the criterior for establishing ATO facilities and services. Our present measured pace will just not do this job. GREATER PARTICIPATION IN ATC Greater improvement in the e~ectiveness of the ATC system can be achieved by making certain that it is widely used and understood. The more aircraft that participate in the . ATC system, the greater the safety provided by the system. In many instances some pilots just don't want to be bothered with ATC. In other cases it is probably a lack of recognition of what services might be available. It is not neces- sary to have full-scale IFIR traffic-control service in all instances; services in varying degrees will satisfy individual situations. With vastly improved dapability in the ATC system, such as recom- mended above, the system should be capable of serving greatly in- creased numbers of aircraft. Not only will it be capable of satisfying the needs of IFR traffic, but it could provide additional service to VFR traffic. CONTROLLED AIRSPACE ATC services, especially for IFIR traffic, are available only in air- space which is officially designated as controlled airspace. The amount of designated controlled airspace has increased greatly in recent years. However, there still remain a number of routes and terminal areas where airlines operate which are wholly or partially uncontrolled. To obtain the benefits of ATC separation service for all airline IFR operations, action must be taken to encompass all routes and all t~r~ minals served by the airlines with controlled airspace. The airlines recommend that it become standard practice for FAA to designate controlled airspace and control zones to encompass all routes and terminal areas used for IFR operations in scheduled air- line service. TERMINAL AREA OPERATIONS Each airport having a control tower has an "airport traffic area" of 5 miles radius around the airport, extending from the surface up to but not including 2,000 feet. .. Under current regulations, an aircraft operating under VFR can overfly the world's busiest `airport at 2,000 feet above the surface with- out the need for contacting the control tower at that airport. In fact, the VFR aircraft can fly through that airport traffic area at less than 2,000 feet, without contacting the control tower, if it is landing at an- other airport within the 5-mile airport traffic area. Since ATC cur- rently has no information concerning the position, altitude or in- tention of such traffic in the airport traffic area, it is virtually im- possible to provide meaningful traffic information to aircraft under its jurisdiction. If the size of' the airport traffic area were increased and all aircraft were required to obtain prior permission to enter such an area, con- PAGENO="0236" 232 troiJers would have specific knowledge of all traffic within that air- space and could use this knowledge for the issuance of traffic in- formation to aircraft under their jurisdiction. This information could also be utilized as a basis for subsequently providing separation of traffic within the expanded airport traffic area. This service could be made available to both VFR and IFR traffic and would not nec- essarily require that aircraft be operated solely under instrument flight rules in all cases. The airlines recommend that : (a) The "airport traffic area" be enlarged to include that airspace from 2,000 to 5,000 feet out to at least a 15-mile radius of the airport ; (b) traffic information be pro- vided to all aircraft which have been authorized to operate within the airport traffic area ; (c) this service be expanded to provide separa- tion between aircraft where traffic warrants. SPEOIAL VPR Certain minimum visibility and distances from clouds are specified by the regulations for VFR operation within controlled airspace. No reduction in these minima is permitted along controlled airways. When weather is such that these minima cannot be observed along the airways, flights must be conducted under instrument flight rules ( IFR~) . By contrast, however, within airport control zones, even those with a high volurñe of traffic, a reduction in the basic VFR weather minima is permitted for "special VFR" operations. Although a 1-mile minimum visibility is stipulated for such operations, there is no minimum ceiling specified. Pilots are merely required to re- main "clear of clouds." Despite the fact that "special VFR" traffic must obtain a traffic clearance in order to safely intermix with full- scale TFR operations in the coutrol zone under these marginal condi- tioiis, the "special VFR" pilot need not be instrument qualified and the aircraft need not be equipped for instrument flying. As a con- sequence, air traffic controllers are limited in the separation stand- ards they can use. The airlines recommend that "special VFE" procedures be elimi- nated for fixed-wing aircraft at all airports used by the airlines within the 48 contiguous United States. ELIMINATING THE "POrUP" PROBLEM Traffic information derived from radar observations has helped reduce ~the collision hazard. With alphanumeric radar displays show- ilig automatic altitude readout on the radarsoope, the traffic wforma- tion si~rvice will be greatly improved for both VFR and IIF~R traffic. However, controllers, particularly iit air route traffic control centers, are faced with the problem of unanticipated radio calls from VF~ flights whiôh desire radar traffic advisories. Descriptivdy named "pop- ups," such traffic requires an extensive exchange of communications to ascertain the type of aircraft, the pilot's desire, ~osition, altitude, intended route, and destination, and to effect radar identification. If the controller had advance information, possibly in the form of a simple flight plan, appropriate flight progress strips could be pre- pared in advance and the controller would then be alerted to forth- PAGENO="0237" 233 coming traffic. Both pilot and controller would thus be relieved of communicatiøits workload. The airlines reoomrnen~i that : FAA e~piore the pos~ibUity of re- quiring that VFB flight plans, specifying the pilot's intended aItitude~ and route of flight, be transmitted to ATC terminal ~nd en route radar facilities for radar flight following and traffic inforrnation service. Also, that pilots submitting such fláght plans be required to maintaJn routine radio contact with ATC and to advise ATC prior tO changing the route or altitude specified in the flight plan. Voluntary IFR operation. For years the scheduled airimes have made it a general practice to utilize the IFR system regardless of weather conditions in order to gain the advantages of ATC separation. This is not true of all other airspace users. Complete `separation of all aircraft flying the airways does not occur with this practice because there can be a mixture of VFR (uncontrolled) with the IFR (con- trolled) traffic. However, the practice does have the advantage that ATC separation is provided between those who voluntarily participate. Safety from collision will therefore be enhanced, in direct proportion to the number of aircraft that participate in this voluntary practice. The airlines recommend that : To the maximum practical extent, qualified pilots utilize `the IFR `system, regardless of weather, in order to gain the advantages of ATC separation. Positive control. The airlines believe the use of "see-and-avoid" procedures alone for collision prevention is unrealistic where jet air- craft operate. We have offered a number of recommendations which will serve to augment the use of "see-and-avoid" procedures in certain airspace. However, the airlines `believe that there is other airspace wherein the density of traffic or the operating characteristics of the aircraft make it necessary to replace "see-and-avoid" with "positive control" regardless of weather conditions. Under this form of control, separation between all aircraft is the direct responsibility of the ATC system. Expansion of positive control. Positive control service is now pro- vided by FAA between 24,000 and 60,000 feet over practically all of the contiguous 48 States. This service is designed to eliminate the mixture of controlled and uncontrolled flights in specified airspace so that all traffic therein will receive positive separation by ATC, without reliance on the "see-and-avoid" principle, even in clear weather conditions. The airlines are convinced that safety requires the expansion of posi- tive control service in congested airspace and specifically recommend that a. Positive control service be extended down to and including 18,000 feet over the entire 48 contiguous States by January 1968. 13. Positive control service be extended `further by lowering it to 10,000 feet within the "Golden Triangle" area (New York, Washing- ton, and Chicago) by January 1969. c. Positive control service be lowered down to and including 10,000 feet along the west coast between San Francisco and Los Angeles (to encompass all routes used by traffic operating between these two cities) by January 19'TO. d. Positive control service be extended from 10,000 feet down to the ground in certain critical high density terminals. Terminals that PAGENO="0238" 234 should reoeive initiai consideration are New York, Chicago, Los An- geles, the San Francisco Bay area, and Washington, D~C. Action to obtain positive control service in these terminal areas should be started inunëdiately with implementation dates no later than July 1970. Let me pause there to comment briefly on positive control. I noted that the previous witness used basically oniy one argument against it; that is, under positive control there have been collisions and there ~have indeed been collisions when the aircraft was under positive con- trol. That does not really argue against positive control. It is quite clear, as Mr. Dingell was saying, that collisions can be avoided by giving aircraft the benefit of positive separation under the ATC sys- tem, and I don't believe really that is debatable. it is entirely possible even under all that precaution that there will be collisions but we at least will have done everything we can to avoid them. GREATER AIRCRAFT AND PILOT CAPABILITIES How well, and under what circumstances, users participate in the air traffic control system has a fundamental bearing on the system's ability to serve them safely and efficiently. Not only is it important to have more users participate in the system, but it is equally import- ant that participating users be capable of doing so without placing an extraordinary * burden on the system. If air traffic control must corn- pensate for lack of capability in the aircraft, or lack of pilot pro- ficiency, then the kind and quality of ATC service will be adversely affected. Inability to commimicate with air traffic control on each of the specific VHF frequencies used by different ATC. functions is already eroding the capability of ATC to provide some types of service. For the future, this conirnunications capability will be essential. There will also be a growing need for airborne radar transponders that can automatically report identity and altitude of the individual aircraft to ATC. Recognizing that the ATC system can function bet- ter when aircraft are properly equipped to cooperate with it, the airlines have equipped their fleets with basic radar transponders. Ad- ditionally, airlines are now equipping their aircraft with newer trans- ponders which send the necessary identity and altitude signals to permit the automatic display of this information on controller's scopes. An ATA survey earlier this year showed that about 200 airline aircraft are already equipped with these newer devices and that 70 percent of the fleet will be fully equipped by 1970. Another 20 per- cent will at least be equipped to send the individual identity signals. The airlines' aircraft will be equipped to transmit automatically their individual identity and altitude signals long before ATC facilities will be prepared to receive and display them. The airlines recommend that: a. Airspace users be encouraged to equip their aircraft with those avionics devices that will enhance their ability to participate in the ATC system, even though such equipment might not be required by regulation in certain airspace. b. FAA specify by regulation that avionics equipment and pilot capability required for safer and more efficient operation of the ATC system, e~en outside of high density areas. I PAGENO="0239" 235 Requir~m~ni~s for flight into high density airports. Traffic at major airports has reac'h~d a volume amd complexity that warrants ~arefuI attention. The time has come for FAA to specify pilot qua1ifi~a~ions and aircraft equipment reqthi~d for flight int~ ~nd Out of' ôerta~in high density airp~rts, such as Kennedy, La Guardia, O'Hara, Wash~ ington National; Miami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco~ The. corn- plexity of operations at these airports is such that ~nIy e*perienced pilots should be permitted to use them. In fact, it i~ay be that two experienced pilots should be required in each air~l'ane in `order to safely and efficiently carry ` out the `duties required in these areas. As far as pilot experience is concerned, we concede that this will be diffi- cult to spell out. However, since major airports use p~eedures that closely approximate IFR procedures in good weather conditiOns, we suggest that, as a ithnimum, an instrument rating be required. The FAA provides many electronic facilities at major airports. These contribute to safer and more efficient opera4ions-provideid the aircraft are equipped to use them. We b~lieive that in addition to the requirement for a safe standard of pilot experience, all aircraft operat- ing into or out of major airports of the type noted above should be equipped with operating: 1. V~OR and DME, or two VOR receivers. 2. ILS and marker beacon receivers. 3. Radar transponder beacons with 64 identity codes now, and later with 4096 ider~tity codes and automatic altitude reporting. 4. VHF communications transmitter and receiver having switch and pushbutton-type channel selectors on the specific frequencies re- quired for efficient operation in these areas. The airlines recommend that : The above standards be prescribed by FAA for flight into and out of high density airports. LOOKING TO TIlE FUTURE What we have recommended i~ by no means the whole story. It is the minimum that must be done to meet the traffic demands of today- let alone catch up with yesterday-with state-of-the-art equipment and the regulatory environment to make the most of this equipment. For the future, however, greater etfort and innovation will be needed. Therefore, there is a continuing and urgent need to expedite research and development that will increase the capacity of the ATC system and speed the development of future ATC systems. Some of the major areas that deserve atbmtion are: 1. Conflict prediction. 2. Flow control planning. 3. Terminal approach sequencing. 4. Digital communications. 5. Improved man-machine workload relationships. 6. Application of time-frequency technology in air traffic control. 7. VOR/DME area navigation. 8. V/STOL and SST ATO requirements. 9. Measurement techniques to determine ATC system efficiency. 110. An airport simulator which would test the efficiency and capac- ity of airport plans before funds are committed for construction. PAGENO="0240" THE COSTS The t~ost of the prog~arn we ai~ suggesting, is high, but the longer the expei~diture is postponE~d;;th~ highei~ the cost will be. The Fed~raI~ Gove~n~e3~11~ ~nde~ti~k theresp~n~ibi1ity for the~stablishment, opera tion and maintenance, of the Federal airwa~a system over 40 years ago. In doing so, it undertook to meet the requirements of civil and~ military aviation, whatever they may be. At the moment, these require- ments are not being met. Unless the program we suggest is carried out, that fai1.ure~ will carry with it increasingly adverse results as traffic grows. Some years ago, the Government properly took the position that the civilian users of the system~ air carrier and general aviation, should pay their fair share of the costs. The airlines agreed. About 4 years ago, the Congress imposed upon airline passengers a 5-percent ticket tax designed to cover the airlines' share of airways costs. As can be seen by the chart (fig. 6), this tax will produce aboufr. CONTRIBUTIONS TO DOMESTIC AIRWAYS SYSTEM FROM 5 PER CENT TICKET TAX MiHions $ 300 1983 1~$4 SOURCE: Air Transport Association Figure 6. $200 million next year-almost one-half the cost of the system__and: this payment will continue to grow as traffic grows.. This being the case, we feel we can ask for the improvements specified. It is the only* way we can actually get the kind of system we are paying for. Also, there is nothing sacred ~thout the, specific costs budgeted by FAA fer facilities in the past. Major cost reductions are possible, with the application of the latest techm9ues, as FAA has so well demon- strated with the ILS cost reduction program (a better ILS for 236 250 200 150 100 50 1965 1966 1981 18~ 1989 1910 FISCAL YEARS PAGENO="0241" 237 $100,000 in pl~~e of an ea~r~1i~r figure of $75,000) . A decision to equip every airline airport wi1~h a certain type o~f facility should carry with it `an obligation to examine very carefully whether airports with a small8r traffic count c~m use simpler~ less costly equipment to provide an adequate level of service. The airlines recommend that: 1~'A.A undertake an intensive cost reduction e~ort by- a. More efficient and realistic design of lighting systems, electronic equipment, and the facilities which house them. b. Purchasing in quantities large enough to permit nianufacturers to use cost-saving production techniques. C. Purchasing facilities on a complete package basis rather than as separate components. d. Considering the purchase of selected facilities complete with onsite installation. We are grateful to this committe& for permitting us to explain so fully our recomme~dations for inere~.sed safety. We ask your help in achieving with great promptness four general objectives. 1. Comph~tion of the currently planned ATC system. 2. Completion of the expanded program we have recommended. 3. More effective use of the system by all aircraft. 4. Expanded research and development for an even more advanced future system. I have data, Mr. Chairman, which I think will be of use to the committee. In view of the fact that the program which we have suggested in- volves additional appropriations, we appeared briefly last week before the Senate Committee on Appropriations and made specific sugges- tions as to additional funds to be appropriated. We identified not only the equipment that was to be acquired but the locations at which that equipment would be installed. I think it might be useful for the corn- mittee if I were to present this for this committee's record. ~ Mr. FRIEDEL. It may be included in the record. Mr. TIPTON. Than-k you, Mr. Chairman. ( Material referred to follows:) APPENDIX A-ATEPORPS Wi~nou~ T&wi~R S~yICE NOTE.-ThIS 1i~t represents the busies~t airports with airline service, but no control tower. Airports `are hated in order of priortty, according `to tGtal `aircraft operations and do not `take iirto `account ather important fadtora~ `auch as weather conditions, terrain, other nearby airports' and traffic activity in the geaeral area. All of these factors should be taken into account and coordinated with the air- lines and FAA. Since we have not yet had time to coordInate these specific loca- tions with either the airlines or FAA, the actual p1a~es and their priority must be considered tentative. Totai aS~orafi opsraUons Locc&tion (thousands) 1. 2. 8. 4. 5. Dothan, Ala 115.4 Bowling Green, Ky 106.3 Vero Beach, 13'ia 93. 1 Lafayette, Ir~d 88.3 El Centre, OaliL 85. 8 6. `Columbia, Mo 81.8 7. Benton Harbor, Mich 74.7 8. Grand Forks, N. Dak 74.4 9. 10. Enid, Okia 71.0 New Haven, 0mm 67.1 Loeatton 11. Minot, N. Dak 12. Gainesville, Fia______~_____ 13. Morgantown, W. Va 14. Tuscialoosa, Ala 15. Decatur, Ala 16; Mereed, Galif 17. Tacoma (Industrial) , Wash_ 18. LaCrosse, Wis 19. Pine Bluff, Ark 20. Visalia, Calif___~___________ Total a4~ craft operations (thousands) 65. 6 62. 8 61. 9 61. 8 59.4 58. 1 56. 6 51. 1 50.3 50. 1 PAGENO="0242" APPENDIX B-AIRPORTS RECOMMENDED FOR RADAR SERVICE IN FISCAL YEAR 1968 Note: This list represents the busiest airports with airline service, but without radar. Airports are listed in order of priority, according to total aircraft opera- tions and do not take into account other important factors, such as weather con- ditions, terrain, other nearby airports and traffic activity in the general area. All of these factors should be taken into account and coordinated with the air- lines and FAA. Since we have not yet had time to coordinate these specific loca- tions with either the airlines or FAA, the actual places and their priority must be considered tentaiive. Tota' aircraft Total aircra~ft operation8 operations Location (thossands) Location (thousands) 1. Bridgeport, Oonn 203. 4 30. Grand Rapids, Mich 121. 7 2. Champaign, Ill 194. 6 31. Pueblo, Cole 120. 6 3. Valdosta, Ga 194. 3 32. Lafayette, La 118. 1 4. Santa Barbara, Calif 190. 4 83. Augusta, Ga 114. 9 5~ Huntsville, Ala 181. 3 34. Modesto, Calif 113. 9 6. Daytona Beach, Fla 181. 0 35. Sioux Falls, S. Dak 113. 6 7. Madison Wis 180. 0 36. Tallahassee, Fla 108.2 8. Lexington, Ky 178. 2 37. Bowling Green, Ky 106. 3 9. Rockford Ill 175. 1 38. Columbus, Ga 105. 7 10. Orlando, Fla 173. 5 39. Fargo, N. Dak 105.4 11. Lincoln Nebr 173. 5 40. Allentown, Pa 103. 1 12. Pontiac, Mich 172. 7 41. Reading, Pa 101. 3 13. Yuma, Ariz 170. 4 42. Boise, Idaho ioo. 4 14. Springfield, Ill 169. 1 43. Wilmington, N.C 98. 8 15. Flint, Mich 159. 1 44. Cedar Rapids, Iowa 98. 3 16. Bakersfield Calif 157. 4 45. San Angelo, Tex 98. 1 17. Peoria, Ill 153. 7 46. Kalamazoo, Mich 94. 8 18. Lansing, Mich 149. 2 47. Vero Beach, Fla 93.1 19. Stockton, Calif 142. 6 48. Evansville, md 92. 1 20. Billings, Mont 142. 0 49. Elmira, N.Y 91. 8 21. Wilmington, Del 139. 1 50. Sioux City, Iowa 91.4 22. St. Joseph, Mo 134. 7 51. Fort Smith, Ark 91. 1 23. South Bend, md 131. 0 52. Yakima, Wash 90. 9 24. Moline, Ill 130. 1 53. Lafayette, md 88, 3 25. Midland, Pex 128.3 ~4. Muskegon, Mich 88.2 26. Columbia, S.C 127.9 55. Springfield, Mo 87.2 27. Beaumont, Tex 127. 0 56. Erie, Pa 86. 9 28. Cheyenne, Wyo 124. 8 5~. El Centro, Calif 85 8 29. Baton Rouge, La 124. 2 58. Columbia, Mo 81: 8 238 APPENDIX A-AIRPORTS WITHouT TOWER SERVICE-Continued Total aSrcraft operations Location (thousands) 21. Fayetteville, Ark 50.0 22. Alamogordo, N. Mex 49.9 23. Bangor, Maine 48. 8 24. New Londou, Conn 48.7 25. Hickory, N.O 47.4 26. Salem, Oreg 44.3 27. Redding, Calif 43. 6 28. Marysville, C~dlf 43.0 29. Kingston, N.O 42.3 30. Fort Leonard Wood, Mo 42.1 31. Harlingen, Tex 42. 0 32. Stiliwater, Okla 42.0 33. Burlington, mowa 41.5 34. Santa Maria, Calif 41.4 35. Poughkeepsie, N.Y 41.4 36. Temple, Tex 40.3 37. Laredo, Tex 40.2 38. Albany, Ga 40.1 39. Greenville, Miss 39.6 40. Victoria, Tex 39.5 Total aircraft operations Location (thousands) 41. Jonesboro, Ark 38. 9 42. Keene, NH 38. 6 43_ Ponca City, Okla 38.6 44. Prescott, Ariz 38. 5 ~I5. Bloomington, Ill 37. 8 46. Greenwood, Miss 37. 5 47. Myrtle Beach, S.C 36. 5 48. Florence, S.C 35. 8 49. Pasco, Wash 35. 5 50. Oape Girardean, Mo 35.4 51. Scottsbluff, Nebr 35. 2 52. Laurel, Miss 34. 6 53. Bartlesville, Okla 34.0 54. Ottumwa, mowa ~ 33.6 55. Flagstaff, Ariz 32. 5 56. Danville, mll 32. 4 57. Duncan, Okla 32.1 58. Astoria, Oreg 32. 1 59. Muskogee, Okla 31.4 60. Mount Vernon, Ill 31.2 PAGENO="0243" 239 Total aircraft operations (thousands) 59. Rochester, Miun 60. Hutchinson, Kans 61. Lancaster, Pa 62. Waterloo, Iowa * 63. Panama City, Fla 64. Fort Myers, Fla 65. Terre Haute, md 66. Battle Creek, Mich 67. Benton Harbor, Mich Aberdeen, South Dakota Alexandria, Louisiana Alpena, Michigan Augusta, Maine Beckley, West Virginia Bloomington, Illinois Bloomington-Monroe County, Indiana Bozeman-Gallatin, Montana Bradford, Pennsylvania Bridgeport, Connecticut Burlington, Iowa Butte, Montana Cape Girardeau, Missouri Carlsbad, New Mexico Chico, California Chishoim/Hibbings, Montana Clinton, Iowa Columbia, Missouri Columbus, Mississippi Crescent City, California Danville, Vermillion, Ilinois Decatur, Illinois Dothan, Alabama Dublin, Virginia Dubuque, Iowa Durango, Colorado Eau Claire, Wisconsin Elizabeth City, North Carolina Elko, Nevada Ephrata, Washington Escanaba, Michigan Farmington, New Mexico Florence, Alabama Florence, South Carolina Fort Dodge, Iowa Fort Lauderdale, Florida Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri Fort Myers, Florida Gainesville, Florida Galesburg, Illinois. Glens Falls, New York Grand Forks, North Dakota Grand Island, Nebraska Greenville, Mississippi Groton, Connecticut Gulfport, Mississippi Hancock/Houghton, Michigar~ Harlingen, Texas Hayden, Colorado Helena, Montana Hickory. North Carolina Hot Springs, Arkansas Total aircraft operations Location (thousands) 79.7 68. Grand Forks, N. Dak________ 74,4 78.0 69. Saginaw, Mich_____________ 74~0 78. 0 70. Missoula, Mont____________ 72.5 76. 7 71. Santa Rosa, CaliL_________ 72, 1 76.6 72. Eugene, Oreg___.~___._____ 72.0 76.0 73. Enid, Ok1a___~____________ 71.0 75.4 74. Worcester, Mass____________ 70. 8 74. 8 75. Palm Springs, Calif_________ 70.4 74.7 Idaho Falls, Idaho Imperial, California International Falls, Minnesota Iron Mountain, Michigan Ithaca, New York Jackson, Tennessee Jackson, Wyoming Jamestown, North Dakota Keene, New Hampshire Kingston, North Carolina Kokomo, Indiana LaCrosse, Wisconsin Lafayette, Indiana Lake Tahoe, California Laredo, Texas Las Vegas, Nevada Lawton-Fort Sill, Oklahoma Lebanon, New Hampshire Lewiston, Idaho Liberal, Kansas Manhattan, Kansas Marion, Illinois Marquette, Michigan Marthas Vineyard, Massachusett,~ Mason City, Iowa Matton, Illinois McAllen, Texas Melbourne, Florida Merced, California Minot, North Dakota Missoula, Montana Modesto, California Mount Vernon, Illinois Moultree, Georgia Muskogee, Oklahoma Myrtle Beach, South CarolirlH New Bern, North Carolina New Haven, Connecticut North Bend, Oregon North Platte, Nebraska Ocala, Florida Ottumwa, Iowa Owensboro, Kentucky Oxnard, Ventura, California Paducah, Kentucky Palm Springs, California Panama City, Florida Pasco, Washington Paso Robles, California Peliston Emmett, Michigan Phoenix, Arizona Location APPENDIX C-ADDITIoNAL AIRPoRTS EXPECTED To HAVE AIRLINE JET SERVICE BY 1972 PAGENO="0244" 240 APPENDIX C-ADDITIONAL AIRPORTS EXPECTED TO HAVE AIRLINE JET SERVICE BY 1972-Continued Pierre, SOuth Dakota stanton, Virginia ProRq1iE~ laTe, Maine Sterling/flock Fafls, Illinois Rapid City, South Dakota 1~acoma, (Industrial), Washington Reddiug, California Temple, Pexas Riverside, ganfornia Texarkana, Arkansas Riverton, Wyoming Traverse City, Michigan Eoanoke, Virginia Tuscaloosa, Alabama Rocky Mount, North Carolina Tucson, Arizona Saginaw, Michigan Twin Falls, Idaho Santa Ana, California Walla-Walla, Washington Santa 1~e, New Mexico Watertown, New York Santa Maria, California Watertown, South Dakota Santa Rosa, California Waycross, Georgia Saranac Lake, New York Valdosta, Georgia Sarasota, Florida Vero Beach, Florida Scotts Bluff, Nebraska Visalia, California Sheridan County, Wyoming Yuma, Arizona Mr. TIPTON. One point that was subject to some discussion that I think might be useful to discuss very ~rieily some more is collision avoidance. I know the entire committee is deeply intersted in it, as we are. In view of the fact that the airlines have taken the lead and carried the major burden for the development of the currently projected system, I think it might be useful to have this discussed for a few minutes, what our progress is, what the equipment is like. Mr. Seltzer, previously introduced, will say a few words on that, Mr. SELTZER. I should point out that for over 12 years now the air- lines have been seeking a collision avoidance system. In fact, approxi- mately a year and a half before the Grand Canyon collision the ATA invited manufacturers, through a broadcast letter, to come forth with any ideas for a noncooperative system, one which would be completely self-sufficient and capable of operating without the need for the other aircraft to be equipped. Unfortunately, I think we got virtually no response until after Grand Canyon. Thereafter, many ideas were of- fered, but none of them came to fruition. In approximately 1958, one of the prominent electronic manufac- turers came forth with what he had as a proximity warning indicator which could grow into an eventual collision avoidance system. Had that come to pass, orders which would have amounted to $10 million worth of equipment would have been purchased then. However, we subse- quently found that the equipment was not capable of performing as anticipated and the ofFer was withdrawn b~t the manufacturer. The airlines had still been urging a self-sufficient system, but our advisers in industry, from the electronic and manufacturing industry. advised us that our sights were set far too high. If we were anxious to obtain a collision avoidance system, we might have to accept, at least for the time being, that which the current state of the art could produce; namely, a cooperative system. It was then that we said rather than get nothing we would rather have something in the form of a coopera- tive system. That is the reason we are on the path we are at the moment. It is unfortunate, however, that a system such as we have in mind is necessarily high in cost. The cost is not any more to our liking than it is to general `aviation. Certainly we would not expect everyone to be PAGENO="0245" 241 equipped with costly equipment of this sort. We have now a technical working group whicth has for the past 6 to 8 months been working spe- cifically on a system description, such that manufacturers might uti~ lize that description to produce prototype hardware which could be evaluated in fii~ht. That group has incorporated in its system descrip- tion the possibility of an abbreviated version which might come at lower cost, which would permit general aviation to participate. Again we do not feel that this is necessarily the total answer for gen- eral aviation. In any event, our system description was completed at the end of June, some year and a half before people predicted we would be able to do it ; and I think it is proper that we give thanks to the var- bus manufacturers and to FAA who helped in that work because we never would have been able to do it alone. It is now anticipated that equipment suitable for flight evaluation will come from that system description and be available in the early part of 1969. We agree that it is desirable to have a noncooperative, self -sufficient system, both for ourselves and for general aviation. We agree that it would be desiratbie to have a proximity warning device that would be noncooperative. I might `mention, sir, that we are familiar with the work of Mr. Adler, whom I believe you mentioned earlier today, and we have been in touch with him on numerous oecaskms, Some of the concepts and techniques have been embodied in our system description just corn- pleted. This entails the transmission and reception of radio signals among aircraft, which our system does involve. Unfortunately, the collision avoidance system is an exceedingly complex one. In essence, the black box is being asked to predict the future position of an air- craft that it knows nothing about. Someone this morning, I `believe, said that we can get a man to the `moon but `we can't seem to get a collision avoidance system. Straiige as it may seem, we can predict where the moon will be a month in advance. But we cannot predict where an aircraft is going to `be used a few mo- ments from now.That' is one of the `fundamental difficulties. 1-iOwever, we have come up with ideas, concepts, and techniques with which we hope that the flight evaluation program will prove feasible. With respect to radar, which was mentioned as a possibility, air- borne radar has constantly been looked upon as a potential for collision avoidance. The unfortunate pa~rt is that radar built `specifically to' see weather i's more or less incompatible with a rada~r designed to look for airplanes. The air traffic controller has this problem today on his scope. When he first got radar, that radar was often oblitei~ated by weather clutter. When they improved the radar to take out the weather clutter so he could see the airplanes, he now has the reverse sit~ation. `By the same token, the aircraft weather radar was designed to see weather and it doesn't do the best job to ~ee aireraft. it has th~ n'arrow beam problem that Captain Ruby mentioned this morning. Furthermore, there is the problem of ground clutter. The aircraft's height `above the ground will be the distance at which ground clutter will `appear ahead of the aircraft position on the radar scope. The crew is further distracted from looking out of the window by attempts to concentrate on a amall radar scope in the cockpit. It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain which of these' targets are targets of consequence. PAGENO="0246" 242 It is a problem very similar to the one the controller has when he tries t, ferret out which of the many targets he sees is the one he should pay attention to where he has no altitude information. I believe that gives you a current `summation of where we stand. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you. Mr. Tn~roN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Wewill be of course glad to try to answer any questions that are put~' Mr. FItIEDEL. It wa~ a 1e~ngthy statement but a very, very informa- tive statement, and I like your charts. You `have made a lot of recommendations. Have you given any thought as to what the cost will be for these recommendations? Mr. TIPTON. In our recommendation for the current fiscal year which includes a large number of ILS as I have described, a large amount of radar, our total recommendation comes to an increase in the appropriation for the FAA for equipment of a little bit over a hundred million dollars. Now to move forward on that same program will cost at least that much every year for a number of years. Mr. FRIEDEL. One of the witnesses this morning I think said around $2 billion. I wanted to know whether your recommendations were included in that or not. Mr. Tiproic~. I am told that was a comment' made with respect to air- port improvement. The FAA idea as to the need for airport improve- ment stated over in the other side in a hearhig was $3 billion in the next 5 years. That was airport improvement. I think that the airways improvement will not rise to nearly the bill that the airport improvement contemplated in future years will rise. Can we give a `better answer to the chairman on cost, Mr. Von Kann? General VON KANN. I think the $101.5 million we have used with the Senate Appropriations Committee, sir, is for basic hardware pro- curement; We would have to say offhand that there would be siting and installation costs, and operation and maintenance costs ; so there would be some inflation in the FAA budget in addition to the hard- ware procurement that we have discussed. I think probably it might be well to consider this a program of about $150 million a year for a period of about 4 years. But this, too, is well within the amount of money. that the passengers are contributing right now `through the ticket ta*. ` ` Mr: Fi~i~i~. You mentioned something about glide slopes. How many of the airports have glide slopes? ~ Mr. TIproN. Can you answer that offhand? ` General VON KANN. Yes; we have glide slopes or ILS's at 189 of the 526 `airports used by the airlines. Now, some of these airports have two ILS's and there are actually about 216 in service. So this leaves a requirement- Mr. `Tir'roN. Shown on page 7 of my statement. (See fig. 4, p. 2~2k3.) A total of 337 ILS installations are required to cover the scheduled airline airports. Mr. FRIEDEL. 337 are required? Mr .TIPT0N. Yes. Mr. FRIEDEL. That do not have it today? Mr. TIYPoN. We have at the present time 189. This is also on page 7 of the statement. And 337 are required. L PAGENO="0247" 243 Mr. FRIEDEL. Just one brief question now. On page 25 when you spoke of positive oontrol service extending from 10,000 feet down to the ground at certain critical high-density terminals, in there you mention New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay area, and Washington, D.C. Why was Miami left out, since Miami is a high-density area? Mr. SELTZI~R. Yes, sir ; it certainly is a high-density area. Those shown are the first five on our list. We indicated in the paperthat these were the first to receive consideration. Certainly Miami should be considered. I believe, sir, in the recommendation with respect to high- density airports which follow, you will see the mention of Miami. Mr. FRIEDEL. On high density, on positive control you do not men- tion Miami. Mr. SELTZER. No, sir ; we do not. It does not mean it is excluded. It means when we first start we are asking to look at the first five. Mr. FRIEDEL. When you speak of Washington, D.C., are you speak- ing of Washington National or the Washington, D.C. area, including Friendship? Mr. Tir'row. As you know, we regard Washington, D.C., as being served by three airports ; Friendship, Dulles, and Washington Na- tional. We would expect the area covered there to cover the Wash- lug-ton area. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Dingell? Mr. DINorii~. I would like to defer my questions. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. On page 16, Mr. Tipton, you make reference to standby equipment or emergency equipment independent of commercial for power. You said the FAA is procuring equipment for 50 selected air- ports. Could someone provide us with those airports at some later time so that we will know what they are? Mr. TIPTON. Yes. Mr. DEvINE. You have reference also to Washington National. I. think in the last 6 months we have two evidences of power failure out there on radar. . Mr. SELTZER. Yes. These are the 50 `airports which FAA has termed continuous power airports. They were selected on the basis that the total geographic area of the country would have some safe-haven air- port in the event of a regional power failure such as we encountered in the Northeast area approximately 2 years ago. Mr. FRIEDEL. Do you, have a list of the 50 sites recommended or selected.? Mr. TIrroN. We will put those in the record at this point. We don't have them with us. (The information referred to follows:) COMPILATION OF CONTINUOUS POWER AIRPORTS, SUBMITTED BY THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSocIATIoN ør AMERICA Albuquerque (ABQ) Andrews AFB (ADW) Atlanta (ATL) Baltimore (BAL) Bismarek (BIS) Boise (BOl) Boston (BOS) Cbtcago (ORD) Chicago (MDW) Charlotte (OLP) Cincinnati (OVG) Cleveland (OLE) Dallas (DAL) Denver (DEN) Des Moines (DSM) Detroit (DTW) El Paso (ELP) Great Fails (GTF) PAGENO="0248" 244 Mr. DEvINE. I would presume Washingtcn National is among those to be equipped. Mr. SELTZER. I am quite certain Washington is among them. Mr. DEVINE. Is it now so equipped? Mr. SELTZER. Washington National has an engine generator system in the terminal building itself. I don't know how well that serves the outlying facilities off the airport. On the airport Washington Na- tional does have generator service, yes. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Tipton, do you have any informntion re1~ative to whether you feel that the air traffic controllers are overworked and under great stress in such places as O'Hare, Washington National, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Miami, Kennedy? Mr. TIr~roN. It is always. a matter of concern to us, Mr. Devine. As you have noted, we recommended that additional personnel be brought in. I think being a controller that Mr. Seltzer can comment further on that. Mr. DEvINE. Would you, please? Mr. SELTZER. I think that the job the controller is expected to per- form sometimes is not really and trñly understood. Mr. Kayne in his testimony previously. mentioned some 400 cases~f litigation and some $2~OO million in claipis being made againsl the Government. I feel `part of this is due to the fact that people are expecting more from the air traffic controller than he is geared up to provide. In the recommen~ `tions we have made here we have tried to tate account of that fact. . If I may just explain a little bit here, with respe~t to the traffic in- formation service this is a service that does not necessarily repñre that an aircraft be concbjicthd lEE ~4..I am certain ~OPA would like to have it. I don't blame them one hilt `but it is a difficult ~job for ~t con- troller to provide traffic information service when he has to look at a scope which does not have any identity or altitude information, nor does he have any knowledge of the intent of hundreds of targets that he may see on that scope. I think it is nigh on to impossible at this time to give meaningM traffic at all times. However, the controller gives the best he can w~ith what `he has to work. For that reason we have recommended the altitude reporting readout. I consider the alti- tude readout one of the most essential missing links in the radar system. CoNTINuous POWER Aiiwouvs-Continued Houston (HOTJ) Indianapolis (IND) Jacksonville (JAX) Kansas City (MCII) Los Angeles (LAX) Memphis (MEM) Miami (MIA) Milwaukee (MKE) Minneapolis (MSP) Nashville (BNA) Newark (EWl~) New Orleans (MSY) New York (JFK) New York (LGA) Oklahoma Olty (OKO) Omaha (OMA) Ontario, Oalif. (ONT) PMladeiphia (PIlL) Phoenix (PHX) Pittsburgh (PIT) Reno (ENO) Salt Lake city (SLO) San Antonio (SAT) San Diego (SAN) San Francisco (SF0) St. Louis (STL) Seattle (SEA) Tampa (TPA) Tulsa (TUL) Washington (DOA) Washington (DIA) Wichita (lOP) PAGENO="0249" 245 Since radar is the foundation of our current-day traffic control sys- tern, and in the foreseeable future it still remains the foundation of what the controll~r will use. I think we must enhance the utility of that radar so that it can serve the controller's needs and so that he can perform the servIce the public is coming to expect of him. I know that controllers will say that automation increases their workload because they have many buttons to push. It is for that reason in our testimony we say don't Lorce the controller to make up for the lack of capability in the aircraft. Try to make the' aircraft work with the controller so that the controller can in turn help the pilot. For this reason we recommended a 4096 transponder so that when a controller's automation gear, which works with that device, comes into play, it can automatically acquire the target without having him press a lot of buttons. It is for that reason we have recommended the automatic altitude readout so that the black box will do the work rather than forcing the controller to press buttons. Mr. Di~vINE. I did not get a direct answer to my question. The only answer I have is that it was recommended that there be more traffic controllers. I personally have a great deal of respect for these men as human beings here and they are under great stress, emotionally and psychologically, particularly under crowded conditions and under IFR conditions. Particularly when they ar~ trying to communicate with incoming aircraft, either commercial or private. Do you find that the air is cluttered with so much communication that it is confusing to both the pilot and the traffic controllers? Mr. Sit~zm. From my personal observation in riding jump seat in air carrier aircraft I would say the situation in the terminal area is more of a problem than it is in the en route area. During recent years FAA has adopted procedures which permit the omission of position reports by the pilot when they are under radar surveillance. This has helped tremendously. But lacking altitud~ in- formation the controller is forced to verify altitude on each new con- tact with a pilot. In the terminal area the problem is more serious. Mr. D~rVTNIL Most of us on this subcommittee have, either independ- ently or as part of a group, visited a number of towers, including JFK. It is pretty rough in~ there, as you well know~ wh~ti you ha~ire six or eight men all talking at ônc~. I thinh ~ this is one area where something must be developed. Mr. 9~I1?TON. ,Tttst to interrupt at that point, you said you didn't get a direct answer to your question, and I don't think you did. I will now answer it directly. I think that the controller's stress and strain is a problem. It is for that reason that we are struggling here to get an air traffic control system which will accommodate the controller's require- ments so that he will n ot have to do so much pick and shovel work of his own. I think it is urgent that we make progress along these lines. Every recommendation we have made here I think would make the life of the controller easier. Mr. D~ivr~ I recognize the sophisticated equipment continues to be developed, yet the air traffic controller is a human being. He recog- nizes every minute that a wr~ng decision on his part may be calamitous and this puts great stress on him. Mr. JENSEN. May I just add, Mr. Devine, in a direct comment on your question, one of the things that is going on today is the use PAGENO="0250" 246 of a lot of overtime oii the part of controllers; I think for the very reason you mentioned, the critiëal nature of their worl~, that it is very important that they have the normal allooated time off duty. I think were we to get controllers in such quantity as to eliminate the overtime us~ of present contrOllers we would be better off. Mr. DEVINE. 15 there a great turnover in air traffic controllers? Mr. SELTZER. I don't know that I can answer that, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEviNE. Can you get the information on that ? ~ Mr. SELTZER. I will be glad to. ~ ~ ~ ~ ( Information referred to follows:) ( AiR TRANSPORT ASSocIATIoN STATEMENT' ON TURNOVER OF FAA AIR TRAFFIC ~ OONTI~OLLERS According to FAA reports, about 350 journeyman controllers left FAA during 1966. There were about 10,500 controllers so the turnover was about 3%. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Dingell. ~ ~ Mr. DINGE1~L. I have just a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman. Your comments with regard to the 5-percent tax imposed on air- line ticket sales intrigues me. I am wondering what the cost of ade- quate area traffic control safety would be, gentlemen. Would it be in excess of the $200 million you projected this figure at on the basis of present earnings ? ~ Mr. TIPTON. The present cost of operating the airways system is in the neigbborhood of $450 million a year. Mr. DINGELL. This would be approximately half ? ~ Mr. TIPTON. Therefore, the ticket tax yields about half of it. How- ever, it must be recognized that the use of the airways system by the airlines is probably less than one-third with general aviation using ~ pol'tion of it and the military usiug a portion of it. So that at the present time the airline contribution is greater than the cost that is ~issigriedto them, or should be assigned to them. Mr. DINGELL. Assuming that is so, what is the cost, and I want to compare this to the cost of a really adequate program of the kind that you have inserted in your statdment-you have made a whole broad series of recommendations for improvement in radar, traffic control improvements, additional controllers, instrument landing sys- tem and devices-so that we can compare the one figure against the other, we know what you have coming in within ballpark ~figures, anyway, but ~ do not hav~ any idea what the other costs are. Can you give us same ideas on that 9 Mr. TIPTON. The only cost study we have made on this relates to our program recommendation for . installation of facilities during the tiscal yea~ 1968. That was ~ about $101 million additional in expense. Since that equipment is written off over 15 years that would be $15 million increase in annual cost. . General Von Kant estimated that our other recommendations would involve similar expenditures for a period of about 4 years, which would add in total about $600 million over that period. Our cost figures aren't any good. Mr. DINGELL. They are about as good as any we have gotten to date. Mr. TIPTON. We have a problem with it. The FAA has better cost data than we are likely to have. One of the things I would like to have happen would be for the committee to address the same question to PAGENO="0251" 247 the FAA, saying, "Here the ATA has come forward *ith a program, how much is this going to cost us ~ " because I would like to know. Mr. DINOELL. This is precisely the question I intended to direct to the chairman of the committee to find out what is the cost of adequate safety for the whole aviation agency. The Chair advises me that Mr. Stimpson is here from the FAA, so I assume that Mr. Stimpson will alert the FAA. to expect some communication from the committee staff for appropriate figures for insertion in the record. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, we can look to their carrying this matter forward. (The follOwing information was subsequently submitted:) FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION STATEMENT ON ESTIMATED Cost To IMPLE- MENT PROGRAM RECOMMENDED BY THE AIR TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION We estimate that implementation of the program outlined in the formal state- merit made by the Air ~ Transport Association would cost approximately $835 million for proocurement and installation of equipment over amounts appro- priated through fiscal year 1967. In addition, annual costs of operation and maintenance would be expected to increase by approximately $75 million after the procurement and installatiOn phá~es of the program were completed. Operat- ing. training and maintenance costs could be about 30% greater during the changeover period to the new equipment. Mr. DINGELL. Perhaps Mr. Tipton would like to take more time and direct himself more fully and comfortably and more conveniently to some of the aspects that you have given us on this point. I would like to now go into a couple of points that concern me. The cost of the collision avoidance system I have heard is $50,000 and now it is $60,000 per aircraft. This would be on the order of a large aircraft a little but more than t~he cost of a propeller, would it not, for a conventional aircraft ? A propeller for an aircraft is $25,000. Mr. Tn~roN. We don't buy as many of them as we used to, but I think it is in that neighborhood. Mr. DINGELL. Also it would be roughly about the same as the cost of the theater and projection equipment that would go into a large 400- or 500-passenger jet that will shortly be coming down the ways; is that correct ~ Mr. TIproN. I have no idea as to the cost of that equipment, but II would not be surprised. Mr. DINoEu~. It really is not, on a 17 or 18 million dollar jet, a very large ~ sum in terms of. safety when. dealing with the lives of 400 or 500 people. Mr. TIyroN. We don't regard it as too large. We don't regard it as in ~ any respect an objectionable expenditure. We have been trying for 12 years to get the opportunity to make that expenditure. Mr. DINGELL. Now. the other question I wanted to discuss with you is the standard of the FAA with regard to getting passengers out of aircraft. There are 2 minutes for the number of passengers we have in the aircraft to go through emergency exits. Do you regard this as an adequate standard of safety ~ Mr. TIPTON. Yes. We have spent a great dealof time on that partic- ular part of our work. I am hesitant to take the time at this point, but, if you would care to, General Von Kann could give you the dis- cussion of industry effort on passenger evacuation. A memorandum prepared by the Aerospace Industries Association on passenger evac- uation and crash worthiness will be put in at this point. (Tnformatioii referred to follows:) PAGENO="0252" 248 PROPOSED AlA CRASHWORTHINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OBJEC~VES The Objectives of the proposed AlA crashworthiness development program are improvements in the state-of-th&art as it applies to aircraft crashworthiness and the determination and evaluation of new and improved methods, equipment, and design characteristics that will substanti~11~ increase the passenger's chance of survival in an aircraft accident by: (a) Proteeth~g. passengers from smoke and toxic fumes and heat inside the aircraft and extending the period of survivable cabin atmosphere. (b) Moving passenger& to~the exits as quickly as possibie~ (c) Providi~ng means by which passengers may reach the ground rapidly and safely. SOOPE The following areas will be covered: 1. Fire-resistant materials: Industry Search for Materials Available for Early Incorporation. Test Above Materials. EstablisJ~ Improved Criteria. Establish.. Test Methoda Initiate Advanced Material Development Program. 2. Fire-suppressant systems and smoke and fume protection: Foam. Fog. Freon. Powder. ITeMS. Curtains, Compartments. and Masks. Insulation, Walls and ~`lhors. Ventilation Air Flow Control. 3. Emergency lighting and exit awareness: interior Light LeveL Interior Light Intensity Distribution. Eidt Awareness. Interior-Exterior Light Interrelation. Warning Systems. 4. EvacuatIon: Slide Improvement : Flow Characteristics. Fire Resistance. Overwing Exit Passenger Flow Characteristics. Exit Actuation. Study Accident and Evacuation Demonstration Data. ANTICIPATED PROGRAM TIMING It is planned that this crashworthiness development program will commence immediately upon enactment of regulatory changes resulting from the NPRM, assuming that such regulations do n~ supersede the need for development in those areas described herein. Delaying the development program start until enactment of regulatory change could well affect and modify some areas of the proposed development work. However, if the FAA decides that certain of the regulatory areas will be delayed, then industry agrees to start the devel- opment program upon reeei~t o,f formal notftIeat1~n from the FAA to this effect. This agreement should be so worded sa to `assure that during the course of the development program undertaken, no regulatory changes will be promulgated by the FAA that would supersede the objectives of the development program. As described herein, the program will continue for a period of 12 mouths. AlA/FAA coordination i~ planned during the program so that as major test or decision milestones are reached, program progress can be monitored. Twelve months from Initiation of the program, the AlA will submit the following to the FAA: Test reports, including results of the development work and conclusions drawn therefrom. AlA proposed wording for regulatory changes In each technical area. AlA proposes incorporation of the necessary hardware to comply with the suggested regulation changes on all new jet transport aircraft certificated to PAGENO="0253" 249 OAR 4b or FAR 25, to be deliverei 18 months after agreement has been reache4l on these regulation changes.. This agreement may either be in the form of additional regulatory changes or receipt by the AlA of formal notice of agreement of the forthcoming regulation change from the FAA. It is recognized that certain of the development areas may ~ot prove to be fruitful, In which case no recom- mendation for mojtfied regulations would be forthcoming. There is no intention on the part of indust~y to rethtce the e~ort or `scope of the development work which would normally take place In the Industry to Im-. prove the crashworthiness or other important transport `aircraft safety categories during or subsequent to the proposed 12-month development program. FIRE-RE5IsTANT-MATEBIALS DEVEL~PMENP PRoGRAM GOALS P1~&se 1.-To provide In 12 months, a regulation that would result in the use of the `least flammable material's which are functionally satisfactory `and which can be implemented in new airplanes within 18 months of the definition of the requirement. The regulation would define flammability test methods and re- qui'renients and a statement of the material properties, compartments or areas within the scope of the regulation considered pertinent to fire safety. This regulation is to be a definite upgrading. Phase 11.-To provide a statement of material research programs containing objectives and goai~ which, if accomplished, would result in `a truly significant improvement in compartment fire safety through materials and new test methods capable of measuring the improvements. PROGRAM AlA members will establish a contemporary baseline of the best existing state~of-the-art materials being used by correlating the affected material spec!- fleations in u~e by the industry member's and analyzing the correlation. This will assure knowledge `of the best available materials in each of the application categories `being used. All materials significantly better than the contemporary baseline materials will be obtained through a search of the materials suppliers and supplier-industry development and will be tested to the methods for horizontal and vertical burn proposed in Revised Item 16 submitted by AlA on 23 February 1967. To assure timely production incorporation, only those new materials which will be avail- able in production quantities within 15 months from start of this program will be considered. Only materials which meet improved criteria resulting from the overall program will be installed in production aircraft for delivery 30 months from start of this program. The AlA will recommend revisions to FAA regulations, Paragraphs 25.853 and 25.85~, covering the upgraded standards of these materials, at the conclusion of the 12-month development program. The scope of the above includes materials in crew, passenger and cargo com- partments used in sufficient quantities or in areas which directly affect fire safety. As a separate phase of the program, existing burn criteria will be examined to determine if more meaningful tests can be devised for use as a future stand- ard. If these revised criteria can be established, industry will include them as a modification to the regulations for incorporation in 30 months. Considerations will include determination whether both small and large ignition sources are neces- sary factors of the burning criteria or whether a numerical value can replace the exis~ting burn rate test (e.g. numerical application of flash point, heat content, self-extinguishing property, etc. ) . Studies based on tests, and analysis of aircraft fires will be made to determine if new testing techniques and burn criteria would be desirable. It is recognized that since these burn criteria and materials development efforts are limited in time, it is recommended that further FAA sponsored development programs be initiated in the specific areas of (1) improved materials', and (2) test methods and criteria. It is recommended that these programs be conducted by qualified materials producers and research organizations to industry de- PAGENO="0254" 250 ~e1oped, and *FAA approved work statements. The industry work statement will, be available in the ;12-m~nth period. i~ accomplishe4, this couM result in a long, term, truly significant improvement in compartment fire safety. PROCEDUU~S (SEE FIG. 1 ) Phase 1.-Industry Search : A summary of available AlA data and survey of material suppliers. (a) Individual AlA members will be assigned specific material categories to search. AlA members will supply each other with material specifications related, to the particular category. Where specifications do not exist, an outline of the required physical and functional properties and flammability data (and test methods) shall be supplied. If materials in use are less flammable than the specification requirement, actual v~alues will be stated. Members will also coordi- nate a list of material suppliers to be surveyed. From these inputs a chart will be made to send to the material supplier. The chart will- List functions and physical property requirements (e.g., abrasion impact, fungus and fluid resistance, acoustical properties, cementability, color fast- ness to light and laundering and drycleaning, strength, heat distortion and discoloration, permeability, flexibility, sewability, resistance to shrinkage from drycleaning and laundering, weight, luster, pilling and cracking, tex- ture, color range, aging and fire resistance.) Provide space for the suppliers to list their least flammable material. Provide space to list material properties which are available for evaluation and will be available in production quantities within 15 months. Provide space to list material properties for long term purposes which will be available at a specified future date beyond 15 months. This chart will then allow a time-availability study to be made. See example chart. (Fig. 2.) (b) Charts will be sent to suppliers with a request to reply within 30 days. Data will be accumulated and tabulated by the searcher and then distributed to the other AlA members. ( e) AlA members will be responsible for evaluating new materials with im- proved flammability, found by the survey, to determine their functional capabil- ities as related to required properties and implementation (timing and process or manufacturing) on new aircraft. (d) After evaluation, AlA members will make recommendations for flamma- bility requirement improvements and then `the AlA will draft the proposed 12- month regulations changes. To assure timely production incorporation, only those new materials which will be available in production quantities within 15 months from start of this program will be considered in this recommendation. Phase 11.-Research statements : materials and burn criteria. (a) From the survey conducted per Phase I, AlA members will determine what material categories require long range research and development to improve fire safety. AlA members will prepare the material research statements giving the appropriate imrn criteria (not specific required values ) and required physical properties. (Ii) Concurrently with Phase I and Phase ha, AlA members will review methods of determining material `burning characteristics, including combustion products, and analyze the meaning of the test data. The AlA will relate the analysis of `these data to data obtained from studies ol! actual airplane fire (mock-up and otherwise). It is proposed to determine what test methods and test requirements for either material types or "area use categories" are meaningful for airplane fire safety. Both small and large energy ignition sources are to be considered. (c) At the conclusion of Phase II, a and b, prepare coordinated AlA statements of material research programs and of development work required to define and measure meaningful material flammability properties for submittal to the FAA. Work is to be conducted by qualified material producers and research organiza- tions under FAA sponsorship. PAGENO="0255" PHAIE I I. lb Ic I' FIRE RESiSTANT MATERiALS ~ ~çHA*'T tOKPILbIIOW ~ ~ CUT ~ ~ mD T*U1~Ih~ [ALp~V~~ t~P~itb coèRoaIsaTlow SU3~9lT ~O FAA PREPARATION 1F MATE~IA(. IIESEAIICH STATEMENT ~:i:::-~-::i EXPLOSE BUSS CEITERIA AND TESI ~4ETHODS E~:t~~ mALYS~S OF EllEN ckrrckca Atib rEST METHODS ~ AlA bRAFIINC RE~SAi~S~ STATEMENTS ON HATERIAIL AND BUNS CRITERIA TEST NETHOI$ 4 SUBMIt ?* FAA PROPERTY TEST METHOD 3 REQUIREMENT MATERIAL SUPPLIER TO COMPLETE MATERIAL AVAILABLE `1 . FUTURE MATERIAL 2 * DATE %VAILABLE PRODUCT DESIG. `PRODLCT DESIG. 1 TNI$ COLUMN ONLY FOR MATERIALS AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION S IN PRODUCTION QUANTITIES PRIOR TO 19 9 TillS COLUMN FOR MATERIAL AT A FUTURE DATE BEYOND ,1S GIVE SPECIFIC DATE AVAILABLE 3 MATERIAL SUPPLIER TO FILL. IN IF DIFFERENT FROM AIR METHOD. FIGuB~ 2 FlEE-SupPRESSANT SYSTEMS AND SMOKE AND FUME PRomo~rIoN A provision which may contribute to survivtthility under a variety of conditions, and is also compatible with the trend toward larger capacity aircraft, is that of 251 DEVELOPMENT____ ~CMEDJLED ~NOJECTED PHASE U Us lib lIe IMPLEMENTATION IN DELIV. A. C A I ~ 2YEARS I AT BUALIFIED ORGMIIZATION a 2 3 4 5 5 7 .1 H IS I I II fl 4 IS IA (7 1$ IN 20 21 22 23 24 iS lo i7 ~1 29 JO MONTHS AlA FIGURE 1 MATERIAL SURVEY CHART PAGENO="0256" 252 extending the period o~f survivable cabin atwosphere, and the~by increase the allowable passenger evacuation time. The AlA proposes to run evaluation tests with various fire protection systems with simulated airplane cabins and crash fire. A study will be made of present industrial and aircraft systems that could be adapted. Development testing will (1) determine efficiency of suppression systems, and (2) overcome problems such as power supply, initiation and aetna- tion methods, and interfaces with other aircraft systems. Comparability with other evacuation aids will be assisted during the program. Tests conducted by ALPA, FAA, and airframe manufacturers and service experience have shown the types of crash fires to be expected, their propagation characteristics and results. Some testing o~f fire suppressing agents, shielding and venting systems has been accomplished to date. Investigations in the following area have been initiated: ~ Fire suppression by means of water fog, high expansion foam, Freon, and dry powder. Use of masks, compartments and fire curtains. Means of fire detection and initiation of suppressions systems. Insulation improvement and duct fire stops to slow fire propagation. These areas will be further pursued, and at the end of 12 months, industry will recommend a regulation change, which, while not requiring the specific system developed, will recognize and give full credit for the capabilities' of such a system in the overall crashworthiness, materials flame resistance, and passenger evacuation time of the airplane design. Specific tests will- 1. Evaluate the effect of lining materials with improved fire resistance on the survivability in a fire with a fuel ignition source. Survivability will be evaluated by measuring temperature and atmospheric content with respect to time. 2. Determine the value of water fog, high expansion foam, powder, Freon and masks to improve survivability in a fire with a fuel ignition source. 3. Evaluate changes in airframe insulation, wail and floor materials,. and use of compartments, curtains, and vents, to reduce the possibility of external fire propagating to the airplane `interior and throughout the airplane. 4. Evaluate means of preventing propagation of fire from air conditioning system to cargo compartment to cabin interior. EMm~GENOY LIGHTING AND EXIT AwAEDNSISS DEVELOPMENT Pnoox~M The objectives of the emergency lighting development program shall be to develop a standard for emergency lighting intensities within a 12-month period. The resultant standard will be incorporated into production aircraft within 30 months `after the start of the program. These lighting intensity stand- ards shall be determined by development of mock-up tests, using human factor evaluation procedures, to determine: (1) An acceptable cabin intensity level for evacuation. (2) An acceptable light intensity distribution for exiting ability and exit awareness. (3) The relationship between the interior lighting and over-wing lighting or escape slide lighting on exit ability, and the relationship between overwing or escape slide lighting and the ground on exit ability. (4) The effect of tactile, audio, and brightness stimuli on exiting ability and exit awareness. Subjects will `be tested in the mock-np that has `bumps to feel on the hatrack near the exits, directions coming through the P. A. sys- tern, and exit signs in various locations. If a satisfactory method of using smoke or smoke simulation can be devised, It will be used in these tests. WARNING SYsm~Ms STUDIES Passengers have been known to sit immobile in a seat when they should ` have been moving because they failed to realize the danger and what to do about it. Human factor studies will be conducted by the AlA into the response of the passengers to various signals designed to alert the aircraft occupants in the event of an emergency. The objective of the work is to determine whether a system to warn the passenger that he should act to leave the airplane is required or desirable. ` The program is to review test data of passenger response ito varions signals such as bells, sirens, voice commands, etc. These data will be used to define the value of these systems. PAGENO="0257" EMERGENOY LIGETING AND Em~ Aw~u~ENEss Moox~ur TEsT ITI~Ms 1. Interior lighting levels: (ci) Conduct test tO verify 0.05 foot-candle average aisle Illumination. ( b) Oonduct test to determine acceptable variation from average illumi- nation levels. (C) Oonduct test to establish exit area illumination levels with the 0.05 foot-candle average aisle illumination. 2. Exit awarei~ess: (a;) Evaluate exit. signs and other tactile/visual aids for brilliance level, general geometry, eta. (b) Evaluate the above both with and without simulated smoke, if feasible. 3. Exterior lighting levels: (a) Establish light levels and satisfactory patterns for evacuation. (b) Determine adequacy Df self-illuminated slides. 4. Warning studies: (a) Human factors studies of alerting devices to determine the worth of devices which will alert passengers that an emergency situation exists. 5. Inside-outside lightiiig levels: (a) Determine adequate levels of exterior lighting and contrast ratios with interior lighting, conduct tests with 0.05 foOt-candle average aisle illu- minatlon. EVACUATION SYSTEM DEVaLOPMEN~ Studies of evacuation demonstration and actual accident reports indleate that some improvement in escape means can he developed in the near `term Ler existing transport models. The industry proposes development ~ort in the followin.g specific areas: EXIT sr.rsns (a) Means to assist passenger transition from the exit door onto the slide. (b) Means to assist passenger transit~on from the slideto the ground. (c) Means to increase passenger confidence in the use of slides. ( d) Improve resistance of slide puncture due to small fire s~nrees near the ground base. ovnawix~ EXIT EGRESS (e) Means to assist rapid egress from the overwing exits to the wing surface such as a step to reduce the di~tanee, and a i~oli-skId surface. EXIT ACTUATION (1) Means to assist rapid and positive opening `of very large exit doors. The `original AlA proposal included development work 1~oward possible improve. i~ent in the seat to Type III and IV exit opening arrangements due to recent l~WA iuterpretation of the existing standards for the seat to exit relationship. N:p further work is proposed in `this area. \AIA proposes to perform a system `analysis of `the results of airline and ind'astry ev~icuatl'on demonstrations already conducted to further improve the understand- in~ `of evacuation system restraints (time consuming ~aetol~s) . It is necessary that ~ th~ FAA make these airline evacuation test results (without identification of sp~cIfic `airlines) `available to the AlA to accomplish this analysis. I~esults of the develapment work of items (a) through (f) above will be used to r~ropose modifications to regulations or TSO's. \ PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND AlA/FAA 000RDINATION Tl~e proposed AlA Management Organization Chart is shown as figure 3. An frerall manager will `be appointed from the AlA Ad Hoc `Ocmmittee member- ship.\Assistant managers will be appointed from each of the AlA member coin- parii~ participating in a major sense in `the development program. In `addition, `a techi4eal `manager wifl be appointed from that AlA member company doing `the large$t share `of the `development work in `each of the te~thmical `devel'opment areas. It l~ proposed that scheduled c'oo'rdin'ation meetings with `the FAA `be held at three-~onth intervals. The first three meetings, that is, those held during the 3rd, 6t~i, `and 9th m'ont~hs of the pi~ogram will `be held `ait three of t'h'e participating compai~ies. During the development program informal coordination meetings will be heic~ timed to development test milestones. The final ~ooI~d1nation meeting would be held at the rAA `offices in Washington, D.C. O~-715-68-17 I 253 PAGENO="0258" DE LOPME~ PROGRAM MANAGEME~ ORGANIZATION AREAMANAGER ~1. 11. H. (Harry) Rauger (Doug~L4s)J PROGRAM MANAGER I J. E. (Jack) Steine~i~oeing)[ ASSISTANT PROGRAM MANAGER I W. T. (Bill) Gross (Douglaalj FIGURE 3 I AREAMANAGER [3. E. (Jack) Nichols (Boeing) MATERIALS I FIRE SUPPRESSION R. 1. Technical Section Man~a~g~ J.jBob) Sutton fDouglas) Alternate I C. (Bill) Potter (Boeing)1 Technic~ Section Manager 3. M. (Jim) Lea* (Boeing) Alternate ~4. B. (Walt) King (Dougla~) I LIGHTING AND AWARENESS Technical Section Nanag~ W. B. (Bill) Y0WP (Douglas) ~ternate ~. T. (George)Febhardt (Boeing) I Team Members ~ ~ A. Moore (Aero Cotinander) ~J. Forbes (Fairchild-Hiller) C. Dietz (GD/Convair) R. Wood (Grun~nan) T. Von Rosenberg (Lear Jet) K. Sipple (Lockheed) ~~_K~AA) EVACUATION I Technical Section Man~er H. (Hilt)_Heinenaui1~eing) I Alternate .3. A. (Jack) (2r~v~s (flOuQlas) ~eam Members A. Moore (Aero Connander) T.Forbes (Fairchild-Hiller) t. Roinanowich (GD/Convair) R. Wood (Grunanan) L~. V~n Rosenberg (Lear Jet) T. Crawford (Lockheed) K, Keelaghan (NAA) . Team Members A. Moore (Aero Commander) 3. Forbes (Fairchild~'Hiller) 3. Hoover (GD/Convair) K. Wood (Grumman) T. Von Rosenberg (Lear Jet) R. Owens (Lockheed) Ka . Keelaghan Q!~1- ~ Metthers F A. Moore (Aero Cocnander) I. Forbes (Fairchuld-Hiller) P. Canegaly (GD/Convair) a. Wood (Grumman) T. Von Rosenberg (Lear Jet) J. Logan (Lockheed) ~ ~ ~.j~eelaghanj~A) PAGENO="0259" 255 corn- very Mr. DINGELL. One very brief question : Isn't it a fact, though, if there is a great deal of flarne, fumes, and smoke the passenger will be pretty well incapacitated in a minute? Mr. TIproN. The present tests of evacuation are very realistic ones in providing smoke and noise and everything else. Don't we have a movie on this subject? General VON KANN. Yes, we have. I believe some of the films were shown to the committee, if I am not mistaken. Mr. TIrroN. I don't think they have been shown yet. General VON KANN. A great deal of research is going into that very subject, as it is going into every aspect of survivability and evacua- tion. We hoped around the turn of the year that one development might give a flame arresting capability. Unfortunately, the toxicity level turned out to be too high. I have no doubt again that with the effects that are underway we will find ways to cut down the propaga- tion of flame and give the passengers more time. Mr. DINGELL. When you are dealing with a 400- or 500-passenger jet is it not fair to say that you ought to err, if you err at all, far on the side of safety, and we are faced with the problem of 2 minutes being too long. If that jet is full of smoke and fire and oxygen-absorb- ing conditions it might perhaps asphyxiate or poison through smoke poison the passengers of that aircraft. Isn't that something that should be looked at? General VON KANN. It is being looked at. We anticipate a new rule by FAA in the near future. Although I can't speak for FAA, there is an indication that this may go down to a 90-second rule. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Mr. TIproN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the mittee, for the attention we have received. Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. Did I miss you ? I apologize. Mr. PICKLE. As usual, Mr. Tipton, you give this committee thorough and complete testimony. Mr. TIPTON. Thank you. Mr. PICKLE. Certainly what you have said can hardly be argued with as I see it. I take it that you have limited your discussion, how- ever, to the original statement when you said you were largely going to give testimony that would focus on ways to reduce the risk of mid- air collision. I like the information you have given us. I note at this point, however, that we did not go further into the area of corre- sporiding cost to other aircraft beyond the ATA organization with the type of construction on planes and exits, certainly as it affects gen- eral aviation. I know you are representing ATA ; you are not trying to sell some- body else's hardware, but we have the problem in this committee of determining what is the best approach and still what is going to be fair to general aviation. I cannot help but feel that if we do these things that you recommend, and they are desirable, perhaps manda- tory, it will result in the inability of many users of general aviation to take advantage of these commercial airports. I don't see how they can come in if they have to meet all these requirements. Am I correct in that? PAGENO="0260" I 256 Mr. TIPT0N. I think that you are quith correct in that our recom- mendations will undoubtedly require those general aviation aircraft that come into congested areas to be well equipped and the pilots to be experienced and well trained pilots. We did not think that there was any better way of maintaining proper safety standards as aviation grows, both general aviation and area operations grow, than that. I believe that the general aviation group must face that possibility. Another recommendation that we are making at this same time relating to airports bears very strongly on this, however. In this I see that we are in complete concurrence with the AOPA. We think it is awfully important that adequate attention b~ given to the creation of airports specifically designed for general aviation. That is true for many reasons. One of the reasons is the one you have mentioned. We are recommending that in the Federal airport program that really pri- mary emphasis be given to the creation and improvement of general aviation airports. We believe that that is a way by which the general aviation will be better accommodated and the airlines and their traffic be better accommodated. Mr. PIoKu~. If we had double the number of airfields and general aviation on separate fields it might eliminate many of the dangers we are talking about. This would take a stupendous amount of money. Even if we had it, though, we are not going to be able to separate general aviation from the commercial airfield. There are too many fields used as a sort of feeder point for the big airlines. So, in ae~omp1ishing what you want and what you recommend, I still think. that we have got to admit that these fields must be used by general aviation to a level that won't break their backs financially to do it. Mr. TrrroN. We have no disagreement with that. We think that there must be a minimum of equipment and professional competence to participate in the congestion that is developing and will continue. This industry, as we noted here, is growing dramatically. I think that we all have to face, all of us aviation people, have to face the fact that it is going to be more difficult and more expensive than it has been in the past. Mr. PICKLE. If we put in all these things, such as control towers, extra radar equipment, daylight radar scopes, and ILS, you are say- ing that it is beginning to approach somewhere in the neighborhood of a hundred million dollars. I would say it is more than that. Corre- spondingly, the private industry is going to have a tremendous amount of money to put h~to it. What I am concerned about is this : How many of these alphanumeric systems do they have in operation right now 9 Mr. Tn~roN. I think the only alphanumeric systems in operation right now are New York and Atlanta. Mr. PICKLE. What does one of these systems cost? Mr. SELTZER. I don't know exactly, sir. It is in the millions as they are currently configured. Mr. PICKLE. How many do you envision we will have in the United States within the next few years-should have? Mr. SELTZER. It is hard to say that unless we define terms, sir. There are various forms of alphanumeric systems, some of which are very sophisticated and very, very costly. Some of the lower cost versions of those which would print the numbers only on the scope can be obtained I/I PAGENO="0261" 257 for $150,000 to $250,000. Wh~reas some .Ofthose necessa*ry~ for the more sophisticated t~rmina~1 areas,. and I speak of termimi~i areas only, might run anywhere from a half million to a million dollars. If we have one for each radar location, we currently would have need for it at the 105 airports receiving radar service today. How many there will be in the future I can't forecast, but we go into 526 airports, and use 21 air route centers. Mr. PIcKLE. You testified, if I recall, that approximately 200 of your craft now either have or are being equipped with machinery that would use the alphanumeric system, that is established altitude. If you are putting 200 installations on your planes why does the Gov- ernment have only two systems? Mr. SELTZER. I don't know that I can speak for the Government but I wish they had it in more places because I am certain it would be in more airplanes, sir. There are at least 200 in airplanes, by the end of this year it will exceed 300 aircraft. We have urged for years that the ground equipment be expedited. I don't know the specific rca- Sons for the lag. Mr. PIOKLE. I suppose this is something for the FAA to answer but I can't understand why they only have two systems when 200 have and soon 300 of your aircraft will have machinery to receive it. Those are all my questions now. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you. Mr. TIPT0N. Thank you very much. Mr. FRIEDEL. I have a question which is more of a statement. I am one with a personal belief that we should not spend a great deal of money for Washington National if eventually we are going to have it for general aviation and feeder service and shift all of our major flights to Dulles and Friendship. I think we have to consider this for the future in this area, particularly. Mr. TIPTON. I should say, Mr. Chairman, I know you did not ask for my comment but I should say that if that were done, neither Friendship nor Dulles could handle the traffic. That requires a vast expansion of both fields. There are an awful lot of people and air- planes that go into Washington National, as you know. The CAB has a proceeding going on at the present time to try to sort all of this out. I would not undertake to make recommendations as to how it will be done. Mr. FRIEDEL. Dulles is operating at around 10 percent of their ca- pacity, maybe 15 percent, and Friendship at only about 40 percent of their capacity, if that much. So they can take many a flight out of Washington National and make it safe for all aviation. Thank you. Mr. TIproN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. Our next witness will be Mr. Frank Smith, executive director of the National Aviation Trades Association. I want to apologize to you, Mr. Smith. You were here this morn- ing. You can see how we are pressed for time~ Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir; I understand I have about a minute and a half. Mr. FRIEDEL. No, you have not a minute and a half. If you want to file your statement and briefly summarize it-we are going to read your whole statement-you may do so. PAGENO="0262" 258 STATEMENT OP PRANK KINGSTON SMITH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL AVIATION T'RAD~S ASSOCIATION Mr. SMITH. For the record, my name is Frank Kingston Smith, executive director of National Aviation Trades Association, which is a group of 400 businesses involved in the sales, service, and support busi- iiess of general aviation. I am sorry to say that my statement has not been printed yet. It is at the printer's now. Our office has not received it yet due to some personal problems I had over the weekend. Mr. FRTEDEL. When you have it ready will you submit it to us? Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir; I shall suhrnit it to you for the record. (Mr. Smith's prepared statement follows:) STATEMENT OF F~ANK KINGSTON SMITH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL AVIATION TRADES ASS0OIATION It is a pleasure to appear before your distinguished subcommittee. I am Frank Kingston Smith, executive director of the National Aviation Trades Association, composed of general aviation businessmen, manufacturers, component suppliers, and operating support facilities. Our association represents sales, service, and supply organizations which support the operations of the entire general aviation fleet. PREAMBLE Over the last 18 months, the problems of air safety, air traffic control, and airport capacity of many communities served by the certificated air carriers have become of progressively greater concern to the air transportation industry, Oongress, and the general public. The press has given prominent treatment to the growing number of air carrier delays, some at airports such as John F. Ken- nedy, Los Angeles, Miami, O'Hare, and Washington National, with the attendant increases in the operational expenses to the airlines, and passenger complaints of missed airline connections and missed business appointments. We would like to explore the subject with specific attention to three areas: I. Scope of the airport problem. II. Adequacies and inadequacies of today's system. III. Needs of tomorrow I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM-THE NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM There are three facets of the national air transportation system: 1. Aircraft. 2. A system of airports from which they operate. 3. An air traffic control system that conducts aircraft from one airport to another, safely. These three sub systems are inextricably intertwined to form the national air transportation system. The problems facing us are rooted in the fact that there has never been any real national system plan for air transportation. Each sub system has almost grown like Topsy independently, without directions or long range plans. Before anyone can devise a workable solution it is necessary to understand the manner in which these three sub systems mesh. We will try to identify the problems, characterize them, identify areas in which problems are critical, and recommend a plan to solve these problems in such a way that all users will operate compatibly overall. FUNDAMENTAL DEFINITIONS1 In both the public press and the Congress, attention given to the problems o~ air transportation is directed almost entirely to "commercial" airlines and "corn- mercial" airports. The premise seems to be that "commercial" airlines are im- portant to the national economy and that airline personnel, pilots, maintenance people, and administrations are ever perfect and without any human failings. 1 Every profession and specialized trade has Its own words of art, which have an entirely different meaning from that of lay usage. Aviation has developed Its own mean- ings and technical terminology. PAGENO="0263" All other flying is conveniently (and confusingly) lumped together under the term "general aviation," treated all too often by press and in Congress as a nuisance activity carried on by untrained, incompetent, unequipped, unregu- lated, rich, and probably drunken pilots. The lack of comprehension of the impact of both airline and general aviation operations on our national economy is a basic problem which must be attacked first. Until aviation in its every form is defined clearly and its requirements are recognized and understood, it is im- possible to make any of the decisions for which these hearings were called. AVIATION TRANSPORTATION-THE BIG PICTURE It is convenient but erroneous to separate and segregate arbitrarily the certifi- eated air carriers and general aviation. The development of a national air trans- portation system must provide for both. Otherwise there is no system. THE AIR CARRIERS Although the press writes about the crowded skies and about traffic jams aloft, comparing them with the 5 p.m. rush on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, this is simply not the situation. The Air Transport Association, representing the major carriers commonly called "commercial" airlines, has 40 members operat- ing passenger carrying airplanes under Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity, issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board.2 These should be properly referred to as "certificated air carriers" or "certificated carriers." Excluding the aircraft operated by the six Alaskan lines, two Hawaiian, two Caribbean, and two helicopter airways which do not operate in the contiguous 48 states, fewer than 2,000 airplanes are operated in the U.S. by the certificated carriers.8 Ob- viously not all of these air carrier airplanes are flying at any one moment, nor do they serve all the country equally. The air space over all the 48 states is cer- tainly not crowded with air carrier airplanes as some people would have us believe. AIR CARRIER AiRPORTS There is a general misunderstanding concerning the coverage of air service in `the U.S. and the facilities used by the airlines. Some people tend to treat public airport facilities served by certificated airlines as if they are for air carrier use only, and a recent trend of thinking is that general aviation should not be permitted to use any such airj~ort facilities. The reason professed is safety. :ls it valid? For the record, the certificated airlines do not own any airports. Carrier air- ports are not private facilities. They are public facilities' paid for by public funds, frequently matched by federal funds. Their use by all users should never be restricted arbitrarily and should not be discussed without a thorough under- standing of the situation. STATISTICAL REFERENCES Consideration of this situation can be confused unless the various types of statistics used by the air carriers are placed in perspective. Furthermore there must be a clear distinction made between `the problems of handling aircraft movements in the air traffic control system (including the airport appi~oaches and landings) and the problem of handling mobs of people on the ground in the terminals. Distinctions must be made between: 1. Aircraft movements, both on the airways and on airports; 2. Available passenger seats; 3. Load factors 4. Number of passengers originated at airports; 5. Passenger miles en route; and 6. Revenue passenger miles. These statistics have valid specific management uses for the airlines but can generate erroneous conclusions unless assessed in their proper frames of refer- ence. I 259 2 P.L. 85-726, 85th Congress, S. 3880, Title 3, Sec. 401. ~ 1967 Air Tran8port Facts and Figures, p. 34. PAGENO="0264" 20 ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS Let us first exax~$ne the airport terminal handling problem from a datum poi~it of 1947. Twenty years ago the DC3 was the backbone of t~e air carrier fleet, an airplane that could carry 24 passengers.4 Let us pose a hypothetical problem at a hypothetical airport to indicate bow the present problem has slowly de- veloped. Suppose a 1947 airport, with a capacity of 40 flights per hQur for L~ hours a day, using 1)03 equipmei~t. This would mean that 640 ai~~pl~nes would arrive and depart (and each arrival and departure counts as a movement) , with a j~otential of 15,360 available passenger seats. Historically, air carriers have been running a load factor of about 50%, so we can project 7,680 people arriv- lug and leaving the airport during each 16 bours-2,808,200 per year~ Now let us suppose that this san~e airport is being served by exactly the same number of airplanes-but jets, with a seating capacity of 150. With tl~e same number of air- craft movements, we now have 96,000 aircraft seats available and at a 50% load factor, the same airport handling the same volume of aircraft traffic now handles 48,000 people each business day, or 17,520,000 per year. The airways are no more crowded, the approach facilities are no more saturated, the airport runways and ramps have no greater volume of traffic, but the terminal facilities suddenly become crowded with humanity coming and going. This is the ro~ot of the present airport problem. It is therefore imperative that we always distinguish the factors of aircraft movements on an airport and the problem of passenger handling facilities. Passenger Miles : The published statistics on passenger miles can create a dis- torted impression in the minds of laymen regarding both the airspace and the terminal facility problem. The term "passenger mile" is derived by multiplying the number of people actually on board an airplane and the number of miles the aircraft flies. For example, a 24 passenger D03 flying 3,000 miles coast to coast generates 36,000 passenger miles, assuming a 50% load factor. A DO-8-61 with 251 seats, at 50% load factor, would generate 378,000 passenger miles, although there is still only a sing'e aircraft movement handled by the air traffic system. We anticipate in the very near future aircraft With a potential of 450 passengers and 750 passengers, which project the passenger mile figure of each aircraft to astronomical proportions. To fill the seats of the progressively larger airplanes coming into airline use is one of the prodigious marketing probiems facing the certificated carriers and is the reason for the extensive and expensive advertis- ing campaigns carried on by them. "Passenger revenue miles" refers to the number of passengers carried by air- lines who actually pay a fare. We must recognize that many air travellers do not pay fares because of special nontariff arrangements. This revenue mile figure is a management statistic which really has no place in our considerations of crowded airport facilities since all passengers whether they pay fares or not have tohe handled at the terminals. "Load factor" refers to the number of people (or freight) expressed as a percentage of the total capacity of the aircraft. THE AI1~PORT SITUATION Where Is the airport problem ? A common misconception equates all airports with Kennedy International, O'Hare, Los Angeles, or Washington National, and their high volume of traffic, then concludes that all general aviation should be barred from all airports served by air carriers. This is not a valid proposition. The airport situation : FAA statistics disclose that there are 8,415 airports registered in the continental U.S., only 37.~% of which are publicly owned and 69.5% privately owned. However, of these 8,415 airports, FAA's testimony before the House Commerce Committee revealed that only 526 are served by the cer- t1ficat~d airlines. That's all. And we must note that of these only 234 have control towers and can be legally called "control airports." Only 105 airports served by air carriers have airport radar surveillance facilities. To put it another way, there are 7,589 airports in the U.S. used by general aviation airplanes only and nQt served by certificated carriers. The vast majority of the general aviation fleet operates from these non-air carrier-served airports ; therefore they do not con- tribute one whit to any of the congestion at the sprprisin~ly few a~rports which have generated all the furor about wldcli this comi~4ttee i~ concerned. ~DC-3 permitted variation up to 28 passengers, but 24 seats Is the average number Installed. PAGENO="0265" 261 Where i$ the airpOrt problem? CAB airline statistics Indicate that one-third of the total U.S. airline passengers originate at just five airports in the U.S.; 10 generate 50%; 90 generate 90%; and the other 560 aIrports originate the remaining 10%. There Is no factual basis to justify treating these 560 airports Ot~ the same basis as the 10 airpOrts whk~h are congnsted with tr~tnsient human bodies and burdened with all the attendant problems of handling people, Includ- ing terminal buildings, ticket and counter areas, parking facilities, reet rooms, restaurants, and public transportation. GF~NE~AL AVIATION ANALYZED Business Airorctft.-Considerations of the very real problems facing a relatively few communities can be further distorted by some other statistics coupled with a misunderstanding of the composition of the general aviation fleet. According to FAA, there are more than 100,090 general aviation airplanes. With a ratio of 50 general aviation airplanes to 1 certificated carrier aircraft, there is a popular misconception that general aviation is akin to a cloud of aeronautical gnats which darken the skies. This is also wrong. There are 40,000 airplanes in the general aviation fleet which are strictly busi' ness machines. Someone observed sagely that the people who make the decisions in our highly competitive business climate don't take the train or the bus- they fly ! The business airplane is known as the "brain wagon" and for good reason. Nearly 600 buSiness aircraft In our fleet are pure jets, flown by APR rated pilots. They are private airlines operating on their own schedules. Almost 3,000 business airplanes are "air carrier types" used by large corpora- tions and flown by ATR rated pilots. Nearly 25,090 light twin engine airplanes in the general aviation feet are used by appropriately rated pilots and flown for business purposes. The term light plane Is also misunderstood. By legal definition a light plane is any heavier than air machine weighing less than 6¼ tons (12,500 lbs.) , an arbitrary figure established more than 20 years ago `when the DO-3 was the standard air carrier nirplane at a gross weight of 35,000 lbs. The P0-3 carrIed 24 passengers sit 165 mph for an extreme range of 1,000 miles. Many light planes outperform the venerable DO-3 with one exeeption~-they carry only from 4 to 15 passengers. Modern light planbs fly faster and higher than the DC-3, are better equipped, yet because they weigh less than 6¼ tons, are regarded by the unknowledgeabie as flimsy toys. As long as this distorted image persists, the problem facing us today cannot be solved. Aircraft such as those described in the above categories range In cost from $60,000 to $2.5 million. These are not toys. They are business tools, yet, merely because they are not operated by the certificated airlines, they are popularly defined as "prirate planes" and the layman assumes that they are Piper Cubs, two place fabric covered training planes. Such aircraft are not worthwhile business investments unless they may be operated on a regular basis ; therefore It is necessary not only that the pilot be instrument rated but that the airplanes be equipped with aiircraft navigation and communications equipment, known as avionics, costing from $15,000 to $150,900 per airplane. ~These aircraft operate on precisely the same basis as the certificated car- riers ; instrument flight plans, frequently flown by pilots holding ATR ratings, the same as airline captains. The question of the competence of private planes operating ih the air traffic system is often raised. Here again there is `a misunderstanding of terminology. A private airplane is alSO any `airplane not operated by the certificated carriers. The Lockheed Jet S~tar, Grumman Guifstream I and II, operated by General MOtors and the Ford t\~totor Co., the Ftii'rchil'd P27 operated by Ohampion Spark Pbig Co., the DG~-9 operated by Playboy, and the myriad DG-3's, Martin 404's, Convairs, and other corporate aircraft are private airplanes. It is time that some~ one capped the well of misinformation which keeps puthping Into the minds of the public the iddd that ØI~e planes are all riper Oubs or the equivalent. Air Taa,i/Uommuter Airlim~s~-In the last few years a new segment of avia- lion haS der~et'opM to ~eet the ~riin5portation demands of many comhiunities not shrved `by the certificated ~ârri~s. This segthent is known a's air `taxi, op- orating on ~ttIie'r a &m~afid basis (likea thxlest'b Oh the streetS) Or on a regular schedule `between stated points. This latter development l's variously ktown `as scheduled air taxi, commuter airlines, sho~~t lines, feeder lines, and more ~ecently as mini-lines. The demand for scheduled air transpoitatlon from Small coin- PAGENO="0266" If 262 munities is shown most vividly b~y the phetnomenal ~wowth of scheduled air taxi operations Which in three years have increased from 12 air commuter airlines to nearly 120. These airlines operate without ~ny route protection or federal subsidy.5 There is only one reason for a pilot to go into an airport-lie has some legiti- mate business there. In the last few years a new industry has deve1o~$~d, rising to meet the need of people to travel quickly to an airport to `make connections with a certificated carrier. This business began as a service of chartering air- planes from an outlying area to a hub, developed into an air taxi ius'iness on a demand hasis, and under special FAA regulations is now de~eloping into a regular scheduled service variously known as scheduled air taxi, commuter air- lines, `short lines, and feeder lines. This category of aircraft iS flown by profes- sional pilots who perform a needed function in air transportation using light aircraft carryIng from 3-9 passengers. A new class of aircraft is being instituted now carrying up to 18 passengers to meet this demand. Agricultural Aviatiort.-Included in the term general aviation is a specialty known as aerial application, siiidely referred to as crop dusters, and looked down upon as a form of insanity by people who should know better. Few members of Congress and the general public realize that almost 20% of the arable acreage of the U. S. is treated by agricultural aviation, or know of the services performed in fire fighting, insect control, or vermin elimination. More than 5,000 aircraft are engaged in this business use. Instractional Flying.-Obviously no one is born as an airline captain. Every pilot must begin with a course in basic instruction and most pilots continue to develop their proficiency as required for the type of flying performed. About 9,000 general aviation airplanes are used for instruction only. Week End Pilots.-General aviation being an all inclusive term also includes many airplanes that are not used for rapid, all weather, business transportation. More than 30,000 such planes are used for recreation and other personal trans- portation in a local area. Some are small 2 and 3 place fabrics covered units. Most of them are used only by a group of people referred to as week end pilots. They do not operate from municipal hubs because they don't have to. Their bases are generally the smaller fields around the country and they are flown only in daylight during good visibility. Such airplanes do not need radio, never hook into the national air traffic control system, never use controlled airports, and contribute absolutely nothing to the airport problem. Many airplanes are also used by individuals for personal transportation and the use o~f the airways system and major airports depends entirely on the pro- ficiency of the pilot and the equipment of the aircraft. There are no statistics to show that such aircraft create congestion problems at airports or that they con- tribute to it in any way. Many thousands of pilots fly for recreation and enjoy- ment. About 30,000 airplanes are used for these legitimate purposes.6 These week end pilots as they are sometimes called do not contribute to the problem facing this subcommittee for the simple reason that most of them never go near a con- trolled airport and never use the federally operated navigation and communica- tions system maintained and operated by FAA. Rules and Regulations. There is also an apparent assumption that while the certificated carriers are highly regulated, general aviation is not, and that almost all general aviation pilots are inept, untrained, and reckless. Without laboring the point we invite your attention to the voluminous Federal Air Regulations covering afl aircraft and airmen under Title 14, Chap. 1, of the U.S. Code.7 6 &~he4uled Air Taa~i Operations as of November, 1966, FAA, Office of Management Services, Information and Statistics Division. 6 Although the airlines claim that they are Important because they are a business, the record shows that in 1906 they spent $144,345,086 (Am~rioan Avkrtiot~, May 1967, p. 28). It is public knowledge that a large volume of this advertising was to inàuce travel to vacation areas. 7 Fed~eral Aviation Regulations, especially: Part 23. Airworthiness Standards : Normal, Utility, and Acrobatic Category Air- planes. Part 83. AIrworthiness Standards : Aircraft Engines. Part 43. Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration. Part 61. CertIfication : Pilots and Flight Instructors. Part 67. MedIcal Standards and Certification. Part 71. DesIgnation of Federal Airways, Controlled Airspace, and Reporting ~o1nts. Part 91. General Operating and Flight Rules. Part 95. IFR Altitudes. Part 97. Standard Instrument Approach Procedures. Part 137. Agricultural Aircraft Operations. Part 141. Pilot Schools. Part 143. Ground Instructors. Part 147. MechanIc Schools. PAGENO="0267" ~63 TUE AIRWAYS SYSTEM The federal airways system must be considered in two parts : 1. Navigation system relies on electronic ai~d other aids which establish pre~ cisely the airways over which aircraft must travel to be iUcluded in the air traffic controi system. 2. The APC system itself. The airways system is based upon electronic equipment used for navigation. The relativ~ position of the ground based electronic fixes is accurately selected by the pilot using avionics equipment in his aircraft. This primary air navigation system depends upon an extensive network of radio fixes operating in the very high spectrum of electronic frequencies, from which bearings in all directions can be immediately detected by airborne sensing equipment. The technical name for this navigation equipment is VHF omni directional radio range, shortened in aviation usage to "VOIR" or to "0mM range." This type of equipment has recently been coupled with newly developed equipment which emits a signal that can be electronically interpreted aloft to show the aircraft's distance from the signal source. This is known a~ distance measuring equipment (DME). Other navigation facilities include low frequency radio beacons, many of which are `being phased out as the more precise VOR or VOR/DME installations are commissioned. THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM The air traffic control system is designed to provide guaranteed separation between aircraft on instrument flight plans while operating in actual instrument flight conditions. Thirty-five years ago all flying-military, air mail, air carrier, and private-was done only in daylight and fair weather, using the human eye both as the primary cross country navigation and traffic separation tool. As aviation matured, it became obvious that to provide any kind of scheduled flight operations for the air carriers or the military, a system was needed which would permit `aircraft to operate safely under conditions of reduced or no visibility. The development of an air traffic control system had to wait until there was a reliable system of radio voice communication hetween the aircraft and the ground, coupled with a navigation system upon which a pattern of civil airways could `be built. No laymen can understand the problem of flying an aircraft without ground reference. It is the tragic fact that a pilot who has not been trained to control an `aircraft solely with reference to fight instruments is literally committing suicide if be flies into a cloud mass and loses sight of the ground. Statistics show that under these circumstances an airplane becomes completely uncon- trollable and lethal within 30 seconds. Therefore, `before flying in clouds was possible, the industry first had to design `a system of special flight operations, but it is only one part. The a'bility to follow the `airways under no-visibility conditions, to compute positions and make estimates of arrivals at various points along the line, and to communicate with the ground, these are the other parts of the instrument en route flying picture. The last parts of the flight, arrival at a precise point in the ter'minal area and performing a landing under instru- ment conditions, are refinements.8 The key to air traffic control is the continuous cooperation `between pilots aloft and `air traffic control specialists on the ground.9 Only if the pilot `has the ability and proficiency to maintain a precise course on the airways and to predict accurately his estimated time of arrival at check points along the way can the ATO controllers on the ground reliably predict traffic movements and prevent possible traffic conflicts aloft. `Constant radio-telephone dialogue between the controllers on the ground `and pilots in the air is required to exchange advice and information which each must have. Communications and navigation equipment 8 ~ is imperative to distinguish the difference between Instrument landings under actual instrument conditions and landings in good visual conditions while still under an instru- ment flight plan. The term "controller" is a misnomer. Actually the air traffic specialist on the ground exerts no control over the aircraft. `The pilot is in control of the aircraft at all times. The proper relationship between pilot and controller is that of cooperative team work. PAGENO="0268" 264 required both on the ground and in the aircraft is coniplicated and expensive, but must be used if the system is goli~g to be expected to work.1° The Theory of Tro~ffle &~pan~ion.-Separation of en route traffic can be ex- plained hi what is a~m~tte~1y! an over-siinp1i~1ed illustration. Imagine a series of small birds eath in a separate empty box ear on a moving train. Phis is how ATO operates. When an airplane is issued an instrument flight clearance, It means that ATO has reserved for it a box of moving airspace along a track over the ground. The bo~ is 5 miles wide (the width of a civil airway) , 1,000 ft. high, and its length varies from 9-50 miles (the minimum length of the airspace reserved is usually the distance covered by the aircraft in three minutes-the allowance error margin) . To be immune from collision neither the bird nor the aircraft need be in the precise center of its moving box ; it may be at the top, bottom, or either end ; so long as it does not stray into the adjacent box, the system creates a protective cocoon of airspace. Visua~ Flight Rules (VFR) Operations.-Federal Air Regulations under which all aircraft operate, both general aviation and air carrier, provide that visual flight, sometimes called contact flight, may be carried on as long as the lateral visibility is three miles or mure and the cloud ceiling at least 1,000 ft.~' Under these conditions the see and be seen concept operates as it did 30 years ago. Air- craft separation and collision avoidance by law are the responsibility of the pilot, who is legally bound to look out the window. In the language of the courts, the pilot under such circumstances is bound to see what he would have seen if he had looked. This is true whenever the acthal atmosphere is clear enough to permit visual flying. It is frequently said that the "see and be seen" concept is no longer valid. This Is nonsense. The conclusion of invalidity comes from the widely held misconcep- tion that aIZ air carrier airplanes are jets, flying constantly at 500 mph, which, it is alleged, generates "instantaneous closure rates." Let us discuss this point. The Federal Air Regulations require that airplanes flying on easterly and west- erly headings above 3,000 ft must fly with 1,000 ft. of vertical separation. Thus an aircraft proceeding east is 1,000 ft. above or below an aircraft going the oppo- site direction. Only if they are going in the same direction can they be at the same altitude. The closure rate between two aircraft going the same direction at the same altitude is the difference in air speed between the overtaking airplane and the one being overtaken. This is certainly not "instantaneous." ,Tets at their altitudes fly with 2,000 ft. of vertical separation. At low altitudes the regulations impose speed restrictions on jet aircraft as for example in terminal areas. An airplane flying at 240 mph transits a mile in 15 seconds, or three miles in 45 see- onds. Under VFR conditions this is not anywhere near being an instantaneous closure situation. Try holding your breath that long. As a better example : in 15 seconds an automobile traveling 00 mph travels a quarter of a mile, 1,320 ft., yet most of us operate in this environment without giving a thought to such a thing as instantaneous closure rates or considering that there might be a problem in swerving to avoid colliding with a car a quarter of a mile away. The only require~ ment is that the pilot be alert and look out the window. Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) Operations.-Whenever the ceiling is less than 1,000 ft. or lateral visibility less than three miles, instrument flight rules (IFR) as prescribed by the Federal Air Regulations go into effect. Under these condi- tions only instrument rated pilots (those who are (1) licensed for this special type of flying ; (2) using aircraft equipped with properly calibrated instruments; and (3) operating under Air Traffic Control-issued Instrument Olearances are legally permitted to fly. Everyone else is grounded by law. The restrictions on instrument flying `and the level of proficiency required to engage in It `are spelled out in the regulations in great detail.12 The result is `that under IFR conditions, the vast majority of general aviation aircraft which are not flown for business and therefore whose fair-weather pilots do not need `or use instrument ratings, do not use the federal airways system, nor the air `traffic control system. 10Pypicai general aviation nay/comm equipment as widely used: Type Automatic direction finder Dhs'tanee measuring equipment VOR nay/comm transceivers VOR localizer incacators 3-light marker beacons receiver Radar transponder 11 Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 91. 12 Ibid., Part 91, Sec. 91.1O5(b)~ Parts 95 and 97. Price range $1, 088-$4, 376 2, 800- 7, 000 795- 3, 400 400- 545 249- 320 2, 200- 5, 000 PAGENO="0269" 265 However, It must be understood that many general aviation pilots are instru- meut rated and have aircni!t equi~pped with e1ectroz~ic. nsavigation and ~oainiuni- cations equipment (avionics) ; they do use the ATO system under instrument conditions and as time goes on wiR use these facilities more and more, because they must operate on an appointment schedule and on the business aircraft is the most efficient form of transportation available to him. Uan~~d In~tr'ument Plight Plan~s.-Genera1 aviation pilots tile instrument flight plans only when they need to file them to go from one place to anotheir nuder instrumented conditions. It has been stated in public communications media that certiflcateçl air carriers file instrument flight plans for every flight and that they are therefore under "positive control" at all times. Let us for a z~ioment examine this misconception. First of all, the premise of those who advocate positive control is that if all aircraft aloft were at all times operating on instrument ifight plans-~even under the best of visibility in good weather-it would positively guarantee prevention of aircraft collisions. This premise is erroneous, the terminology misleading, and the conclusions fallacious. The fact that an aircraft is on an instrument flight plan does not guarantee traffic `separation except from other aircraft also on instrument flight plans when both are operating under actual instrument conditions,18 The fact that an air carrier or any aircraft is on an instrument flight plan does not in any way guarantee it separation from any other aircraft flying-whether on visual flight plans, instrument flight plans~ or no flight plans, if the weather Is clear and visibility good enough for VFR. All pilots flying under VFR conditions are still responsible by the law for avoiding collisions. The results clearly, precisely, and undisputedly impose upon every pilot the legal duty to look out the windshield for other traffic. The certificated carriers operate on published ~ scheduled approved by CAB on the basis of which the carriers can and do file in advance a series of in- struinent flight plans using the airline flight numbers. These are called "canned" flight plans. However, under VFR conditions most air carrier pilots, particu~ larly those of the local service airlines, will cancel their instrument flight plans as they roll out to take off positions or they will cancel their IFR very shortly after they are airborne and proceed VFR. For the record, all air carrier aircraft do not fly on Instrument clearances at all times.14 In good weather they are not required to, nor does it always make sense when the average flight time for a local service carirer is approximately 30 minutes.15 how an IER Plan Works.-There is no mystery to the operation of the system. although many aviation writers and fliers try to make it sound mysterious. Suppose that an airplane pilot is going to institute an instrument flight plan from Washington National to LaGuardia Airport, New York. Sometime prior to the flight, the pilot, as required by law, would review the status of all navigation aids and facilities along the. route he would take then would notify AT'O (through a flight service statJon, a control tower, or a direct phone call to the center) certain information including his point of departure, point of origin, routing, and requested altitude. This communication would then be sent to the Washington Air Route Traffic Control system at Leesburg, Va., which would aacertain available airspace on the routing requested ; Washing- ton ARTCO (Washington Center) would then contact New York ARTCC (New York Center) to cooperate in creating a ` course and `altitude that would fit in with New York's available airspace under `the existing and forecast traffic sitna- tion. New York an1~ Washington Centers would strike a bargain for an airspace reservation whieh~would be transmitted to the pilot. In the meantime the pilot would be on' board his `aircraft at Washingtom National, would call Ground Ooutrol and receive clearance to taxi out to a ramp area adjacent to. the end of the active runway, where he would pull off to, one side and contact Instrument* Fiight Plan Clearance Delivery on a special~ frequency. i~ time his clearance would come through something like this : "A'TC clears November 1 2 3 4 Poppa from Washington National to Robbinsville VOR via radar vector's to Churchill. `3The duty is still upon the pilot in command to be vigilant for other traffic at all times. Under actual visual flight conditions a midair collision caused by loss of communication or failure to follow controller's directions is legally indefensible. 14 There is an agreement among the air carriers that in some parts oi~ the country they will operate on instrument flight plans particularl~" Os routes' in thS triangle formed b,~' Washington, Boston, and Chicago. All pure jet aircraft do fly on Instrument flight plans, but propeller. driven local ,servic~ aircraft have no such renuirement. 15 American Aviation, May 1967, p. 31; Flight, June 196~, p. 69. PAGENO="0270" 266 Victor 123, Robbinsvi1Ie~ Olimb and maintain 5000 ft." This means that the air- plane has separation protection only as far as the Robbins.ville VOR fix north of Maguire Air Force Base. It cannot proceed further into the New York area until it receives an addition ATO Clearance. In ATO lingo the Robbin~ville limitation is known as its Clearance Limit. The pilot reads the messtage back to the con- troller so that there can be no misunderstanding, then contacts the Tower and receives his takeoff clearance. Immediately after take off the tower instructs him to contact Departure Control (radar) on a specific frequency, which will steer him (vector him) to a point out of the terminal area, at which time the Departure controller will inform the pilot to "contact Washington Center" on a specific fre- qt~ency. This is known as a radar "hand off." Washington Center would continue to vector the aircraft until it intersected the assigned airways at Churchill in- tersection, identified by radio navigation equipment in the aircraft. In a few minutes Washington Center would notify the pilot to contact New York Center on a specified frequency as he proceeds up the airways past Woodston, N.J., to- wards Robbinsville. In the ATCC's teams of controllers sit around large horizontal radar screens resembling glowing card tables-the great tools of ATC. Crawling across the face of these screens are many glowing points of light known as "blips," each representing an airplane, showing its position and movement over the surface of the earth. Altitude reporting equipment is not yet in service. Under actual Instrument Flight conditions every one of these aircraft would necessarily have to be on an Instrument Flight Clearance, meaning that they all would have to be identified and their altitude communicated by radio to the Center controllers. Alongside each blip being controlled would be a small piece of plastic upon which would be written in grease pencil the aircraft number, altitude, and flight route. These would be continually moved by hands as the blip progresses across the face of the scope. These plastic tags are known as "shrimp boats." On a console next to the controllers is a stack of Flight Progress Slips containing more detailed information on the flight than can appear on the little shrimp boat. As the air- plane approaches New York Center's area of responsibility, a New York con- troller, watching a similar radar screen, is notified by Washington Center on a direct line communication system that an aircraft is arriving which `he must handle. The pilot is then told to "contact New York Center" on the frequency that the New York controller is using. The usual way of completing the hand off is for the pilot to transmit : "New York Center : This is November 1 2 3 4 Poppa maintaining .5,000." The center identifies the aircraft and merely replies "Radar contact." In the meantime the New York terminal air traffic situation has eased so that before the aircraft reaches Robbinsville, where the pilot would expect to go into a holding pattern he receives an additional clearance : "November 1 2 3 4 Poppa cleared to La Guardia Airport. Expect ILS# aj~proach." At Queensiberg intersection (just west of Sandy Hook) he is told, "Contact La Guardia Ap~ preach Control now," on a designated frequency. At that time the pilot conta~ts Approach Control, is identified, and, when cleared to do so, initiates his in- strument approach. The Instrument Approach. Under the present state of the art, there is no such thing as a "blind" landing.16 Under conditions of reduced visibility and ceiling, instrument approaches are made on clearly and definitely prescribed regulations and criteria, the theory being that an airplane shall be delivered prdcisely by the system to a position approximately % mile from the runway threshold, at which time the pilot must be able to see the ground and to complete the landing visually. The type of approved instrument approach and the ground based equipment assigned with it may change the landing minima criteria. The finhi stages of an instrument approach and landing are made with reference to a special terminal chart, called an Approach Plate, which contains all the informa- tion needed for the specific type of approach to be made. Some approved instru- ment approaches are based on low frequency non-directional radio beacons, the position of which can be ascertained by an automatic direction finder (ADF). Other approaches are based on a combination of ADF in conjunction with a radar assist and are popularly known as Ground Controlled Approaches (GCA). This is the type of approach historically used by the military. There are VOR approaches emanating from a nearby VOR facility. localizer approaches which are 16 The British are using automated approaches under conditions of no visibility and no ceiling ("zero zero"). However, zero zero landings have not been approved by the FAA for either air carriers or generaL aviation. PAGENO="0271" 267 established by a localizer beam, bisecting the runway and extending for several miles to bring the airc~,aft to the proper runway heading to the airport. The most precise form of instrument approach is the ILS type ; the full Instrument Landing System ~ approach consists of (1) a localizer beam, (2) a glide slope, also detected by electronic equipment in the aircraft, (3) marker beacons, (4) approach lights, and (5) runway lights. Marker beacons, identified by equipment in the aircraft~ tell the pilot the distance he is from the airport ; the outer marker (OM) is usually 5.5 miles from the end of the runway (located on its center line extension) . In many installations there Is also a low frequency non directional beacon co-located with the outer marker to facilitate capture of the center line extension and localizer beam. The middle marker (MM) is located about `/~ mile out. (In early ILS systems there was also a boundary marker, on the end of the runway, but this type installation has been discontinued.) ILS approach lights consist of a high intensity lighting system including the "ball of fire" strobe light installation which facilitates the pilot's transition from pure instrument flying to the visual phase of the landing.* Some `airports have more than one approach system. At many airports the pilot will know that there are ADI3' approaches, localizer apprOaches, back-course localizer approaches, VOR approaches, and full ILS approaches. When the pilot is approaching the airpovt of destin:atiton on an Instrument Flight Plan, he is informed by the ARTCO of the type of `approach being used and that he may expect. This enables him to extract the correct approach plate from his flight kit and place it on a holder for study during the `approach and landing. Sometime during the approach the pilot is told to contact the tower for a final landing cleañtnce ; after having touched down on the runway he contacts Ground Control for taxi clearance to his ramp. What About Radar? The widely expressed reliance of laymen upon radar to solve all the problems of air traffic control seems to look upon it as an electronic panacea. Unfortunately this is not the case. Radar is only one part of the ATC system. It is a wonderful tool which makes expenclitious handling of traffic easier, but the ATO system is designed so that the entire system cannot fail if one of its parts ceases to function. Radar is not a panacea by any means. In elementary terms, there are two categories of radar operations : First, is the use of primary radar, in which the radar transmits a radio signal which is reflected from an object almost instantaneously, the "echo" recaptured and measured usually as a blip on a cathode ray tube. There is one advantage of primary radar : it requires no special equipment in the aircraft to reinforce the signal. However, it has some system peculiarities and serious limitations. Fre- quently aircraft blips will disappear altogether from a radar screen because of some electronic anomaly. The technicians talk about scalloping, ghosting, and interference. For a long time radar operators observed returns from ground tar- gets such as nearby buildings. TV antennas, or trees ( "ground clutter," in radar lingo) . This was removed trom tue scOpe by instituting a circuit which will show only moving targets, called moving target indicator (MTI). In earlier ra~Jar, precipitation areas, thunderstorm cells, and snow showers would create an echo and block out aircraft returns. This was cured by the institution of a system known as circular polarization (CP) , which effectively cut out all but the most intense areas, such as the cores of thunderstorms, but showed aircraft targets clearly. The problem with OP is that pilots frequently find themselves steered by controllers right into areas of extreme turbulence simply because the controllers' radar scopes screen ~ut violent meteorological phenomena. In the last few years, FAA has entered into a great program of using "second- ary radar" in aircraft. This equipment,. which developed from the military use of similar equipment called 1FF (identify, friend or foe), is known as a radar transponder. It reinforces the radar puise echo and enhances the blip on the radar scope, * and by isolating and detecting one of a number of selected codes the ATC can positively identify the aircraft with which he is working. In case of a loss of identity the aircraft can be instantly re-identified by a special identification flare are which shows up on the radar screen when the pilot is directed to "squawk ident." ~ `~`The origin of this term is military. Transponder type equipment used for identifying flying aircraft was given the code word "parrot" and pilots were told to "have your parrot squawk ident." PAGENO="0272" I\ 268 Nearly ~ iii general avtati~ aircraft to~y~ aitlw~ig~ many radar fa~ilities on, tl~e grcnmcl. stiU do not ha~ ifltei~rqga~iQn eqUip~X1~rLt WI4CITL makes them ~ Eut tz~ai~spiM~d~rs t~e n~t i~ifalJM~. T1~y, too, 1~ave system peculiar~ties : sjde.lobe ti~teri~Qgal2Qn, ~SR s~a4~wi~g (~i4 resultant lQSS o~ blip), refie4~tiou p~oble~s, ai~ g~u1~Uag. F4~ is ~ow~ ~t~ili~g parametric amplifiers and side lobe suppression (SLS) modificatious, but ti~e fa~s~ target probiems and others caused by mixing electiroi~ic p~~ses from diffQrent atrcra~t are yet to be solved. As the trtansponder comes into gr~at~r ijsago, new problexpa are dpi~e1opiijg ip this technical field. Frequently upon arriving at ~tn~a1 areas, pilots are directed to "sauawk standby," which means "tuvn off the t~ranspQn~ler," Thpswe ar~ right back to operating on raw radar primary returns. The busier the li~ub airport, the re~te~ is the likelihood o~ beipg tol4 to tarp off the tpppspond~r~ II. ADEQUACIES AND INADEQUAClES Qr To1)~Y'~ SYSTEM Obviously today's system has demonstrated its overall adequacies In practical use, with few exceptions. The 10 busiest airports servec~ by the carriers are suffering greatly because the carriers are tralisporting more passengers through them than anyone ever anticipated. The problem is complicated by th~ fact that the. air carriers, in order to meet the d~mapd of the traveling ppblic, acizedule their flights competitively to meet this demand. The problem of peaking is not unique to aircraft ; it faces every mode ~f public transportation : trains, inter- city busses local busses, and taxicabs. However, except for tiies~ 10 locations naitl~cr the air traffic problem nor the passenger handling problem in the terminals is really acute, yet. However, there is a rei~l concern by all users of the airspace that the tituation will become acute in the very near future. In the hypothetical flight plan from Washington to New York above, it can be seen that the ATO "system" works perfectly for a relatively few aircraft. But the ATO system, like a chain, is only as strong as its weakest link. In aviation the weak link is the saturation level of the system, including the airport acceptance rate and approach system saturation under actual minimum instru- ment approach conditions. All reasonable air carrier scheduling must be based on this criterion. It is imperative that the difference between operating under these restricted circumstances and operating under vishal conditions be always separated when considering the problem. All federal airways must begin and end at an airport. Some airports absorb a load that no one could have imagined 25 years ago. The New York area, for instance, with three airports served by U.S. and foreign flag carriers, Is literally a target at which airplanes are fired from all parts of the world 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, Air travelers stream in from places like Miami, Atlanta, Dallas, Las Vegus, Los Angeles,~ San Ftanciseo, Chicago, Ottawa, London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, and many other great urban centers. Every airplane arriving, from any direction, must be handled by New York ARTCO, which under actual instrument flight conditions guarantees them airspace separation. The burden carried by the human being who man the New York Oenter is incredible. It is easy to understand why the New York Oenter every so often muet report that the system is saturated and that it therefore cannot accept any more traffic. Under actual instrument conditions there is, all too frequently, simply no.airspace left. Airplanes approaching the New York area (and New York Is only an ex- ample-every one of these cities mentioned can have the same problem) must then be told to "hold" at a certain designated holding point because the air traffic control system is incapable of affording them protection in the final ap- preach and landing phase of the flight. By weather restrictions, the actual airport acceptance rate can be reduced from 120 m~vements (the acceptance rate under good weather conditiops) to 40 or 50. The situation. is similar to the familiar one on an expressway when cars moving at 50 mph find themselves in an immense traffic jam because someone at `the head of the line is driving 30 mph. The ATO system., bOth en-route and for contro~ling approaches, is handled on an Individual controller-to-Pilot "hand ~old~ng" basis. Each pilot is personally directed to fly at a certain altitude and along a course that wiU insure him separa- tion. Every aircraft movement must be manually directed and controlled by human beings on the ground. This individual `han~lipg system will not be ade- quate to handle the instrument flight trafflc volume in p few years'. The answer is computerized automation, a Subject that seems too much like Jplesr Verne PAGENO="0273" I 29 to be ta1~en seriously. FAA. ]ias sw~h a ~rc~gr~rn wQrkit~g exp~ri~e~taj1y ~t simu~- tion e~erQises iaow. By 1~8~ it will t~e a part o~ the syf~tem. The Peopte Prob~em.~--T'I~e ~adeqt~a~y of the so]~ution o~ ~ Pr~em Q~ p~.Qp1e handling on th~e ground is, also being re~og~i~e~ as critica~l iz~ n~u~y citie~, Airline terminal buildings are constantly being enlarged; ticl~etj~g ar~d baggi~g~ facil- ities are expanded to meet the demand, let standing in line, departure a~iid arrival delays, and lost baggage are all sources. of irritation to say the least for the airline traveler. Arrangements which were satisfa~ory for tb~ passe~ig~r volume of small air carrier airplanes are no lorig~r ~4~qnate for today's needs. Certainly they cannot be considered for tomorrow's. III. Tim NEEDS OF TOMORROW The airport runway and ATC problem must be wet if the number of air carrier and non-air carrier aircraft involved in our national air transportation system is to continue groWing. But, there can be no system plan without cooperation of all concerned. Runway reejuirements at many airports are dictated l~y the type of aircraft acquired by the carriers-a unilateral management decision, fre- quently made without reference to the fiseal capabilit~ies of the communities served to meet such needs. Only 2~ airports will be able t~ handle the ~mbo Jets and the SST. Also, at the present tune only 1~7 airports can band]~e pure jet equipment of the airlines. The Need$ of ~1enera1 Aviation.-Relatively few general aviation aircraft require runways such as those needed by the air carriers. Many communities have expanded airport capacity by relieving the traffic pressure on jet run- ways used by large aircraft by building 4,000 to 5,000 ft. parallel strips, which will easily accommodate by far the greatest percentage of general aviation aircraft. These runways do not require either the length or the heavy structure as those of the large jets. At Washington National the tower controllers can handle departing or arriving general aviation light aircraft traffic under visual flight conditions by directing them to land on 1,200 or 1,500 ft. of the intersecting runways which can be done without impeding the flow of heavy aircraft traffic on the long runways. Under instrument flight conditions National Airport's acceptance rate is severely curtailed and there are delays. With the development of new approach aids and precision navigation systems it would be possible to use parallel runways on many existing airports simul- taneously for air carrier and general aviation instrument approaches. Proper long range planning of the national airport system can solve the problem at almost every location. People fly to an airport because they want to go to the community it serves. The reason for going is not important. The air carriers do a thriving businesS ` in carrying passengers to resort areas for fun and recreation as well as to other areas on business. The air carriers are businesses operating for profit. What is needed, therefore, is a planned program for creating a system of general aviation airports which will give access to air carrier served communities and will relieve the traffic pressure on the large airports. What is needed is a syat~m of equally accessible airports for general aviation. The ideal reliever airport situation can be found in the Twin Cities of Minne- apolis-St. Paul. The reliever airport program planhied and executed more than 20 years ago developed a ring of general aviation airports and has. made it un- necessary for general aviation users to land at the airport used by air carriers. No regulations bar them ; indeed some general aviation aircraft do use the facil- ities without any problems whatsoever. The political problems involved with instituting such a program are tremen- dous. It is ackpowledged that few communities want airports usually upon a highly emotional basis, but this situation must be faced directly. The requirements of air taxi and commuter airlines which are also air carrier operations, since they also carry passengers for hire (frequently for the purpose of interline transfers with the certificated airlines) must be considered in this long range plan. FEDERAL AID TO AIRPORTS PROGRAM The Federal Aid to Airports Program (FAAP) has been rendered inadequate for the very purpose for which it was formed.18 Historically FAAP has been 18 Although the legislative intent of Congress in passing the Federal Airport Act was to encourage general aviation through a nationwide system of good general aviation airports the result 20 years later Is that the program is approaching the billion-dollar level for 2,300 airports instead of the 6,000 originally Intended; also, 83% of the total funds have been spent on airports used by the air carriers. 92-715-68-18 PAGENO="0274" 270 under-funded by Congressional appropriations and Administration policy. What funds have been available have gone largely to Improve airports served by the air carriers and to enlarge runways and ramps directly as a result of the carriers' unilateral decision to institute service with heavier and more capacious equip- merit. General aviation has been given little consideration. The entire FAAP has received an annual appropriation of $75,000,000-the cost of 50 miles of high speed highway. This fact certainly illustrates the inadequacies of the appropriation under the program supposedly created to establish airport facilities for the benefit of small communities. THE PASSENGEE HANDLING PROBLEM In order to handle the volume of individual people who will be transported by the certificated carriers, a system of mass transportation of parallel capacity between the community and the airport is needed. A plan must be developed which will induce air travelers not to drive their own cars to airports. Such a system must be economical to these passengers and at the same time offer them rapid transportation. The answer, we believe, is to develop a high density modular rapid transit system using equipment that is compatible with city streets, like a bus, yet which can be integrated into a monorail or rail track system so that several units can be joined together to carry several hundred people to the air- port at once. By such a system airline passengers could be collected at various points in the community, then transferred as a group to the airport, and delivered either to a particular aircraft or to a terminal building facility. CONCLUSIONS 1. The national air transportation system depends upon a balanced interrelation- ship of: (a) Aircraft. (b) Airways system. (c) Air traffic control system. (d) Airport system, including general aviation reliever airports. (e) Airport/downtown mass transportation system. 2. The critical aspect of airport air traffic saturation is the airport acceptance rate under adverse (IFR) weather conditions, defined as the minimum instru- ment approach conditions. 3. The most critical congestion problem of the ATC system is based on the high traffic volume of approximately 10 urban centers, or hub airports. 4. The problem of passenger handling must be considered separately from the problem of aircraft handling by the ATC system. 5. The terminal problems on the ground are: ( a) Adequate ramp space for air carrier aircraft at the terminaL (b) Passenger handling facilities within the building itself. (c) Public transportation of passengers between the airport and the community. (d) Public parking facilities for those using the airport. 6. There has never been any formulation of an integrated national air trans- portation system plan which would consider the needs and requirements of all aircraft at all types of communities, or of the passenger support facilities re- quired forsuch an overall system. RECOMMENDATIONS Believing that free enterprise businessmen who have a real interest in the problems of airports and aviation safety can act together to solve them expeditiously and practically, we recommend that there be ëreated a commission patterned along the lines of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, setting up a program whereby representatives of FAA, the air carrier industry, the general aviation industry, and the state aviation commissions unite to design a national air transportation system, giving full attention to the needs of the future growth of aviation. We recommend further that this body make budgetary recommendations to the Congress and to the administrations of the several states involved so that such a national transportation plan may be fully funded and implemented. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. PAGENO="0275" I 271 Mr. SMITH. 1 think, Mr. Chairman, the biggest pEoblem we have, despite all the curve balls thrown here, is to define the problem of crowded air and define the safety problem and have some idea of what we are really talking about. We have in this country some 8,000 airports registered with the FAA. Five hundred and~ twenty-six of those are served by the certificated carriers. For some reason or other, it has become popular for those to be called commercial airports or nirline airports. They are not. They are public airports. They are public facilities paid for by public funds. The airline fleet consists of 2,000 airplanes ; they are not all flying at the same time. We have two types or, I should say, three types of aircraft flying under certification of CAB. We have the domestic trunks, there are 11 of those. They fly 1,117 airplanes according to the last statistics I have available from the CAB. We also have the 13 local service carriers which fly 395 airplanes. Incidentally, 97 of those are DC-3's, which is still the largest num- ber of a single airplane type used in local service carriage. We also have 13 supplemental airlines which run about 200 airplanes, de- pending on what their financial status is at the moment. The problem of the crowded air, which is what the press is pleased to call it, really exists in a very few locations. There are 10 places in the country that really qualify for what we would call major traffic hubs and every one of these 10 places is jammed with airline traffic because these are central locations where people want to go and they want to go not only by public carriage, by the certificated carriers, but b their own airplanes. . Mr. FRIEDEL. Would you care to name the 10 airports you are speak- rng of? Mr. SMITH. I put my stuff away because I thought I was going home but I will be very glad to give it to the stenographer. (Chicago, O'Hare, John F. Kennedy, Los Angeles, Miami, Denver, Phoenix, St. Louis, San Francisco, Atlanta, Cleveland.) The fact is that you must make a complete differentiation between actual visual flight conditions and actual instrument flight condi- tions. The criteria, the tight part of our whole `airway system comes when the actual weather alt instrument conditions requires instrument approaches at a hub airport. When this happens each airplane must be separately handled and frequently there is a 5~minute interval be- tween handling the airplanes. ` Here at Washington National Airport under instrument flight con- ditions it i's said the airport has a capability of handling `60 flights an hour. There has been an arbitrary figure put on those : 40 for the scheduled air carriers `and 20 for general aviation which includes 16 air taxi operations an hour, and these air taxi operators, I `submit, are also commercial carriers, `although they are not certificated by CAB. Under visual flight conditions the fact that certificated airlines are filing instrument flight plans does not mean a thing. The airport move- ment acceptance rate at National Airport using light aircraft under good visibility conditions goes up to 120, sometimes 130 per hour. I have a light airplane. I fly a light twin. I am completely equipped with everything that Mr. Tipton just talked about a little while ago, including a 4096 code transponder. I can come into Washington Na- PAGENO="0276" I 272 tional Aiirport in VFR conditions and land on the end of a cross runway that does not interfere at all with airline traffic,. it does not cause any slowdown, it does not cause any congestion. We must remem- her that the tight point, the most difficult part of our whole system, comes when the weather is bad. This is when the air suddenly becomes crowded because the air traffic control system just can't handle the crowd of people who all want to land at the same airport. When we talk about positive control we are talking about another thing and there is `a lot of misconception as to that. There is no such a thing as air traffic controller. This controller on `the ground is not running airplanes in the air like control line models. The controller on the ground is using systems like radar, which is one of his tools, to assistthe pilot, to advise him of other traffic and to help him by setting up a program of flight and reserve airspace so that under bad instrument conditions he will have an insulation of airspace about him. If you would try to put under all weather conditions all the air- planes that use the system right now, if every one who flies in general aviation at any one time filed instrument flight plans, our whole air traffic control system would totally collapse right now. And it will be years before this situation is better. This is why when you talk about positive 00 ~ ntrol it sounds good if you say it fast, hut if you really understand the problems we have with the congestion, with the fre- quency congestion, with the controller workload, you suddenly realize that positive control, that is to say, imposing instrument flight plans, instrument flight clearances and programs for all aircraft, even under the best of w~ather conditions, is simply a system impossibility and it will be for a long time to come. My airplane is equipped to fly in all weather except ice and thunder- storms. Those are the two things I won't fly in. But in many parts of the country the people on the ground are not equipped to handle me with the equipment I have. There is an airport north of here called Friendship-I think you may have heard of it- Mr. Fiui~om~. Yes, sir. Mr. SMIni. They do not have the interrogation equipment to use my radar transponder. When I go to Friendship, and I am in there regularly, I have a $4,000 instrument in my airplane that is valueless because they don't have the equipment that is needed to make it work. There are many other places that don't have the equipment. A little while ago we heard Mr. Tipton recommend that every air earner airport, as he calls it, should have a tower and ILS and a radar, and there has not been any discussion yet about what traffic volume jg required before you should have all these things. Sure, it is great to have them. I would love to have all the radar help I can get. When I fly, as I did coast `to coast last year three times, and to Florida nine times, and I have flown to Canada and Mexico, when I fly I use every aid I `can get from the ground. I use the air traffic control centers as much as I can. But, it is surpristhg how often, when you get into the terminal areas, into New York, Chicago, even here in Washington, when you get in close, when the chips are down, where it is `crowded, where the area is congested, suddenly the guy in the radar control tower will say, "Squawk, stand by." That means "Turn your transponder off," there are too many reinforced targets. They are cluttering up the radar scope. PAGENO="0277" 273 Mr. Tipton gav~e you a statement. On page 10 there are illustrations of three radar scopes. (See fig. 5, p. 227.) On the left-hand scope there are three targets, what they call blips, indicated on a scope. This illustrates the raw return shc~wn on rad~r when there is no transponder reinforcement involved. The next two illustrations, one of them indi. cates three transponder returns showing a double bar on the scope. When the control tells the pilot to "Ident," he pushes a button in the cockpit. This fills in the space between the two bars, that is how radar identification is confirmed. When he gives you positive ide~tifi~ cation he can say "I got you." The third one of those drawings shows three radar blips with transponder returns and longside of them are the alphanumeric codes read-outs. If you fly into New York or to Washington, or into any place where they will have alpha- numerics in a few years, if every airplane in there is flashing an alpha~ numeric code, the scope will be so crowded with this imagery that they will be saying, "Squawk, stand by." That means we will go back to raw radar for terminal traffic control. A lot of the technology works well when there is a little bit of traffic but when there is congestion and you need it the system becomes over- loaded and fails. This is something that lay people don't consider. In instrument flying, there is nothing tricky about it or secret about it. If you follow an instrument flight plan from here to New York the first step is to get the flight service station and advise him you want to go to New York. I don't bother making a flight plan any more. I file it and say, "I want to go from Washington National to New York, your routing, and the lowest altitude I can get." At the end of the runway I am sitting there, he comes back and say "The clearance is ready." He reads me the clearance. That assigns me a route and an altitude. In order to get that the two centers, Washington center and New York, have had to strike a bargain on a piece of reserved airspace. This piece of reserved airspace is 5 miles wide. It is a thousand feet thick arid it is as long as my airplane takes to go in 3 minutes, the speed of my air- plane plus 3 minutes is the length of this box. If you imagine a box- car on a track with a bird in the boxcar and another bird in another boxcar, that is the way our air traffic control system works. You each have a box of reserved airspace. When all airplanes feed into one center or one target as you must, one airport, it is obvious that the traffic moving along the track cannot be accommodated by the airport as fast as it can fly along the track. This is why you get stacks at holding points, why you get traffic delays. The traffic delays are caused by the fact that the system cannot accommodate all the people at one time. I `don't know how we ~tre going to solve this. Automation may help but still you are going to have to get the airplailes on the runways one at a time because you can't land them in formation. This is the pro- gram. This is our plan. These meetings were called as a result of the Asheville accident. A lot of people talk about the fact that Asheville should have radar. As I recall, there are only four airlines going into Asheville. They only have nine or 10 scheduled flights a dayas I recall. It is essentially a general aviation airport. Most of the traffic is general aviation traffic. I have been in there many times, just 2 weeks, ~go,'in fact. I think that what happened at Asheville has not been explained~ I have analyzed it and explained it myself of my board of directors PAGENO="0278" 274 and I will be glad to supply you with my comments to my board on this subject. I think radar would have prevented this thing from happening but after a while you reach a point where you have to ask how much money can we expend, how much can the Federal Government put into this to assure people that there are not going to be accidents. And will it assure them ? I don't think so. We have had accidents under positive control, under instrument flight plans. There is no assurance particularly if the weather is good enough for one airplane to see an- other. This is a problem we have to consider. The last thing, of course, was the hooker that was just thrown about user charges. There is a move afoot I think to make people think that general aviation is not paying its own way and that the airlines are. The airlines are not. They don't pay any gas taxes on the kerosene they . use to power their turbine equipment and only, incidentally, 46 percent are pure jets, and 54 percent are still propeller-driven airplanes in the airlines. The kerosene burners don't pay any fuel taxes. They don't pay any taxes at all, as a matter of fact. You realize that the passenger ticket tax is what pays their por- tion of what they call the user charges. If you take the local service carriers, the 395 airplanes of the local service carriers were subsidized by the United States Government as of last year to the extent of $140,000 per airplane per year and they don't pay any user charges, the passengers pay them. I think these facts should be known. I think that a lot of the things that have been said here today about air traffic safety, about the inte- gration of general aviation and of the airlines, you have to get down to bedrock and understand what the problems are. Sure, we have 102,000 airplanes in the general aviation fleet ; 40,000 of those are flown by professionals or semiprofessionals. We have jets. We have highly equipped airplanes. These airplanes cost anywhere from two and a half million dollars right on down to $40,000 for a single-engine business airplane. They are not toys, they are business tools. They are well-built airplanes. You cannot equip those 40,000 airplanes flying in the air that don't go to big airports. They can use the 7,500 air- ports that are available, many of which we are losing fast because of land development and so forth. These are the things you have to rea- lize. I recognize there is a shortness of time. I could spend hours on this subject. Obviously I am full of the subject. But I do think, sir, that the record of this committee should show that before any con- siderations are made of some of these pie-in-the-sky plans about hay- ing radar and towers at every airport that there should be some con- sideration of the actual fact and the pragmatic aspects should be exam- med very thoroughly. Mr. FiuEimL. Mr. Smith, I want to assure you that not only the sub- committee but the full committee knows the importance of general avi- ation. Just because you heard certain testimony don't think for one minute that there is any idea of putting out general aviation. I think you were a little perturbed because you heard other testimony. I am glad you are going to submit your statement for the record. I can assure you again that we are taking all aspects. The one thing we want to do is provide safety for pilots, for the passengers and for the people on the ground. We are not going to put anybody out of business. PAGENO="0279" 275 Mr. SMITH. Thank you, sir. I assure you I am interested in safety be- cause I fly. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Devine. * . Mr. DEVINE. I appreciate Mr. Smith's position. I look forward to reading his formal statement he will submit here. I am sure it will contain some interesting information. As the chairman has suggested here we had hearings immediately following the North Carolina crash. Some of us insisted that futher hearings be held in order that the position of general aviation be brought out in public hearings. Of course there are facts on both sides. We want to hear all of them and to weigh them. Mr. Si~nTH. I might say my statement is not that any one of us should try to solve this unilaterally. I think the way the whole problem must be solved is by a formation of a group like the radio technical com- mission for aeronautics (RTCA) whereby Government, industry, in- ciuding the carriers in general aviation, people who are knowledgeable about the problems, will get together and thresh them out themselves and made recommendations. I think this is what is going to have to be done. I think the arbitrary differentiation between carriers and general aviation has been distorted. Although there are times that I digress with ATA, I respect them. I know what they are in business for and that is to make a profit. I favor that. We do work together and we do have mutual respect, but I have a low flash point. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Pickle, do you have any questions? Mr. PICKLE. No, Mr. `Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you very much. Mr. SMITH. Thank you, sir. Mr. FRiEDEL. Now we `have Mr. Stanley Lyman, vice president for Federal Aviation Agency Affairs, National Association of Govern- ment Employees. if you want to submit your statement for the record we will be glad to have it. The ~ho1e statement will be included. If there are any ques- tions we will direct them to you and you may answer the questions `and they will `be placed in the record. STATEMENT OF STANLEY LYMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OP `GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ~ Mr. LYi~AN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that suggestion. I recognize that time is indeed running short. We too, this organiz~ation that I represent, and the members as part of our organization, are concerned with air safety. With your indulgence, I feel because we represent the heart of the air traffic control system, the guts, so to speak, the air traffic controller, the technician, and various other employees of the FAA, I would ap- preciate the opportunity `of exploring some of the information we have. If you decide or choose to adjourn we certainly have no objection to returning tomorrow morning and giving you this information because we feel that the information `we have is vital. Mr. FRIEDEL. We have a list of witnesses for tomorrow. We do not in- tend to have any afternoon session tomorrow. I am a'fraid that we ~yon't be able to get to it. The committee will read every word of your PAGENO="0280" 276 statement in the record. If we have any questions we will direct them to you and you can supply the answers for the staff to go over arid the members to go over. Mr. LYMAN. May I note that we have additional information that we haven't incorporated in the original statement. Mr. FRIEDEL. If you have additional information how long would it take you to have it submitted? Mr. LYMAN. I will ask Mr. Lyons. STATEME~IT OP KENIIETH LYONS, PRESIDENT, NATIO~1AL ASSOCIATION OP GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Mr. LYONS. I am Kenneth Lyons, national president of the National Association of Government Employees. As Mr. Lyman pointed out, he is the national vice president of our FAA locals. We have national formal recognition with the FAA. Of course for the past 8 months or so we have been asking Congress to hear u~ relative to what we call a very unsafe condition that exists because of the undermanned FAA facilities. Mr. FRIEDEL. The question is this : He has additional information. How long will it take to have it prepared so that we can have it in- cluded in the record? Mr. LYONS. Tomorrow afternoon, I believe. Mr. FRIEDEL. That is all right. You may submit that. The committee will direct questions to you and you can answer them promptly and we will have that inserted in the record. Mr. LYMAN. You also were given some testimony today by other individuals and groups. We were just taking some notes. Again be- cause of the complexity of the questions, the complexity of air traffic control under these conditions, we will have no opportunity of clar- ifying and exploring some of the information. Mr. FRIEDEL. Yes, you will. I asked you how long would it take you to give us the additional information. If you want to clarify anything, submit it along with your record. Mr. LYMAN. Very well. Mr. DEvINE. I do not understand the haste involved in concluding these hearings. We are only going to be a half day tomorrow and why do we have to finish now ? What is the rush ? I can be here tonight. I came back here for these hearings. Mr. FRIEDEL. If it is your wish I will come back tonight. Mr. LYMAN. We are not inconvenienced, but we feel that the people who are performing the services are not being given an ample oppor- tunity to be heard. I being an ex-controller, the gentleman to my right being a tower controller from Newark, can present, we feel, informa- tion that will be of vital interest to you gentlemen. Mr. FRIEDEL. If you wish to return tomorrow, return tomorrow `and we will try to work you in. If not, you may have to submit your supple- mental remarks and we will have them put in the record. Mr. LYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. The committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m. the committee adjourned, `to reconvene at 10 a.m. Tuesday, August 29, 1967.) PAGENO="0281" AVIATION SAFETY. TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1967 HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERONAUTICS, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Samuel N. Friedel (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FREIDEL. The subcommittee will be in order. This is a continuation of the hearing on aviation safety. Our first witness this morning will be our colleague from California, the Honorable Don Clausen. Please proceed Mr. Clausen. STATEMENT Oi~' HON. DON H. CLAUSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CON~RESS PROM THE STATE OP OALIPORRIA Mr. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to you and the members of your subcommittee for holding these hearings on aviation safety and the problems relating to general and commercial aviation. In order to be of maximum service to the committee, I should like to present a few thoughts that I have regarding the increasing airport crisis as it relates to aircraft accidents in this country As we discuss safety for aircraft, I will label my presentation here today as "An Aircraft Accident Prevention Plan." 1 am taking the liberty of aiming my remarks and focusing atten~ tion on one of America's most pressing and, as yet, unpublicized prob~ lems-the growing crisis of airports, or lack of airports, in this Nation. Many will say that there are more important and more pressing prob~ lems facing America but I submit that unless something is done soon about this problem, air tragedies will increase in our country. Recently, we were all shocked to learn of a midair collision which took the lives of Navy Secretary McNaughton and his family plus 79 others. To those of us familiar with this accident pattern, the regret- table fact is, that this accident and the many others like it, could have been prevented. We cannot long continue to disregard aviation and airport problems or relegate positive action to reaction each time an air tragedy occurs. With every aspect of aviation growing at a fantastic rate, it is clear that what is needed most and needed now is an entirely new approach to our aviation problems. These problems, which I shall outline in more detail, are compounded b'y the fact that more people are flying- more planes take to the sky-and planes are b~ing designed to carry far (277) PAGENO="0282" 278 more passengers with each passing day. Simply stated, our present systems and accommodations for handling this increased activity are just not adequate to do the job and we are failing to keep pace with the demands of our a~viation industry. I would say, in this regard, that congestion is the key word in describing our air safety problems. Congestion inside our airports, in the hangars, on the strips, in the air, over communications. Congestion is the "enemy" of aviation which must be dealt with. As a former Navy fighter pilot, a professional pilot, manager of an airport, and now the president of the Congressional Flying Club, I have devoted many hours of study and research to the problems of American aviation. I have been both pleased and encouraged by the interest shown by other Members of Congress who have spoken to me and indicated their concern over the lack of attention and priority given to the needs of aviation. But the problems of air safety and airspace planning cannot be resolved, in my judgment, unless and until we first develop a truly effective national airport system plan and a method for financing the plan. With the huge costs involved, coordination between all levels of government in our Federal system must be maximized and unnecessary duplication of effort and facilities must be minimized. With land values steadily escalating and available airport sites steadily diminishing, particularly in and around metropolitan urban areas, the problem of guaranteeing access for general and business aviation-type aircraft is the most crucial and a solution must be found immediately. For many years, I have advocated locating airstrips contiguous to highways. Lands for these strips should be acquired at the same time lands are acquired to build highways or to expand them. All that is required to accomplish this, is coordinated planning and financing. At this point, I should like to list what I believe to be the most immediate requirements for improving aviation safety and efficiency ii) high-density areas such as Washington, D.C. 1. Establish integrated airport systems with proper administrative and policymaking authority such as a commission or port authority now has with a joint exercise of powers agreement. 2. Provide general aviation reliever airports in metropolitan areas, with maximum emphasis on building airstrips contiguous to circum- ferential highways. 3. Establish airspace zoning, with specified climb and descent quadrants and/or corridors-reserving separate quadrants for air ~ carrier and certain quadrants for general aviation and military air traffic based on numbers of operations. 4. Accelerate efforts to provide terminal area radar, instrument- landing systems, high intensity approach light systems, terminal VOR, and communication and tower facilities. 5. Expand basic radar systems by adding secondary radar equip- ment designed to accommodate computers in high density areas to assist the air traffic controller establish safe separation and sustain a smooth flow of aircraft in the controlled areas. 6. Complete airline collision avoidance systems at the earliest pos- sible date and intensify efforts to develop low-cost collision avoidance devices and low-cost radar beacons for general aviation use. / PAGENO="0283" 279 7. Designate "practice areas" including flight strips for general aviation VFR student activities. 8. Require minimum communications and navigational equip- ment consistent with requirements in high density areas. 9. Enhance pilot education programs through `broader use of flight simulators to be acquired by flight schools, high schools, colleges, and universities to establish a trend toward professionalism in pilot training. 10. Improve and expand clear zones and buffer areas in order to permit the installation of all-weather landing systems and minimize noise problems. In the long run, one of the most critical phases of coping with air- space congestion, is the development of effective and reliable collision avoidance systems to supplement and operate independently from the air traffic control system. Such a system has been 12 years in develop- ment and experts say we are still 3 to 5 years away from realizing this critically needed equipment. Much of this time is reportedly need- ed by FAA to prepare a U.S. common standard for collision avoidance equipment. Because of the vital part such a system would have on reducing midair collisions, I would urge placing this equipment devel- opment on a high priority. In addition, much can and must be done to improve weather and terrain reporting for pilots and this can be done at very low cost. Twenty percent of our general aviation accidents occur only 5 miles from an airport and many are attributed to weather and terrain con- ditions. What is required in this regard, are more weather reporting stations and expanded hours of observation and reporting particularly in areas where weather and terrain pose hazardous threats to aviation. One of our distinguished congressional pilots, Senator Peter Domi- nick, of Colorado, advocates requiring general aviation aircraft to be equipped with crash locator beacons. Such equipment provides auto- matically generated beacons for downed aircraft which will greatly facilitate locating them, thereby resulting in the saving of a great many lives which each year are lost when downed planes cannot be readily located. Senator Dominick is urging the FAA to exercise the legal authority already granted by the Federal Aviation Act to require general aviation aircraft to be equipped with crash locator beacons, and I think the proposal should be considered by this committee. At the present time there are over 102,000 personal and corporate air- craft, compared with only 2,379 in the airlines fleet. This is a ratio of 50 to 1. Last year, there were 5,425 aircraft accidents reported in the United States resulting in 538 fatalities. Many of these accidents and deaths could have been prevented. If we are to stem the mounting tide of aircraft accidents, I urge the adoption of an aircraft accident prevention plan along the lines I have presented here today. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the distinguished members of this subcommittee for permitting me this opportunity to outline my views on this subject. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you for your presentation Mr. Clausen. We appreciate your views on this vital matter. At this time I would request consent to place in the record the re- marks of our colleague, the Honorable James Fulton, as they appear PAGENO="0284" 280 in yesterday's Congressional `Record. Without objection, it is so ordered. (The document referred to follows:) [Frøm the Congressional Record, Aug. 28, 1967] AIR TRANSPORTATION `SA1~'gpy-~ErrRNsIoN OF REMARKS OF HON. ~IAMES G. FULT0N OF PENNSYLVANIA Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to call the atten- tion of the Congress and the American people to the excellent outline on air safety sent to me by an outstanding Pittsburgh businessman, Mr. R. W. Mallick. A vice president of the Joseph Home Co., Associated Dry Goods, Mr. Mallick has flown private aircraft for many years'. This long flight experience and his constant civic interest in air safety make his thoughtful suggestions and recoin- menthtlons valuable to those of us in Congress and in the Federal agencies con- cerned over air transportation safety. I am glad to place in the Congressional Record Mr. R. W~. Mallick's recent letter and the editorial from the Pittsburgh Post Gazette of August 19, 1967: JOSEPH HORNE Co., PittCbRrgh, Aug. 22, 1967. Hon. JAMES G. FULTON, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mn. FULTON : I am sending to you a copy of an editorial that appeared in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette on Saturday, August 19, 1967, captioned "Air Safety Procedures Neglected". I thought you might be interested in reading it as it points a finger at both the F.A.A. and Congress. As I mentioned in previous letters, I had mentally debated the thought of pursuing the matter any further. However, each day I see more evidence of the gravity of the situation, so I am compelled to belabor the matter further. Mr. James Ridgeway's comment echoes what I have said repeatedly, i.e., that the F.A.A. is not doing all it can with the facilities and authority it has at its dis- posal. What is most discouraging is that there is no evidence of an effort on the part of F.A.A. to acknowledge the suggestions to it. Certainly, if there is no merit to them and the persons or organizations making the suggestions were convinced of it, the issue could be closed. Nevertheless, there are volumes of correspondence on the subject, from responsible sources, and it continues to remain unanswered. It is fully appreciated that the problem is not a simple one, and that there are no readymade, overall solutions. But it will never be solved with the present "head in the sand" attitude. It is far better to do something and risk a failure than do nothing in hopes that the problem will cure itself. Apparently, the confu- Mon and complexity is so great that a "wait and see" attitude exists. To anyone who wishes to delve into the history, he will find that the following suggestions have been submitted. Some involve much time and expenditures to implement, others only a change of attitude and a will to do. I will enumerate several that could start the ball rolling. 1. Immediately provide for volnntary controlled visual flight procedures at all low altitudes for cross country flights as previously suggested. Last week I flew from Pittsburgh to Coudersport on a VFR flight plan. Visibility limits were legal for VFR but marginal. I departed Pittsburgh on a special VFR clearance. When I cleared the control zone, I radioed Cleveland Center to advise of my flight route and altitude which was 5,500 feet MSL. The controller asked if I had transponder or DME. When advised negative, he told me he could not give me radar service at that altitude. Yet, 5,500 feet is higher than permissible I.F.R. altitudes. I continued to monitor the radio frequency and know that the controller was not busy. 2. Discourage rather than encourage more instrument ratings for pilots until such time as the air traffic control can handle more Instrument flight plans. The system eanpot handle the volume of such potential traffic now. 3. Accelerate a program of new secondary airports in busy areas to handle private, executive, and feeder line and similar aircraft to reduce the load on metropolitan airports.' This would not only improve air safety, but would tend to relieve ground transportation congestion, For example, the Pittsburgh area needs a new airport in the northeastern district of Allegheny County or western Westmoreland County to relieve the loads on Greater Pittsburgh and Allegheny 1' PAGENO="0285" H 281 County airports. An adequate airport of such type can be built today for the price equivaleut of one mile oi four-lane expressway . for eac~h runway required. Most such secondary airports would be more than adequate with two runways. 4. Establish a program whereby non-essential pleasure flying and student training, usually done In the vicinity of airports, be conducted away from the traffic areas of major airports. The secondary airport program ~uggested above could do much to bring this about. 5. Relocate all military air operations from busy metropolitan areas. There are plenty of military airports that are now inactive to provide bases for military operations. 6. Recently FAA announced intentions of controlling V15'R ~ights above 18,000 feet. This is fine, except the problem is between the ground and 10,000 feet. A check of the records will reveal that the collisions or near misses have all been at low altitudes. To fly above 10,000 feet requires oxygen equipped or pre& surlzed aircraft which represents a very small percentage of registered aircraft. Let's get to the "scene of the crime." 7. Of great importance is the need to quit looking at the problem as one being associated with the commercial airlines. The commercial airlines represent only about 2% of the registered aircraft in the country. Also, it is the most sophis- ticated aircraft, operated by highly qualified pilots, under strict procedures~ Yet, (hey become involved in midair collisions because of the system under which they must operate. The other 98% of the aircraft and pilots have the same right to air safety as do the airlines. We do not make special rules or enact special vehicle codes or build special highways for buses, and we should not attempt to give preferential treatment to airlines. We must Improve air safety for all aircraft, and only then will the solution to the problem be forthcoming. My apology for another long epistle, but I hope it will serve to stimulate some. one to get the F.A.A. to do $ometM~9 other than take a defeilsive position. Ac- tually, the F.A.A. is a fine organization of capable people, faced with an ov'er~ whelming problem. They need help not hefl. They will learn that maiiy people will help when they come out of their shell and quit behaving as though the prob~ lenis and solutions were their exclusive prerogatives~ It is my understanding that Congressional hearings are planned to explore this all-important matter. If so I respectfully suggest that the above seven points be covered in the hearings. Perhaps in that way their merits can be determined. My appreciation of your patience and cooperation. Sincerely yours, R. W. MAu~IcK, Vice President, Properties. (From the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 19, 19671 AIR SAFETY PRocEDUREs NEGLECTED The public is justified in questioning federal procedures to Insure air safety when there have been five major plane accidents so far, this year and a number of smaller ones. The latest was the crash of two single-engined craft as they stimultaneously approached the same rtinway in New Iiampslhire recently. There are 54'r airports in this country served by airlines : 285 have no control towers and 434 lack radar which would provide a means of keeping planes a safe distance. There wasn't any radar at Asheville, N.C., where 82 persons were killed recently. According to James Rldgeway in the August 5 New Republic, the Federal Aviation Administration, part of the Department of ~L'ransportation, Is at the root of the problem. The FAA Is understa~ed and isn't given the money to implement technological advances. Its chief, an ex-Air Force general, William F. McKee, scarcely makes the best of what the FAA has, Ridgeway says. He cites, for instance, the number of safety requirements that don't apply to air taxis (chartered planes for hire) ; no requirements for co-pilots, radar, emer~ gency evacuation, or weighing of baggage. McKee has said the government must not place too heavy an economic burden on small operations lest they fail. When the FAA's budget request was cut this year from $Th million to $65 million, the argument in Congress was that ~ince the money was being poorly spent arid the amount inadequate to meet the airport crisis, it might as well be trimmed. PAGENO="0286" TURTHER STATEMENT OP STANLEY LYMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, PED~ ERAL AVIATION. ADMINISTRATION AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ASSO CIATIO'N OP ØOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES; ACCOMPANIED BY KENNETH LYONS,'PRESIDENT; ALAN J. WHITNEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT; AND HENRY GROTE, PRESIDENT, NEWARK AIRPORT LOCAL Mr. LYMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. You have a rather lengthy statement and if you wish to summarize it your whole statement will be included in the record. Mr. LThtAN. We will summarize the statement, Mr. Chairman. Be~ fore I do I would like to introduce the other gentlemen that are here with me this morning. To my far left is Mr. Kenneth Lyons, president of the National Association of Government Employees. Next to him and to my immediate left is Mr. Henry Grote, who is the president of our local at Newark Airport and represents the Air Traffic Controllers of Newark Airport. To my right is Mr. Alan Whitney, the executive vice president of the National Association of. Government Employees. We appreciate the opportunity ofappearing before you this morning on behalf of our members in the organization which represents Fed- eral Aviation Agency employees. In order to be expeditious I will, as you requested, attempt to sum- marize our official statement that has been submitted to you previously but I would like to take the opportunity to summarize or highlight what we feel is the blood and guts of our entire statement. (Mr. Lyman~s prepared statement follows:) STATEMENT OF STANLEY LYMAN, VICE PRESIDENT FOR FAA AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Ii 282 Such a view not only contradicts logic but renounces reSponsibility. There shOuld be no doubt in anyone's mind that airports serving airliners should be equipped with radar and that height-finding equipment to avoid mid-air colli- Sions, which military planes have used since the Korean War, should be placed in all commercial planes. Orashes in the vicinity of airports can be reduced. The tragedy is that not enough attention is being given to the matter. Mr. FRIEDEL. Our next witness will be Mr. Stanley Lyman, vice president, Federal Aviation Agency Affairs, National Association of Government Employees. Mr. Lyman, if you will introduce your associates, for the record, you may proceed. Mr. Ohairman, members of he subcommittee, the National Association of Government Employees appears before you today as the representative of approximately 8,000 of the Federal Aviation Administration's 14,000 air traffic controllers. Our role is to convey to you their concern for the state of the FAA's air traffic control system and to present certain recommendations designed to arrest the deterioration of flight safety in the country's airways. Since our initial statement to Congress on this subject on March 22, 1967, a great deal has been said by other organizations and by the agency itself. The general thrust of official FAA pronouncements has been that our charges are exaggerated and unfonnded. Significantly, however, we have received many off-the-record expressions of support from individuals in key positions of respon- sIbility within the agency. They tell us that thsy are unable to publicly express their agreement with our general position but they hope we continue to press PAGENO="0287" 283~ our case because they recognize that, in the final analysis, sweeping measures are needed to meet the safety crisis which confronts us~ Our central conclusion, for reasons we shall explore in more detail shortly, is that the air traffic control system possesses neither the manpower nor the equipment to exercise "total control" and further, that the situation is seriously aggravated by mismanagement at the agency's highest level. We believe that two immediate steps are required to stop and reverse the downward trend in flight safety. First, the President must replace William F. McKee as FAA Administrator with an individual who is not only knowi- edgeable, but expert in all phases of the air traffi~ control system. Secondly, the Congress-and in particular this Committee-must force-feed the agency sufficient amounts of money, back-bone and honest concern to act now, not five or ten years from now. The situation further requires the closest Congressional scrutiny of FAA programs and policies to place the agency~s mission in the proper perspective- that is, to determine whether the governing factor in the FAA's budget is going to be safety or "economy of operation." The National Association of Government Employees filed an extensive brief last March 22 with members of this Committee charging that mismanagement, coupled with shortages of manpower and equipment, was bringing flight in the U.S. "to the point of public peril." At that time, we called publicly for an in-depth Congressional investigation into the entire spectrum of air traffic control procedures within the FAA. We now must renew our request for a probe of FAA despite a series of directives issued May 10 by FAA Administrator McKee' ~ which were, according to the FAA, designed to maintain and improve air safety. Basic conditions which we uncovered during a six-month survey of FAA policies and practices continue un- diminished. We can only conclude that the sole purpose of General McKee's May 10 orders was to lessen the pressure for action which followed the release of our brief. General findings of our study, which was participated in by air traffic con- trollers throughout the FAA, include the following: There are insufficient numbers of air traffic controllers in virtually all center and tower facilities to safely handle the rapidly expanding volume of aviation traffic. Because of their too few numbers, controllers are developing hypertension, heart problems and other conditions which stem directly from the extreme ten- sion and pressure of their jobs, and which could suddenly render them helpless at a critical point while handling passenger liners carrying hundreds of individuals. There are not enough electronics technicians to provide adequate maintenance of the equipment needed by the controllers to guide and direct aircraft. Because of this lack of maintenance personnel, it is common policy throughout the agency to forego preventative maintenance. That is, employees are told to not check equipment to prevent its breakdown, but to wait until it fails and then repair it. Due to this vital gap in FAA maintenance procedures, it is a common occur- rence for an air traffic controller to experience a radar failure during a work tour. Controllers, through `the auspices of the National Association of Government Emp1oyees, have found that the agency is forcing them to rely on out~dated and temperamental equipment-posing a definite threat of potential tragedy. They further found that the FAA is arbitrarily phasing out vital ~electronic equipment at the Air Traffic Control Stations, that in many areas the agency is purchasing "factory seconds" to replace tubes in radar and. related electronic equipment. Perhaps the most unsettling of all the conditions uncovered by the survey was the higher number of unreported "incidents" taking place in the crowded Boston- New York-Washington air corridor-instances in which aircraft pass each other at distances less than the FAA's safety limits. We found that, while five to nine such incidents are reported in this heavily- traveled corridor each week, unreported near-misses often run to as high as 20 to 25. The principal reason why such incidents go unreported,, we found, is the FAA's tendency to blame the controller for a near~miss, rather than acknowledging that these potential tragedies stem from the controllers having to handle too many aircraft at one time and the lack of adequate electronic equipment. I PAGENO="0288" 284 Experi~need air traffic caatrollers at one large FAA facility on the East Coast reported that there is at least one "confliction", sometimes as many as five, on an average day at the facility. Most of these potential collisions, they said, go unreported. One final example provides dramatic accent to the situation. The FAA's own surveys show that an air traffic controller should not handle more than 11.5 air- craft at a time ; yet, controllers from throughout the U.S. report to us that they handle as many as 15 to 25 at a tin~e and sometimes more. FAA officialdom, in some quarters at least, is aware of the problem and has sounded dire warnings of what may happen if ~ corrective measures are not taken. A transcript of remarks made by Oscar Bakke, the FAA's Eastern Regional Director, before a September 1964 meeting of air traffic controllers in Syracuse, New York, typifies this awareness. He tOld `the controllers that "we are overdue for another collision," and that on a statistical basis, some of the very men in the room with him `at that time would be "directly and personally Involved in one of the greatest tragedies aviation history has ever known and it's going to be an air traffic tragedy." Mr. Bakke waiPned the controllers, "The traffic sititation In the New York area is fast becoming more `and more tense, very, very rapidly, and the increase in traffic throughout the agency, `both enroute and terminal, Is reaching serious proportion's." He said, ". . . we are now approaching an era in which air traffic control problems never have been more serious and at this very time the ATCS (Air Traffic Control System) is being squeezed to the maximum extent." More `recently, on January 11, 1966~ the chief `of the Eastern Region's Air Traffic Division addressed all divisional personnel in `the following words : "The mounting number of systhm errors occurring in the Eastern Region has become a matter of great concern. 1 fully realize that all control personnel share this con- cern when a system error occurs, hut I wonder how many of us have reflected on where the current trends, if continued, will `take us? "What does the term "system error' mean's ? Aside from the `official definition, it means simply that a failure in the air traffic control system has endangered one or more aircraft. It means that human lives rn~ght have been `ost as a result. We must never lose sight of this fact." These remarks, conring `abs they do, from top mauagenient echelon's within the FAA, `lend strong credence to the charges `of the National Association of Govern- mont 1~mployees knd its `air traffic controller `members. The controllers reported examples in profusion of `situations relati'ng to work- force and equipment In direct contradiction to the public statements of the agency. One instance of FAA economiziilg at the eupense of safety occurred last year at the Newark, New rersey, control tower. Controller members `of the N.A.G.E. local there charged that `the decommissioning of `the "airport detection radar" and the ".preclsion approach `radar" caused an extremely unsafe condition on the `airport~s number four runway in `adverse weather conditions. The FAA replied, in effect, that the controllers did not know what they were talking about. According to the chief `of the `area `air traffic branch, " . . . the operation of air navigation and tra~c contr~l facilities is `accomplished In accordance with Agency policy, the formulation of whtch `results from a much broader knowledge of eoonomtc and `operational considerati'on's than may be apparent locally." Again, sacrificing safety on the `alter `of economy, the official responded that, "All expenditures of Federal funds must be examined `on the basis `of cost versus benefit." The official concluded by suggesting that the employee's confine their complaints in the future to `the f~eiltty level, rather than `attempting to bring them to `the attention of the agency's bigher level's. The agency response completely ignored the fact that the absence `of the decom missioned `radar equipment forced controllers to grant unauthorized radar np preaches to `runway number four in emergencies ; that only the week before the union's complaint one arriving aircraft nearly landed on top of a departing craft because of the lack `of the precision radar Another cogent answer to the FAA's claim that it maintains up-to-date equip- mont can be found at the Toledo, Ohio, facility. The activity utilizes ASR-4 `radar. However, the cables which connect the trans mitter site to the indicator `site (Ithe control tower) continually fill up with PAGENO="0289" 285 water. An attempt to dry and splice the old cables corrected the problem for a short time ; however, the cables, once wet, corrode and short out, causing equip~ ment failures and many costly temporary repairs. The only adequate solution would be to r~place the corroded cables. The FAA's area office, however, claitns this would be too expensive. N.A.G.E. controllers also claim that the Toledo facility's radar antenna is tilted, which would affeOt radar readings and cause misidentification of aircraft targets. Once again, the area office refuses to spend the money to determine if the antenna is tilted. On the q~stion of whether the agency is making a serious attempt to provide enough controllers to handle a growing volume of air traffic, wcrkload and work- fGrce changes at the agency's Little Rock, Arkansas, facility provide graphic demonstration of what is happening throughout the country. In W63, this facility had 1~ ~ontrolliers handling 112,286 airport operations and 35,524 instrument operations. Last year, 1966, the facility had only 18 eontrollem, yet it handled 139,~386 airport operations and 47,349 instrument operations and the facility instituted expanded radar service. phjs is an increase of 24.4 percent airpc~rt ope.rati'qns, 33.3 percent instrument operations (an `additional service which requires the use of two radar contrOllers during peak periods) , and a 20 percent workload increase in handling Air Force Traffic. This increase in traffic and `service `has been accomplished even though the facility had experienced a workforce decrease `of 5.5 percent. Another significant aspect of the manpower problem facing the FAA is pointed up by the fact that just last September, the area manager of the FAA~s Los Angeles Area office attempted to warn the agency's Western Regional Director of the need to ward off an impending critical situation. His memorandum made the following points "Our professional workforce is growing older and we `have not recruited youth. The average age level in ATS in the Los Angeles area is 3D. We have seven employees between ages 21 and 25, 251 between 26 and 30, 279 between 31 and 35, 133 between 36 and 40, 177 between 41 and 45, and 285 over age 45. "We need youth to be prepared for a large retirement rate which should corn- Inence in about five yeara I hope we can agree it is difficult to teach an old dog new tricks and also the old dog responds more slowly when performing ` tricks he has known for years. With the aircraft speeds we are encountering today, a decision delayed 5-10 seconds could easily result in a disastrous event. Deficien- cies in hearing, sight and reflexes are becoming more and more critical." And still another aspect of the agency's manpower problem is typified by the situation at `the Windsor Locks, Conn.,' facility. Despite the FAA's official policy of mandatory radar handoffs, in which one tower or center passes off departing aircraft to another or accepts incoming flights, the agency's own stringent manpower controls make it impossible for many facilities to comply. The Windsor Locks facility, for example, advised neighboring facilities and centers on April 21, 1967, that it would be unable to give or accept hand-offs due to insufficient personnel. This was the second instance in a week's time that the Windsor Locks facility was forced to refuse hand-offs. For another example of the desperate straits into which agency mismanage- ment is forcing those responsible for the safe passage of aircraft through the nation's skyways, consider the report from the publication General Aviation News early this year which revealed that at one of the country's busiest and most important IFR towers, it was necessary for one of the most vital posi- tions to be covered by a nonqualified controller-a man who had never been checked out on covering that position. According to the publication, "This was done with the knowledge of the tower chief and the watch supervisor. It happened because there was no alterna- tive . course of action and because there was no one else to do it." In its issue of December 27, 1965, the respected McGraw-Hill publication, Electronics, commented editorially: ". . . Money is only part of the FAA's shortcoming~-and maybe the ~inallest part. Too often, the Agency has tried to freeze technology that was already on the verge of being obsolete. In the past three or four years, it has traded in its militancy on air safety for a Casper Mik~uetoast attitude. FAA men often seem more concerned about rocking the boat than about solving problems affecting travelers on commercial airlines. "In the past six months fatal air accidents have been frequent and frightening. At this time, it is hard to say which is more terrifying-the collision of an Eastern 92-715-6~----l9 PAGENO="0290" I 286 Airlines plane and a Trans World Airline jet earlier this month or the FAA's `that's the way the ball bounces attitude.' `frAfter the last major air collision of 1960, the FAA tried to improve its control system. It failed, but at least the Ageney~was recognizing its responsibilty. After this month's collision, the FAA figuratively shrugged its shoulders and said It had a system, to be installed by 1970, that might prevent such accidents. Then it went on to less controversial matters . . Concluded the editorial : "A technological society in which two space capsules keep a rendezvous somewhere in the immeasurable universe should have no problem getting safe, efficient, comfortable air transportation. But first a major change in attitude and direction Is required. The FAA has to do a lot more than count the bodies after an accident." Turnover is running high at Air Traffic Control facilities, so that the burden upon experienced personnel gets heavier. Letters freni sources of NAGE locals complain of over-work, training problems and low morale at ATC centers. A typical letter recently received from an N.A.G.E. Local office at an eastern facility said, in part: During the year 1966, we have had a considerable turnover of personnel . . Look at the workload here at our facility. During the year, ~we had approxi- matciy 290,000 total Wgbt services performed, During 19~6, we had an abundance of sick leave. This means the remathiing specialists had to carry the workload. This was done by the mora1e~breaking procedure of changing watches, being called in earlier, and no spot leave being granted. From January to May, 1966, ~ we had a complement of 24 personnel, counting the chief. From June to December, we had a complement of 22. This ~ meant 29O~OOO flight services were divided by 23 personnel, and if my math serves correctly, 23 into 290,000 t equals approximately 12,750 flight services per man, that is including the ~supervisor. "Are the supervisors to be classified as `working supervisors' or supervisors? As of the ata.rt of 1966, they were supervisors, thus the 290,000 should be divided among the jour~ey'men and assi~tant jot~rneymen. Using just 19, ~ corribined journeymen and. assistants, the total flight services comes to approx4~ ~ mately 15,300 per man for 1966. In using 18 journeymen and assistants, which we did for a great part of the year, the flight services per man increased considerably. "More qualified personnel (must be) assigned, so we can have a half-decent watch schedule and be able to have spot leave or annual leave. Morale is at its `lowest point and unless we can come up with some solution, we are ~going to have to sacrifice safety for economy. . . . Why are personnel assigned ~here who require study and training, when we cannot spare the manpower to ~ help them ?" Manpower vacancies have reached a serious point at several facilities (by FAA's own admission) in the Washington Area (among others) . A notice issued by the FAA Washington office, Fail's Church, Virginia, ~anuary 25, 1967, said, "Manpower vacancies among ATOS employees have reached a critical stage in several facilities . . . These vacancies cannot be filled solely `by promo- tion action's within the specified facilities, `because only a limited number of personnel are eligible for promotion. Llmithd vacancies at GS-10 and average grade ceilings have contributed in part to restricting some promotions in the ~past." From another NAGE ATOS Local came this recent note : "As it stands now, we will have ~ three supervisors for seven journeymen." In `large red letters, the letter concludes : "We're understaffed. Especially with Summer coming on. Help !" I could read excerpts from many other letters we have received, Mr. Ohairinan, unsolicited letters from "out in the field," telling of conditions that should not exist in any agency of this `government, not to mention one with such vital responsibilities. These reflections of FAA field functions, I will admit, Mr. Chairman, strain one's credulity in the light of the Federal Aviation Agency's porsistent pre~ occupation with cost cutting. As recently as February 1966, an elaborate booklet was issued entitled, "Federal Aviation Agency Cost Reduction." It described the "Cost Reduction Program" as the umbrella covering all of FAA's diverse economy programs . . . We contend, Mr. Chairman, that what we need under such a program are more parachutes instead of umbrellas. This booklet, whose cost of preparation and publication would have `paid for a one or two badly needed added traffic, controllers, envisioned "specific cost PAGENO="0291" 287 reduction actions which will lead to s~ving~s of $31.7 mililoal in fi~a1 yeai~ 19G~6 and $27.8 m~illion &n 1967." "These goals are in a&lition to the more than $100 million of savings accorn~ pushed since 19~0," said the paraphiet. "Hitting the 19& and 1967 targets will require more effort fro~n each employee-~surpassiflg them will challenge his imagination." However much it has challenged the imagination, it's certain that the penny~ pinching program has posed a serious physical and emotional challenge to our ATOS personnel! Another illustration o~ how our hard~pressed, over-worked and umder-apprec1~ ated air traffic men are often taxed to the limit of hunian en~urance, while inevitably increasing the possibility of tragic error, was contained In the NAGE-LA Newsletter (Los Angeles ARTO Center) o~ December 23, 1966. In the month of Septemiber 1904, said the Newsletter, the center had 39,6~6 operations and a staff of 294E ; in September 1965, 47,066 operation~$ and a staff of 285 ; and in September 1966, 56,594 operations and a staff of 285. And a 17 percent increase ~in traffic was predicted for this year. This sombre pattern of sharply rising operational loads without commensurate increases In personnel and adequate technological provisions is common to al- most all air traffic control points In the United States today. And the crisis of need, particularly in consideration of the fact that the margin of safety in American air lanes is probably at a record low point, worsens from month to month as the gulf widens between control measures and traffic flow. God forbid that we should be jolted into action by a series of air tragedies. At a time when much more, certainly not less is needed, the FAA has been boasting of its cost-cutting, penny-squeezing policies. The FAA's "Intercom" bulletin of July 18, 1966 reprinted a letter from President lohnson to "Dear Bozo" (I.e., General William F. McKee, FAA Administrator) and reading in part: "I have noted with satisfaction the excellent work which you and yourt as- sociates at the Federal Aviation Agency have beendoing in reducing costs and manpower while absorbing additional workload and improving service to the public. I have taken particular note of your cost reduction program under which you saved $~7 million during the 1966 fiscal year. These savings have been accom- panled by a reduction in Agency employment of more than 3,500 employees- eight percent since 196& The Agency has succeeded in combining economy with a safety program which has helped the commercial air carriers of the United States achieve the best safety record in the world and the best record for any five-year period in the history of American aviation. You have clearly demon- strated that outstanding performance in a critical and complex program can be continually achieved while reducing costs . . ." The President's confidence that the "outstanding performance" can go on this way is open to serious challenge. As always, the men and women who bear the burden will continue to give their best ; but their best is no longer enough. They need help-both human and electronic help. System errors at many Air Traffic Control Centers are alarmingly high. In May of 1966, for example, an office bulletin at an East Coast Center reports 64 8yste-m errors the previous year. In a review of a "serious air traffic staffing problem," the Manager of the Los Angeles Area Office advised the director of the Western ATO Region (September 13, 19G6) , that "the recruitment process is too slow, cumbersom~, and has not been available to us during the past three years." He further advised, ". . . potentials in airline activities are more attractive than in the FAA and many of our better people are leaving to accept employment with the airlines ; equitable pay for complexity and responsibility was adversely affected wl~en Level II VFR Towers and Level III Approach Control Facilities were created-promotional ladders are no lçn~ger attractive ; we are robbing Peter to pay Paul by selecting within-grade candidates . . . " The ATS System ~rror Reportipg Program went into effect December 1, 1963. Statistics accumulated since then demonstrate the clear need to reduce-by such measures as added manpower and equipment and certain fundamental changes in FAA concepts-the number of errors occurring. A bulletin `issued in June of 1965 by the Boston Air Traffic Office, however, said the goal of each facility must be total elimination of control errors and solicited the recommendations of all personnel for achieving this goal "within PAGENO="0292" and that insure col manner al the work minimizi: If t~ 288 budgetary/manpower limitations ." Here Federal Aviation Agency would take necessar; a certain financial point~ an arbitrary budgetar so much safety and no more, An FAA Eastern Region Air T emphasized the importance 1 and rightfully so. And the faulty judgment is limited supervisors can all be ~ 1 the coming of radar in Ai action is more vital than ever. `J actions have become even more c great re~i~ etion in available "1 ngas v power and C (ji~ SYStE condition ~ ~ the S Continu d the c'~ t his wor of peoi ~,j to ren ake soun unity exi dreds C orce at the possibility .1 Aviation itely h~ lye d National ~t amon~, es of the bur In tention of I independent opini in one way or am tion to a r~ from time tot personality. ~n such other ills a PAGENO="0293" 289 The National Association oi~ Government Employees has made numerous, close studies of coilditions within the Federal Aviation Agency and finds a clear need for an immediate ftIl-scale Congressional inquiry. Such a study should make determinations as to the safety "quotient" for the public under current FAA operational procedures and policies. The FAA, we believe, needs the same kind of Congressional investigative focus that was recently given the automa~ tive industry safety standards. There are far too few controllers on duty at traffic control centers ; we need many more controllers and other personnel ; many FAA facilities are seriously undermanned. This is FALSE ECONOMY, which turns our airways into casings that gamble with human lives, and which can only have the effect of constricting the growth of the aviation indusitry. When anything goes wrong in the crowded skies around airports, the FAA is quick to try and make the controllers the scapegoat. But the real trouble i~ that toO few people have to handle too many aircraft. There is never any crOwd in a control room. In the conviction that there is direct relationship between "system errors" and facility staffing inadequacies, and that all "conflictions" are not reported in an attempt by the FAA to cover up the seriousness of conditions, a large NAGE Local at a major airport recently submitted a series of questions to the mem- bershiip-and asked for frank answers. Overwhelmingly, these experienced staffers (ARTOC) estimated that there was at least one "confliction," sometimes as many as five, on an average day at the facility. They testified to having personally seen an average of two or three "legal conflictions" in the previous two months. Opinions as to the need for "last minute" action to avoid conflict between aircraft-considered in a Radar en- vironment-ranged from five up to 25 per day. Almost all expressed belief that fewer "conflictions," whether discovered or not, would be possible if staffing were increased to distribute the workload. A preponderance reported there was less than full staffing in their particular sector every day they worked! Assistance of a handoff man was listed as a relative rarity. Asked, "Have you ever been forced into a position where you no longer have time to pvc-plan or `thoroughly scan the control board in order to make the right decision ?" a majority replied in the affirmative, and agreed that such situations were dangerous. Presence of handoff controller at `all times would permit more time properly to scan the scope and control board, it was also agreed, The controllers and other personnel almost unanimously believed that the Facility administrative staff was aware of the need for more personnel, and that safety was being compromised by a policy there of staffing for an 80% traffic level. Too much traffic was almost unanimously blamed for the majority of inci~ dents, as opposed to strip marking, lack of knowledge or phraseology. As to whether they thought it was safer to fly through the area today than it was three years ago, a substantial majority replied : "No." Not long ago, personnel officers in the New York area of the New York FAA Traffic Control Facility submitted confidential questionnaires to personnel in ab "evaluation program." And the reaction was not flattering to the FAA. The employee generally gave ratings of no better than "poor" or "fair" to such categories as the hanciling of work s'chedples and annual leave ; p~hcy with respect to overtime work ; "spirit of cooperation" among employees ; reputa~ ti'on of the Agency in the community ; and personal evaluation of job. This study, and other evidence, points to a serious morale problem among our over-worked controllers and other FAA personneL ` The situation, we contend, has attained crisis proportions. And what it boils down to is that there are not enough air traffic controllers to handle the growing number of flights, and, on top of this, the controllers do not have adequate modern eqpipment to do their jobs.' The FAA must awaken to the controllers' plight. It must acknowledge that all is not as it should be, and that if action does not come, and come soon, we have all the ingredients for further tragedies. RECOMMENDATIONS In the light of all of the facts, the National Association of Government Em- ployees earnestly urges the Congress to consider the following: 1. The immediate enactment of legislation authorizing a 20% increase of Controller staffing at all Air Traffic Control Centers, Air Traffic Control Towers, PAGENO="0294" 290 Mr. LYMAN. The National Association of Government Employees appears before you today as the representative of approximately 8,000 of the Federal Aviation Administration's 14,000 air traffic controllers. Our role is to convey to you their concern for the state of the FAA's air traffic control system and to present certain recommendations designed to arrest the deterioration of flight safety in the country's airways. Since our initial statement to Congress on this subj ect on March 22, 1967, a great deal has been said by other organizations and by the agen- cy itself. The general thrust of official FAA pronouncements has been that our charges are exaggerated and unfounded. Significantly, however, we have received many off-the-record ex- pressions of support from individuals in key positions of responsibil- ity within the agency. They tell us that they are unable to publicly ex- press their agreement with our general position but they hope we 3ontinue to press our case because they recognize that, in the final analysis, sweeping measures are needed to meet the safety crisis which confronts us. Our central conclusion, for reasons we shall explore in more detail shortly, is that the air traffic control system possesses neither the man- power nor the equipment to exercise "total control" and further, that the situation is seriously aggravated by mismanagement at the agency's highest level. Mr. Di~viNE. Mr. Chafrman, I think you suggested to Mr. Lyman that he might summarize this and he ~S reading it in detail. I read this whole statement last night ; I ~ don't kiiow whether you had an opportunity to read it or not. Mr. FRIEDEL. No; I will read it. I hope that'you will keep on safety. Mr. LTMAN. Again, I will. I don't intend to read through the whole statement, I was just trying to bring us to a point where I could divert from our prepared text and then go from that point. As I say, one of the immediate steps we feel needed to improve safety is the review of information that we have had made available which is the fact that we have mismanagement within the agency, mismanagement at the highest level, and that we feel the first and immediate step is the replacement of the managerial people within this agency to correct the serious deterioration which has come about in the Federal Aviation Agency. We feel the only way this can be ~1 Flight Service Stations. This must be a first step, however ; just one part of an integrated program to modernize the entire system. 2. The enactment of legislation authorizing a 20% increase in the electronic and technician field as it relates to Airway Facility Branch activities. 3. An inimeditae cessation of the arbitrary "phase out" of vital electronic equipment at Air Traffic Control Stations. 4. Enactment of legislation implementing an "ad hoc" standing committee comprised of active journeymen Air Traffic Control specialists who will be assigned a continuing role of submitting recommendations concerning air traf~ fic control procedures to Congress yearly. 5. A Congressional requirement that all air traffic electronic computers, con- trol systems, and their allied equipment will be inspected and maintained on a continual "preventative maintenance system rather than the present system which requires equipment failure prior to maintenance being performed. 6. Additional funds for the updating and purchase of modern Radar and Electronic equipment for all types of Air Traffic Control. Thank you for your kind attention, Mr. Chairman and members of the Corn- mittee. PAGENO="0295" 291 done is by removing General McKee and his deputy administrator, David Thomas, removed and replaced by articulate ~e~tlernen wtw have an up-to-date understanding of what is developing within the FAA. We filed an extensive brief as I pointed out on March 22 of this year, and at that time we went into great detail in the nun~ber of midair near misses that were occurring throughout the country, the fact that there was lack of preventative maintenance in electronics. Mr. Fiui~oEL. How many near misses did you report? Mr. LYMAN. We talked about, on the east coast in particular, the "Golden Triangle," as it is referred to by the Federal Aviation Agency, the Boston-Newark-Washington air c~orridor. We have information that shows anywhere from five to nine near misses being reported within this triangle and we have additional information documented by people in the various facilities within the east coast area that shows we have near misses occurring unreported at the rate of 20 to 25 per week, depending on the weather conditions at the time. Mr. DEvINE. What separation do you feel is necessary to call it a near miss? Mr~ LYMAN. A near miss, as far as the system itself goes, is any- thing less than the standard separation. Mr. DEvINE. Is that a thousand feet? Mr. LYMAN. It could be less than a thousand feet, depending on radar and depending on the separation they are using. They have a 3- to 5-mile separation. Three miles from the antenna site and 5 miles if you are beyond a certain point. So anything less than the three or the five or anything less than the thousand feet could be a near miss. It depends how close the aircraft comes. Mr. DEVINE. Twenty to 25 a week unreported in this New York. Boston-Washington corridor? Mr. LYMAN. Yes. These have been, as I said, compiled by the con- trollers within this eastern region area. ~ We also have information within a brief we have produced, infor- mation that shows that the electronics people have been handicapped *to the extent where they are not allowed to implement a preventative maintenance program to the electronics equipment but rather it is being done as the equipment fails, there is no standard procedure. If they have a piece of electronic equipment to work on for a. par- ticular day, this is their assignment for that day and if they report to the facility or location where this equipment is located they theoreti- cally are not supposed to work on any additional electronic equip- mont in the building or in that vicinity. Mr. FRIEDEL. Would you be a little more specific ? Yo~ speak of electronic equipment. Give us some examples. You are talking gen- erafly. Give us specifics so we can try to follow it. Mr. DEVINE. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman. That is a very seri- ous charges `4Employees are `told not to check' equipment." Nc~w, if `you have any trifôrmation like that, we wOul& like to have names, dates, places,, and times,. because that is a very serious charge andwe wouldlike to~know about it. Mr. LYMAN. We realize this is a serious charge `and' we say it comes from the electrothc technicians themselves' who. are told "When you PAGENO="0296" I 292 report to x facility to work on radar equipment or whatever piece of electronic"- Mr. DEVINE. If you have names, dates, times, and places we would like to have them. Mr. LYMAN. Fine. We will be happy to give that to you, , sir. (For information requested, see p. 301.) Mr. LYMAN. Also we have instances on record where the flight service station employees-and this would concern, gentlemen, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association-have become so understaffed and overworked and that they are not able to adequately give flight briefings, give weather information that would be of vital interest and of vital need to the private aircraft owner, to the corporate aircraft owner who depends on this service. ` Mr. FRIEDEL. This is because of the shortage of men Or because these men work overtime? Mr. LYMAN. No ; this is because of the shortage of men and that does not exist only in one location, it exists in all locations throughout the country. The fact that one man is being asked to give a pilot brief- ing, which would be as an aircraft owner or pilot reports to the f a- cility across a desk, he is looking for various pieces of weather infor- mation, this individual is attempting to give this man a briefing and at the same time the telephones are ringing and he is expected to an- swer the telephone, to give additional information through this tele- phone. He is being `called upon to provide two or three services as one mdi- vidual where there should be at least two or three people to handle that. Mr. FRIEDEL. One man where? Mr. LYMAN. This is in the flight service station, sir. Mr. FRIEDEL. What about the tower? Mr. LYMAN. In the tower we have the shortages of people where they are again asked to double up on their positions and we have the same shortages in the air traffic control centers and we have doubling up and sometimes tripling up of positions. ` When we talk about control centers and radar environments which was discussed yesterday, the radar handoffs, it is a fact that the air- craft is supposed to be given constant radar coverage and is being handed off from one facility to another which is a separate and dis- tinct function of the air traffic controller. I would like to read for the record some information that we have that does not appear in our prepared text but which has come to us as we have constantly tried to update our information. This deals with radar and radar coverage and radar handoffs. Again radar handoffs are a mandatory function required by the FAA. It says you will do this as an air traffic controller: We have operated under a radar concept for almost 1 year. (This is a facility out in Los Angeles now. ) During this time both management and employees have struggled to reconcile procedures with reality. The order from within the agency itself recently established new handoff com- munication release procedures which presume the existence of requirements for handoffs. This was left to the facilities. It appears that only good news has been reaching Washington headquarters. The radar concept can be defined simply. In every case a radar handoff must he made before an aircraft enters an adjoining center or an adjacent facilities air space unless prior coordination is perfected. PAGENO="0297" 293 The procedures for meeting this requirement are extremely, complex. The over- lapping responsibilities are more complex.. Yet policies coutinue to dismiss the mechanics of the concept ~ by simply making the controller responsible for the handoff. . Mr. FRIEDEL. Who is making that statement ~ Mr. LYMAN. These are our people in Los Angeles giving us informa- tion as itpertains tO the process and policies that have been in effect in the western region which apply to all centers around the country, sir. I am trying to give you the information as we have it. Mr. FRrEDi~L. IS this from an individual ~ Mr. LYMAN. This is from a group of controllers, not any single one but a group of our controllers who are in the field in Los Angeh~s. Mr. FRIEDEL. These are charges that are very serious. Mr. LYMAN. We will be happy to provide the committee with the names and times and information to substantiate this information. Mr. FRIEDEL. I hope you can, because I want to make it clear that I, for one, very strongly believe in unions, but I want to know if you are representing one group and another union group. If this is it, we don't want to be used for a forum for a membership contest. I would like you to be very specific on the charges that you are making sir. Mr. LYMAN. Again, we will, sir. We are not using this as a platform in order to obtain members for the National Association of Govern- ment Employees. This subject is one that to myself and to Mr. Grote here is one of vital interest. Mr. Grote still remains as an active air traffic controller, I only recently have left the Federal Aviation Agency. I have been active air traffic controller in Boston for years, had flight service experience for a number of years outside the Boston area. This is a subject that vitally interests me, is of vital interest to the people that are performing a service to you, as a Congressman that flies the airways ; they are not interested at this time or at any other timç when they start compiling this information in a membership drive. We have been very successful within this organization for member- ship without attempting to use an elaborate procedure such as we have here to be heard before Congress. We feel the information we have should be heard because it has been suppressed for a long time. Mr. FRIEDEL. Any charges you make, I want made specifically, and 110 generalities. Mr. LYMAN. As I say, the information I am reading to you now comes from the Los Angeles center but applies to every center around the country. The reason I am reading this document- Mr. FRIEDEL. Who gave you that information? Mr. LYMAN. The air traffic controllers of the Los Angeles center. This outlines the procedures. Mr. FRIEDEL. One controller or three or 10 or five, whatever ~ Mr. LYMAN. This is the thinking of some 160 controllers in the Los Angeles center. Mr. FRIEDEL. We would like to have names. Mr. LYMAN. I will give you the names of the people that put this together as one piece, but we will be more than happy to give you the names of specific controllers that have information that will sub- stantiate this information from their location plus any other names PAGENO="0298" 294 from any, other centers around the country `which will substantiate the same ~acts that I am presentii~g to you here this morning. Again to go on, the agency has told the controller, and the con- troller agrees, that radar environment is both inevitable and desirable and there is no argument with this. The handoff, however, is basic and no controller will deny tMs either. The radar concept gives a license as well as responsibility to the controller. While a controller must hand off before the boundary that he is responsible for, unless prior coordination we spoke about is in existence, he also may climb, descend, or alter the course of any aircraft within the airspace that he is controlling and will. despite any other information. as presented to him by written air traffic con- trol strips without coordinating these changes in any flight, altitude, direction, without any other control. ~ . He can do this as long as the aircraft he is controlling is within his responsibility or within his area. Not one controller in, 100 however, and we again will give you the names and times around the country, not one controller will exercise this total control nor will he exercise this license for the simple fact it is not a safe operation. Thus, something must be wrong and the controllers know it is wrong. We have overlooked the mechanics of attempting to operate in a complete radar handoff and we do not have the personnel nor the equip- ment to operate in a complete radar environment. In order to have a prior boundary that handofF must be not some of the time or even most of the time, but all of thetime, and this is a fact that no controller will argue with you about. Radar coverage must be adequate throughout and sectors must be iar~e enough to permit accepting and making simultaneous handoffs. This is not the case today. There must be a sufficient amount of per- sonnel at the sectors all of the time and not some of the time to make these handoffs, because the agency has adopted a principle around the country within the centers and within the tours of telling one controller, "You do the actual following of the aircraft and in addition divert your attention to accomplish a radar handofl~ to the adjacent sector, to the adjacent tour, to the adjacent facility." When one man attempts to divert his attention from the radarscope to push those magic buttons, he now diverts his attention from his im- mediate duty because he now has to look at the button, he has to wait for the other man on the end ofthe line to answer and nine times out of ten, we can again produce information and facts, nine times out of ten the man on the other end is doing the same thing, he is now diverting his attention because he hears a voice calling him, and he has to leave his primary duty to accept the handoff and relieves the primary duty and he is no longer providing the service that he was there for in the first place, which is the basic separation of these aircraft. Mr. DEVINE. What you are doing, Mr. Lyman, you are supporting your charge in your statement here on pages 2 and ~, that there is an insufficient number of air traffic controllers, there are not enough elec- tronic mechanics and you would like to have more personnel? Mr. LYMAN. That is right. Mr. DEVINE. I notice in theNew York Times artiôle, dated July 31, that the FAA, which you condemn in its management, has already re- PAGENO="0299" I 295 versed their trend on budget personnel reduction and are seeking 700 new traffic controller jobs for the present fiscal year. Has anything developed on that ~ Mr. LYMAN. To our knowledge, we recognize there has been some recruiting and hiring within the agency but again, the information that is coming to us from the various facilities which reortfit is that it i,~ not proceeding in the manner in whioh the agency indicated a full scale recruiting but just on a scattered piecemeal attempted recruiting to patch up one lo'op~hole here and let the other two or three go. Mr. DEviNE. I would like to reiterate what our chairman, Mr. Friedel, said here that we will riot be used as a forum for any dispute between you and the A~ir `Traffic Control Association, whic~h apparently is a competing union. I notice on the first page of your statement here you say you repre- sent 8,000 out of 14,000 air traffic controllers. In their prepared state- ment that will `be given next, they say they represent 5,000 out of 12,000. So I see a dispute here right now. We do not want to be used to get in any inter-union dispute, that is not our function. We are interested in air safety and air safety alone. Mr. LYMAN. First, sir, we am not here to dispute or argue with any other group. The ATCA is not a union ; we are a union. The member- ship again matters not. I will not use this as a platform to argue membership. Why they wish to pick up numbers, we have no idea. And we are not interested in talking numbers. Right now we are talking air safety Mr. DEvINi~. You make the point there is an insufficient number of air traffic controllers and electronic technicians. I don't believe you should belabor that any further. Mr. LYMAN. You have some information that says the agency is attempting to make some corrected changes, and I would like to, in turn, read to you an agency document which is a sendoff in the Miami area and other centers around the county. This is off an agency tele- type, by the way. It starts off: Due to the shortage of funds, the following actions will be implemented Imme- diaitely: Stop all `recruitment immediately, defer commitments to the extent possible. This is the Miami area. Then it goes on and it says, "Defer all procurement except essential items." We wonder what are the essential items they refer to. Mr. DEviNi~. You are formerly an FAA `personnel- Mr. LYMAN. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. When did you leave? Mr. LYMAN. I officially `left on `medical separation 60, 65 days ago, but up until that time I wasan active air traffic controller. Mr. DEVJNE. Did you leave under any circumstances other than medical? Mr. LYMAN. No ; strictly medical reasons `because of ~high `blood pres- sure and nerves and I was taking medication that would affect judg- ment in the case of a radar environment. Mr. DEVINE. How long were you there? Mr. LYMAN. I started with the Federal Aviation Agency in 1955. Mr. DEVINE. And y'ou were there for 12 years? PAGENO="0300" I: 296 Mr. LYMAN. That is right ; first, time in flight service stations and then in 1958 I transferred into `air `traffic control center operations, and was with the center from 1958 until the time of my separation. ~ . I Mr. DEVINE. Where ~ Mr. LYMAN. In Boston. Mr. DEVINE. Boston? Mr. LYMAN. Yes. Mr. DEvINE. The man immediately to your left? Mr. LYMAN. Mr. Grote remains as an active air traffic controller at the Newark tower. Mr. DEVINE. At the Newark tower? Mr. LYMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. DEvINE. Anybody here from the Washington tower? Mr. LYMAN. No. We have nobody here today from `the Washington tower, although, again, the information that Mr. Grote has-and we hope to have time to give you-nlso would be representative `of `the Washington tower and any other tower around the country for the same conditions exist nc~t only at Newark but around `the country. As I said `this is an agency directive `to ~ stop `the recruitment, stop procuring material, defer maintenance projects and so forth. Then we come `to another- ` Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Lyman, I thought we had an understanding and I want to' be very fair with you. You said you would summarize your statement and you are going far afield with other things. I did not know that you were going to take this time. We will never ge~t to another witness this morning. I just would like to be as courteous as I can, let you get all the information in `the record. The only thing I ask you to do is `to be specific rather general. If you `are going to read all `these letters, if you want it in the record, I will put it in the record for you, but just try `to get down where you are claiming there is not enough personnel `and try to keep `to that and make recommendations where you feel `that this would `help safety. Mr. LYMAN. Well, we do in our prepared text, as you know, at the end of our statement, have our recommendations that we feel will bring `about `immediate corrections and it does talk about immediate increase of personnel, 20-percent increase, across-the-board, tower, center, flight service `center, and electronic's people. We also feel that a standing committee should be formulated b~y the Congress to be made up of active air traffic controllers to work in conjunction with the managerial people of the FAA, so that the views and information that are of interest to the controller will be heard by management within the FAA and will be presented to them by people that have a firsthand knowledge and not rather rely on information to be fed into management of the FAA by other management officials who only want to pass the good word along as it has been their prac- tice in the past, but rather pass the good and the bad along to the higher managerial people within the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr. FRIEDEL. Have you submitted these recommendations to the FAA, Mr. Lyman? Mr. LYMAN. We have submitted these on numerous occasions, Mr, Lyons and I both. Mr. FRIEDEL. In writing? PAGENO="0301" 297 Mr. LYMAN. In writing and also verbally to the Administrator and also to Mr. Thomas, on two occasions. Mr. FRIEDEL. The ones you submitted in writii~g, did you receive an answer? Mr. LYMAN. I don't recall. I would have to defer on that one to Mr. Lyons. Mr. LYONS. We did. They accepted the brief that we sent to the FAA but we heard nothing further relative to our recommendations. Mr. FEIEDEL. How long ago was that? Mr. LYONS. I would be guessing now. I would say about 6 or 7 months ago. I do&t know exactly. Mr. FRIEDEL. You have not received a response? Mr. LYONS. Other than that it was received by the FAA, that was the only response. Mr. FRIEDEL. You made studies and recommendations? Mr. LYMAN. Pardon? Mr. FRIEDEL. And were they making studies of your recommencla. tions? Mr. LYMAN. No, that it was received, but no response as pertains to the merits of the recommendations made by the organization. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Chairman, in line with your remarks, 1 appreciate you and Mr. Devine making it clear that we don't want to be parties in your dispute here-I think the tone of some of the state- ments made in your remarks would indicate a degree of animosity between your organization and the FAA because at the bottom of page 2 you made a charge, and I am going to ask that this be sub- stantiated-you have charged someone with a criminal act here and 1 think it should be brought out as to who you mean. I think that you should be able and ready to support that with names. We want them here. Mr. LYMAN. It just so happens I will give you one specific. We will give you the additional information. Colorado Springs, Cob., July 19, 1967. This is an FAA document from a supervisory electronic technician. Operating short of personnel. We may not always have a man available to take care of your problems so be patient and we will take care of the equipment failures as soon as we can. This is one specific piece of paper. Mr. FRIEDEL. Who was that signed by Mr. LYMAN. This was signed by a supervisory electronics technician out at Colorado Springs. Mr. KTJYiiENDALL. Sir, if you think what you read is the same as what you put in your statement, I would like to be the prosecuting at- torney against you in court sometime because that is not the same thing. No one was told to let a piece of equipment break down. Mr. LYMAN. No, no. Mr. KUYKENDALL. You said that. Mr. LYMAN. I said perform the preventative maintenance only after it has failed. Mr. KIJYKENDALL. You said it right here. Mr. LYMAN. That is right. When the piece of equipment fails, then you perform the maintenance on it. PAGENO="0302" 298 Mr. KtJYKENDALL. Let it fail and then fix it? Mr. LYMAN. When it has failed, then fix it. Mr. KUYKENDALL. All right. You charged the FAA managemeru let a piece of equipment fail. Mr. LYMAN. If you are in the room and you are working on aniother piece of equipment and you look across the room and a gear is going to fail and your project for that day is to work on X over here, but Y is failing, you are telling these people, do not work on Y, only work on X. That is correct. Mr. KUYKENDALL. I hope that regardless of what anybody ever tells you that as long as I am flying an airplane around and you look across the room and see a piece of equipment failing that would endanger human life that no boss in the world would keep you from fixing it. Mr. LYMAN. Now you are getting to the point that I did not get to because we are trying to summarize and that is exactly what is hap- pening because you have professional and dedicated electronics tech- nicians. That is right. They are acutally being forced into a moonlighting situation. Mr. KUYKENDALL. FAA would let a piece of equipment deliberately fa~il and endanger human life? Mr. LYMAN. In order to satisfy statistics that show that this piece of electronic equipment fails only seldom. Yes, we have that information. Mr. KIJYKENDALL. And you have information that they deliberately let the equipment fail and endanger human life ~ Mr. LYMAN. Encouraging the equipment to fail because these peo- pie are iiot working on it. When you have a technician in that room, this technician has a responsibility in his own mind when he looks across that room and he sees an indicator that that equipment is get- ting ready to fail, he moonlights but does not record that in his of- ficial record because disciplinary actiou is then effected by his im- mediate supervisors to the point where he does not report it. So as you say, as a pilot we are getting a service from him which he wants to give to you but he is giving it to you not because he is told to but because of the fact he is there. He knows what the con- sequence is going to be and that is correct. Mr. FRIEDI~IL. What do you mean by "the consequence ?" If he reports something, he is going to be reprimanded? Mr. LYMAN. If he works on a project that he was not scheduled- Mr. FRIEDELI. He is going to be reprimanded? Mr. LmAN. That is correct. And we will give you this information. We will give you the specifics. Mr. LYONS. Mr. Chairman, if you will, last year at the eastern re- gional meeting of all of our locals of the AFS groups or the systems maintenance employees, it was brought to the attention of the head of the eastern region that equipment is not being maintained properly. As a matter of fact, the presidents of these locals informed the head of the eastern region that we have been moonlighting on equipment; that they themselves have been checking on it although they are not supposed to perform preventative maintenance. Preventative maintenance is to check material before it breaks down. Now they had quite a few outages but they were told they were not PAGENO="0303" 299 to do this because they did not~ have &nough help. and thei~e were fur~ ther cutbacks atthat time ; is that correct? Mr. LY~iAw, That `is cQrrect, Mr. FRIEDEL. Wait a minute. You said they did not have enough help. But if a man is there will he be reprimanded? Mr. Lyo~s. Heis not supposed to do it, Mr. Chairniman, and this was brought up, thatmany o1~ the employees will perform preventa- tive maintenance even though they are not supposed to do it. They will when they go out in the field and they will look at other equipment they feel can break down, whether it `is tacon or any of the other equipment. They were told they were not supposed to `do this, they were not supposed to perform preventative maintenance. They were only supposed to perform the actual outages to repair material or equipment that broke down. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Lyman, I would like for you specifically to give us the name of one person in the management of FAA that has told directly any. person in your ~ organization that they were not to perform critical preventative maintenance that stared them in the face. I would like names. I don't want any more opinions, I don't want any more "they said," I want a name &nd a place. I think I can begin to understand a little bit here why your commu- nications with FAA have broken down and some of the charges here. Maybe they are going to make the same charges back. That is un- fortunate, but it is unfortunate this situation exists of an absolute breakdown in communications. This is no place to be making this kind of charge. Mr. LYONS. I will gladly send to you, Mr. Congressman, the date of the meeting held in New York- Mr. KtTYKENDALL. I don't want a meeting ; I want the name of the individual. Mr. LYONS. Yes ; I will give you the names of the individuals present. I believe we have a summary of the report as made by the FAA and we will submit that to the chairman and the full committee. Mr. DINGELL. If the gentleman will yield, I think you should submit that to the dhairman of the subcommittee here. I think we also would like to have whatever minutes there are or a summary of the discus-. sion or discussions that took place, and have these things fully and appropriately. Mr. KTJYKENDALL: We know that there is a shortage of maintenance personnel. We know that any management of any organization when they have a shortage of personnel tias to put in priorities. If you were ~unnin~ the organization you would put in priorities, we know this. Now this is probably up to that point. I think it is Un- forturrate that you `have specifically put in this one short statement of saying, "Let it break down." Let it break down. Now this is th~ unfortunate thing. You have made a direct charge whi~h is very, very criminal and' this is the unfortunate thing here. We know there is a `shortage of per~onneJ and this is one of the pur- poses of the meeting, to ask' for recommendations that the personnel be increased. I happen to be one that is going to join in the recommendation that it `be increased, if I `have an opportunity to. I will vote on appropri'a- tion for it to be increased, but the thing that disturbs me most `here PAGENO="0304" 300 about this testimony is the matter of these broad charges without the specifics that we in this committee want and Mr. Dingell said, to be most specific, we are not interested in a meeting where someone is told that because of the ~hortagc of maintenance personnel we must put on priorities. We want an example of someone that is either reprimanded or told not to do critical maintenance personnel on a piece of equipment at ~43 times and a, place that would endanger human life. Mr. LYMAN. Again, as Mr. Lyons indicated, we will be happy to give you specific occurrences from the east coast and also the central and also the western regions. One other view. When we talk about electronic equipment failures,. as an individual flying, the thinking of the technician is opposed to the FAA's thinking. Mr. FRIEDEL. What are you talking about? Mr. LYMAN. I am talking about electronic equipment failure. We talked about moonlighting and this has been implemented and the agency in turn says their equipment does not fail. We are providing the maintenance to keep our equipment working. They come up and they say 98 percent of the time equipment is available, there are no failures. They use this figure. However, this again is based on the moonlighting fact. They turn around now and they have an order out which eliminates complete shifts of electrothcs people on specific days. In other words, you can be flying-I don't know, Mr. Congressman, if you are a pilot or not-you can be flying a specific day. As you mdi- cated you certainly would hope that somebody was available to monitor the electronics equipment to determine whether it was operating nor- mally, and yet the agency has adopted a policy on specific shifts to eliminate all the people so that the machinery is now operating itself without anybody monitoring the equipment. The man is home, they adopt this on a holiday, they reduce this down. The records show that 98 percent of the time the equipmel1t does not fail but again we will show you where it does fail more than that and that it is not avail- able 98 percent of the time. Again, if you were flying on a hoTiday I think you would like to have somebody down there watching your equipment, somebody do- ing routine maintenance. Yet it says routine maintenance can be de- ferred on holidays in order to allow employees to pursue their interests. The equipment is available 98 pe~eent of the time. Therefore failure on a holiday is highly remote. Well, the equipment fails holidays or any other days. Again, this is just one instance of where this whole thing has come down the line. I know it is difficult for somebody to correlate in their mind the fact that a man is told to not do this, do this, and forget the other. It is difficult but it is not difficult for the controller to be told to provide radar separation, provide the handoff and do a few other functions because there is nobody there, make it work. These people are making the system work for ~ll practical purposes. The system should have fallen on its face a long time ago. You can only extend productivity, which is a favorite word of the FAA, to a point. You, as a Congressman, can only divert your attention to w amount of duties before, after that time, somewhere along the line, PAGENO="0305" 301 you are going to derogate something in your decisionmaking. These people-that controller, the flight service station individual, the elec- tronics individual-are responsible for immediate decisionmaking. The electronics man and flight service conceivably has a little more time to correct an error but the controller who is separating aircraft and being forced to spread himself so thin that decisionmaking is af- fecting his responsibility for your safety and my safety and anybody else that is flying is affected. If they are not providing the service, than we have the information that this maintenance is not being provided and affects your safety. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Lyman, is that your statement ? Is that your case? Mr. LYMAN. ~ This, basically, is the case. As you asked we have the recommendations. Again, we feel, as you indicated, we need an immedi- ate increase in personnel, we need an immediate increase in equipment. There is not backup system of radar equipment available to these peo- ple, so when we talk equipment we are talking an addition of x amount of additional radarscopes to provide a backup system capability for these people. Mr. FRIEDEL. Now furnish the specifics that we requested. Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Dingell. Mr. DINGELL. You are alluding, I assume, to the series of circum- stances referred to in the statement of the eyewitness beginning at the bottom of page 2 and going down to about the middle of page 3, where- in the witness has cited the inadequacy of electronics technicians, and of the FAA maintenance procedures ; that controllers through the auspices of the National Association of Government Employees have found that the Agency is forcing them to rely on outdated and tern- perarnental equipment ; that the FAA is arbitrarily phasing out vital electronic equipment at air traffic control stations and in many areas purchasing factory seconds to replace tubes in radar and related elec- tronic equipment; and the high number of unreported incidents where aircraft passage show a distance less than FAA safety limits. I believe you are asking for specifics on those items? Mr. FEIEDEL. Yes. Mr. DINGELL. Very well. I hope it will be received for the record. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you very much. Mr. LYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (The information requested follows:' day, -715---68-----20 PAGENO="0306" 302 The principal document referred to was issued over the signature of John Hanlon, area `supervisor of the Cleveland SyStems Maintenance Area Office, aii~I entitled "Project Focus". Pertinent excerpts follow: "The Cleveland Systems Maintenance Area Office is implementing a Mainite- nanoe Schedule Improvement Program, the purpoue of which is mlaximum efficiency in utilization of manpower while assuring completely adequate opeTation of services and facilities. Under the Program, Sector personnel will accomplish most maintenance procedures aceordtng to schedules developed ]~oc~a11~y, based on local oondWons. One of the key points in operation of ~e o~r~n~ ~s a po~!e~ o~ NOT attempting lie hold facility or system parameters to eenter~of-tolerance values, but to take corrective action oniy when an out-of~tolerance condition is found or when one is imminent. "Success of the Maintenance Schedule Improvement is essential, if the Cleve~ land Area is to assume the `additional werkle~td to ~ which we are committed. However, success `of the program depends completely on the whole-hearted coop- eration of Secter technicians and their complete `acceptance of the program. The inspection process involves measurement of `system and equipment parameters. Very often, in the past, `inspectors who have found a parameter near the edge of tolerance have adjusted it to its nominal value during the inspection. "FEG (Field Engineering Group) personnel who conduct 1~flectronic and FED inspections will support the Cleveland Area Maintenance Schedule Improvement Program `and will conform to guidelines established by the program. They will provide a feedback to the Area Office regarding Secto.r participation in the program. Specilleally, inspectors will: "a. Include in Section 1 of the Inspection ReØort `a `~tatement regarding the extent and efféctivenees of Seoter participation in the Maintenance Schedule Improvement Pregram. "b. Refrain from taking action on making adjustments when departures from center-of4olerance conditions `are i~oted during inspection so long as `an out-of- tolerance condition Is not found or Is not Imminent. Doing so might obscure justification for altering a maintenance schedule. "C. Apply `adjective ratings to facilities inspected, based on utility, function's and reliability of operation. Adjective ratings will not be lowered by `any condiitiions which `are found `to be in tolerance, even though they are near `or at `the edge of the permissible `area. "In summary, Sector Chiefs `and `all other technicians are being `asked to `adopt new maintenanee philosophies, which `are considered a radical change by `some `of them. Evaluations conducted by FE~ engineers should in no way re~'1ect an evaluator's opinion that perfection of equipment operation is favored over an operating condition the eva'uator thinks shostkl be improved, but which reafly doesn't need to be. Reports s*o~ld not refteot disapproi~al of equipment operation, which is not at center-of-tolerance conditions as long as out-of-tolerance condi- tions are not found." (Italic supplied.) Again emphasizing that this philosophy continues in effect, maintenance em~ ployees comment as follows: "Mr. Hanlon told the technicians to closely monitor their equipment to determine when it will fail, then repair it just before it does fail. In electronics, this is not only impossible, but utterly ridiculous. "On one of Mr. Hanlon's trips to Buffalo, he encouraged doing the monthly monitor checks on the Instrument Landing Systems without removing them from service. In his own words, we should, on sunny, clear days, shift the course, go to broad alarm condition, and act without notifying the pilot. "By checking past records, you will lind some airports that ran 100 percent availability month after month, but still recorded their routine work as being done. This is cheating to make the availability time look good. This same point was brought up last March 21, 1967, in Syracuse at the ILS (Instrument Landing System) conference. "You will also note in his directive (Hanlon's) that he instructed his inspec~ tors to close their eyes to all but out-of-tolerance conditions. This is still done today, very few facilities fail an inspection. We hope this will help in the testi- mony and if we can assist in any way please let us know." A further case in point comes from Boston's Logan International Airport. Employees at this facility comment as follows: "Under the FAA's Reduced Preventive Maintenance Program, monthly time limits have been placed on site and situation. This includes time spent on preventative and corrective maintenance. PAGENO="0307" 303 "The policy at AFS-411 Logan International Airport is that if the allotted time for a site is used up during the month and some of the equipment at that aite has ~:iot been rontined for that month, it will not be routined. Tile only justification for looking at this eç~i1ip~ent is that it is failing or has failed. At Logan ATOT, there is one transmitted for the primary frequency of departure control. This transmitter doesn't receive the proper routines according to agency handS books because (1) there is not a back-up transmitter for this frequency, and (2) there has not been a midnight shift for communications since May 1965, even though traffic between midnight and 0800 has doubled and tripled. The NAVAID section at AFS~-411 is constantly being monItored regarding time spent at sites. Se~eral times, marker sites of the Instrument Landing System have had scheduled preventative maintenance, but all the time allotted for this site for the month was used up. This task was put off until the next month. "The safety of the flying publie has been jeopardized by putting time limits on maintenance at the Airways Facility sectors. You cannot put time limits on preventative or corrective maintenance and have a facility operating at peak efficiency." A shortage of maintenance workers is the principal ingredient in another prob- 1cm area, this one at the New York Afr Route Traffic Control Center. As reported by employees at that facility, "Presently, at the N~w York ARTCC, there are only two qualIfied engine generator men. If there is a trouble at night, a WB-9 building maintenance man, who is not qualified to certify the power- plant and related switchgear, must perform the task of transferring the center from commercial power to emergency power. If he encounters any problems beyond his technical competence, the New York Center could very possibly be without any power, or in effect, be of no use to any aircraft which normally rely on this critical station. "Recently, the New York ARTCC was utilizing the emergency powerplant when both engine generators developed trouble, forcing the engine generator man to revert back to commercial power. Fortunately, commercial power was available, and also an engine generator man happened to be available." Another typical example of degradation of maintenance programs because of lack of employees occurred at Colorado Springs, Cob. The supervisory dee- tronics technician of the radar/communications unit there advised air traffic control tower and Weather Bureau personnel, by memo dated July 1, 1967, that repairs of equipment outages would simply have to wait. Text of the memo follows: "Beginning on or about July 24, the Radar/Comm crew will `become involved with installation of the ASR-~5. We will transfer Joe Vegh to the installation crew for the duration `of the project. This transfer, during the annual leave season, leaves the crew two men short. "Operating this short, we may not always have a man available to take care of your problems, so be patient, and we will take care of the equipment failures as soon as we can." Note the employees, "This is one of the reasons for poor air traffic control service. The ASR-1 radar that we are using here was out~dated years ago, and as the `above letter states, there is nobody to maintain It. If there is a near mid-air or a collision tomorrow, it is nobody's fault but the FAA." Evidence is at hand which indicates that things will get much worse before they get better. In the minutes of the Kansas City Area Chiefs Conference, February 13-17, 1967,, Warren C. Sharp, Airways Facilities Division Chief of the FAA's Central Region, is quoted as saying, "Improved ma~ntenanee techniques are still being evaluated in an effort to `determ~e optimum levels of maintenance. Less than 24-hour watchetanding on ARSiR facilIties has been proposed as a means of improving productivity." This statement has a commendaible ring to it, but the em~iloyees who would be affected by such a program offer the following observations on the pos~ible consequences of such a cUt back : "If for some reason tl~e hIgh voltage goes off at the 4~RSR (Air Route Surveillance Radar) site a~d the circuit breaker drops out, who is going to reset it? If the equi~ment is changed to the standby u~it~ by remote control, who is going to see that it is operating at peak performance? We helieve that we should not sacrifice safety for the Sake of saving money or, as quoted above, improving proUuctivity. Surely, we want to im~rove in productivIty or in any other area Where it l'S needed, but we should not take the ~afety of peoples' lives too lightly." The minutes of the same area chiefs conference further note that "the three percent annual productivity increases are expected to continue." PAGENO="0308" 304 Respond the Kansas City electronics technicians, "How long can it be dec]~ared that we have a productivity increase of three percent and thereby ci~t the number of employees by the same amount? We would think that after a facility has been eslablished for a period of two to three years, there would be no further productivity increase there. IPurthermore, as the equipment gets older, it requires more maintenance. So, even though we might have a productivity increase, we very well might need more men rather than to decrease the staffing by the same amount as the productivity increase." Another problem is the phase-out of electronics equipment which air-traffic employees believe they still need to fulfill their mission. Report workers at the Airway~ ~iaeilities Branch, Trinidad~ Cob., "Several weeks ago, our subsector chief and our local FS$ (Flight Service Station) chief were notified that the region's plant and structures section has decided to discontinue and remove all standby emergency generators from Flight Service Stations `in the interest of economy.' "It will probably cost several thousand dollars to remove and rewire each facility. It will not do away with any technicians since our work load will be affected very little by removing them. About all that will be saved will be the few gallons of gas and oil per month it takes to keep the unit in good operatingeondition. "However, there is a great possibility of air tragedy occurring due to emerg- eney power not being available. "For exalurile, on April 22, our FSS experienced a 21/2-hour power failure. If the emergency power plant had not been available, the communicators would not have had any communications with the aircraft in the area. While Trinidad is not extremely busy, there were three inbounds and one outbound during this period. Loss of communications could have resulted in a collision. "Also, our station is equipped with Direction Finder equipment to render assistance to pilots who become lost or disorientated during the freak weather conditions which occur in our area regularly. On April 2~, one communicator had three such problems. "It is during these unusual weather conditions that air traffic needs the most assistance ; it is also during these times that we experience most of our com- mercial power failures. So, you can see what problems we are going to have in air safety if management get's their way and removes our standby emergency power plant." According to employees at New York, more potential trouble threatens because of another instance of equipment phase-out. They report, "FAA has all ith eggs in basket with the only capable radar at Kennedy Airport. "In the event of a breakdown of the Kennedy radar site, there would not be enough air coverage with the backup Palermo and Benton radar systems. "The FAA discontinued service of the Montauk radar site which would have served as an excellent backup of the Kennedy radar site." A final point on which subcommittee members requested further specifics was the subject of unreported "incidents" taking place, instances in which aircraft pass each other at distances less than the FAA's safety limits. Because of the very fact that such incidents go unreported, it is extremely dif- ficult to assign figures to the numbers of times they occur. However, in a survey of N.A.G.E. members, we found that, by the air traffic controllers' own estimates, they happen with alarming frequency. Controllers at the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center reported that there is at least one "confliction," sometimes as many as five, on an average day at the facility. Most of these1 they said, go unreported. Mr. FRIEDEL. Our next witness will be Mr. Clifford P. Burton, exec- utive director of the Air Traffic Control Association. STATEME1~T O~F CLIPPORD P. BURTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIR TRAFFIC cONTROL ASSOCIATION; ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES HILL,. GENERAL COuNSEL Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you wish, I can summarize my statement; however it is only some six pages long, so I am at your disposal, Mr. Chairman. PAGENO="0309" 305 My name is Clifford P. Burton, and I hold the position of executive director of the Air Traffic Control Association. . On my right is Mr. James Hill, general counsel of the association. At this point I would like to mention that Mr. Hill is a former Deputy General Counsel of the Federal Aviation Agency and I form- erly held the position of Deputy Director of the Air Traffic Service and in that capacity I have some working knowledge of the problems that the agency goes through in trying to get budgetary approval of its request for personnel and equipment. In my statement I mention 5,000 of the 12,000 aircraft traffic con- trollers. We do not include in that 12,000 figure flight service station personnel but of our 5,000 members we can authenticate this by records which are kept through the computer at the Service Bureau Corp. and we can make our roster available to the committee to prove the actual number of members we have in our association, and how many we represent. . We do not maintain that we represent the other 7,000 of the 12,000 controllers or whatever exact number it is. We are an independent, nonprofit professional organization dedi- cated to the advancement of science of air traffic control. Our statement, Mr. Chairman, does not deal specifically with equip- ment. ~Te have read the testimony of the previous witnesses, ATA, the AOPA, and others, and we believe all the goodies in the world are included iii those statements as to equipment. Our particular thrust deals with the recognized shortage in person- nel, the rapid growth of traffic, and what must be done to correct this situation. Our statement quotes in full an editorial in our journal of January of ~tliis year, where we really pointed up this problem. We did not wait until an accident occurred to point it out. We also recognize that during the past 4 or 5 years the economy pressures that have been on the agency, and that many people in that agency recognized this problem, yet there was not too much they could really do about it. Our concern now is over the fact that in the last 4 or 5 years the traffic has increased rapidly, it has been handled by increased pro- ductivity on the part of the controllers to almost the breaking point. We recognize the shortage in nearly every facility in the country. The difficulty now arises with the fact that the pipeline is empty. There are no new bodies coming into the system in time. It will take at least 18 months, 15 to 18 months to train a body in a ]~ow activity facility, 3 to 5 years in a busy one. So the pipeline needs to be filled up. At the present time, as I found in my tour through the Western . ~ States and through the central part of the country, there are a few new . : bodies coming into the system but not in any great numbers, and they are largely composed of retired commanders1 colonels, and sergeants. We think there should be an all-out efFort at the present time. to recruit new and qualified personnel. We specifically recommend immediate acquisition of around 2,000 for training purposes. We also recognize that while it would be desir- able to rapidly expand in the electronics field and commission new radars, new facilities throughout the country, that this cannot be done PAGENO="0310" 306 with the present work force, and it would drain off the qualified people from the existing facilities, now working shorthanded, We think the first order of business, insofar as safety is concerned, is to get the bodies on hand to handle the equipment and the facilities in existence today. Certainly it would be desirable according to ATA's statement that we have more radar, more towers, more ILS, et cetera, but we must have the people to maintain them, so the particular thrust of ourt~stimony is in the personnel field. We work closely with the FAA on these problems. We have seldom, if ever, sent a recommendation or a communication to the FAA that they have not answered it, however, it has not always answered to our satisfaction. Many times we quarrel and we quarrel quite strongly and quite bit- terly, but at the same time we have confidence in General McKee and Mr. Thomas, and we feel that they can get this job done, that they can get out of this dilemma if they are given some immediate sup- port. I speak now of the Appropriations Committee as you cannot get things done without money. So in our statement, Mr. Chairman, we have three areas which we think should be given priority attention : One is the immediate acquisi- tion of 2,000 personnel, and I use a round number of this- Mr. KUYKENDALL. What page~ Mr. BURTON. That is on page 6. Major emphasis on the airport construction program because quite obviously if you have no place for the airplane to land, we cannot handle them and the traffic controllers have to chop them off-restrict traffic. An accelerated implementation program on the national aviation system is now underway by FAA. Here, again, Mr. Chairman, this cannot be accelerated unless there is money in hand to do it. When you add to that, of course, the recomn- mendations of other associations that have appeared before you on additional radar, additional towers, additional lights and facilities, and so on, again it comes down to a matter of money. So we are pressing you strongly, Mr. Chairman, to urge the Appro- priations Committee to get behind the FAA and give them the money that they need to do the job. We do have confidence in the administration to get the job done, we expect to quarrel with them in the future as we have in the past, but at the same time we are trying to cooperate with them. Basically, Mr. Chairman, that is the thrust of our statement. Mr. FRIEDEL. The three recommendations we have here~ What do you estimate the total cost would be ? Mr. BURTON. I have not gone into the matter of cost on these at all, Mr. Chairman, but I would say it is quite astronomical particularly in the airport area and in national aviation system. I think they have ordered most of the computers, radar, and other electronics that are very, very expensive. Of course, if you take the average salary of a controller and multiply by 2,000, that would give you a pretty good figure, but we have not done so. We can come up with a rough estimate but we have not attempted to do this. I would say it would be at 1e~st $200 or $300 million. PAGENO="0311" 307 Mr. DINGi~Li~. Would it be beneficial fQr the sub~omrnittee to have the benefit of the cost estimates not oniy on these recommendations but also on such other recommendations as the subcommittee will re- ceive in the course of the testimony ~ Mr. FRIEDEL. Well, we will try to get the figures. I want to say this: I am greatly impressed with the shortage business, the need for moreS men. I wonder if we can get 2~000 ; but at least we ought to get a start on it. Mr. BUI~TON. Mr. Chairman, I had a little experience on this about 1~0 years ago. I was then a division chief in OAA and I had air traf- fic control and communications. At that time I urged quite strongly that they hire at least 25 percent more personnel for on-the-job tram- ing, pointing out the rapid increase in traffic that has then-that was then forthcoming and that we would be caught shorthanded and with a low experience level. This happened, and suddenly CAA started hiring people off the streets and getting from well, wherever source they could. So I think the total cost to the taxpayer was far greater by waiting and then ac- celerating the program that was if they had hired these people at the time. The mood was evident. I think the same situation exists today that eventually the taxpayer and the public will benefit by getting these people on the job as quickly as possible. Our great fear is that the jth is getting too strenuous and so dif- ficult that it is not attractive any more. We are not getting the right kind of bodies into the pipeline. We have recommendations before the Civil Service Commission today and to the FAA to do something about it. So ~wthether or not they are given the authority and funds, I think they will still have a very, very difficult time in getting the proper kind of material into the pipeline for training purposes. Mr. FRILDEL. Mr. Devine? Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Burton, the previous witnesses said the turnover was running high in air traffic control. Can you give me any specifics on that ? Are you losing a lot ? Are the oldtimers dropping out or what? Mr. BURTON. I do not believe the turnover rate is high, I do not have the specific figures. But when we were conferring with the FAA, dur- lug the past year, this was pointed out. We attacked the morale problem, and one of the responses that we got from the agency was that the turnover rate in the service was quite low. We accepted their figures. I don't remember what that figure was. Mr. DEVINE. You suggested on page 2 that when an air traffic con- troller reaches age 40 his proficiency decreases-I suppose that is every- body, not just the aircraft controller. Do you have quite a few in that category? Mr. BtIRTON. I don't know what the average age is, probably 37 to 45, but one of the FAA's own studies indicates that their peak efficiency in this field wherein split-second decisions are needed, that they begin to go downhill at about age 45. It is a safety business and we are talking about increased safety. I think it is different than sitting behind the desk. Mr. DEVINE. Have you had any tower experience yourself? PAGENO="0312" Mr. DEVINE. Do L former FAA personnel end up in unions? / Mr. BURTON. I represent a professional association, sir, not a union. / Mr. DEVINE. Thank you. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Pickle? Mr. PICKLE. I have not had a chance to read the testimony. I will do so. Mr. KIJYKENDALL. Mr. Burton, you mentioned the term "bodies" and I think that is of great concern to all of us, about where these bodies will come from. About what educational level can handle this job with proper train- ing at any time, high school graduates or would it require college? Mr. BURTON. That question arose during a transportation workshop that I attended recently headed up by General Shriver and it was the consensus there that if they shot for, say, the college graduate, we would probably lose more people than we could retain. So you need the sharp high school graduate, 2 years of college, but not necessarily all college graduates. You need somebody that is real sharp and fast. Mr. PICKLE. What age would you like to have? Mr. BURTON. As young as possible. Mr. PICKLE. You are talking about maybe 20 years old. Mr. BURTON. Twenty, 22 years old ; right. Mr. PICKLE. Now what are you doing to try to retrieve the young draftees and enlistees after a hitch in the Air Force that have had this experience? Specifically, what are you doing to try to get these folks the day they walk out, or maybe 60 days before they get out? Mr. BURTON. What we have done as an association is ask our mem- bers to contact their friends and their friends' children and so on, who are in that age bracket, to urge them to make a career in the air traffic service. If I did not make myself clear, Mr. Pickle, I am sorry. Mr. PICKLE. I am talking about the young fellow that is sitting in a tower down at Orlando, let's say, who is 23 years old and is going to get out in 90 days. He has `had a couple years of good experience. Now, are we-when 1 say "we," I am talking about this as our joint problem-are we doing anything specifically to contact that man ahead of time ? Industry does, you know that, and in fact they try to pirate him, frankly, and I don't blame them. Are we doing anything specifically to get that fellow to come with us or me directly upon his separation. from the Air Force? Mr. BURTON. I don't think there is any organized effort, sir. Mr. PICKLE. Do you think there should be. Mr. BURTON. I think there should be. Mr. PICKLE. All right. You mentioned the retir&l person. I would suggest probably that there are a great many more of these young 308 Not tower experience. I ~ ndIhave~ in an air route my career. I 2 years ~iA perso: ~AA? ~er, and then my military ael end up in unions? PAGENO="0313" 309 fellows that are getting out * after one hitch availaMe than there are the retired people and that the person that is retired has a par- tial income at least, and he might not be quite ~s eager as this young fellow. Now, would you suggest a -formal school for these people in stra- tegic locations throughout the country? Mr. BtTRTON. We have supported an air academy, I don't remem- ber the Congressman's name who is sponsoring this, but we are a strong supporter of the FAA Academy at Oklahoma City, and we think that should be expanded and used to a greater extent than it is. Mr. PIORLE. All right. Mr. BURTON. We think colleges and universities should sponsor courses which would leiid itself to bringing people into this kind of business. Mr. PIcKLE. Now one last question and maybe I can say this a little better than you can: I do not know whether there are any airline executives here. Why don't we encourage the airlines themselves to maybe run some institu- tional-type ad~~ertising in the flying magazines or possibly in other type magazines, more or less glamorize this job? You have seen one of the major life insurance companies that runs, "Would you like your son to be an engineer ? Would you like your son to be a doctor ? Would you like your son to be this?" See, I am a career salesman, I spend my entire life selling and I continue to sell. It seems to me that we need to glamorize this job some by advertising, by pointing out the tremendous responsibility for the public good that is available to the person that serves here. I think it was just mentioned by my colleague, Mr. Brown. I wonder if the better people seek out the less pressure control areas than are in the high pressure control areas. My guess is that you have your best people in the high pressure because the right kind of person. responds to pressure properly and responds to challenge. The type we need is one that wants more responsibility, that wants an opportunity to serve, that wants to moonlight if it is necessary to save lives. So I think we ought to build up a challenge, the opportunity to serve through possibly encouraging, even industrial-type adver- tising by private industries, aircraft companies, and airlines companies to help you with your task. Mr. BURTON. I would agree with you, Mr. Pickle. I would like to point out one other thing : The O'Hare tower, the busiest in the world, perhaps, except Saigon, others are now catching up to it, it qualifies for a level 3 on one shift alone and jobs become open at grade 11 at other locations, which is one grade below the controller level at O'Hare, they are bidding out from O'Hare into the lower level activity to get less pressure and so on. So, if we are going to glamorize it, I think we have to have a degree of compensation that makes it a practical one. Then I think we can progress, there must be some incentive to progress from the lower levels to the next higher levels. I think there is one further step. If we recognize that their efficiency goes down after age 45, there should be some way we can take care of these people.. PAGENO="0314" 310 We for 10 years now have been working on an ea~r1y retirement bill. We are now working with Senator Monroney and his staff, however, we are not making much progre~ss. There is no place for these people to go when they can no longer control tra~ffic,there is no market for their skills. Mr. KtJYKENDALL. Mr. Burton, let me interrupt. You know, back when I joined the Air Force, an old man of 28 could not even get into the Air Force. Anybody that was 25, could not go to the combat fighter plane. The only reason we did not have any pilots over 25, we didn't have any. We later found out that the best fighter pilots we had in Korea were 35. Of course now 10 years later some of these guys are still fighting and they are 45 or 50. Are you possibly overestimating the wearing out of these guys as they pass 45 ? I hate for guys that are approaching the age you and I are to admit they are too old to do something, sir. Mr. BURTON. I don't think I am overestimating it. I think the psychological examination that the FAA was conducting turned up about 200. Mr. Hill can probably speak on that a little more accurately than I can. We are dealing with the safety business. The fighter pilot is out to kill somebody and if he gets himself killed that is just another casualty, but when you have a jetliner with 125, 150 people, it is pretty serious business. Mr. KtrYKENDALL. I find it difficult to understand that a man is per- fectly capable of flying at 55, but is not capable of helping direct the tower that is bringing the SST in. I will take your word for it. A few years ago we thought of useful occupations and found ottt that that was only because the youth were in it. I hate to think about trying to do something about a business here when you are wearing somebody out when he is 43 years old. Mr. BURTON. I have one more new bit of information that might throw some light on it. Recently, Mr. Huntley narrated a program, "The Coming Revolu- tion in Aviation." And he was interviewing a TWA pilot I believe it was and the TWA pilot stated, "I would rather have my job at the controller's salary than the controller's job at my salary." And he was an overseas pilot making $25,000 and $30,000 per year because pressure on the controller is continuous for an 8-hour period. Mr. KUYKENDALL. I know a lot of people would not want my jc~b at my salary. Mr. FRIEDEL. Any other questions? Mr. Pickle? Mr. PICKLE. No questions. Mr. FRIEDEL. I want to thank you, Mr. Burton. Mr. BURToN. Thank you. (Mr. Bi.wton's prepared statement follows:) STATF~MF.NT OF CLIFFORD P. BuRTON, EXROUTIVE DIRECTOR, Aiu T1~AFFIO `CONTROL ASSocIATIoN Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Clifford P. Burton and I hold the position of Executive Director of the Air Traffic Control Amo- ciation, `and I have with me Mr. Jim Hill, General Counsel of the A~sodation. We appreciate very much the opportunity of `testifying before this Committee PAGENO="0315" 311 on the important ~ubjeet of air safety and would like first to a~quaint the Oonnnittee with the origin ai~d growth of the 4~ssociation. It was formed In 19~6 and is com~sed of approximately 5,000 of the FAA's 12,000 air traffic controllers~ APOA is an independent nonprofit profe~siona1 organizatior~ dedicated to ad- vancement in the science of air traffic controL Although composed principally of active air traffic controllers, its membership also includes pilots, private aircraft owners and operatorn, aviation Industry organizations, engineers, and manufacturers. The A~ssoc'iatlon is also a Oorporate Memier of the International Federation o1~ Air Tra~e Control Associations. Mr. Chairman, we listened with great interest when General MCKee and Mr. Thomas. together with members of the National Transportation Safety Board, testified i*fore this Committee on air safety. The questions posed by membe~rs of this Committee to these witnesses raise many issues on air ~atfety and, In particular, stressed the possible need for radar and control towers at all loca- tions served by air carrier aircraft. Comments of the Committee indk~ated to us that if the agency would just come forward and present a case for what it needs, sympathetic consideration would be given to these requirements. However, press reports now indicate that the agency is encountering great difficulty in obtaining funds even to maintain the present system. We understand that the agency's F.Y. 1968, budget request sought no new towers or radar, int nevertheless was cut by the House Appropriation~ Committee. A discussion of air safety be~omes academic in the light of the economy pressures that are being exerted on the agency. Air safety, in the next decade, cannot be provided merely by maintaining the present air traffic control system. The Committee will undoubtedly hear the same general tenor of statistics repeated `by many people. They `show that gen- erally, 1~y any standard of `measurement, air traffic has more than doubled in the period of less than the 10 years that the FAA has been in existence. They show further that it is expected to more than double again by 1975. Air carriers antit~ipate `a future `annual growth rate of approximately 12%, compounded FAA Annual Reports for past years all repeat the same fact, that the number of aircraft handled by air traffic control facilities have increased at `a yearly rate of approximately 15%, and were handled at no increase in the size of the con- troller work force. The controller work force today handles more than twIce the number of aircraft annually than it did when the FAA was created in 1958. Today the system is stretched to the limit of its endurance. The Civil Servh~e Commission Classification Standards for controllers created in 1958 contemplate that the busiest towers and centers are those which will handle more than 100,QOO instrument operations annually. Today, there are some that have 500,000, and FAA estimates that by 1975 there will be 12 ARTO con- ters that will handle one million operations per year, while seven others will hit the 600,000 mark. The pressure and tensions which this increased work volume is causing to controllers has become an increasing concern to FAA. The agency last year subjected all controllers to a psy~hol'ogical evaluation and four~d 200 to be suffering from tension `sufficiently severe to require a full psychiatric ex- amination. Of these, 15 were retired for jisability and an additional number were required to obtain tr~atment. A recent FAA medical report diselosea that a controller's proficiency commences to decrease at age 40, `and shows that the average ~ontroller age will exceed 40 by 1972. Controllers are not the `only ones `affected `by air `traffic growth. Air oa~iriea~s and their passengers are `also affected by it. At `one time passengers could expect `delays during bad weather. But in recent years probably every member of this Committee has experienced air traffic delays at the Nation's larger airports even in the `best `of weather. These delays der~gate from the one principal `advantage of this mode of `tran'spo'rtation-~speed, `and ` `are estimated by the `air carriers to cost them $`SO million per year in added costs. But the most important consequence of the increasing saturation of the airspace is not delay `or inconvenience, it is the effect upon `air' safety. The Nation's growing air traffic volume `simply cannot continue to be `handled with `safety with existing airports, `existing ATC facilities and equipment, and `the existing `size of `the controller work force. We `suppose that all witnesses before this Committee will agree that the Nation urgently needs more airports. Some person's propose more air carrier `airports at larger `cities; others propose the segregation `of small aircraft to new satellite airports. Whichever is done, new airports are urgently required to `reduce the present saturation at larger cities. The Federal Aid to Airport Act authorizes the PAGENO="0316" 312 FAA to n~ake matching grants to loeal commun~ties for ~thport construction and improvement. F~or many years the Congress appropriated $75 million annually, as this was roughly ~ equivalent to ~rant in Aid requests which were received. But as the airport crisis has increased, the volume of requests for aid has increased and has backlogged. For F.Y~ 1968 FAA received 778 requests, totaling $339 million. The answer of the House Appropriations Committee to this emer- gency was to reduce the agency's $75 million request fGr f1~cal 1969 to $65 million We pointed out in our editorial in the Journal of Air Traffic Control in January of `this year the need for immediate action to acquire additional personnel to meet the rising tide of air traflic within the the next 10 years. The editorial is entitled, `The Folly of Fiscal Brinkmanship," and we should like it quoted in full for the record. Anyone with more than 10 years in aviation remembers from first hand experi- ence the rag-tag condition of the nation's `air traffic control system in the middle fifties. Despite an explosive increase ifl the number `of flights using the system, the Civil Aeronautics Administration lagged a decade `behind. With each passing year, aviation's thundering progress further magnified the system's stagnation. It took the Curtis Committee, RPCA, the.Ai'rw'ays M'odernisati'on Board, sundry other committees of "experts" and-most of all-several bone-chilling air tragedies `to finally convince the laWmakers `and the fiscal planners of what every air traffic controller and pilot bad known for years-that the system was woefully short of both trained people and modern equipment. When the dozing Department of Commerce finally woke up to the fact that `air traffic demands could not possibly be met with people already on the payroll, they were a1~]~ady five years late ! The ranks of experienced air traffic controllers were decimated by the sudden addition `of new f'acilifies and services. And, ala's, there was no ~me to ff1 the gaps because there never had been an intelligent and feresighted plan for recruiting and training replacements. Well, everyone knew that the government had been caught with its collective pants down. But there was no time fc~r fault finding. While the sharp-penciled fiscal planners fidgeted with their ledgers and scratched their heads in dismay~ CAA mounted a frantic recruiting and training program. To say that recruiters `occasionally `took some liberties with `the `entrance standard's would be a gross. understatement. F'or `the prospective controller, a warm body that could see lightning and hear thunder was almost `as good a's holding three-of-a-kind in stud poker! It took a lot `of time, money `and sweat-and not a little luck-to bring the new recruits up `to `speed while `also running the `system safely. The controller work- ferce, growing from 4,111 in 1955 to 12,333 in 1960, was mere `than tripled in size in five short years. Somehow the system survived and things gradually began to pick up. But, 4n the meantime, `the industry and the traveling public `suffered mightily. How much, no `one will ever know because fiscal planners never keep thosefigures. An ominous n'Gte was `struck `at the `recent ATCA National Conventional in Miami where the current phenomenal growth in `aviation proved `to be the number one topic `of discussiOn. This onrushing tide of aviation activity is, even now, placing tremendous demand's on the air traffic control system. Over the next five years, lit will make the growth wave which nearly swamped the system in the middle fifties look like a mere ripple. Since 1DGO, there have been less than 700 new air traffic control `positions added to the system. Yet, in the same period, no less than 94 new ATC facilities have been commissioned. Viewed against the skyrocketing activity in aviation,. these figures become almost incredible. Nevertheless, we find that the government's fiscal planners have again pruned away the `pessiblltty of anything but negligible hiring in the coming year. Undoubtedly, they are banking on automation to bail them out of this predica- ment. If that's the ease, they are either ill-informed or someone has led them down the garden path! It's hard to imagine th~it those who are knowledgeable in the business of air traffic control would advise the fiscal planners that automation, particularly at the outset, will suddenly enable the current corps of controllers to cope with vast increases `in air traffic. Insofar as sheer numbers of flights are concerned, there is `scant evidence that automation of ground facilities alone will increase the overall capacity of our air transportation system. Certainly not when the automation of ATC facilities is being accomplished piecemeal, and at a snai;l's pace. And certainly not so long as our airports continue to be such Mg bottlenecks. I. PAGENO="0317" 313 Eveii if automation ~s eventually as successful as the most optimi~tic engi- neers rosily predict, it is still more than five years away for most ATO facilities Anyone who thinks that future automation will elin4iiate the current urgent need for more manpower in air traffic control is simply wMstling in the dark. Phe long-range impact automation will have on ATO manpower needs is, at best, an educated guess. But the impact of recruiting and training new controllers now is a precise matter. Even the cost-benefitniks should `be `able to figure so simple an equation. We have today a serious manpower shortage in the air traffic control system. This year's false economy may well be reflected in the tragic headlines of lomorrow. One year ago, on this same page, we closed our editorial with this question: "No doubt the recent accidents will spur things `along, but must improvement always come only as the aftermath of tragedy `1" Aviation history is on the bring of repeating itself. While everyone else in aviation is moving ahead vigorously, planning for ~ the future and preparing for the greatest expansion the industry has ever known, the air `traffic coiitrol system is again on the brink of slipping several years further behind. Shades ~ef the fifties! It's time to stop this nonsense about personnel freezes and niggardly savings in an agency that is so critical to both the national defense and the skfety of the traveling public. If FAA cannot Immediately begin to gird the controller ranks with talented and trained young men, the next decade will be another ignominious example of the folly of playing fiscal brinkmanship with air safety. In our view, there are three major areas requiring immediate attention: 1. The acquisition of at least 2,000 additional air traffic personnel to be placed in training to fill the presently existing gaps and to gird for the coming expansion. 2. Major emphasis must be placed on an airport construction program, which I understand will be reviewed in depth by a Senate subcommittee this week, under the chairmanship of Senator Monroney. The Congress must understand that an expanded airport system will necessarily also entail ad- ditional air traffic control facilities, equipment and manpower. 3. An accelerated implementation program on the National Aviation Sys- tem, now underway by FAA. This program, however, cannot be accelerated unless the Appropriations Committees of the Congress recognize the need for immediate action and provide funds for this purpose. In summation, Mr. Chairman, we have confidence in the Federal Aviation Ad- ministration to get the job done if it is given the support it needs, unhampered by cost effectiveness experts who place economics ahead of all other factors, in- eluding increased safety. I should add, Mr. Chairman, that this Association has had many disagreements with the Federal Aviation Administration, and we expect to have many more in the future. At the same time, we recognize the limitations placed on the agency by the Administration, the cost of the Viet Nam war, and other factors which dictate an economy program not compatible with the purpose of this hearing which is, as I understand it, "Increased Safety." Mr. FRIEDEL. Is anyone here from the Air Line Stewards and Stew- ardesses Association ? Is Donald Madole, Esq., National Press Build- ing, here? ( No response.) Mr. FRIEDEL. Well, the meeting will stand adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair. The hearings will be continued at a later date. (Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to re- convene subject to the call of the Chair.) PAGENO="0318" PAGENO="0319" AVIATION SAFETY TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 1968 HOUSE OF REP1~ESENTATIVES, Sui~co~rMIa~m11~ ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERONAUTICS, CoMMIm~E ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Wa~1i~ington, D.C. The subcommittee met `at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2123, Ra~burn House Office Building, Hon. Samuel N. Friedel (chair- man of the `stthcomrnittee) presiding. Mr. FRIEDEL. The committee will now come to order. Today the Si~bcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics re- sumes hearings on aviation safety. This series of hearings commenced in the first session `of the 90th Congress. As Chairman Staggers of the full committee said at the outset, aviation safety is one of the most important matters within the juris- diction of the `Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. There were several interested parties from the aviation community that we did not have an opportunity to hear `in the first session. It is `hoped and expected `that `we will be able to afford an opportunity to the remaining witnesses today and tomorrow. Beyond that, we will keep the record open for 5 legislative days in order to receive any further statements on this subject. `The subcommittee fully appreciates the importance of this matter and also the active concern `of Government, industry, and private par- ties with respect to aviation safety. We shall hear first this morning from our colleague and member of the full committee, the Honorable Donald Brotzman. Please proceed as you `wi~h, Mr. Brotzman. STATEMENT OP HON. DONALD G. BROTZMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS PROM THE STATE OP COLORADO Mr. BROTZMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportu- nity to present a statement on the problems of aviation safety. Certainly the increased use of air carriers by the traveling public and the do- inands on the airlines for faster and more efficient service `have drawn attention to the need to carefully review flight procedures and safety regulations. I am pleased that those hearings are `being `continued and that they are covering a wide range of p'ro'blems in the aviation industry. I know that this subcommittee has heard expert testimony from witnesses on nearly every aspect of aviation safety. My own comments `will `be limited to two areas which I think the committee should fully investigate. (315) PAGENO="0320" 316 First, I will address my comment to the problem of airline pilot training. Particularly, careful oonsideration should be given to the matter of pilot training in and around commercial airports. The tragic crash at New Orleans on March 30, 1967, demonstrated the need for new policies or, at the very least, a review of the present regulations for pilot training programs. Last April-nearly a year ago-I suggested that several surplus Air Force bases could be converted into airline flight training fields. Existence of sudh training fields and regulations requiring their use could have averted most of the loss of life in the March 30, 1967, crash. There is a small but definable possibility that any takeoff or landing will result `in an emergency. But when emergency situations are created aboard the aircraft for training purposes, the probability of a mishap on that flight is increased. It seems to me that the use of ~ ~ airbases I lation areas could present every wea and runw Such fields would not have to `hand ~ tr~ they certainly would minimize f d which takeoff and landing abnorni I also think it is important to simulators. United Air Lines m~ training program at Stapleton familiar with the work which iir~'~ ~ and necessary to continu~ ~owever, ~ always be nec and, with fact in mind, ~on Ac -- stration my o trai trly in view of ~m the FAA. ~I'have~~ -~ ~ second area of `aviation the area of private-aircraft operations. filing of flight plans prior to cross-coun operations are to be effective, and yet i file them. In the State of Colorado there `have been nearly 150 crashes of private aircraft `in the last 25 years. The situation is particularly tragic in Colorado because many of these pilots do not fully realize the prob- lems connected with flying in a mountainous terrain and the con- stantly changing weather conditions over the mountains. On March 17, 1968, the Denver Post published an article by Mr. Ed Mack Miller, a flight instructor for United Air Lines Flight Training Center in Denver. Mr. Miller `has done an excellent job in out- lining the pmblems faced by the private pilot over Colorado and has made several suggestions on what steps should be taken to `provide more adequate training and regulations for private pilots. I have submitted, as exhibit B, a copy of the article, in the hope that the members of the committee will have an opportunity to review it and consider some of the suggestions it holds out. PAGENO="0321" 317 EXhIBIT A DEP~BTMEI~T OF TBANSPORTATIO~, FEDERAL AvI~TTo~ ADMIWISTRATION, We~sMngto~, D.C., May 5, 1967. Hon. DON4LD G. BROTZMAN, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. BROTZMAN : Thank you for your letter of April 7, 1967, suggesting means of enhancing safety in airline pilot training. We support and are working toward both your proposals, namely, (1) ac- complishing as much training in simulators as available equipment and the state of the art will permit, and (2) utilizing military surplus and noncongested air- ports for training. Examples of where such airports are and will be used follows: 1. Pease Air Force Base, Portsmouth, N.H. 2. Grant County Airport, Moses Lake, Washington (formerly Larsen AFB) 3. James Connally AFB, Waco, Texas, 4. Palmdale Product Flight Test Installation (USA]F Plant No. 2) , Palmdale, California 5. Peconic River, Calverton, N.Y. (USN facility leased to Grumman Aircraft Co.) 6. Mid Continent International Airport, Kansas City, Mo. 7. Barnes Municipal~Airport, Westfield, Mass. 8. Otis AFB, Falmouth, Mass. 9. Caidwell-Wright, Oaidwell, N.J. 10. Atlantic City Municipal Airport, Atlantic City, N.J. 11. Dulles International Airport, Chantilly, Va. 12. Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, New Mexico To stimulate more effort toward these objectives we have n~iet with repre- sentatives of the airlines and airline pilot a~sociations and jnternaliy the FAA is channeling efforts toward optimum use of not only these airports but other airports with relatively lower populated areas. We have been working with the Department of Defense and the airlines on the problem `of using surplus bases for airline training.. ~ The most successful example is Larsen AFB (now Grant County Airport, Moses Lake, Washington) which is ~ jointly financed by a manufacturer, airlines, FAA and local ~ government. Work is now underway with regard to possible use of Walker AFB, Roswell, New Mexico. At the present time, much of, the training is accomplished at remote airports although the aircraft and crews are based at large city airports. For example, in the Denver area, training flights are dispersed to Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Casper, Cheyenne, `and other airports In the area. In * the meantime, we are working with the airlines and pilot groups to pro- vide additional safeguards for the `protection of persons on the ground and air- craft crews when performing necessary training maneuvers.* As a longer range selution, we are urging maximum use of current simulators and the develop- ment `of more realistic simulators to reduce air training time. I think our efforts are very much in line with your suggestions which are ap- preci'ated and we will welcome others. Sincerely, WILLIAM F. MCKEE, Administrator. ExHIBIT B tFrom the Denver Post, March 17, 1968] How Wn CAN STOP "MUnDEB IN THE MOUNTAINS" (By Ed Mack Miller 1) Several years ago, a 43-year-old businessman flying a light plane left Tuscon on a January day for Denver. In midafternoon, he called Trinidad radio and re- ported his position as near Alamosa. A few. minutes later he cal'led back and said lEd Mack Miller is a flight Instructor for United Air Lines Flight Training Center In Denver and is part owner of a private flight instruction school, Aero Training Academy, in Denver. 92_715_68-21 PAGENO="0322" 318 that be was a bit groggy from being at altitude too long and he wasn't quite sure where he was. With the aid of Flight Service Station (FSS) personnel, he regained his orien- tation, and said he was going to climb to cross the mountains near Salida. Trinidad radio advised of heavy cumulus buildups along the entire front range, and advised that flight by Visual Flight Rules (VFR) was doubtful. The pilot told FSS that he had adequate fuel and would turn back to Alamosa if he could not maintain VFR across the range. He was never seen alive again. Seven -months later the wreckage of his plane was found by a hiker in the Sangre de Cristo mountains at an elevation of 12,000 feet. That tragedy was just one of the nearly 150 aircraft crashes in Colorado in the past 25 years. Most of them have occurred in the mou~itains. Hardly a week goes by that the Civil Air Patrol is not called out for another search. Wit- ness the local headlines : Two Lost Planes Defy Hunters . . . Five Dead in Wreck of Plane . . . CAP Resumes Search for Illinois Airplane . . . Major Search Begun for Wyoming Plane . . . Lost Plane Found Near Mt. Elbert . . Air Search Und~r Way for Iowa Man . . . CAP Searching for Downed Craft . . . Crash Near Aspen Kills Eour. An oversimplified, and yet really quite accurate formulation of the problem (that variously has' been called "murder in the mountains" and "suicide in the scenery" ) places Colorado's imposing array of mountains pitted against low- horsepower aircraft, overloaded with four people and lots of baggage. Add the ingredients of wind and weather, and the odds are on for death before the plane ever takes off. Experienced mountain pilots are up in arms against the carnage. They say that most of the accidents are needless and that tOo much money is being spent and too many lives are being endangered in fruitless search missions. "The government won't let yo'u cross large bodies of water without clearance, briefing and survival equipment," says Warren E. White, former Air Force and airline pilot and currently president of Aero Training Academy, which operates light aircraft out of both Stapleton and Sky Ranch airports. "Why are inex- perienced pilots from the flatlands allowed to take off and kill themselves and loved ones-~and precipitate massive searches-without any type of control?" Says Rocky Warren, Colorado's famous bush pilot who has been flying the Rockies in light airplanes for more than 20 years out of his base at Gunnison: "Mountain flying in light airplanes is perfectly safe, if you know the terrain, the weather and your equipment-and know when to stay on the ground." Warren received his training from the late, great Eddie Drapella, who logged more than 22,000 hours "over the rocks" in small planes, and only bad one forced landing in that entire time. Many flight schools offer mountain flying courses ; aviation magazines publish articles on the nuances of high terrain flying ; and the Public Utilities Corn- mission for several years has offered free a pamphlet put together by Ray Wilson, Colorado's "Mister Aviation," entitled Do's and Don,'ts of Mountaii~ Flying. But the transient pilot, hurrying to the ski slopes or en route to a blast in Las Vegas, rarely stops to think that his plane won't perform as it did back East or out West at sea level. The pattern is tragically classic. He staggers off Stapleton International Air- port, wondering why the old bus won't handle like it did off his home field, why it took nearly twice the runway to get airborne. He remembers that he should have filed a flight plan, but this leg of the flight is so short and the weather does look good, bright and sunny, if a bit windy. Those saucer-shaped "lenticulars" over the front range are the only clouds in the sky, odd shaped, stacked just like hotcakes. Perhaps he has to circle a few times before he tackles the high mountains. Soon he discovers the plane just won't get over the coulds. So he decides to go underneath, up a canyon. In the canyon, suddenly, the turbulence is fantastic. The plane drops a hundred feet like a free-falling safe, jumps up two hundred. "We're getting our brains knocked out," he says grinning weakly, "but we should be out of it soon." He tries to look confident so the passengers won't be frightened, but the churning air, breaking across the ridges like water over Niagara, is shaking their teeth loose. The plane isn't climbing too well and the canyon is getting narrow. Fighting the bucking, wind-tossed plane, be tries to turn back. The horn that warns of an impending stall is making its death rattle now. He must tighten up the turn or 1' PAGENO="0323" 319 hit the canyon wall. There is a sudden stall, and the plane falls straight into the forest below. There is one great tearing crash-and silence. So often the last call recorded is the brave statement by the pilot : "No sweat. I think I can make it . . ." The men at the FSS stations get that sick feeling in the pits of their stomachs when they hear it. They've heard those words so often. Senator Peter Dominick of Colorado, himself an experienced pilot, has led a fight in the Senate to improve weather reporting services in the mountains and to require installation of crash locater beacons in private aircraft as a method of finding survivors. . "From 1964 to 1966 in Colorado alone," Senator Dominick said, "349 general aviation accidents resulted In 81 fatalities. Many of these accidents were caused by weather closing in on the pilot. Most often this happens because complete weather information is not available on a current enough basis, or is not available at all . . . Anyone who has flown in the mountains," he adds, "knows how critical weather information can be." Dominick's proposed changes include new weather reporting stations at Nucla and Walden, and expanding operations at Montrose, Gunnison, Salida, Aspen, Durango and Alamosa. Remarking on the omission of this program from the Weather Bureau's budget for 1968, Senator Dominick said : "The Air Force alone has incurred a cost of $112,208 for each person saved through search and rescue operations, but the Weather Bureau appears unwilling to spend a third of that amount to help prevent these accidents." On the floor of the Senate, Dominick said he has won support of many pilots throughout the country for the mandatory installation of crash-locator beacons, costing about $200, in private aircraft as a way of saving lives. "It seems ridiculous to me," he said, "to have the FAA, time after time, state that they are not going to do anything about crash beacons because they have heard some objections from some of the aviation people who do not wish to pay that much money. I certainly must say this makes little sense from the taxpayers' point of view, from the point of view of human suffering, or from the point of view of the country at large, in our effort to try to use updated technology to provide aviation safety at its best." A leader in the fight to stop the "hail of light planes into the mountains" is Ted Bryant, supervisor of flight operations training for United Air Lines and Republican state representative, who is chairman of the interim Aviation Com- mittee of the House of Representatives. Bryant introduced a resolution which requests the FAA to require filing flight plans on all flights except those which are less than 30 minutes in length or less than 50 miles in distance. The resolution was approved unanimously by both houses and was sent to the FAA. Bryant has suggested the FAA should consider subsidizing the installation of crash-locator beacons in all present aircraft, with manufacturers being required to install them in new planes. He points out that the Air Force spent $59 million in fiscal 1966 on search and rescue missions, and that this amount could be reduced to a fraction if locators were made mandatory. Recognizing that these regulations may not be adopted by the FAA, Bryant has asked that they be considered by the legislature's Aviation Committee for possible state action. Rick McCoy, a Frontier captain and part owner of a flying school, says: "Many schools operate in the Denver area with most of their training planes never flying farther than 20 miles from the traffic pattern. It doesn't make sense to put $200 beacons on them-but I definitely feel they should be on all cross-country airplanes." McCoy suggests that a certain number of the "beeper" radios be purchased by the state and made available to aircraft embarking on a cross-mountain flight. A small deposit and user's fee would be charged, the deposit being refunded when the unit is turned in "on the other side of the hump." He says 100 units could be bought by the state and placed at key airports on either side of the mountains. The cost would be infinitestimal compared to the expense of just one search mission. McCoy also believes that every plane should be equipped with an inexpensive "see-me" kit that would contain rolls of toilet tissue (for stringing through the trees or around the terrain by survivors of a crash), black and orange crepe paper for the same purpose (on snowy areas) and gas-cartridge ballons with radar-reflective foil. "These aids would make aerial spotting infinitely more simple," he says. "1 have been on many search missions, and can testify how difficult it is to see wreckage in the trees or on a snowy plateau.' PAGENO="0324" 320 Added could be cheap mirrors for signal flashing and a batch of Fourth of July sparkiers or auto flares. An entire kit of these items-even bought retail, could hardly cost more than a few dollars. At a fraction of the cost of searching for just one downed plane, `every flying service in Colorado could be given such kits by the state. Line boys refueling transient planes headed mountainwards would be obliged to give the kits out-along with pamphlets explaining the rules for mountain flying. Like the beepers, the kits could be dropped off on the far side of the mountains at `the end of that leg of the flight-or could be purchased at cost by planes continuing over more rough terrain. Rocky Warren contends that "any competent pilot" should be able to make a successful forced landing in the mountains, particular in the winter. If he does, the next question is survival. "We always carry a flashing mirror," he says. "It really works if the sun is shinning. We also carry a bright orange `gb-cloth' which can be seen for miles, and special fire-building materials we know will work, even in a high wind." I feel that, in an effort to eliminate "highland flying tragedies, a system similar to the dispatch system used for years by the airlines ought to be employed. The airline dispatcher is a man who Is an expert in his area of flight and `its particular meteorological problems. The captain and the dispatcher both must concur that the particular flight can be operated with absolute safety before it rnean depart. If this system were put in effect for general aviation, a number of Port of Entry airports would be designated. Operators at these airports (men who know their area) would be designated as dispatchers (on a fee-per-flight-worked basis) and would have to concur with the pilot heading for the mountains that the ~flight was safe before it could depart. Re would make sure the pilot had and emergency survival kit, a "see-me" kit and crash beacon aboard, check the weight and balance of the aircraft, the fuel nboard, the density altitude, the winds and weather, and go over the best route with the pilot, making sure he had current maps and approach charts, and was appropriately rated for the condition of flight, had operable radios and dc-icing equipment (if needed) and a good knowledge of emergency field and radio frequencies. There would be established, in Colorado and other mountain states, Mountain Identification Zones (MIZs) similar to defense areas where the pilot can fly only if be has met minimum equipment and flight plan qualifications. 13~or the pilot trained in mountain flying, a special "mountain rating" (a blue card, perhaps) could be issued that would make him his own clearing authority- not subject to dispatch restrictions. The right of the state or federal government to require this type of control would be based on reducing the heavy cost to taxpayers for aircraft search and rescue operations. The government does not allow ill-prepared or indiscriminate flights into the Alaskan back country. There Is no reason it should continue to allow something intrinsically more dangerous : the flying of small planes over large mountains, a practice which has proved more hazardous and more costly of rescue than flight into either the Airetic or `over the Atlantic or Pacific. Some time back I was sitting in the cockpit of a Boeing 727 at Stapleton, ready to call for taxi clearance, when a light plane with six persons aboard came into view, taxiing eractically. The pilot had a problem : With all the passengers and baggage, the center of gravity was so far aft that the airplane kept tipping back on its tail. When this happened, he was unable to steer the plane (accomplished by turning the nose- wheel). It was apparent that if his airplane had that much of a problem on the ground, it would have more of a problem flying-and that, if he was headed west, his chance of clearing any hills, much less mountains, was poor, weighed down as he was. However, neither the tower nor any interested spectator had the authority to stop him. Too often an inexperienced pilot will resent any advice and go on anyway- carrying the people he loves most to an unnecessary fate. A sensible legislative program will save the government a mint of search and rescue money-and many personal heartbreaks (and headbreaks) will be averted. A glance at a map locating airplane crashes in Colorado since 1942 will quickly-aiid dramatically-delineate the problem. PAGENO="0325" P 321 How ix~any more needless "tragedies in the trees" are we going to countenance before we get down to business? When are we going to decide to use the common-sense system the airlines adopted years ago? How soon are we going to insist that "I think I can make it" isn't good enough? Mr. FRIEDEIJ. Thank you, Mr. Brotzman, for your interesting and informative remarks. Our next witness this morning will be Mr. Lloyd H. Weatherly, Jr., manager, Catapult and Arresting Gear Division, All-American Engineering Co., Wilmington, Del. STATEMENT OP LLOYD H. WEATHERLY, SR., MANActER, CATAPULT AND ARRESTING GEAR, ALL-AMERiCAN ENGINEERING CO., WILMINGTON, DEL. ; ACCOMPANIED BY M~. MacBRIDE AND MR. BENSON Mr. WEATHERLY. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify today and I have brought with me Mr. MacBride on my left and Mr. Benson on my nght to assist me. My ~ testimony is intended to establish the state of the art in the field of emergency arresting gear for use on civil airports, and point out current plans and programs for the installation of this equipment. First, I wish to establish the need for arresting gear on civil air- fields, , and in support of this contention let me cite the following incidents: (a) On November 1, 1967, a Pan American 707 skidded off the end of a runway at Logan International-one hurt. (b) On November 2, 1967, a Seaboard World DC-8 rolled off the end of the runway 22L at Kennedy International-none hurt. (C) On November 5, 1967, a Cathay Pacific DC-8 crashed into the harbor on takeoff from Hong Kong and broke in half--one killed. (d) On November 6, 1967, a TWA 707 aborted a takeoff at Ciii- cinnati and rolled off the end of the runway and burned-li injured; one subsequently died. (e) On December 3, 1967, a Pan Am `707 ran off the runway at London Airport and got stuck in the mud-none hurt. These overrun accidents occurred during a 6-week period. They are nothing new. On A~ri1 15, 1964, the Nation's press reported three overruns in New York in a 12-hour period ; two at Kennedy and one at LaGuardia. It can happen anywhere, anytime ; a Vanguard at London in 1965- 36 killed ; a Convair 240 at Tokyo in 1964-20 killed ; a 707 at Orly in Paris in 1962-131 killed. The cause of these overruns varied : brake failure, asymmetric thrust reversal, water, slush, or ice on the runway, power failure on takeoff and other factors affecting aircraft operations. Arresting gears are not a panacea to airport safety. Actually, all they do is stop an aircraft when it is unable to do so by itself. They do not eliminate the emergencies but they are able to substantially re- duce the effects resulting from these incidents. The history of arresting gear goes back a good many years with the U.S. Navy being one of the first to use land based arresting gear. PAGENO="0326" 322 They were followed by the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force. More recently, nearly all the air forces in the Western World have adopted arresting gear. Military aviation has used a number of engagement systems including a "pop-up" barrier, a hook and cable, and a net. Arrestment of large transport aircraft also is not new. The appli- cation of arresting gear to civil aviation began some 10 or 11 years ago. The Federal Aviation Agency sponsored a feasibility test pro- gram in 1958 to evaluate the possibility of arresting multiengine transports. This program culminated in 1962 in the arrestinent of a tailhook equipped Boeing 720. From 1962 to 1967-a 5-year period-there was no progress toward adoption of arresting gear for civil use. . The latest development in the field of civil emergency arresting gear has been a test program sponsored by the French Ministry of Civil Aviation. This program has been oriented toward evaluation of the feasibility of use of a nylon net to engage a multiengine jet transport. A net, capable of engaging a Boeing 707, has been designed and built, and was tested in the United States in October and November of 1967. The French Government and the French Ministry of Civil Aviation are continuing their program with the actual engagement of a Cara- velle scheduled to take place at Toulouse, France, in the near future. The French are so convinced of the necessity for arresting gear pro- tection that a net system is being installed at Toulouse prior to the flight of the French/British supersonic transport. The recognition of the requirement for arresting gears for civil airports is not a purely national prerogative as evidenced by the sub- ject appearing on the agenda of the Fifth Air Navigation Conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which met in Mon- treal, Canada, from November 14 to December 15, 1967. During this conference France and the United Kingdom stressed the develop- ment of arresting systems and were ready to lead in the establishment of criteria and a "civil operational requirement." The United. States, through participation in a preliminary working group, eliminated the statement of a "civil operational requirement" from the working group report. The United States, while stressing interest in the development of any safety device, including arresting systems, convinced the meeting that, iii the absence of a "civil opera- tional requirement," further action beyond advice would be premature. The state-of-the-art has reached the point where arresting gear, capable of stopping today's large civil transports, is available now. However, there is no program or plan in existence in the United States today to authorize the use of arresting gear on civil airports. The position of the Federal Aviation Administration, according to an article by Ed Hudson in the New York Times of October 6, 1967, was that the FAA had never taken action to require the use of arresting gear; also, that officials believed that "equivalent safety" could be pro- vided at less cost by other approaches, including grooving runways, to increase breaking effectiveness and developing better thrust reversers for jet engines. These improvements are certainly in order but they are not going to prevent overruns. / PAGENO="0327" 323 The Air Line Pilots Association has endorsed the use of arresting gear. However, the association, in commenting on the use of emergency arresting gears, is quite positive in stating that their adoption should, in no way, affect runway length criteria, and I wholeheartedly agree. The advancement in aircraft design, including supersonic tramsports and air buses, does not point to a decrease in the incidence of overruns, but with higher performance and heavier aircraft we can expect more overruns. The points to be remembered out of this short presentation are: 1. Overruns are a problem. 2. There are arresting gears in existence today capable of stopping civil air transports. 3. No positive action is being taken, except by the French Govern- ment, to place arresting~ gears on civil airfields. I predict that within the next 2 years you will see a net arresting gear installed on Orly Airfield in Paris, France. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you, Mr. Weatherly for your very precise statement. When you speak of the arresting gear system, are you speaking of the system that we see on aircraft carriers ? * Mr. WEATHERLY. It is a modification of such a system, yes. It is an energy absorber placed on either side of the runway and an engaging means placed on the runway. The aircraft will engage this e~igaging means and in further moving down the runway the plane will have its energy absorbed and brought to a safe contrOlled stop. Mr. FRIEDEL. You say on page 3 in your statement : "A net capable of engaging a Boeing 707, has been designed and built" Can you tell us by whom it was built and whether it was tested? Mr. WEATHERLY. An arresting gear to stop a 707 was designed by American Engineering under contract with the Federal Aviation Agency. It was built first with a hook being put on a FAA 720. That hook was first evaluated at the naval test facility at Lakehurst, N.J. The arresting gear was then installed and tested at our test base in Georgetown, Del., with dead loads and then tested with a Boeing 720. This work was done in 1962. That was the finish of the test program. To support this, Mr. Chairman, I would like to show you a very short movie clip. Mr. FRIEDEL. I would like to ask you a few more questions before we see the movie. How would the arresting gear be operated ? Would it be controlled by the pilot in the cockpit and how many different nets would have to be up for the system that you speak of on the runway? Mr. WEATHERLY. For a net system which is the system currently under test and under consideration, particularly the one by the French Civil Air Ministry can be used in either of two operational modes. You may either have a rapid erection system which is capable of being erected at the command of the pilot or the tower, or you may have a net at the end of the runway within the allowable minimums erected on the upwind end so that any aircraft landing or taking off will have protection at the upwind end of the runway. With a net already erected, you then would have no choice to be made by either the pilot or the tower as to when the net would be called for. Both systems are in use by the military. Some have rapid erecting PAGENO="0328" 324 systems, some have nets erected at the upwind end. When the wind changes, you lower one end and raise the other. ~ . Mr. FRIEDEL. Do you know at what airports the Air Force is using the net ~ ~ Mr. WEATHERLY. Our Air Force is not. They are in use by air forces in other than this country. The U.S. Air Force does not use them. The French and German Air Forces are using the net system. The English Royal Air Force and Danish and Norwegian Air Forces, the Swedish and the Swiss Air Forces, the Israeli Air Force, the Australian Air Force, all have some net systems and there are a few others. Mr. FRIED~L. At vario~ fields of these different governments? Mr. WEATHERLY. Yes, sir. Mr. FRIEDEL. You may proceed with the testimony. Mr. WEATHI~RLY. The movie clips are taken from military and civil test films. The film starts with shots of a hook equipment. (At this time the film referred to was shown.) Mr. WI~ATH1~RLY. Here the F-4 is being arrested in the United States and then the German system. This is tak~n in El Centro, Calif. This is the erecting gear at the side of the runway. This particular arresting gear is used by the U.S. Marine Corps. We are now taking a picture of an F-104. He has just engaged it. This is a German 104. This film was taken in Germany during the. past year. We will move down on the ground and see a similar arrest on the grottnd. Mr. DEVINE. is that arresting gear causing it to veer from the center- line? Mr. WEATHERLY. The tail hook is slightly off center so he drifts off center. This runway arresting gear meets NATO criteria. The runout is about 270 meters. He does get a little drift to the side here. ~ This is the first Mirage test into a net. This is a dead load simulating the aircraft going into a net at our test plant in Delaware. This was evaluated prior to use by the Swiss Air Force after these tests were successful. You now see a Mirage aircraft going into the net. Here is a French Mistier going into the net. This particular opera- tion took place at Istres test base in the southern part of France. This is FAA's C-431 first evaluation of equipping a commercial transport with a tail hook. This once and for all established that a civil air transport can with- stand the loads imposed by an arresting gear. The FAA's own Boeing 720 going into a model 3500 arresting gear is shown here. You see the tail hook picking up the pendant. The runout is 1,650 feet whereas one of these model 3500's is installed now at the naval test facility, FAA test facility at Atlantic City, N.J. This is a dead load built full scale to simulate the mode and wings of a Boeing 707 going into the net this past November at our test base in Delaware. The runout on this particular equipment was 1,000 feet after en- gagement of the net. Mr. FRIEDEL. How fast was it going? PAGENO="0329" 325 Mr. WEATHERLY. The maximum speed run in this test was 130 knots. Mr. DEVINE. Is there any other braking device 9 ~ Mr. WEATIrERLY. There is a braking device on either side of the run- way. There are no brakes on the dead load so we had pretty positive proof of no pilot slipups. ~ During the testing of the 720 tail hook in the model 3500 arresting gear there was no braking used by the pilot in the tests you say. Mr. DJ~IVINE. What material was used mthe net itself? Mr. WI~ATH~RLY. The net is a nylon webbing. It is nylon webbing of individual bands of 7,000-pound force. We have a number of vertical elements so you distribute the load completely over theleading edge of the wing surface. Mr. DEviNE. Wouldn't the jet engines ingest a portion of the net ~ Mr. WEATHEBLY. No, sir. We have run these tests on military air- craft and the civil transport dead load and we completely dup1~cated the engine cells and we have uever even had one. The construetion is such it pulls off the cell. We put initial tension on the cell. You can see that the state of the art is such tha.t all of the military services have gone to an arresting system to preveflt these overruns. The U.S. Air Force has estimated now that there are some 250 "saves" a year accredited to the arresting gears now used by the U.S. Air Force. With the U.S. Navy the number of ~`saves" are appreciably higher. Mr. WATSON. Mr. Weatherly, I have been ~ imp~essed with your testimony and I am quite surprised that nothing has been done su!bse- quent to 1962 in the implementation of this arresting equi~pment for civilian use. You mentioned earlier that a number of foreign air farces have it. Most of our military bases have some type of arresting, equipment- . primarily the cable arresting equipme~it. They do not have the net equipment but they have arresting equipment. I personally have been on an aircraft when we had to abort a takeoff and we ran off the end of the runway. You have given us some impressive figures here as to the number of lives that have been lost on these aborted takeoffs. On page 1 under example c, you say, "On November 5, 196~t, Cathay Pacific DC-8 crashed into the harbor on takeoff from Hong Kong and broke in half-one killed." Had it left the runway to such a degree that your arresting equip- ment would not have had any effect anyway ? Mr. MAoBi~m i~. * Mr. Watson, we got photographs from UPI that showed the skid marks, going right off the end of the runway. Mr. W~nri~m~r. The runway goes right to the edge of the water so the aircraft was braking about maximum braking when it went into the water and broke in half. Mr. WATSON. Thus far, do you mean to tell me that FAA has demonstrated no particular interest in proceeding with this arresting equipment but rather that they are still looking for improvements in reverse thrust and other factors? Mr. WEATHERLY. A New York Times article of November 18, 196~, states: Transportation Secretary Alan S. Boyd persuaded the agency to take another look at the value of arresting gear to prevent aircraft from rolling off the ends of runways. PAGENO="0330" 326 I/I He also convinced the agency to soften its plan to oppose the use of runway barriers at international airports-a proposal expected to be supported by the British and French at a meeting of the world's major airlines in Montreal next week. . The arresting gear devices come in two basic concepts. One is a nylon net erected at the end of a runway to trap a plane. The other is a hook-and-cable device long in use by the military, particularly on aircraft carriers. Mr. WATSON. You, are in th,e business of catapulting and arresting equipment. What is theappróximate cost of the ~i1pmentthat you are speaking of here today? It does impress me from these examples, and from what we see at Air Force bases, that we are not dealing in astrono~dcal cost at all. Mr. WEATHERLY. No, sir ; not at all. A system which would protect the full range of aircraft you could expect would be in the range of $250,000 for completh installation. ~ Mr. WATSON. We are not `dealing with very much money. I am dis- turbed that the FAA has .appai~ei1t1y not~proceeded to look into this further since 1962 \vhen apparently it was proven ~that the arre~ting equipment on a Bothng 707-I assume that is a taiihook-cable equip- ment was effective in arresting that. ~ Mr. WEATHEELY. They ~ did proceed ~ in ohs step. They put out a specification, which:i ha~ with xiie now, they put out a draft copy, of the `specification, invited industry to ebme in and comment ` on the specification, went furtherwith a finalized spec and solicited proposals "against this spe9ificatio1~. , " After recewing these, I quote from another New York' Times arti- cle on Saturday, April 10, 1965, which was roughly 1 gear after the solicitation which is headlined "Safety Decision Put Off by FAA." It starts out A year has. passed since three airliners skidded off slippery runways at New York airports in one 12-hour period,, endangering the lives of 223' passengers an.d crew. ` It also goes on to quote further Senator A. S. (Mike) Monroney, Democrat of Oklahoma, who is chairman of the Senate's Aviation Subcommittee, thinks the delay iias been long enough. "The time has come," the Senator says, "to cut the red tape and put this onto the' runways that are most frequently used by high-performance aircraft (jets). 1 think it would~ be a very' practical thing to do and' it should have been speeded up.,, - ` Mr. WATSON. You are on the House side, in all deference to the other side, and we have a very determined chairman of this subcommittee. I have onlyone' thing and then I shall yield tO the `expert.' We have a pilot on my left here. On page 2, in paragraph 4, you state the figures of 131 killed. All of these were in reference to'the aborted takeoffs ? Mr. WEATHERLY. Yes, sir. Mr. ~ WATSON. After studying these particular accidents,' do you believe th~t the arresting equipment would have substantially re- duced or elim'im~ted the loss of lives in these accidents? Mr. WEATEIERLY. There is not a single one of those' in the presenta- `tion this'mo'rning whichwould not have been prevented in my opinion. The particular one you refer to of the 131 dead, this is the accident which had the people from Atlanta that were in that Boeing 707 that PAGENO="0331" 327 went right off the end of the runway through quite a bit of real estate' before it finally stopped. Mr. WATSON. I am not looking for any commissions from your company, but I want to see us push forward in this particular field. Mr. DEVINE. Would any substantial structural changes be necessary in the airframe to engineer in these hooks so that when they are ar- rested at a reasonably high rate of speed it would not pop all of the rivets and tear up the airframe ? Mr. WEATTIERLY. Yes, sir, there is engineering required. I will tell you about the 720 on which we put the tailhook. Part of our contract and program with the FAA was to put a tailhook on that 720. That installation iticluding the weight of the tailhook and the necessary plates hooked to the fuselage weighs 240 pounds which is the weight assigned to one passenger and minimum bag~age. So, there would not need to he an appreciable modification. That included the structural changes, the doubler plate that went on it. It is a matter of distributin~ the plate over a small contact surface. Mr. DEvINE. Would this apply to your DC-9, 707, and 880? Mr. WEATHERLY. It would be much lighter on the 880 and DC-8 and 707 would be in this order of maghitude. ~ These other smaller aircraft would be lighter and smaller. ~ Mr. DEVINE. Pretty soon we will be talking' about , 747's. Mr. WEATETERLY. It would be a little ` bit hard but we might be knocking ofF a passenger and a half or a passenger and three-quarters in weight for this. Mr. MAcBmm~. May I add something, Mr. Devine? Mr. Weatherly did not mention 727's and United Airlines has had the structure of the 727's in their fleet ~t~engtl~ened or had the capa- bility, the hard point designed into their models. Mr. WEATHERLY. For every aircraft delivered to their airlines. They already have this structure ready to' put a tailhook on. Mr. DEVINE. Do you mean Boeing changes the specs on United's 720's? Mr. MACBRIDE. Yes, sir. If we are talking about, a net arresting gear there are no structure changes. Any aircraft can take the arrest- merit by net. Mr. WEATHERLY. Our concern for recommending a net system when you look at this aspect is if we have a net system not only can we take our own transports but then those other transports that will be using our international airports in this country can then be saved from going off the end of the runway because we certainly cannot control whether these aircraft have tailhooks installed or not. Mr. DEVINE. Is a net type of device practical for a piston engine with propeller? Mr. WEATHERLY. The U.S. Navy has tested this particular equip- ment and were asked this by the press at the presentation of our test program last November and Mr. Walter Kaufman of the Naval' Air Engineering Center at Philadelphia answered with a very positive "affirmative." It will catch the propeller system. The result is the propeller cuts some of the vertical straps in the immediate vicinity of the propeller but we don't use those straps to cut the aircraft. PAGENO="0332" 328 We use the straps outboard of the aircraft which are against the wing surfaces at the time. Mr. FRIEDEL. What size aircraft are used in the net systems in the foreign air forces? Mr. WEATHERLY. What size net? Mr. FRIi~EL. Yes. Mr. WEATHERLY. For the military system the net is about 20 feet in height and usually extends beyond a runway 180 feet wide and 10 feet oneither side of the runway. In military aircraft at the present time they go up to some 65,000 or 1Q;000 pounds that I can imagine at th~ moment for the military nets. . There is already the large net which has already been built and it has been tested b~y Aerzur of Paris, a French corporation for the French Civil Air Ministry, so the scaling up of a structure certainly wouldnot presentany difficulty. Mr. FRIErEL. We hear a lot about 747's and I understand they weigh upward of over ~t00,000 pounds. Would the present nets handle that size aircraft? Mr. WI~ATHERLY. It is quite an economical structure. Three elements will handle the ~t0'T and DC-.8, which is in~ the 850,000-pound range. It is only a matter of adding additional elements which are all in~ stalled on the same ereoting equipment to then give the additional strength. For* the energy absorber on either side of the runway it is only a matter of increasing this by doubling the number of energy absorbers or sizes of it. It is a known art. Mr. FRIEEEIJ. I want to thank you, Mr. Weatheriy, and the gentle~ men with you. Our next witness will be Mr. W. F. Maready, from Winston-Salem. STAT~MF~T OP WILLIAM~ P. MABEADY, ATTORNEY, WINSTON. SALEM, N.C. Mr. MAREADY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a unique American privilege for a citizen to be invited by his Con- gress to give his views on the subject matter of proposed legislation. I ~am sincerely grateful for the opportunity. I am a practicing attorney who owns and pilots a private airplane and also uses the airlines from time to time. I do not represent any organization or interest. My presence here arises out of my concern as a citizen for safety in aviation both private and commercial. In spite of the fact that I ~ am from Winston-Salem, I have no (connection with Piedmont Airlines. My comments will deal primarily with the subject of collision avoidance. Following two very tragic midair collisions last year, much has been said and written on the subject. Much of this has been construc- five. A great deal of it has been uninformed, misleading and extreme. There has been a questionable tendency to look for blame and the search has resulted in colored judgments and opposing views which often go to the extreme. We have seen this reflected in the news media and in the views of those who represent special interests. / PAGENO="0333" 329 Thus, we have seen the users of our skies divided into `the two separate camps of conmiercial aviation and general aviation. This is a regrettable circumstance aiid overshadows the fact that we are all striving for what is best for the country. We should approach the problem in that spirit. It is patently obvious that both commercial aviation, with 2 percent of all aircraft, and general aviation, with 98 percent of all aircraft, make substantial contributions to the commerce and mobility of our Nation. It is also a fact, albeit unrecognized, that there is no appreciable difference in the fatality rates of private and commercial aircraft on a per-hour basis. Certainly, both interests must be recognized and the differences reconciled. In doing so, we must act with reason and with the interests of the American people as the ultimate consideration. With this preface, I would make the following observations: 1. It has bee~i proposed that private and commercial aircraft be segregated at our busiest airports. I would join in the spirit of this proposal but would alter ~t by proposing segregation based on the relative speeds of aircraft. It seems to me to be too clear for argument that a jet passenger liner with a cruise speed of 500 or 600 miles per hour has no business in the same traffic pattern with an aircraft with a cruising speed of 150 miles per hour or vice versa. I have no desire to be in either aircraft under such circumstances. Of course, where such segregation of traffic is effected, ample pro- vision must be made in the terminal area for all categories of aircraft. Of course, this would meet the `objection of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to the effect that private aviation should not be deprived of the use of airports because all such airports are built with tax dollars. No such segregation is either necessary or desirable at the vast majority of our airports `because the volume of traffic `at them allows for more spacing between the aircraft. 2. I would urge the Congress to undertake a crash program of installing radar facilities at all airports used by jet traffic, particularly passenger airlines. Unquestionably, radar is the most effective safety item in aviation today. Without it, the only anticollision method available, both to the jetliner and the Piper Cub-and it has been that way ever since `the Piper Cub-is the rule of seeing and being seen-a method limited to the capacities of the human eye. This is not adequate because we are involved in a situation where the capabilities of the machine far exceed the capabilities of man. To illustrate, on a headon collision course with a jet aircraft travel~ ing 600 miles per hour, a typical propeller-driven aircraft-and I am referring to my own-will close with it at the rate of 775 miles per hour or 1,137 feet per second. From 3 miles apart, `the closure will take about 14 seconds. If the two pilots are lucky enough to see each ot~her at' this distance, the chances are that their eyes will be unable to perceive the relittive position and course of each other until they are much closer together. By that time, the chances are that neither of them will be able to take effective evasive action. PAGENO="0334" 330 In the case of two jet aircraft meeting each other, the example becomes even more emphatic. It would be futile and meaningless to seek blame for the tragedy which might follow. It would be much more meaningful to consider that the real reason we have not had more such accidents is because of the tremendous mathematical improbability of two aircraft happening to occupy the same airspace ata given moment under a very big sky. . In so considering, we would have to conclude that such matheinatical improbabilities include a vastly remote but nevertheless very definite probability. Many jet liners are now bthng routed through airports which have n9 radar facilities. On a climb to altitude from such an airport the pilot is, to an appreciable extent, flying blind in that he is unable to :See aircraft which may be approaching from varftus vertical and horizontal angles and winch may be on a collision course with him. It is practically impossible for the pilot `to see an aircraft overhead and on a cruise course approaching at a high rate of speed from either the side or from the rear. As the two aircraft converge, their respective fields of vision change rapidly and while each pilot is able to see where he is going, he is unable to see the converging aircraft until an instant before collision. In considering this, we must remember that the pilot's cone of vision from the cockpit remains constant in relation to the airplane. The trouble is the airplane is moving constantly and at a very high rate of speed. This difficulty with vision on a climb-out applies not only to the airliner but it applies to my Bonanza and it applies to most other aircraft. Depending on the types of aircraft involved, the rate of closure under these circumstances can be up to around 1,000 miles per hour. I, therefore, respectfully submit that routing a jet liner into an airport without radar facilities may bear some resemblance to posi- tioning artillery near an airport and then at periodic times during the day and with closed eyes firing the artillery into the air. This is not an extreme comparison to make. The projectile from a howitzer will close on its target at the rate of `approximately 900 miles per hour. Thus, we are talking in terms of closure rates of two air- planes which compare to the closure rates of a howitzer and its target. We are also talking in terms of projectiles ; that is, airplanes, meeting each other which cannot see each other without radar facilities. Considerations like these should place the danger in proper perspec- tive. It seems to me that radar facilities for the use of such sophisti- cated machinery is not merely desirable-it is absolutely essential. 3. The absence of more balanced use of radar facilities may be ac- counted for by the fact that man developed the airplane thinking only in terms of its environment being open space. Our technicians have brought us to the point where electronic equip- ment can fly, navigate, and land an airplane with very little assistance from the pilot. While developing such technology, we have failed to think in terms of the fact that the open-space environment is no longer so open. We have now been alerted to this and we understand that anticol- lision devices are beingdeveloped. / PAGENO="0335" 331 The development of anticollision devices will repr~sent progress but we can easily be misled by the amount of progress which they will represent. The primary collision danger is at and near airpoits. At a busy airport, the aircraft are of necessity in close proximity to each other. Because of such close proximity and the limitations on the man flying the airplane, the value of an anticollision system is, therefore, mini- mized. ~ Apart from the specific action which can be taken to reduce collisions, it is my judgment that holders of pilot certificates should be required to renew them periodically. For reasons which are apparent, this is required in most States in the case of a license to operate an automobile. A pilot's certificate is now issued for life, subject only to passing a periodic medical examination. The same considerations which made this advisable in the case of. an automobile are multiplied many times over in the case of an airplane. The Federal Aviation Agency recently has proposed that certain areas of the country be designated as high-density traffic areas, All the aircraft entering such areas would be under positive control and the pilot be required to follow instrument flight niles. I take this to mean that the pilot would have to hold an. in~trument ticket or instrument rating when entering such an area. I agree with the philosophy behind the proposal but I disagree with the requirement that the pilot be required to hold the IFIR ticket. There are hundreds of pilots-and perhaps I should have said thou- sands-who hold a private license and who are safety conscious to the point that they do not desire to get an instrument ticket simply because it would permit them to fly legally in adverse weather conditions. These are pilots who are qualified to get the rating but do not want the problem of temptation when weather conditions make flying much more hazardous. It does not seem that a requirement that all pilots obtain an instrm- ment rating in order to fly in certain parts of our country would pr'o~ mote the cause of safety. It has been and honor and pleasure to appear before you today. Gentlemen, that completes my remarks. As I say, I do not profess to be the expert. These are the views of a layman. Mr. FRIEDEL. I want to thank you for your very fine statement and the spirit of your testimony. I do not have any questions. Mr. DEVINE. I have a couple of questions. I would first like to correct the record. My colleague from South Carolina indicated I am a pilot. I am not a pilot, although I am in the air a good bit of the time. I would like to compliment you for presenting your views in this matter as an attorney-pilot. On page 3 of your statement you say you would urge the instal- lation of radar facilities at all airports used by jet traffic particularly passenger airliners. Are there a great number of airport~s that do service jet passenger aircraft that do not have radar at the present time? PAGENO="0336" 332 Mr. MAR]~ADY. It is my information there are, Mr. Congressman. Asheville, N.C., did not have radar. There are a number of smaller airports being served by feeder lines that do not have radar. Mr. ThwiNE. They doservice jet passenger aircraft? Mr. MAi~nr. Yes, sir. Mr. DIWINE. I would be interested in knowing from the Federal Aviation Agency the number of airports that do service the jet pas- senger traffic without radar equipment. Mr. FRIEDEL. I understand in oiie of our previous hearings it was brought out there are quite a few airports that donot have radar and we are trying to get. them to speed up the installation of radar equip- tnent that ha~ve ~mmercialje~tpasseiiger service. ~ ~ Mr. DEviNE. Mr. Maready, toward the bottpm o:1~ page ~ of your statement,yoti ~y the primary collision daflger ia at arid itear airports. ~ i: am reminded of the one at Hendersonvilie, N.C., and Urbana, Ohio. These were not in the immediate proximity of the airport ; is tl:La)t not correct ? I ~ Mr. M~utEADr. The accident in Asheville occurred, as I understand it, iinmediateiy~ after the jetliner made its left turn out of the traffic pattern. This was some miles from the airport . however, within what would have been radar range of the airport, and, of course, within just a minute or so from takeoff. Mr. DEviNE. The only other one I recall offhand in the immediate proximity of the airport was the United-TWA crash over Brooklyn as they were approaching Idlewild but I think mid-air collisions gen- erally occur in noncongested areas, do they not? Mr. MAREADY. They certainly do and the one over the Grand Can- yon was such a situation. However, as I understand the Urbana col- lision, the airliner was in the let-down stages of its flight. Mr. DEVINE. Again, thank you for takmg the time to appear before our committee. I think your testimony is quite valuable. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you, Mr. Maready. Our next witness who will be the final witness for today is Mr. Wil- 11am A. Jennings, director of aviation safety, Airline Passengers Asso- ciation. He comes all the way from Burlingame, Calif. Mr. Jennings, we welcome you to the committee. STATEMENT 01' WILLIAM A. J~ENRINGS, DIRECTOR OP AVIATION SAFETY, AIRLINE PASSENGERS ASSOCIATION Mr. JENNINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall give a brief background of the Airline Passengers Association. The Airline Passengers Association-APA-has a membership of approximately 12,000, the majority of which is composed of profes- sionals and business executives. The beginning of the APA can be traced back to July 1960. It has been the consistent policy of the association to speak up on matters dealing with aviation safety. GENERAL POLICY At the outset, it is important that the general policy of the APA be known. The association takes the position that there is no legitithate justification for compromising aviation safety. / PAGENO="0337" 333 Much is heard about the cost of modifying present day aircraft and designing future aircraft so that the degree of safety of their opera- tion will be improved. Particularly this is heard in regard to improv- ing the crashworthiness or survivability characteristics of present day aircraft. Air carriers, airframe and component manufacturers, and airport operators should not be heard to complain that such improvements will be costly, for it is the passenger who ultimately will bear the economic burden of these beneficial changes, either in the form of tickets or taxes. The APA believes that every aspect of airline operation should be directed to obtaining the ultimate in safety for the passengers, par- ticularly wheu the compromise of safety might result in short term economic gain by reason of load factor or other cost of operation. The stress for maximum utilization of cabin interiors for optimum passenger seating is an example where economic interests must be balanced by the primary responsibility for passenger safety in the event of an evacuation. The Government has recently taken the first of many important ~teps to insure that evacuation considerations will be implemented by manufacturers and air carriers. Much more remains to be done. Where safety results in reductions in efficiency and economy, it simply means a re1~tive increase in the cost of operation, the economic burden of which will utilimately be borne by the passenger. It must be realized that safety is no accident. To assure that the passenger will arrive alive will require the coordinated efforts of Government, industry, and the flying public. LETHAL THREATS POSED TO PASSENGERS BY TOXIC CABIN MATEBIALS In the past 6 years, 174 passengers have perished in accidents which the Federal Aviation Agency Administration calls "survivable". The APA feels that one of the factors that has contributed to this high death rate in survivable accidents is the fact that most `modern air- liners can be lethal gas chambers when afire. The aviation industry has been aware for some years that the materials contained in corn- mercial airline cabins release toxic gases upon thermal decomposition. It has been relatively recent that the exact nature and quantities of these gases has been made known. Hydrogen cyanide, which is used in California and other States in their prison gas chambers, is generated in large quantities by the burning of certain acrylic materials com- monly found in rugs, seats and other interior appointments. `Tests run in mid-1966 by the Airline Pilots Association, together with supporting airline organizations, showed concentrations of hydro- gen cyanide of at least 50 times the lethal level. The National Bureau of Standards pinpointed some of the substances which contained high hydrogen cyanide concentrations. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, which does studies of victims of air disasters for the National Transportation Safety Board, admitted that hydrogen cyanide was present ill the tests run on the bodies of the three astronauts whO were the victims of the Apollo dis- aster at Cape Kennedy. Tests for hydrogen cyanide and other toxic substances have not been routinely run on these victims of aviation disasters. 92-715-68----- PAGENO="0338" 334 The Cleveland aircraft fire tests established that the life of a pas- senger may be endangered by the presence of these toxic fumes even during the 90-second escape period recently established by the Federal Aviation Administration. In addition to hydrogen cyanide other gases that the passenger in a burning airliner faces are hydrogen chloride, phosgene, carbon mon- oxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen fluoride and nitric oxide, which are also released from the materials used in the cabin interior. This toxic environment can dehabilitate or take the life of a pas- senger rendering him incapable of following the established evacua- tion procedures. The Cleveland fire tests showed that there would be an extended period of time well beyond normal evacuation times during which the temperatures of the cabin environment would not reach incapacitating levels. On October 24, 1968, new standards are being put into effect by the Federal Aviation Administration concerning the cabin interior ma- terials. These standards only concern flameproof criteria and do not take into consideration the problem of toxic gases. The APA feels that there will be continuing threats to the safety of all aboard com- mercial aircraft until a requirement is established for nontoxic materials. The APA is sufficiently concerned about this problem to air travelers that it has undertaken a special investigation at its own expense of the status of Air Force One, the aircraft in which the President and other dignitaries regularly fly. The results of the analysis of the interior materials of Air Force One will be released as soon as they are made available, hopefully by the conclusion of these hearings. We hope to discover whether the red carpet treatment afforded these officials is not a potentially lethal one. We have taken the liberty of attaching a bibliography to this state- ment which, we feel, is a good summary of the literature on these problems. (Bibliography referred to follows:) BIBLIOGRAPHY COMPILED BY THE AIRLINE PASSENGERS ASSOCIATION "Post Orash Survival Oonsiderations", Bernard 0. Doyle and John J. Carroll, Air Transport and Space Meeting, April, 1964. "Human Factor of Emergency Evacuation", Stanley B. Mohier, John J. Swearingen, Ernest B. McFadden and J. D. Garner, Air Transport and Space Meeting, April, 1964. "Discussion of the Post-Crash Fire Problem", Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), December, 1962. "Structural Design for Fuel Containment Under Survivable Crash Conditions", P. M. Nissley, General Dynamic's/Convair, AD 609 615, August, 1964. "Feasibility Study of Turbine Fuel Gels for Reduction of Crash Fire Hazards- Final Report", Ken Posey, Jr., The Western Company Research Division, February, 1966. "Synthesis of Aircraft (Crash) Fire Rescue, and Evacuation Technology", H.G.C. Henneberger, Aviation Safety Engineering and Research, July, 1964. "A Study of the Flammability of Magnesium", Paul Boris, Systems Research and Development Service, FAA, April, 1964. "Principles for Improving Structural Crash Worthiness for STOL and CTOL Aircraft", William H. Reed, et al, U.S. Army Aviation Materiel Laboratories, June, 1966. PAGENO="0339" 335 "Design, Development, and Evaluation of a Crash-Resistant Fuel System In- stallation", W. Buckson, et al, All American Engineering Company, U.S. Department of Commerce, December, 1965. "Crashworthy Design Principles", D. L. Greer, FAA, September, 1964. "Flammability and Smoke Characteristics of Aircraft Interio~r Materials", John P. March, E. B. Nicholas, J. B. Demaree, U.S. Department of Commerce, January, 1964. "Protective Passenger Smoke Hood" 39 Aerospace Medicine 177, February 1968. "Joy Ride in the Sky : Safety Takes Back Seat", George B. Parker, Institute of Aerospace Safety and Management, University of Southern California, Trial Magazine, August-September, 1967. "A Study of Air Transport Passenger Cabin Fires and Materials", John F. Marcy, National Aviation Facilities, Experimental Center, December, 1965 ( U. S. Department of Commerce). "Some Properties of Flameproof Fabrics", Marjorie Sandhozer, National Bureau of Standards, American Dyestuff Reporter, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 37-41, 1/26/59. "Thermal Decomposition Products and Burning Characteristics of Some Syn- thetic Low-Density Cellular Materials", Bureau of Mines Report No. 4777. "Evaluation of Interior Materials for the 707 Airplane", Boeing Aircraft Co.,~ Document No. D6-1084, 1957. "Cabin Fire Incident and Investigation TWA Boeing 707-131, Plane 7739", Trans World Airlines, Inc. Engineering Report No. 1203. "Flight Fatalities Studied," by William J. Reals and Richard B. Danielson, Journal of The Kansas Medical Society, August 1963, pp. 354-357. Mr. JENNINGS. The recent "skyjacking" experienced by National and Delta Airlines again emphasizes the need for effective steps to prevent such occurrences and to minimize the risk to passengers when a berserk passenger creates an en route flight emergency. President Kennedy and former Director of the Federal Aviation Administration, N. E. Halaby, proposed special regulations, some of which were adopted. The APA feels the following additional steps should be taken to insure greater security of aircraft. 1. A special transponder code should be set up to notify air traffic control facilities that the particular aircraft is undergoing a skyjack- ing operation. This would not require the use of radio communications but would be a signal receivable by Federal Aviation Administration ground radar facilities. 2. Uniform standards for training and arming of flightcrews should be established. At present, some airlines permit side arms at the pilot's option. Apparently no airlines pay for or provide for train- ing in the use of such side arms. 3. A uniform standard should be adopted for devices allowing the flight crew to observe the passenger compartment through a one-way mirror or peephole. Use of such a device should be mandatorily re- quired before the flight engineer or other crewmember opens the door. Doors should be bulletproofed with openings for a pistol from the cockpit side like an armored car. At present, some flightcrews do not look before opening when a knock on the door occurs which presumably is a stewardess. 4. Uniform radio code signals or code words should be adopted to notify persons on the ground in contact with the aircraft by radio in- dicating a skyjacking is occurring. 5. Training should be given to flightcrews using hypothetical sky- jacking situations such as a stewardess or passenger hostage. 6. Dehabilitating weapons such as some gases currently used in riot control and other military chemical agents can incapacitate an assail- PAGENO="0340" * 336 ant without the risk of gunfire. Such a device might be installed adjacent to the cockpit door for release rendering a potential cockpit intruder harmless without the risk of gunfire. The past skyjackings have resulted in injury to thghtcrews and in at least one instance possibly resulted in the death of 43 people. The costs involved in protective or educational programs for install~ ing neceesary devices is minimal. The APA highly urgee that this reoccurring problem be given im- mediate attention. Mr. FRIEDEL. If a man wants to skyjack a plane and he puth a gun at the stewardess' head and he seizes the pilot, would the pilot let him shoot the stewardess or open the door and let him in? . Mr. J]~NNINGS. Every situation has to be judged on its own facts. But at the present time we don't know of any training being given flighterews in such hypothetical situations. Some criteria of good judgment is needed. It is important that the captain exercise the best judgment possible for the safety of his air- craft. We think this should be skulled around and discussed with various alternatives. Our recommendation No. 6 does give a possible answer for the man who has gotten a stewardess or a passenger as a hostage in such a situation. In the recent Delta Airlines situation, the stewardess was coming up apparently with some coffee or something for the fiightcrew, gave a rap on the door and the door was immediately opened. The skyjacker was seated in the first-class cabin up front. He then took this oppor- tunity when she had this tray and she opened the door with her foot and he went right in behind her. At the present time, even those airlines that have peephole devices aboard their aircraft in discussing it with fii~htcrews, generally what occurs when the rap comes on the door, the flight engineer is seated at his position which is behind the first officer, he reaches over and opens the door. It is a rare occurrence when that flight engineer goes up to the peep- hole to identify. That could be potentially almost any person. We think it should be mandatory that the flightcrew identify the person at the door before opening the door. Large one-way mirrors may be more useful. The next potential idea for reducing such a risk would be a dehabili- tating weapon, one that would not necessarily kill but would at least incapacitate without too much danger the person who is the assailant at the cockpit door. A double-door entry could make an enclosed space for this purpose. We talked about toxic gases in airplanes that could be a danger. This might be one that would be a solution that would dehabilitate the potential intruder. The use of gunfire aboard aircraft, of course,. presents a potential hazard. We have checked reports of the major airframe manufacturers and a random bullet penetrating the skin of a fuselage of a jet at altitudes where you might worry about rapid loss of pressure ap- parently will not affect the structure of the aircraft and will not cause any major accident if a gun goes off. PAGENO="0341" 337 We feel the number of lives taken in the past by this activity, together with the fact that apparently Castro would like to build his own air force out of the airlines that are being operated today by keeping the aircraft that get to Cuba, we think it is a problem that should be given renewed attention. Mr. FRIEDEL. I want to thank you, Mr. Jennings, for your statement. You have a lot of good suggestions. I should like to stress one thing I heard on the radio this morning where the FAA does not have any regulations but they allow people to take the border patrol school course and have a kit and tear gas and a pistol. I am wondering, with all of these things, if a gun is at a stewardess' head, what should thepilot do-jeopardize all of the other passengers~ The man knows if he is brought back alive he is subject to the death penalty under the act we passed so he would not care if he loses 100 of them. Some planes do have armed men up front, Mr. JENNINGS. They may have reinstituted that practice, begun in 1961. I think we should train these crews in the various alternatives; give them some situations and perhaps test their judgment because their judgment is going to be involved. Crews dese~rve to not be totally at the mercy of the hijacker. Mr. FRIEDEL. This committee went to the FAA installation at Ok- lahoma City. It is very impressive and I want to assure you that the FAA is trying to find out all it can concerning toxic fumes and heat. In the report of our committee, page 2, members of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics in October 1967 saw a demonstra- tion of an experimental smoke and fire protective hood where the wearer could be subjected to intense flame without injury. We saw them get into the water and inflate little tanks-people could survive. There are a lot of worthwhile things that are going on in the FAA that the public does not know offhand. I wish everyone could have a chance to get out to the installations at Atlantic City and Oklahoma City. I am very proud of what the FAA is doing on research in safety. Mr. PIoKL~. Mr. Jennings, I was not here to hear all of your testi- mony and I am wondering if your testimony covered this question Ihave. You say a bullet penetrating the skin of an airplane would not cause any structural damage. What would a bullet do with respect to pres- surization within a plane? Mr. JENNINGS. I would assume it would cause a decompression. The laws of physics would take care of that. Mr. P1CKLJ~. I don't want to be misunderstood, but say you assume it would cause depressurization. I assume that to be true, but how severe would it be? Would it instantly collapse the people in the cabin? Mr. JENNINGS. There have been a number of decompressions in miIi~ tary and civilian aircraft. At the present altitudes most of our general aircraft operate 24,000 to 39,000 feet, the decompression does not result generally in injury. If there are loose objects and there is a large hole, it will suck things out that way but generally it causes a large bang, then there is a cloud that forms in the cabin, a cloud of moisture condensation. PAGENO="0342" 338 The breath is then exhaled out of the occupants and they must use other available oxygen. There was one decompression that was kind of interesting on human reactions that one of the major carriers had where they had a decompression of 103 passengers aboard. When the oxygen masks came down that they always demonstrated when you get aboard the flight, out of the 103 passengers there were only three who understood the instructions or were aivare of what to do. The others were not injured because they made a rapid descent to where other oxygen was available. Mr. PICKLE. You say then a bullet~ fired in the air which punctured the skin of the frame would cause no more damage than the normal loss of air pressure? Mr. JENNINGS. From what I understand, and this question was asked by the Air Line Pilots Association about 1963 of Lockheed and Douglas, and perhaps Boeing as well, and their engineers felt it would not cause- Mr. PICKLE. What would you expect to happen if a bullet hit a fuel line or a fuel tank or any part of the electrical circuit? Mr. JENNINGS. We know what happens when a red-hot turbine blade hit a kerosene fuel tank in San Francisco. Captain Hines was the captain who brought the airplane in with abouthaif of one wing gone. They said it couldn't fly but he flew it anyway and he landed it at Travis. It caused an explosion which blew a portion of the wing off, so per- haps a bullet would do the same thing. Mr. PICKLE. Do you say if a bullet hit the fuel line it might not blow up the plane? Mr. JENNINGS. I really couldn't answer your question, Mr. Pickle. .~, Mr. PIoKt~ With respect to skyjacking, I like your idea of putting transponders in the plane. Mr. JENNINGS. They are in there already. Mr. PIcKu~. This is action that would report what was taking place. How can we prevent the skyjacking? Do you have a specific recommendation in your testimony as to how that can be done? Mr. JENNINGS. I don't see where there is any means at all to prevent a berserk passenger from getting on the aircraft. The only thing is remedial steps you can take once he is on the plane. Mr. PIOKLE. We are reaching the point where this is more than an emergencymatter. We have to find some kind of answer to protect both the pilot and the passengers. If this means penal action, if we could ever get our hands on them, I think that is required. Perhaps we ought to cancel their citizenship, seek out extradition papers if we have relations with a country and if we don't serve notice that if that man ever comes back he will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Mr. JENNINGS. I think the pattern has pretty much developed, those people involved in skyjacking are very desperate. They sometimes ap- pear to be under drugs. As Mr. Friedel said, they are under potential death penalty under the present law and I don't think you could draw / PAGENO="0343" 339 and quarter them and cut them into little pieces-you are not going to discourage their getting on an aircraft. Mr. PICKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Devine? Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Jennings, I might point out to you the members of this subcommittee made a trip last fall to Oklahoma City and witnessed tests on toxic materials from cabins of particular aircraft. I think literally millions of dollars are being spent in research in this area, not only by the FAA. but also by United Airlines and other certificated carriers who are vitally concerned with safety and sur- vivability of passengers. Getting to your skyjacking recommendations, I think that there might be some resistance relative to suggestion No. 2 and suggestion No. 6 because I doubt very much whether even the Air Line Pilots Association will want a bunch of two-gun jockies up front carrying guns. They are not charged with the responsibility of guarding the air- craft against pirates and invaders, and we may create more problems than we would solve if we indeed trained pilots who have the primary responsibility for the safety of the aircraft. Particularly the dehabili- tating type of weapons that have been used, of course, by police in some types of riot situations. However, they have run into situations where the user has also been the victim and if he would use some type of `dehabilitating gas that blows back on the pilot and copilot, someone still has t~ fly the plane. I think we will have to weigh thoroughly the possibility of arming the crew of aircraft to prevent skyjacking. Mr. JENNINGS. I might mention within the state of the art as far as bullet proofing material is concerned, there are presently available and have been for a number of years lightweight armor that could be used for bulkhead or cockpit doors that would prevent any shots being fired from a person on the outside who couldn't perhaps get in but wanted to shoot it out. That is available now but it is not being used and there is no established requirement for it. Mr. FRIEDEL. Thank you. The hearing is now adjourned and we will meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. (Whereupon, at 11 :45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m. Wednesday, March 27, 1968.) PAGENO="0344" PAGENO="0345" AVIATION SAFETY WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1968 HousE or REPR1~SENTATIVES, StJBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERONAUTIOS~ COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FcrniaGN COMMERCE, . Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Samuel N. Friedel (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FRIEDEL. The subcommittee will please be in order. Today the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics will continue public hearings on aviation safety. I believe that we have only three or four witnesses scheduled and I expect that we can conclude this series of hearings today. Our first witness this morning is Mr. F. Lee Bailey, acting executive director, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization. Mr. Bailey, you may proceed. STATEMENT OP P. LEE BAILEY, ACTING EXEGUTIVE DIREOTOR, PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ORGANIZATION Mr. BAILEY. Good morning, sir. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, on which I should like to give a brief background because it is a new organiza- tion, was formed as a result of the feeling of certain controllers in the New York area which has unique problems because of its operation of three major airports within a very small area ; that a new organi- zation was needed because the system of air traffic control at least from the controllers view was rapidly falling behind the demand placed upon it and approaching a critical condition. They requested that I act as general counsel in forming an organi- zation, not just in that area but across the Nation, and to promote their aims. Since January when the organization held its first meeting in New York, we have visited about 12 of the major facilities across the country. The membership is now at 4,000 and is growing very rapidly. The controllers have pretty well reduced their major problems to a state where. we can describe them with some degree of accuracy. The basic problem and I know this has been said in other ways but I think strictly from a controller's point of view is that the job of the air traffic controller has shifted much more rapidly than he has been able to keep pace with that shift. (341) PAGENO="0346" 342 That is to say, whereas 10 years ago an air traffic controller was more of an adviser who received reports from pilots and then advised other pilots as to the reports he was receiving, he is now a man who accomplishes positive control through electronic aids and is in control of the airplane most of the time. The pilot must accomplish the landing and spend hours in between those events cruising at an altitude where there is relatively little to do. In that circumstance, he is not under continuing pressure. I might say, in addition to representing these gentlemen, I will speak with one hat for general aviation, since I own a flight operation, including a school and a charter service, and with one hat for the professional pilots point of view, including the airlines and business jets and larger business planes since I own one of those and I am rated to ~fly it. The controller being under continuous pressure as he is often called upon to perform tasks which we think are beyond his capability because of constant overlOad of the system which promises to go up as rapidly as it has in the past few years in the next few years. The controller is very often handling more traffic on his scope than he can safely handle, and he is fearful this will not come to gener~il attention except by such events as the Grand Canyon incident md other events which immediately commanded a great deal of attention. ~ ~ First of all, there is a lack of adequate and competent personnel. Air traffic control work is no longer attractive to young men. This is a special breed of young men, we feel. He is a man whose decisions must be very very rapid, much of the time more rapid than the pilots in the cockpits. ~ He must not make any mistakes. He must carry a tremendous amount of information in his head because the radar that we have at many of our facilities is not adequate and it is not as good as could be provided. I notice from earlier hearings that no requests, or substantial requests, for improvement in the radar systems have been made. There is . equipment which can take a tremendous load off the controller. As it is now, he may have to remember the identities, airspeed, general headings, and altitudes of 30 or 40 targets. I rather doubt that a human being can do this for a long period of time, as controllers are now required to do, without suffering some impairment in efficiency. There is equipment which can print out this information so he can direct his attention to other matters. It is operating in some areas, asyou know. We think it could be installed on a much wider basis and at least those airplanes which are in the professional category could be required to have the equipment which would report in as I have described. In addition to that2 because of the vast shortage of personnel and I think that this is critical and that the agency will probably concur, the controllers are now working mandatory 6-day weeks in some areas, while pilots are limited by law to 100 hours a month. That being the limit, the agency feels, at which one can maintain top-level efficiency to manage an airplane. Controllers are working three and four times that amount. I rather think that the exigencies of ii PAGENO="0347" 343 their job couM be demonstrated physiologically and psychologically as great, if not greater than, the exigencies of the cockpit. In any event, because of that these men are burning out and I shall say by age 40 most of them feel they are becoming too brittle to handle the frontline jobs at the high-density areas because of the pressures day after day. There should be some study made and effective limitation placed upon the number of hours a controller is alilowed to work by law. I shall report just as an example, just very recently as I flew into St. Louis to pick up some controllers to take them to Florida, I was told a man named Tyson, 32 years old, died of a heart attack. He had just had a physical and was told he was in excellent health. Statistically, as you may know, heart attacks with people of this age-and I will be sensitive about it since I am not much beyond that-are very uncommon. ~ The warm bodies that are being herded in to fill the empty spaces in air traffic control, simply because qualified personnel cannot be had, requiring the overtime, are going to put the Nation in serious trouble when they graduate to the frontline and the controllers who are now just barely meeting the stress of the system are either retired or gone for some other reason. The controllers who formed this organization and who lead it state very frankly that people are now being pushed up through the ranks who do not have the necessary speed or independence of judgment to perform this very delicate task. They are being carried simply be- cause there is no convenient or practical way for controllers to wash one another out. We think, therefore, a system of checking such as is used on professional pilots is appropriate to the business of air traffic control. That is to say, if one were to bring a frontline controller, a highly qualified man from one facility to another to run periodic checks on the individual controllers operating in their positions and to flunk them if they can't handle it before they demonstrate their incompetence by smashing two airplanes together, that a substantial burden would be taken from those who are now carrying people who cannot carry the responsibility. The air traffic controller, in our judgment, is a man who should know much more about the business of flying than he now does. There is a story that is often pushed around that an air traffic con- troller is by and large a pilot. I do not believe this is so. A few are; many, many are not. I noticed from reading the report of the testimony of another wit- ness in the Chicago area some controllers said they would not fly be- cause they could see on their radar what the inherent dangers are. I don't think this is so and I think in the future the Government is going to have to require the air traffic controller to be a person who received formal education in the business of air traffic control at a university and I understand some of these are under study but none are available, that he be at least a private pilot with an instrument rating and more important, that he periodically spend time in the air. I have suggested that the air traffic controller is many times flying the airplane and I think this can be suitably demonstrated by de- scribing a typical flight. PAGENO="0348" 344 j make them every day averaging i,ooo miles a day or better, most of the time in the cockpit. From the moment we light the engines we have almost no decisions to make. We are told in what direction to take off, what headings to follow, at what altitude to fly, and then at a comfortable altitude we are then told to hold that altitude. We depend on these controllers when we are in the soup, so to speak. We are powerless to do anything about where other aircraft are. A more dangerous position results when there is possible obscura-. tion. When we are under positive control but flying through clear air where other aircraft are not, we have the dual responsibility of carrying the controller's commands absolutely and at the same time being on the lookout for a noncontrolled aircraft which may be in the area and over which he exercises no jurisdiction, indeed, with which he is probably not in contact. The heart of this system is today, and always will be, in our judg- ment, the individual at the radar scope. If there is trouble, the rapidity with which he can provide a solu- tion to a pilot who can do no more than follow his commands because even though he has an emergency he can't tell who he is going to hit if he heads directly toward the runway. The other day, in coming into La Guardia when the weather was bad and we were in ~a stack of airliners, five light airplanes were lost over an overcast, four were recovered, one was landed at La Guardia by an air traffic controller who talked him down. I listened to this entire procedure and the pilot was not instrument- rated. Fortunately, the man at the other end of the microphone could see into that cockpit from his own experience and dictate, moment by moment, just hbw the controls should be moved to put the airplane on the ground. The FAA has limited to a large extent-and our quarrel is not basi- cally with the agency but we think this is a bad mistake in approach- the FAA has limited the extent to which a controller may fly. They may have imposed the following restrictions although there' is a program called SF-160 which permits controllers to ride in airliner cockpits in the jump seat where they can observe what is `going on in- side the cockpit, the redtape involved, and the restrictions imposed usually limiting a controller to one flight per airline per year at his terminal discourages controllers from putting the time in the air. ` I have talked with the airlines' and many airline pilots and they would be delighted to have controllers aboard any time they would come but they are sharply inhibited from coming. Mr~ FRIEDEL. What regulation is that? Mr. BAILEY. The Agency has imposed that limitation. In addition, the Agency has'imposed, if an off-duty controller wants' to fly, he may notfly for hire, ~iveinstruction Or tak~ chaTterflights. Our position is that every moment an air traffic controller spends in the air makes him' a better and more valuable controller because, as he gives his order, he can see what is happening, he can appteciate what confronts the pilot when he is asked to reduce to the given air speed which is near the stalling speed. When the pilot declares an emergency `he can cooperate more closely with him in getting that airplane on the ground more safely. PAGENO="0349" A burnt-out air traffic controller is not a likely prospect for any other kind of job. He is one of the most highly trained and skilled specialists in the narrow field that our society promotes today. On the other hand, if at age 40 he is no longer suitable to run a high-density scope or the "boards" as they are called in the profession of air traffic control jargon, if he had both flight experience and the appropriate ratings, he would be a most valuable pilot. A~s an employer who employs nine pilots and runs various opera- tions, I would be very quick to hire such men more so than some who are ignorant of air traffic. We think some required education of the pilots about what the front- line of traffic is all about should be mandatory in the ratings. I will not give a commercial license to anyone who takes an instru- ment rating although the Agency permits this. We will not give a license to anyone until they have been in the towers and observed the operations. We think a pilot ought to know what loads he imposes when he comes into a high-density area and asks for a sudden clearance. We feel he should know what happens in those IFR rooms when he declares a priority and asks to be landed immediately. Just as con- trollers must spend more time in cockpits, we think the law should require that pilots spend more time in air traffic control. Whereas there used to be a domination by the pilot in an advisory capacity by the controller, there is in fact a partnership in all con- trolled aircraft. We take nothing from any of the pilots. Indeed, I think that that is a highly skilled profession and must continue to be so. On the other hand, there is no way to move an airplane, at least a big one, in the United States today without a successful partnership be- tween an air traffic controller and a professional pilot at the controls. Unlike the pilot, the controller has no copilot. If he makes a mistake it probably won't be picked up in time. Unless the personnel shortage, which is the most critical problem, is alleviated, the controllers have two decisions. They can either permit the increase in traffic to further overstress the system until collisions began to occur and people are willing to pay great attention or they can exercise their responsibilities to absolutely refuse to take that additional traffic into existing facilities and thus curb the annual increase. Their feeling is that judgments as to where the limits of safety may be are daily judgments in a rapidly expanding system and it is their responsibility to make those judgments and to live with them, not the responsibility of those higher up or further out in the Agency who are not familiar with any individual scope on any given day. For that reason, in the exercise of their responsibilities, they take the position that they should and. will in areas where the operation is really existing only on the resilience of an able young man who is able to operate overstressed for long periods of time but should not be doing so, but when he finds he is losing some of his targets or that near misses are occurring, he should at that time refuse to take another handofF until his radarscope is in control. I should like to see exhibited before this committee a videotape with an audiotape of air traffic controllers operating a radarscope or operat- 1 345 PAGENO="0350" 346 ing from the tower at something like O'Hare, where an airplane is taking off every 17 seconds and I understand that record was set the other day. There is what is called the slowdowil. These are thought to be demon- strations by the controllers who have long been frustrated about their positions and crying for some kind of help. However, it is ironic to note that a slowdown is no more than obey- ance to the regulations. If the r~gu1ations were to be enforced at Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York today ; if the separation supposedly required were to be enforced, the air traffic into each of those areas would be dropped sub- stantially as a matter of physical limitation on any day where a bad day rec~juired the controllers to bring every airplane in and out of those airports. If the controllers' position and status can be improved to the point where young people capable of doing this kind of work are willing to do it, and are willing to go into air traffic control so that the conscrip- tion now being conducted is not necessary-and I may say even that is not adequate to fill the ranks-then better equipment must be obtained, a little more realistic approach given by those who are in the business of constructing airports without bothering to find out whether the air- port is operable. As a recent example, various city fathers in New York and New Jersey are having great dissertations on whether they should place an airport in Morristown or Saulberg or elsewhere. They are not mindful of the fact that there is no air left in New York to bring additional planes to that area. In addition to that, New York cannot stand a further increase in traffic. It is handling all it can handle now without crossing the lines of safety. Unless an airport is activated from the present holocaust north of the Kennedy and La Guardia Airports it is not going to be operable. The failure to provide a guide slope path at 150 and 190 knots and anything built today can fly at those speeds but most aircraft cannot fly at both. Unless this method is used much concrete, money, and time is being wasted. An air traffic controller cannot be made overnight. Now they are reaching the front line iii something like 4 years. This is probably the result of need rather than qualification in many areas. We could not provide an adequate number of air traffic con- troller~ if we were given unlimited funds and the willingness of every qualified person in the United States in order to meet the current de- mand in less than 2 or 3 years, and that would take some optimism. Therefore, the position of the controllers is largely this : that the system is operating today, and', as you know, it is not in a state of panic and we do get, by and large, airplanes in and out of major terminals. On the other hand, it is necessary that everybody approaching New York, the Kennedy Airport, must anticipate a 1-hour delay on the average when the weather is bad. The average over a period of a year is 20 minutes at Kennedy. I believe it is the highest in the country and that is average again on good days where all aircraft land on schedule. PAGENO="0351" 347 This is simply a limitation in the system. The controllers have gone as far as they can without running a substantial risk of collisions in order to even go this far. Even where the collisions do occur, they are not the fault of con- trollers ; it is because they lack the proper equipment and because they are too busy to afford advice to airplanes that are on the way to their way of making a mistake. Let me cite an example. Some time ago Eastern Air Lines in a Con- stellation collided with a TWA-I believe it was a 707 or a 720-over New York or upstate Connecticut. It appears from the investigation that one of the airplanes was off altitude by 1 ,000 feet. If the printout ~ information which is available now-whether or not it was then, I do not say-if it had been in operation the controller would have instantly noticed two targets converging which he assumed had altitude separation, both reporting the same altitude, advised one of the pilots or both of them, and that accident would not have occurred. If he had not been as busy as he was at the moment and had had the time to constantly recheck the pilots, because when he sees two blips converging he has no way of knowing whether there is any separation there from what he can see. He relies wholly on the pilot. If he had time to recheck that it was on collision course and doublecheck the altitude, that accident would not have occurred. We do not know how many chalked up to pilot error could be avoided if the air traffic control system was adequate to meet its needs. If it is adequate it is just barely adequate in some places. It will not be adequate tomorrow. The anticipated' sophistication of equipment will not be accommodated by our present facilities. We have a saying in flying that when it comes to checking out pilots "you are either ahead of an airplane when you fly it or you are be- hind it." There is no such thing as being even with the airplane. I think the same thing is true of air traffic control. Unless they are able to stay ahead of what they are doing, to be constantly anticipating every move required of an aircraft or another, then they are behind the sys- tem because they can i~ever be even with it. Controllers now I might say, who are required to work overtime are unenthused about doing so because they are paid less for their over- time than they are paid for their normal working hours. Many controllers are on tranquilizers because of the stress of the job. Some of them have reported in and have been temporarily relieved of duty until their nerves have been repaired. Because of shortages, controllers sometimes sit 3, 4, and 6 hours without a break at a position continually handing off and receiving aircraft and maintaining overloaded scopes. All of this, we think, is destined for some difficulty. There is a duty on the part of these gentlemen before that becomes imminent to bring it to the attention of those who can do something about it. In my judgment, after evaluating the problem, after talking to the airlines, with general aviation, with probably more controllers than any other human being has visited in the last 3 months, with the FAA, PAGENO="0352" 348 the Air Transport Association, I believe that the remedy for this situ- ation is not within the Agency. I believe that the remedy involves a much broader step, in essence, a scrapping of the present system and the creation of a new system in- sofar as the individual controller is concerned. We anticipate presenting to the Congress I should say within a time-I have in mind the fact that this very rapidly growing orga- nization is trying to accomplish in 6 months what would ordinarily and properly take 2 years-some kind of legislation to provide for a professional air traffic controller, perhaps analogous to the circum- stances of those in the Federal Bureau of Investigation but probably attempting to reject the whole notion of GS ratings which we think inappropriate to this business. He is as important as a pilot, he must be as highly skilled as a pilot, and in order to attract that type of man he should have something somewhere roughly comparable to what the pilot has and will con- tinue to have. We are very hopeful that this will receive the attention of the Con- gress and we do not intend to rest it simply on the fact that the air traffic controllers demand this. We are hopeful the Members of Congress will visit the facilities. Congressman Minshall was flying to Ohio and requested radar ad- vice from the controller and the controller said, "No, I am too busy; you can't have an advisory." He went down to the facility to see why he couldn't have advisories and I am satisfied, because he spoke at one of our meetings, that he, as I am certain many others do, realizes the gravity of these problems and their potential danger. This in synopsis is pretty much what the professional air traffic controllers have in mind. I have a letter here with me that I sent to General McKee explaining, basically what we are doing and why. I might say the organization does not have the backing or involve- ment of any other organization, that it is entirely self-supporting, at the moment rests on the initiatior~ dues of its members and will rest on their dues periodically taken. We hope that by the time our legislation comes up for attention we will represent virtually all of the air traffic controllers in the United States. We rather think that that is possible. Up until this time they have had no effective voice, at least in their own judgment, to bring these problems to the attention of the Congress in a proper, efficient, and sober way. We rely wholly on the evidence. We do not think that any reasonable person knowledgeable in the business of aviation can spend any time listening to a radio frequency in any of our high-density areas-and to just tick off the worst of them, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York- listen to the pace at which these people make decisions, and none can be wrong, and imagine the retention in the minds of an individual that much information when planes are constantly coming in and going out without realizing this is a critical pattern, that without much further delay we should make the effort to secure~ the use, judgment, and skill of everyone who can be found. PAGENO="0353" 349 The business of the controller will get tougher as will the business of the pilot, but it is no longer possible just to recruit anybody who may come in off the street, and the present demand for qualifications I consider to be very low according to information promuTigated by the FAA. These people are not going to be able to do the job when the present front line controllers are gone unless someone comes in to replace them; the business of air traffic control could very well wind up and very quickly wind up in a very nasty mess. I thank you very much. Mr. FRIEDEL. I want to thank you, Mr. Bailey, and I wish to assure you and everyone here that the chairman of the full committee and the chairman of this subcommittee are very much aware of the matters that you mentioned and we are very much interested in the safety of aviation for the benefit of all. We know there are areas where we need more controllers and we need more radar facilities. There is a need for a collision-avoidance system. All of these are being worked on right now and I think the con- trollers are dedicated men, doing a good job, and I think in the appro- priations bill we passed last year we provided for more controllers than we had the year before and we hope to have more. Mr. STAGGERS. I have no questions. I would like to thank you for your very clear presentation of a problem which we all recognize is going to have to be worked on and I think you have done a real fine job in presenting it. Mr. BAILEY. May I leave for the committee our letter to General McKee which is a formal presentation to the Agency of what this organization is (See p. 351.) I must emphasize that this is just about as far from a union effort as you can get and nothing in the letter promotes the organization. Since we expect to appear again and again before the Agency, not as a union looking for its own advancement but just speaking for con- trollers generally, whethey they do or do not belong, because they simply have the problems-we simply want the aims of the organiza- tion on record in case other suggested aims are brought forward. Mr. DEvINE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I want to say that we do not want this subcommittee used for any organizational purposes. Mr. BAILEY. Absolutely not. I hope my remarks are pertinent to every controller in the United States whether he belongs to any organization or otherwise. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Your reputation as an attorney if not as an aviation expert has preceded you here, Mr. Bailey. How large a radarscope would it take to put altitudes on in O'Hare or the New York area? Mr. BAIr~EY. The ones I have seen operating at Atlanta in the alpha- numeric system I should say are 24 inches in diameter. Mr. KUYKENDALL. You are not implying they would be large enough for a highly congested area? Mr. BAILEY. I don't think the question of the size of the scope is necessarily determinative because the areas are broken up into many areas and one scope covers a small area .and they overlap. ~)2-7i5-68---23 PAGENO="0354" 350 I know there has been some talk of giant screens on the wall where all aircraft could be viewed and I think this is something worth investigating. Most controllers feel that would not be a good system. Mr. KUYKENDALL. In my visits to FAA centers and in standing behind and watching these terribly busy people operate, at the present time it is indicated that the state of the art is not ready for the alpha- numeric scope that we have. I know in the context of trying to put myself in the shoes of a rated air traffic controller I would probably find it about as difficult as a lot of them would trying to put themselves in my shoes. They have their problems and we have ours. I want to know if you know about the fact that the Civil Service Commission has just recognized the professional status for 17,000 aviation administration employees. Mr. BAILEY. I read that in the paper this morning. It confuses me as to how the professional status was recognized. I read it as consisting of an increase in grade. Mr. KUYKENDALL. It means an increase in pay. Mr. BAILEY. I don't think it will come close to some having our problem. The job is still unattractive. Mr. KUYKENDALL. Have you read the testimony before this corn- mittee from the two previous organizations who are representing the same group of people? Mr. BAILEY. In summary form it has been reported to me. Mr. KIJYKENDALL. I would say you have about 99 percent duplica- tion of their testimony. What do you mean when you say in the first person "I" will not give a commercial license? Mr. BAILEY. As the operator of a flight school- Mr. KIJYKENDALL. I thought FAA gives licenses? Mr. BAILEY. I understand that, but we cannot send anyone up for a recommendation until our own instructors- Mr. KiJYKENDALL. I thought you knew something I didn't know. Mr. BAILEY. As a matter of fact, we do give licenses. Our own people-our employees-are authorized by the FAA to issue licenses. Mr. KTJYKENDALL. But the FAA issues the license? Mr. BAILEY. They have authorized us to issue the license. Mr. KTJYKENDALL. The thing that bothers me here, and about the other two organizations also because the testimony is practically identical, is that you have a great many "shoulds" but you seem to come up with the same old dollar poultice for the cure. Everybody who comes in appears for every disease known to man and has a dollar poultice. I would like tO have some ideas from your organization and others about training, education, and some specifics about how to do a PR job. For instance, we all know that one of the New York life insurance companies has done a terrific job in putting in national magazines full page advertisements which say as an example "would you like your son to be a doctor?" This skilled manpower shortage is not only true in your field. We have tremendous areas where there are shortages of highly skilled people. We need not so many "shoulds" but a lot of "hows." This is what we are looking for. PAGENO="0355" 351 We are concerned with this problem as you are. We sat and listened to the last words of the pilot on the tape in the New Orleans crash. It creates concern in anybody. We have done that here and in Oklahoma City and elsewhere ; so please give us "hows" and not so many "shoulds." Mr. BAILEY. I would be pleased to give you a few "hows." First of all- Mr. KUYKENDALL. I have been called downstairs to another com- mittee. In the "hows" I am talking about specific proposals. Mr. BAILEY. You would like me to submit it in writing? Mr. KIJYKENDALL. Yes. Mr. BAILEY. I would be happy to do so. Mr. KtTYKENDALL. They are the types of things we expect to use and I know you are a brilliant attorney and have great retention but I suspect you would like to study your proposals before you put them in writing. Mr. BAILEY. I am prepared to give them right now, but I will be pleased to submit them in writing. Mr. KTJYKENDALL. I don't retain as well as you do, and I would like to have them in writing. Mr. FRIEDEL. Your letter to General McKee will be included in the record. ( Letter referred to follows:) PRoFEssIoNAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ORGANIZATION, Boston, Mass., March 25, 1968. Gen. WILLIAM F. MCKEE, J~drninistrator, DepartmeiU of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administratioi~, Washington, D.C. DEAR GENERAL MCKEE : This letter results from a conversation held between Mr. I). D. Thomas of your office and myself some weeks ago, wherein lie requested that a letter of description and a charter be furnished as soon as possible in order that the Agency might have some concrete evidence of the structure and objectives of this organization. I am in the process of drafting a temporary charter ( since a detailed constitution and by-laws must await our first con- vention in July, 1968) , and will forward a copy to you as soon as it is complete. Meanwhile, I ask that you accord us your recognition as an organization based upon the representations set forth herein, PATCO was formed in January, 1968, at a meeting in New York of controllers in that area. Because of the critical traffic problems in that area, the New York Controllers felt that major steps would have to be taken in the immediate future if air safety was to be maintained in the face of steadily increasing loads. They explained to me that because of conditions that now exist they were operating inferior equipment for excessive periods of time, and that because of the low pay and lack of realistic retirement periods, many of those now being recruited to become controllers were incompetent to discharge the heavy re- sponsibilities involved. As in any other line of work, where the working conditions are unattractive to the caliber of man needed, that caliber does not apply. I was asked to assist in the formation of this organization, and to act as its general counsel once it had been placed on its feet. It was decided that the tenor of the group would be professional, in every sense of the word, as distinguished from a unionistic approach, and that only active controllers current and pro- ficient in the actual control of aircraft would be eligible for membership. Since the orginal meeting in New York, we have visited a dozen major facil- ities across the country. According to our present figures, between 85 percent and 00 percent at each visited facility have joined. We will shortly publish ouy first Journal, partly to explain to all interested parties what PATCO is and where it intends to go, and partly to communicate with those controllers whom we are unable to reach by direct meeting. PAGENO="0356" 352 We do not think that the remedy for the numerous grave problems which flow exist is to be found within the Agency itself, although we do support the Agency in every way. We intend to ask Congress to enact a new law, which in essence will : (1) Take Air Traffic Controllers outside the GS rating structure, and place them in a separate group similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2) Provide much higher compensation for front-line controllers, and at the some time limit the number of hours which they may work during any one week (as pilots are limited) and permit early retirement. (3) Increase future qualifications for controller-applicants to include formal education and flight education~ (4) Authorize by law the participation by controllers in flight programs of all kinds, including unlimited familiarization flights with consenting carriers. It is our thesis that the more a controller knows about flight the better controller he will be. In addition, he will then be suited for some useful occupation when he is no longer sufficiently resilient to take the pressures of air traffic control. I should like to emphasize that this Organization involves only air traffic controllers, and is not backed or financed by any larger group. We have refused offers of outside help, and will continue to do so. It is our view that the con- trollers of vast changes in the duties and responsibilities of air traffic control during the past few years, and similar changes forecast for the years to come, must be sharply upgraded if they are to have any chance to keep pace with demands confronting them. I hope that we may have the support of the agency in accomplishing our aims. Agency officials are welcome at our meetings and are invited to make any suggestions they may think appropriate. Very truly yours, F. LEE BAILEY, Acting Ewecutive Director. Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Bailey, when was your organization formed? Mr. BAILEY. January 1968. Mr. PICKLE. Then you have only been in operation a couple of months or more? Mr. BAILEY. Yes. Mr. PICKLE. Why did you form this organization when there were two organizations in this field? Mr B ~ULEY It was the controllers who formed the organization and they approached me and I am simply their general counsel until they can afford an active competent executive director ; we are satis- fled neither of those organizations could accomplish their objectives for two reasons: First, one was a militant union type organization operating under the Executive order which they did not feel was appropriate to their professional status and their professional aims and responsibilities. Another factor was that a professional organization which at one point had quite a large membership but which included in addition to controllers those who are clearly in the business of management and the controllers did not feel that it represented their interests. Second, because of a failure to support individual controllers in trouble in times past, the organization's strength had dropped and a gre it deal of hostility had set in in certain areas They felt rather than working back up to a beginning in an organization in which they lost faith, they felt it was better to start with a new concept. Mr. PICKLE. Do you say these two organizations have lost faith and have not done their job? Mr. BAILEY. I would say because of their sharp differences in strengths in different areas and the hostility that exists in a given area that does not have strength it has tended. to divide the controllers and PAGENO="0357" I mom ~. BAILEY. 1 L~. PICKLE. I iization in attempting to that the NAGE and the ATCA have record bears this oat. u have a strictly proJ~essiox ~, A REPRESZNTATIVE ~ OP OHIO with the 92- 15-68-24 PAGENO="0358" 354 quest* in this area, as I ~sui~ you ~e subeoiiimfttee o~i wffich I serve shall. For the record, I wi~li to `inchide.articles from the Cincinnati En- quirer and Cincinnati Post, which emphasize the in~reasing need for air safety funds. * (The articles referred to follow:) [From the Cinc1ni~att Enqu1rer~ Feb. 5,' 1968] PANELISTS' AG~E~ $~ ~BILiiIO~t N~DTD FO~ AtE SAI~ETY (By BGb Brumfield, Enquirer Aviation Writer) * The19e8 Air Safety Oonference `Is~1d in Cincthnatl Sunday proved that Ohio's congressmen and a blue ribbon panel of aviationexperts are vthally interested in flight safetybut don't knowwhere to get $~ billion. It also indicated that airline pilots disagree with general aviation pilots, botiL disagree with air traffic , control, everybody is sore `with the Federal Aviation ~utbority and airport managers are caught ii~ the middle. FOrtunately for the cause of air safety, in airing their differences of opinion on just about every faee4 of flying, the spokesmen for the various assoei~tion~ and agencies repre$ented at Sunday's meeting pointed up the many problems involved and the va~ious options available for solving them. And according ~ Reps'. Robert Taft Jr. and Donald D. Cl~ncy (R., Cincinnati), co-sponsors of th~~ conference, tba1~ was the idea of hav1i~g it in the first place- to inform the public and their elected officials. Since the meeting featured four congr~ssiaen-Rep. Donald E. Lukens (B., Hamilton), Rep. William E. Minisball (R., Cleveland) and Representatives Taft and Olancy, it could have developed into a political show. It didn't. The legislators spokebriefly at the beginning of the conference sticking strictly to aviation and flight safety, then turned the meeting over to Cincinnati attorney Carl ]~. RublE, who served as chairman for panels on ai~ traffic control, uniform standards for airport certification, airport constructiOn and mo'derization, flight crew training and all-weather flying and noi~e abatthnent procedures. `Panelists included repr~sentatives from the Federal Avi~tlon Administration,, Air Line Pilots Association, City of Cincinnati, Greater Cincinnati Airport, Flight Safety Foundation, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and Air T~raffic Con- trci 4ssoeiatioii. The basic needs, as revealed by the panelists, ~ are familiar ones-more people to operate more and better equipment at better airports, all paid for by more money. Maj. Gen. Joseph D~ Caldera, USAF' (Ret.) , president of Flight Safety Fo~nja- tion, termed the present air tnaffie control system, which is under the jurisdieUon of the FAA, totally inadequate to handle the present and future needs of aviation. Byton Hood, chairman of the Ohio Area Chapter, Air Traffic Comtrol Associa- tion, and control tower ` operator at Gi~eater Cincinnati Airport, said the big problem in air traffic control is `the small number of trained ` people ayailable. He said the FAA simply ha:sn'*t done much hiring in past years~ and that now con- trol towers must operate with "no bench." Hood also said a computer assistance system ror airport control radar is needed, and that the FAA `has been very remiss in providing ~nch equipment. Thomas Basnight, director of regulatory matters for th~ Air Line Pilots Associ- ation, disagreed with Hood, arguing that the need is not for more manpower on the ground, but for utiliation of space-age technology and placing the decision- making function for collision avoidance "in the cockpit" with the pilot. "Yeah, but we still get blamed for cra~bes," countered Hood. Robert Monroe, representing Aireraft Owners and Pilots Association, said a new method for controlling air traffic must be found, but added : "When there is sUch ,a good economic justification, why use the safety argument?" He said more people die frotn therapeutic accidents in doctors' offices' than in airplane accidents. Oii the subject of airport modernization and construction, Capt. John McDonald called for certification of airports and airport managers by the FAA. He said that some airports do not even require fire fighting equipment, and stated that many I ~1 PAGENO="0359" 355 airport rnäiiagers are ~tà1ified~for thejob onI~ ihatc~li~'ar~ the :brtt~he~s of the wives of mayors., ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ` ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Byron Dickey,' manager Of th~eater C1ihnat1Airt~ rèplled~that hewas not the brotbe~ o~ the wife of any mayor, but tiiathe kno~s*~ ttMt most a1i~p~rts can't modernize properly `withIn th~ ~rnrrent bmIg~t for Co~g~ress~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i~ . . McDonald said air safety~ dO~ i~ot eo~tmoiiey.'~Laek of air~afety eonts~r~ney," he stated. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ` ~ U ~ ~ ~ He cited the cost thatonë airplane cr~h ith~ses oi~1n~üranee companies and the owners of the aircraft involved, s;ayIn~ that this eo~t ~wou1d nt,re than pay fQ~ aix' safety equipment at aü airport. * * * ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ Ar~d so the meeting we~1t,throngh all the ~ at the same question : Where dOes the estirnát~d $~ billion needed for air. safety during the next 12. years come from ? .. If the aviation indusi~r j~ to have adequate airports; ~tisfaetory. nc~ise abat~ went, improved simulatots for training, closer ~crutiriization and cèrtificati~a~ by the FAA, sophisticated new co~itroi ec~iiipment, irnpr~ved lnstrumen.tatlônfor~ aircraft-in short, air safety-who's going to pay forit? . ~ . ~ . . ~ Nobody at the ~onferen4~e vthuliteered to pIck up the check. [From tile Cincinnati Post and Tijnes~Star, Feb. ~, 1968~ AIR SAirn~ IS~G Tq fl~ (By Dick Rawe) Plane crashes at the Greater Cincinnati Airport weren't supposed to be dis- cussed ~aAt the Cincinnati Air Safety Conference, but they came up for dis~uss1on'~ anyway, if only indirectly. . . . ~kperts from all fields of aviation agreed that billions of dollars mu~t be spe~xt~ in the future In aviatio~i and much of It for air safety. They didn't agree en who should footthe bill. ~ Financing of larger, better eqi4pped airports, new instrumenta;flon in plane5~ and better trained personnel lii l~iation came it~to each of the 45-mirnite panel discussions held yesterday durii~g?tb4~ safety conferelice a1~ the U.S. Poistoflice and Courthouse. ~ ~ . ~ During a discussion on "Airport Construction ~nd 1\4Tod~ni~atlon," Capt.~ John McDonald, a United Air Lines. pilot who flieS Out Qj! Detr~Oit,~tid, "I cannOt disagree, safety does cost money. But the lackOf taking s4féty precautions cost more." . .. ~ : ~ ~ . He then explained a standard which suggests cbmpnctior~ of soil ortpaved run- way shoulders to a distance one-third the width of the runway~. This woulçl mean soil compaction 50 feet wide on. either side of a 15O-fo~t wide paved runw~. The cost of "one accident you ma~r tiave had already because of the lack of 1~his~ feature would pay for this (comp~ctthn) at every airport in the state of Ohio. You spend it irE destruction of.tbe airplane, in 1o~ Qf Income from that airph~n~, in litigation. Why not spend that money 1~or something to prevent accidents ?" he said. . . . ~ . ~ . ~ . He was referring to the Nov. 8 crash in wh1~h a TVA )3oeing 707 slid off th~ west end of the east-west ruflway at the airport. & Delta Airliner was mir&1~in the mud off the same runway. The co-pilot fiyi~g the TWA p1an~ has said he he~d a thud as he passed the ~n1red plane and aborted, the flight which restdteci in the; crash. . . . ~ ~ Capt. McDonald is chairman of the Air Line Pilots Assn.'s enfOrcement ~ pro- cedures study committee , and has been active In accident ii~vk~tlgations. He said sliding off runways is. one ot th~ worst things facing pilots tddä~, ~ "One major carrier bad 11 planes go Off runways last year," h'e said. ~ ~ George Gary, eastern regior~al director of the Federal Aviation Agency, was asked if the FAA certified airports~ He said tht~i3'A4 did not, that it wasleft up to local governments. . . . McDonald said that because it does not certify airports the FAA doeS not require them to have fire fighting equipment~ Noting that the Greater Cincinnati Airport has a fire department, he said, "A lot of airports dG not, even ha.~e a bucket of sand and yet air traffic is authorized into those airports." He said most everyone associated with aviation is certified and airports should be, too. PAGENO="0360" 356 PAGENO="0361" that is V rement. t~wards to whose ar t minor t me repol irs last way. The latest available Fi~ corn~rater ation with PAGENO="0362" :358 ~T:~ Ouri~oi~1 ~` sbows~ur copi~1~or saMyand our. plea today is oniy that the p1atitu~. ~bc foris ~ ~ aIç~n afl4 that .tI~ order Qf priority be die- tated b~y reality. ~ ~ ~ ~ Reality dictates. that the capacity of the a~r transportation system be increased. We are all aWare of the existing voh~me Qf air traffic ti~d of predictions a~: to the volume that the public requirement will generate in the short~term future. ~ ~ ;, ~ . Yet, no recent Federal proposal. offers ~ny hope or promise ~f sig- nifleant system capacity increase. Several major Federal programs, such as the semiautOma~ed~ ~ir traffic control system, offers probable benefit in terms of saf~1~ We ~ould notwish to belittle such programs, but rather to place them in proper perspective. A series of four consecutive recent Federal actions have all been highly restrictive to the capacity of the system. Briefly, they are:. 1. The 250-knot speed limit; 2.~ The special VFR rule;. 3.* The mandatory IFR proposal ; and 4. ~Ehe terminal airspace proposal. Each of these proposals has at least some partial justification on the basis that it would o~r a probable improvement in safety. Some, but not all, of this claim of improved safety must rely on the obvious fact that less traffic meaaas, greater safety on a direct ratio to the ulti- . mate point where total safety may be equated with zero air traffic. I ,~ We would even agree that certaiii portions of these four consecu- tive, most recent Federal proposals are ~iecessary. But we would nly so agree following our reluctant observation that there ha~ been no Federal proposal that would offer significant capacity increase, nor, despite our aggressive efforts, have we been able to, learn of any such piitnned or impending program'.; ` in a climate where there ` will be . no significant capacity increase, ~ artificial reStrictions to fulfillment of th~ public demand for air trans- portation are probably inevitable. ~ ~. , This absence of program to increase capac~ty exists despite specific recommendations frcsm NBAA and from other aviation organizations ~and interests. Some major `portions of thes~ recommendations have been repeated over a .W-year period. Nearly all of the equipment and the technology have been available for a similar period. The problem is that~ as the Federhi has preempted in the area of air traffic control, ftu~ther progress bl the industry cannot be made without cooperative Federal action. ~ .~ By this we mean th~Ct aircraft operators will not install costly im provernent in the airborne display of navigational data unless there are procedures `~nablihg'4he ATC~eontroller ~to utilize such airborne ~ capability and `p~r~ision. Similarly, airports cannot build runways to. , separate slow and fast traffic unless~ Fedoral. criteria are developed to show how the runways must be plac.~d; before ATO ccn'trollers may clear aircraft to them',on an indepen~eb~t and nonconflicting basis. ~ , It is `our behefthat tI~'central thèm~ of the means to inereas~ system capacity can be s~mpl~ defined if we strip away the maze of supporting `technical det~i1, hr t'he eatly: days of ~ir traffic control, `the pilot,had an elementary display of navigational data that `would po~mit him to fly only directly PAGENO="0363" `359 to o~ directly from a ground-based i~avi~tjona1 facility. 4s the con- troller had no navigational display, he relied on position reports from pilots to issue clearances, monitor progress, `and i~solve potential con- flict. This was'known a~ a cooperative sy~tem as~the factor which held it together was cooperation between the pilot and the controller. Tt w~is rea4ily agreed that the controller could do a better job of issuifl~ c~earances, moiiitoring progress, and resolving potential con- filet if he bad a~i independent means of observing the traffic flow and did not have to place complete reliance on position reports. ~ Ground-based radar did this job beautifully and still does. Auto- mated radar will do it even better. The problem is that the pilot's display was not improved even tho~gh the tedimology ~ to do so was concurrently developed. As ~ result, the pilot had to ~ go from point to point, but the controller could take `him over an infinite number of routes due to the area naviga- tional capability of radar. As this area navigational capability of radar enabled an increase in system `capacity, it was so used as it is now and as it will continue to be according to Federal plan. One result is that, particularly in the complexities of tei~rninal area ro'utings, the pilot is always slightly lost until the controller vectors him onto a route that his navigational display can identify and enable him to follow. We do not call this a cooperative system. We call it a ground-dominated system. The ground-based portion of the ATC system is controlled by the Federal Government and operated by Federal employees. That this portion should dominate is the apparent preference of the Federal Government despite the colossal inefficiency of such an arrangement. There are two reasons why this arrangement is inefficient: First, to provide navigational guidance by radar vectors, the con- troller must `concentrate intensely on each aircraft ai~d should hanc~le only `about four at one time, wihereas `he can monitor the progress of a large number of aircraft. Second, radar, ~ a magnificent tool for monitoring traffic flow, is too inaccurate ~ `and too unrealiable for preci~ navigational guidance. A reason for this is that the controller's display miniaturizes miles of airspace into a 36-inch circle so that aircraft a mile apart often appear to toudh. The safe resolution of these inefficiencies is to provide huge blocks of airspace `around eac~h aircraft enabling a relatively small number of aircraft to create a crowded sky. Existing precise airborne navigational displays are so much more accurate than ground-based radar that the same terminal airspace would theoretically accommodate at least twice as many aircraft in greater safety. We will not know the exact number unless the Federal Government permits a broad scale operational evaluation. Another advantage of the cooperative system is its lower total cost and the fact that most of the cost is placed directly on the user. Another portion of the total problem is the airport. The cooperative system described previously w'ould free reliever or satellite airports from their existing restriction's which is caused by the fact that the airspace over them is no'w used and dominated by operations to and from the primary,, or major hub airport. A~~the presenj,, time, for PAGENO="0364" 360 ion under~ we that sa S a systeri proce 1 Woods. eare in support of H.R. 3400. PICKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No questions, Mr. Chairman. ~. Thank you very much. witness will be Mr. John B. Galipault, president of Gall- sociates, Worthington, Ohio. PAGENO="0365" 361 - ~ipau1t's prepared stateme STATEMENT OF Jorn~ B. ( ny may be mad~ a part Li be included in the record as t follows:) )ENT, GALIPAULT & ASSOCIATES, [10 PAGENO="0366" ; ~frsrktce shoflid be rë~trk~ted, ~ c~ on1ys~~ it ~ should accbmrnod~tte all parties iki a~afe, efficient, and equitab1ernanrrer~ ~ ~ . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I! ~ Until somec~e c~r~ pr~wide valid arime~i~ tO t1~e contrary, it is. our view tha~; the nation's airspace should be available to . aU members of the aviation corn- munity on a >first come first serve basis. Forth'e past ftvè rnonth~, ~onsiderablé dialogue' ha& bE~n presented by `two ~ interest groups in a~iathn. The Air Transportation Association, on one side, is advocating limited use of airspace by other than larger, revenue producing aircraft, and general aviation groups on the other areGppo'sing tbis'!po'sit~ion. Both aiUe~ ~ou~1d like to `~e to heaven with~~ OU!t dying"-éàch ~OuIdlikè absolute fr~edorn ` in `aii~pace utilization without having to pay a price ~ it. ; . ~ ~ ` ` ` ~ . ` ~ ` ` : I feel we must encourage careful and sensible specification of operating limi- tations in our airspace. How~er, we shouidfirst be çQncemed with those char~ges in procedures axid~ regulations .~~hieb enhance sa~ty and not the econ9~n&e gain for any specific interest group. ` UnfOrtunately, theretis mounting evidence that new regulations and procedures have, and will contihue toJ~e, initia~ed that have economIc bases. I will dlscu~s ~TO such rule changes later tn my testimony. ` ~Poday's air traffic control system is basically a good one for traffic lçads of ten years ago. It has evolved over the past thirty years into a, ~asq~tb1y safe aii~j c~ffective , system for moving limited numbers of aircraft. ITówever, the non~ linear growth of~ aviatkn negates the validity of thiss~rstem. The time has arrived for aU of us to become actively concerned wi~ ~ystom changes. While the events at Hendersonville, ~ Urbana, Grand Canyon, an~ ~ New york bring to mind the mutual interference of aircraft, there are other equally critical prob- lems, ATC is like the prQy~rbial tceberg,i.e., there ar~ hundreds of problems below the surface of which the general public Is not aware. Th&t~e are short-term solu- tions to some of these problems. I would like to direct my attention to the short- term problems, because o~ the e~eët they ean have oa the ~ e~sting situation and allow for orderly system growth and development. The eoi~troIler-p~i1ot air traffic system ~s rn.uch like the pilot-aircraft system in the following manner. The aircraft. J~s ~1~wn~ physical and flight operating characteristics. The air traffic system has several known characteristics among a ~large number of vartabies. The ~i1ot; i~ith skill and experiemee, can make his aircraft into a far better vehicle by ht~ expertise.' If the aircraft is capable of ~erform141g ~hort-fleld take off ami~ landings, the pilot usually can exceed the pubithhed pei~fonnanee capabilitie~through expert flying. In the same manner, the air traffic controller is able to do a better job of controllingair traffic~ with existing radar and other hardwa~*e~devices, than the original requirements set fOrth by the system designers~ This Is true onl~ if theconti~oller has ~ornefre~- d~n1 hi operational decision-making. Given a good working en~1ronment~ acle~ quate visual aids and communication channels, the controller can ~greatly 4th- prove upon the existing s~ystern. However, in todars ATO system, the controller i~ greatly constrained, inhibited, and demoralizedbecause of inappropriate, re- stirictive procedures and poitcies and conditions of overwork without prosjects of tangible rewards. ~ . ~ ` ` . At this point, ` I would like t~ sep~trate the pr~bierns of air traffic control into Iwo catego~ties and talk briefly ab~uteaeh. They are *s~tem. oriented problems and the human oriented problems. These problems arenot'thdependent of each tther ; they `interact vigorous1~, and d~, in geueral~h;ave ` a debilitating e~ffect on ATO. ` ` ` ` The key system orientedprdblem stems fr~m traffic density. A salient th~rac- teristic of ATO . which promotes congestion is the necessary convei~gence and divergence of aircraft on single points. This is true in the enronte airway navi- gation structure and, of course, in airport terminal areas. Because of this point, convergence characteristic, controllers have only a few techniques for main- taming proper aircra1~t `~eparation~ These include altitude, airspeed, and heading differences. Unfortunately,. the controller can only manipulate . aircraft that communicate with him aild followbis colmuands. He does have aids inploviding aircraft , separation such as * radar, instrwnent lluxllngt systezus,~ and volc~ communications. ` ` ~ . ~ *~ ~`By and large, the limftat4ons placed ~ii the ` controller are thd~e of communi- ~thtion~~ mi~tbers of `airdrartbeikgitbandled;ahd lcnowledgeof the ~4rcraft's poab tthns in spa~e. *" ` ~ ~ , ~ ` ,` ` ` ` ` `~ . ` ` ` ` ~ !, ~ ~ ~ `From a ~s~stem operation'~iewpoiut,~ the sti~plest~control1lng task ~ `ifl real i'~the~ flying' weather. Dnri'ii~ 1~PB ~in~1~ruinent Fli~ht Ritle~ opcrati~M, th~ `controller i~ ab1'~ `to effe~ti~l n~éiT~nLreraft to and from `~ii~ports and on PAGENO="0367" udes. find the' controller tegrity at all isplay r~d~ rmatio~ contr(,Jer ohn Q. Public, all the~ Lequnte job pf fkn ~ do n&' oll*i~s i tiób4lity. Yet, I ( ioaials. They are &%~erw9rk~d, `un to the. second point-~--thuma~i c ~rti~ulài~, are I 7 structure is ~ in the ii ~ikewise, the ~ numerous a ~nany atlon and need for procedures are ex a ordex lOts and is `tht~ lug, ion of IFR approxim For e'~'~ ems- i~ the an~orn1t' ~theam ~- aviation cot do promotion were not allowed t.~ ~ out. ial air' cttrr PAGENO="0368" 364 / PAGENO="0369" -~ ~s quite a~ alternatives av~ to have radar in an ~ I have two aircraft on final ap n and have them land safely t of service three 1:~ not aware t here ~re c ~ of aircraft. You do not have ~atest ones we ic control system mont does a fair ~aslonç PAGENO="0370" 36 .~ why they would like to have unrestrioted use of the airspace with no delays. But, by the same taken ~ am a user of ~ the airspace mys~lf and I like to have node~ayst But, I guess i~1oils~down to this : Both parties want to go to heaven without dying andwe dust cannot do this. We all ~ have t6 trade ~ sbmething ofF in order to use this ~airspace. Until we reach an impasse and ~tart coope~ating ~aiid understanding each other's problems, we are going to have miich'confli~t and further deterioration of safety. ~ I think we have to be careful in the specification of the dperation limitations of our airspace. We should be concerned with fii~st those procedures, those ri~'les, those changes in the rulesthat are directed to safety and not economic gain by some special interest group. ., There i.s mounting evidence that there ar~ numerous regulations on the books which have economic bases on behalf of the air carriers. I will cite you anexarnple. There is a modification of part 93.113 . of the FAR's, which will terminate special VFIR privileges at 33 "hi~b" airports in the United : States. Questionnaires, I am told, were forwarded to all `terminal fa- cilities of the FAA seeking opinions from the. controllers, supervisois, and management personnel about the value of special VFR. There was a docket announcement in October of last year concerning this proposed rule change. As a result, a tremendous inflow of mail was made to NBAA, NATA, and AOPA concerning the mochfic~tion of special VFR and yet there were no opportunities for these parties to . express themselves. Within the last month, there~has been a ~ change in the regulation without r~presentation by all parties. So now there . is no special VFR permission at these hub airpOrts. Yet, you talk to controllers w1~io provide separations and clearances for aircraft in these sitUations and they say, "No, special VFIR is not a bad thing. It does not hurt anyone as lbng ~as it i~ used properly." I feel that the general aviation public ha~ not been pi~operly heard or represented on this problem. . . . I think at this point. i would like to talk about system concept as it applies to air traffic~ control.: Any system. is made up of components. These components are usually ~michine components and human corn- ponents. Machines and humans a~ connected together by communica- tion ]inks. I think one of the most ridiculous situations we have in air traffic system today is the arëhaic method of information transfer, the communication link between the man, the machine, and other men. Let me give you a verysimple example of this. This is a roll of paper. This is teletype paper. If I were to plan a flight from Columbus, Ohio, to Richmond, Va., I would have to look at 16 feet of this paper. It is in cryptographic or that I must decipher, that I have to intëg~ate into a picture and that will ±ell me whether or not ii: can safely fly frOm COlumbus to Richmond. In the process of looking at this information or calling to a flight service station-~when the phone ~s not busy-~or calling a flight service representative on the radio, I can consume anywhere from 10 to 30 minutes seeking that information. Last week I was grounded in a northeast city. I won't tell you the city for a definite reason. I had my own aircraft there. I wa~ trying PAGENO="0371" 367 tO `~etuImd~o. Columbus, O1~ii~, H ~y~o~i recall, last Wednesday through Saturday we had some rather ugly weather.. Cloud ceilings at this northeast pity were down to 1Q0 ~ feet with anywhere. from a~ mi1e~ 1~ç one-eighth of a~ mile visibility. ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I made phone calls at least six times in each of 3 days trying to find a "window" through which I could ~iy, trying to . get back to Columbus ; a window which ~ would keep me from picking up ice ; ,a window that would keep m& away from s~vere stçrms and turbulence; a window which wo~jJd allow me to reaclipiy çlestinatiom with adequate fuel ; and a window which would allow meto. find a suffipiently close airport that 1 could reach and still h.av~e the required fuel reserve. 1 never found that window because there was a lack of information. The .p~oblem was basically at that point of departure. The atmos- phere, had an. uncommon characteristic dtiring that perio4 ; that is an mversiou where temperatures wènt up instead of down as you in- creased in altitude. This was a cjesir~b1e situation during that period because it would allow me to fly at a higher' altitude without pickiiig up ice which, in my aircraft, we had no means of removing. ~ ` The ternperature on the ground at this `airport was 33 degrees, I had the suspicion that the first 3,000 feet would put me in rather high icing CQnditions. I would have gladly paid $25 for that information; that is, who is pickingup ice ? Has anyone picl~ed up ice ? Nobody could tell me ~at the flight servjce station. I said, "Will you. give me the~te1e- phone number of the approach control ?" They `said, "No, we cannot, it is an unlisted phone number." I could have , gone to the tower and asked permission , to enter the tower and ask them to contact an aircraft coming in. Instead,, I went to my airplane, started the engine i~ii4,turned on the radio to a ground control frequency. ~ ~ ` ` ` A Mohawk BAC-lil just landed and I called the pilot asking if he picked up any ice in his landing approach. He said, "No ; very little." At that point, I had my information. But it seems. rather ridiculous that yo~ have to go through `this exercise to gather information in order to make a decisi9n whether or not to fly. ` ` ~` I hwve done some very interesting research on risk acceptance in pilots,. In this experiment we asked pil9ts to fly at a 2-foot altitude toward two bamboo poles and try t~fit th~ aircraft between the two poles. We would vary the width `of the poles in a random' fa'shion so tile pilot never knew the size of the opening with respect to the air- craft's wing span. We did not give him any information. We let him ask us for information. We said, "Ti~y to go through. If you cannot, pull up and go over it." ` ` As a result of this experiment, we were able to get a fingerprint on the pilot which described his willingness to accept risk. We found where he wa's willing to take risks and where `he was not. We found out who was the Casper Milquetoast and~ who was the so-called tiger. One interesting result of this research was `that the so-called tiger, the one who took the b'ig chance and didn't really understand what the consequences were, was the pilot who did not seek mformation. This is significant, and it is borne out in many of the accident reports. All you haire to do is look at them. This i~s one of the major problems we have in our airway system. PAGENO="0372" / s quite incongruous dn't see tli -~-"Icou 368 1 do v the vital I an adequate j ~. I don't ~rs ~ho would without bias a better deci ~, to take the really are. -the without C we want a PAGENO="0373" 369 rial. As a Ihavethat~ are ~ ~s. ~,dmiration for the controllers across the able job? I would like the job, I would would not be recognized as cial aircraft or a corporate a and it just happens have respect but they communication, of ex- communication. ~ing new ways for have no means `i the people a with whom? functions- controllc PAGENO="0374" 370 are under psychiatric~ c~tre, or are suffering from frustri~tions as a re- suit of their occupations ? . ~ Mr. GAj~IPAUrJr. As ., to. the first two things,definitely. no. Ses~era1 of them drink socially with: me and that is the extent of it. Some do have ulcers that are not detected in their annual physi~ai examinations. They do suffer from many frustrations and I think one of the major frustrations is the inability to have themselves heard on the problems of air traffic control operations. ~ Mr. Th~vii~. By their~p~urent agency? ` . Mr. GALIPAULT. By their parent agency. ~ . ~ ~ ~ Mr. DEVINE. I have a final comment which does not~ re'ate toyou but again it relates back th the testimony of M~' Bailey when he cited a singular example of a man in his thirties who had a heart attack which may or may not have been connected with his duties. ~ Mr. GALIPAULT. The gentleman sitting behind me is about 47 `years old and he has been a controller at Columbus for ~O years and he is one of the finest pilots I have ever had occasion tO fI~ with. I am embarrassing him iiow but I think he is typical of the men at the facilities. I think perhaps he is no different' than anyone else, you or I. Really, there are pressures on him and I am sure `Mr. Bailey is em- phasizing these pressures. They are there. I khow' if I had targets con- stantly converging on a radarscope I would be mighty concerned. Let me give you an example. ` ` Sunday, February 4, 1968, at ~ Columbus was a beautiful clear day. This gentleman advised me that there were 93 targets on a radarscope at Port ` Columbus within 25: miles of Port * Columbus airport at a specific time of day. An American Airlines aircraft took off to the northwest. This gentleman advised me that he heard the taped con- versation between the controller and the pilot. The controller called traffic to American 16 times before he passed through 5,000 feet. The pilot was able to identify 11 or 14 of these targets. Of the 93 targets, the controlie~ had knowledge of the altitude of less than 10 percent of these because they w&'e ` the only aircraft that either reported an altitude or were on instrument flight plans. Now, thi~ is a case' in point. When you have 93 aircraft in such limited airspace crisscrossing at unknown altitudes, the contrOller `is like a pilot flying without. any flight controls-he is helpless. He just ha~ to sit there and watch it happen and it is not easy for him. Mr. DEvINE. I think our hearings over the years would demonstrate that the fellow who comes up with this, and maybe you will in your research, a radarscope that shows altitude will help solve these problems. . ` ~ ~ . Mr. GArAPArnZP. It will help. We have this equipment available but try to get it-you can't and it is so desperately needed. Let me make this point: I can take an airplane of known ciharacter- istics and I can make a better airplane out of it because I am a good pilot. I have to say I am a good pilot because that is something I have to believe in order to be a pilot.'I can make it better than the manufac- turer thought it would be because I bring out things in it that are not really emphasized. The same thing goes with the controller. He can make an archaic system into a workable system-he is doing it every day. i PAGENO="0375" DEPAI~TMENP or TEANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Washington, DXJ., Mctrclv 11k, 1968. 371 I[t~II you now that ho is ~ ii~ ha~ tc- ~ but h~ ~ inakingthè s3~stem better; ~ ~ .~ ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ Now, ~ add a few things, ~ eh~n~ a few prpeedures, and you might make it even beft~ but d~n't let ~it toniic frcm the top down ~ where special interest'gro~p pressure is applied for the sake ~ of ecoilomics or profits. ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ That is not how we shpuidir~proite the system. It has to come from the bottom up, from the people who know the problems. The only people who know th~ problems are the people there doing the job. Mr. DEviNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ` ~ Mr. FRIEDEL. I want to thank, you very much, Mr. Galipault, for your very fine testimony. Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Ohairman., I notice that Mr. Stimpson from the FAA is present in th~ `roOm and there is something I would like to have in the record before' this matter is concluded. It does not deal with the ~ comments of our witness he~e but, Mr. Chairman, if you recall,' the National `Transportation Safety Board recently madt~ some recommendations , regarding j~art `135 of the Federal Air R~u1ations. This dealt' with air traffic operators and safety air taxi operators. This is a matter of some con~em to me and I would like to ask if the Chair would not. request of the FAA comthents as to what that agency proposed to do about the matters that were in the recommenda- tion by the Air Safety Bo~ird. , I feel quite strongly on'this. , I believe that a careful review of the record will show that the POst Office Departmeiat requires rather greater care on the part of operatois of its equipment than1 ~1oes the FAA require of air taxi operators. I have always felt v~y' strongly that it was important that we should provide thern highest p'ossibie,,safety for people even though we do want the mail to get' through. I would appreciate having Mr.' Stimpson provide us', for the benefit of the'record, first; the `communication rec~ived by the FAA regarding the air taxi operators aiid; second, a statement of what the FAA pro- poses to do regarding those recommendations which I think are im- portant to air safety.. . . Mr. FRIEDEL. The FAA, through Mr. Stiffipson who is present, is requested to furnish the cO spondence to which reference has been made. (The following documents were ~ubsequently submitted as re- quested:) Hon. WILLIAM F. MCKEE, 4dministrator, FeO~e~k~Z Ariat~on Administration, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. DEAR GENERAL MCKEE : The Safety Board has become increasingly aware in recent months of the very rapid expansion in the `operations of the air-taxi operators, and within that group ~ similar burst of activity on the part of the scheduled air-taxi operators. Also of interest t9' us, and in the same general area, is the rapidly expanding use of such . operators by the Post' Office Department in the contract carriage of mail. ` PAGENO="0376" 372 is our i e Departn provisions of the Post Brators - ~erest of safety are i PAGENO="0377" PAGENO="0378" 3.4 I~~Y TEE I~DUST$)~ i~ A: ~Di~*a~ijzed ~i~c~ups of sch~d~1~jd atr4axl operators are nrged to devote thei~ e~nergies to the safety o± t~ie~r operations to an extent ~uQr~ ~easonab1y related to the .amornit pr~sently teing. ~zpe~d~1~r .tl~e è~aneen~t of their econ~n~ic oppoJ~;unh1:iE~s.~ For example, it wouj~ not ~eem eit~aer beyond the capabilities of the~ie o~rganizatioi~s o~ adyerse .tqrjlie intelligent .se]~f-inl~est of their members were they to institute. prograrns devised to giv~expert guidance ~o operators in setting up operating rules and establishing desirable opera1~ing practices in areas involving safety (a large portion of accidents in this field are attributable to deilcieneies in operations, i.e., inadequatemaintenance, Inadequate training e't~). ~ B: Scheduh~d airlines are~urged to take affirmative action commen~urate with their responsibility for th~ saiety of~passengers being canned by scheduled a1r~ taxi operators pursuant to Interline agreements or specific contracts fOr the operation of * route segnhlentE. Her~ ~ if the earners are unwilling, for whatever reason, *0 assume affirmative responsibility for safe operations of air-taxi op~ erators with whom they have either interline agreemeut~r specific contracts to cp~rate route segments, serious consideration should be givem.tohavliig the CAB condition its approval of any such ~ontractUal arrangewente on the' existence of contractual undertakings by. .ea~li atr~taxioperatoir to k~o~hp1y with' a set of safety rules comparable or at l~ast ~i~a~l to thetben~oohtractual arrangements between the Post Office and its air mail eätrier~. ~ IL B~ T~E GOVERNMENT ~ -r~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . , ~,.. ~ ~ ~ `~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ A~ 9~h~ ~ed~erai.AviaUon Ad~i~i~t~ation ~hou1d launch irnp~çdiately a program addressed to the scbe4ui~4 air~taxieperatQv~ and the ~ under contract wj4h I~1~e lj~ost Office Department ,whieh would involve not lyi~ve~lance of the oepyei~tional type, but also the. teaching of this group ~io~ better to perfOrm ~a basically common carriage operation, witI~ emphasis on assQci~atqd safety aspects~ P~prqgram should b~liide .s~nding in FAA teaals(}P~Q r~view ai~1 ~ccomplish th~e ~ec~ary upgrt~ç1~n~of t1;~eir safety .practic~es ; ç~nçI ~. ~ ~ . ~ B. Tha1~A~b~ ~A4 pia~ee$~ie safety supe~visiop of seIi~dulq~L air-~~4, ope~aiors and Pg~t Office contra~~operators orgaiLz~t~z~ally un4er FA4 ota~ associated with the handling of ~iir carrier safety op~!á~o.ns,~ and proeee4 prQmDtly to ~stablLsh safety programs ~d stacnd~rds for, them cowme~s'tp~ate with their cur- reitt an~i, long-range status,: act~v~ti~s; :ancI importance ~ in av~ation. ~ ~ , ;~4du4~tec1ly~ the progra~s :repc~~~ended ~ herein for actioi~ by ~ the ~E'ederai A~~tion A4~nii4stratio~ tl~ ~r~rri~rs, ancl~t1~e ~jr4axi operators, are beyonc1~ the'scopeof what.the~4dmi~t~&tL~n ai~d the Industry have be~i either equipped or~~~peeted to do, and ~igh~t notreven be favorab~y received b~ the, group of air- ta~x1 operators ~ich prugraw~ woi!]~d 4be intanded ~o help. ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ However, the need is real ~ndirnnaediate and it is our i~iewtbat ~ Citi~ati?ofl will i~o~wait~?ithe~ f~rj'~s. usual" incit~st~'y practices or for4~e ~rd1nary yegula- tory ~ te it ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ . ~. . ~ ~ ~ . Sineerelyt1 ~ ,: ~ *~ ~ ~. ~ ~ ~ ,. ~ ~ H ...,. Jo~a~u J. O!Oo~Eu~, J~r., _____ a'irman FEDEEAL AY~IO~ A*I~IsTRA~ON A.pril ~1968. Oha1rintln~ National~ Transportation Safety To :. Hon. Joseph L~ O'domieli~ Jr., Board. From : Administrator. ~ ~ . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ : ~ ~ S~ft?:Ject A~r ~an op~ra~1ons The agency ;~Las been incre~siiigly ~onc~ned with the prôblem~s associated with the rapid ~owth ~i! air taxi operation a1x~d I can apprthate and understand the ~on~ern exi~r~eid~ ~ your Iette~ ~o th~ o~ Mkj~1~ 14, 19k3~. ~ , . Pttblication of tl~e agency ~ stat1st~es on ~ehOduled air taxi operations as of October ~ together withth~ ~vènt~f~ilr tá±I airinairop~atioñ~, ha~é served t~ focus, atté~itthn on th~~rO~+thkf th~ ~fr ta~1 lii&t~str~r in recent months. ~ `While it i~ c~1iite trueth~tf~we have pruvld~d ~shiatancea*d guidai~eto Post Office officials at their request, the safety st ~ird~ we s~g~sted to ~thein' were generally derived from requirements already Imposed on many of the larger and PAGENO="0379" 3/75 more active air taxi operat~r~ through operations speéifieati~na Similar, az~d more stringent operations specifi~ation~, which inelude appropriate sections of Federal Aviation Regu1at1on~, Part 121, have beeit applied to air ta~t opera- tore who operate segmei~ts of certificated air~arriers' routea Itis our opinion that these air taxi operators have affirmati~e ~ references to safety practices through their operations1 speeifieat~oüs despite the lack of specific references in their ec~ntra~tual agreements With carriers: ~ In~ recetit ~eàrs, we have sent * sj~ecia1 teams to review operating iiractices of air taxi operators when there was reason to believe that their operations were substandard. The procedures followed by these teams closely parallel those used when conducting special inspections on certificated air carr1ers~ holding Civil Aeronautics Board authority. Additionally, at least one region is ai3plying the Systems Worthiness A~nalysis' Program (SWAP) to some of the larger air taxi operators on atest basis.If this proves practical,We will instittite it On a national basis. ~ ~ 4 . ~ . ~ ~. I have noted `yom~ suggestion that we consider the use of personnel assigned to our Project 85. This is a test program implem~mted in two regions with a limited numbèrof personnel. We do not feel it would be wise to divert the person- nel in this program. Your suggestion that we use air carrier inspectors to conduct . surveillance of scheduled air taxi operators is one that we have considered in the past. As a matter of fact? our field air carrier people have ~ participated in developing standards and requirements for the operations specifications of air taxi opera- tors. Additionally, we have considered transfei~ing the responsibili~~ for policy guidance of air taxi operations from our General Aviation Oper~itions Branch in Flight Standards Service to the Air Carrier Operations Branch. The reason we have nOt done this is primarily because of personnel shortages and ~iling limita- tions under which we currently are operating. This is not to say tMt our Air Carrier Operations Branch does not involve itself with problems relating to air taxi operations. It does, as the need arises. With regard to your suggested industry programs, I believe we may be con- siderably further down the road than many people realize. For example, the National Air Taxi Conference (NATC) , with the encouragement and partici- pation of FAA, held an Air Taxi Seminar last November in West Palm Beach. Approximately one hundred persons, some from as far away as Massachusetts and California attended the one~day session which eovered management prac- tices, operating methods, regulations and related subjects. Three more seminars, sponsored by NATO are scheduled for this spring and early summer. ~ ~ . S Also, it's worth noting that individual air `carriers have made space wVáil- able in their own training and management programs for air taxi operatOrs. A number of major air carriers have participated in the programs presented at' the NATC annual conventions. ~ Recently we discussed' with the Air Transport As- sociation the~ po~sibUity of participating in an industry `program similar to that which you suggest. Their, iflitial response ~ was favorabh~ and, in light of your sugg~stion, we will be pursuingitfurther. S ~ " Insofar' as government action is concerned, we are well along with a program addressed to the scheduled air `taxt opera1~ors, including ~no~ only' those who carry mail, but also' those who' hold interline agreements or conduct regular or frequent "on demand" operations. Iii February of tbL~ .ytar we asked our re-. gions to place special emphasis on the surveillance of air taxi operators falling in any of these categories. As I ~ mentioned' earlier, many of our field offices al- ready have issued operations specifications based on the local or regional operat- ing conditions and envii~ohments. These "~~atio~s sp~cifik~atióii~' `include `such Items á~ prescribed' traitting prOgrams, plot-in-command requirements, pro- ficiency checks and flight time limitatidns e~ual to or more restrictive than those imposed by the Post Office. S ` We agree that effort should b~ made to advise and' counsel these operators in how better to perforth cominox carriage ~ ~ipethtions, with empha~is on safety. Regrettably, our manpower situation does not permit `us `to devOte as much effort to such `a prbgram as we wouldilke.' ~J~*~ver~ we shall continue `working with A'OA, NATO ` other groups ` at s~Ihars~ ~ annual ~ conventi0n~' and wherever else we believe we~càir help ththn~fo hclp~hem~ei~es make thei~ :o~erations safer. We agree that the safety supervision of air taxi operators wito engageprlmarit~ in air tr~n~'porfà'tióñ' (a~' o~pösedt~o~tho~e who hbid ~n `al'i~taxi eert1fic~te as ~n adjunct to another primary ~viattoa 1nter~st such ~ a flying ~chôélr~or fixed-base operation) should beair carrier oriented~ Unfortunately,±nost air taxi operations are not located in the immedtate~ ~V1cinLty ~f our air carrier offices.' As a matter of PAGENO="0380" , many &f them e located a considerable distance fror - people, ~d a Not~ i take every a that I ca: ~u expressed. is well as ti you tin are is m Saferl `Itt .~da well to ii part of or be inserted in our record. Mr. FRIEDEL. Without objection, it will be i: (Article referred to follows:) [From the Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1968] `ToRTunnn' JETS SAFER THAN CARS (By David Hoffman, Washington Post Staff Writer) In the evolution of automobile travel, more drivers and more passengers have meant more accidents and more fatalities, the toll now standing at 145 deaths a day. Air safety experts have long predicted a similar fate for air transportation- that disasters will inevitably multiply as air travel booms. But a decade of hard statistical evidence is proving the experts wrong. Last year was the tenth consecutive one in which U.S. airlines flew turbojets. And there was no measurable increase in the number of fatal accidents, the num~ ber of fatalities or the fatality rate per passenger mile. Judged by that most meaningful ratio, the accident rate per aircraft flight Jiour, the tenth year of jet travel was the safest. In 19~7, the accident rate per 100,000 aircraft hours dipped to a record low of 1.2 for U.S. commercial operators. Enjoying such odds, a passenger can expect to fly a 13.5. airline nonstop for 80 years before an accident might cost him his life. WORKING SINCE 205 By automating air traffic control, enhancing the competence of pilots, expanding airport facilities, improving the turbine engine and perfecting the jetliner itself, the aviation establishment has engineered a system in which more users survive each year. Just as the Federal Government moved last year to regulate roadworthiness and crashworthiness into 13.5. built automobiles~ it moved In the 1920s to regulate safety into 11.5,-built aircraft. Now, almost 80 percent of the world's jetliners are manufactured in Western American states and the craft share one thing in common : their construction was supervised by the Federal Govern~nent, by the Federal Aviation Administration's Western Regional Oflice. ~ ~ In trade jargon, this Federal supervision is called "certification." It entails dozens of semiformal bargaining sesslosas In which engineers and pilots from the company and the Government argue the cost of extra safety and try to anticipate-and eliminate- the causes ~f futhre accidents. 376 ositive and )verlooking t mation or~ WILLIAM - PAGENO="0381" Meane fuselage , the a a moving adicator wa airline service, r flaws, which `rect the flaws. to the aii~lines izon as agency to f also, until the, safety belt restrained below. But rE~ `PICKLE SWITCH' dents during certiflc~ to trim away ~f his finger- PAGENO="0382" I 3~Th neously, CAB and Goveri~ux~eut. agents were collecting debris from ~ ~]ie accident site hauling it 40 miles 1~ç Miaith and rebuilding the jet s carcass in a $100 000 search for clues or causes ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ i~, ~ ~ . . ~ ~ . ~ Northwest Airlines in cou)unction with the Battelle Institute, set out to assess all the evidence. , ~ ~ . . ~ Northwest Capt. Paul Soderlind toured the country warning fellow pilots not to actuate the pickle switch in turbulence, warning them not to chase their airspeed indicators in violent up~ and ~ downdrafts. Airspeed indicators, he reminded them, are notorious for flipping back and £orth across a 200-knot speed band even while the airplane pro~ee4~ at ~ a constant speed. ~ ~ ~ How should they penetrate thunderstorms ? Slow the jetliner, keep it straight ~ and level and ignore pressure-~ensing instruments, Soderlind said. ~ In November, 1963, Boeing distributed to all airlines a handbook entitled "Flying in Severe Turbulence,~ which elaborated ~ on earlier company telegrams. Recommendations in both bad already been incorporated into all pilot training programs. ~ ~ An urgent advi~ory from Boeing's Renton, ~ Wash., headquarters Instructed airlines to limit maximum possible stabilizer movement by about 25 per cent. ~ . ~ ~ A BASIS FOR ACTION *~ ~ In the ca~e ~ of Northwest Airlines, tragedy triggered a massive response But must ~ the aviation establishment await the impetus of tragedy before ridding air transportation of hazards long identified by engineers and pilots? Phe question was put to Lee Warren, deputy director of FAA's Western Regional Office. ~ ~ "You can't junk the whole (air transportation) system just because you've developed a mathematical model that predicts the likelihood of an accident," he said. In promulgating safety rules, Warren added, "FAA holds its ground best when it hlis precise facts in hand.~' . To justify a safety regulation that oo$ts big mouey, FAA must demonstrate that the regulation will save big money, as did the mandatory ~ installation of airborne radar during the 1950s. Or FAA must shOw that the regulation will si~ve lives. If no lives have been lost in the regulation's absence, the agency often must backtrack. For example : Many within FAA believe that today's heavy jets are being flown from run- ways too short * for safety. Airline pilots agree overwhelmingly. But neither the agency nor the pilots have mustered enough statistical evidence to convince U.S. airlines or the operators of U. S. airports that a hazard exists. Unfortunately, that evidence is beginning to collect. A UNIQUE SPEED On Nov. 6, at 6 :41 p.m., a controller in Cincinnati's traffic tOwer cleared a Trans World Airlines 707 for takeoff. : Unknown to the TWA pilot, another jetliner was mired in the mud alongside the takeoff runway, hidden In the darkness. ~ Like a car accelerating in high, the TWA jet rumbled down the runway, slowly gaining speed,. Again and again, the eyes of its pilot, Capt. V~ D. Matheny, returned to the airspeed indicator before him. At this point in the takeoff sequence, he was concerned with one speed and one speed only-the speed pilots call Vi. Vi is a unique speed, one that varies with the weight of an airplane, the length of its runway and the temperature of the day. It's the precise speed to which a pilot can accelerate, suffer failure of an engine and still do one of two things : He can stop on the runway remaining, or he can continue the takeoff with only three engines operating. If engine failure occurs before Vi, ~ he must stamp on the brakes and stop on the runway. Should it occur after Vi-even one knot after-the pilot continues aloft with three good engines, circles the field and lands. As Matheny approached Vi for Cincinnati, 132 knots, lie saw the other jet- liner "loom up in my landing lights." Its silhouette appearqd dangerously close to the runway. The TWA 707 sped by the stationary DC-9 and at that precise moment the TWA pilots heard what sounded like a cannon shot, or the sound ~of metal ripping into metal. PAGENO="0383" ;379 . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ T~IE ~ CONVERS+~TION * ~ ~ ,Wh~1t occui~ed in theco~j1t is told best by an edited and aijnotd~ed ~tran~ ~ cript from tile pi1ot~' vôt~ ~1~ëco~dÔr' It 1~egins at the point ~ oi~t~o the runwayi~or tákêöff. ~ ~ ~ ~ ., ~ ~ ~ . ~ Mathëhy: "Close ~s I can get to tile end, Ron, without backin~tt ilj." (Only one nose gear steering ~V1ieé1 ~is installed in the 707, a1or~gside the jdlot's left knee. Sitting in the 1e~1t~eat, lVIatlieny has positioned the jet at the fatthe~t end of ~ Cincinnati's runW~ty ~o th~tt none of its length ~`oes wasted behind. hith. Now be turns the aircraft, over .l~o rlrstOfflcer Ronald 3. Reic)aardt, who will perform the takeoff.) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Olneinnati Tower ~"TWA 159, cleared for takeoff." ~ ~ Reicbardt: "O.K." Cincinnati Tow~ : "Delta 379, yo~re clear of the runw~, aren't you?" (Delta Flight 379, the DC-9 jet, has just latided and ~Ls rolling to a stop i~ar the runway's end. fore, the controller wants to be certain the runway is clear for TWA's takeoff. Clearance shbuld have been ascertained before the controller gave Matheny and Reichardt the go signal.) Delta 379 : "Yeah, we're in the dirt, though." (The DC-9's tail section is just seven feet from the edge of the runway. ) ~ , ~ ~ ~ Cincinnati Tower : "Q.K., TWA 159, he's clear of~ the runway, cleared for takeoff, company jet on final behind you." (The controller, in effect, tells Matheny to hurry up because another TWA. jetis descending to land on the same rth~way~) Reichardt : "O.K., we're rollin'." (Engine roar reaches its highest pitch here.) Matbeny : "Eighty knots, you got `er," (The jet's rudder becomes effective at 80 knots. Matheny takes his hand from the nose gear steering wheel and passes control of the plane to Reiehardtin the right seat.) Matheny: "Not very d'an~n far off the runway." (EEc sees the Delt~ jetliner appear in the darkness.) Reichardt: "Sure as hell isn't," Matheny: "See that fire in the end?" (lie spots the orange torch of fire belching from the DC-9's tail-mounted engines as the Delta pilots attempt to pry thair craft from the mud. A loud boom i~ ~flperimposed on this transmission. Engine noise decreases dramatically as Reichardt elects to abort the takeoff.) Rei'chardt: "Good God, I hit him THE RIGhT PROCEDURE ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ Both pilots stomped down on the brake pedals. Matheny raised the s~ol1era- large metal flaps that kill lift atop a jet's wings. NOw the plane waS si~pposed to stopbefore it ran out of concrete. But it didn't stop. Instead, the 707 rolled off the far end of the `(800-foot rm~way, plowing into a ridge of earth. After its landing gear sheared, the plane belly~ skidded to a halt on the grass. All 36 aboard leaped from Its cabin just before the outbreak of a fuel-fed fire~ There were no fatalities. Reichardt had been wrong, however. His jet had not collided with another ; it had inst~ad produced a rare kind of backfire. Not knowing this, Reichardt elected to abort the takeo~f, doing prç~4sely the right things, quickly, ~ hi prQcisely the right sequence~. ~ ~ ~ Because the ~ccldent killed no one, there was little fanfare on Dec. 5 when the National Transportation Safety Bôsrd cOnvened a public hearing to in~esti- gate its cause. But at ti~fit hearing, a young attorney built a ease that the FAA, the airlines and the manufacturers are finding difficult to ignore. ~ Using the C'incini~ati accident as evidence,., he argued that on hundreds of ~ U.S. runways, when a jet engine fails at the all-impçrtant speed Vi, a crash çbacomes inevitable. ~ Donald W. Madole's credentials are unique 111 a highly speciaUzed profession- aviation ~ Fo~ ~sev~a~ years, h~ w~ chief of the Civil Aeronautics Board's Hearings and Rep~r~ Div1~ion ~n~,hs such, presided .ov~er many an accident hearing. Be is alsO a Navy plane commanderwith some 5000 bour~ of pilot time. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~Q 5~U'ETY MAIWIN Madole's j~b, as he saw it, was to expose a weakness in the certification proces~ This is how he proceeded: Using the TWA jet's cockpit voice recorder, Madole ~howed that exactly 19 seconds elapsed between the time M~thcnv called 80 knots you got er and the PAGENO="0384" 380 PAGENO="0385" 381 PAGENO="0386" 3~ ion May 4and ~ 1965, 25~ men frrnx~the FAA met at the Boe~gp1ai~t With 32 company èi~p1oy~s. All were exp~*ii~,some aerot~itLcá1 s~ecia1ty ; together they* zthde up~the Pre11thi±~u,y J~i~ Oerttfi&~t!on B~ar~1~fc~ithe 737~ ~ . ~ ~ Rocco L. Lippis~ assistant dhief bf th~AfJ~Engine~rifig Dhrision in FAA's W~stern Rê~ionai Office,wásoi~e ~ the pari~»=4~aiits, and in a reeet~t Los Angeles inte~ie~v he explained the why~ si*li: ~ : ~ * ~ prior th ~ the ~reiiminary board, all that ~ FAA knowe about th~ airplane is what it may look like and that the manufacturer has applied to build it. At this point, Boeing familiarizes the agei~y with the whole jet, what it will be made of and how it is supposed to fly. ~ If Boeing como~ up with some new system that hasn't been tested yet,, ~r if Vliere's a system that's causing trouble, then FAA atta~ehe~ "sj~ecia1 k~Ond!tion" to 1t-meani~g that the ~geney Intends to look it over vei~ey ekrefully,Lippis s~üd. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Mintite~ ~ that prelimixary bo~ai~d disclose that an~o~ig many spe~lal eoñdl- tion~ attached to the 787, * at least two resulted dii~eetly frOm the Northwest Air- lines accident. ~ ~ Und~r the first, ~AA asked Boein~ to instrument the ~ilot'~ seat in a flight test 73~'; then fly the craft throngii sevete thnriders'tortas. Instruments Would record how the jolts ~ vihrátion~ mig~t impair the pilot'~ ability to' see his instruments and manipulate flight controls. They would also reveal the effective- ness . of ailerons, rudders arid eleVators in counteracting the impact of up and down drafts. ~ ~ thider the ~eeond speci4i condition, FAA asked Boeing to put the 737 through its paces fully untrimmed' (with its ixuovthle stabilizer full up or down). In that unstahle condition, Boeing and FA~A test pilots wrung out the airplane, rolling it into tight turns, forcing it tnto stee~i~ dives and punishing pullouts, and after each, the plane obedientlyrighted itself ~ ` ~ Not until after the Nórth~~t 4irli~ies accident Was Boeing's earlier 720B put through comparably demanding testa ~ But the ~t was, and it pased With flying colors during its eight-month, $14.3 ~nilthMi fiighttest prog~ram. A ~ CONTEST FOR TIME Many within FAA view the initial stages of certification as a kind of techno~ logical debate between the Government and the manufacturer. With all its exper- tise, the manufacturer presses for speedy certification of its product so as not to lose in the marketplace, wh~re conrpetitors are busy ~olling. Befo1~e the certification process evet1~begins, the btiilde~, is convinced that his pw~duct is airworthy~-~afe ror pass~ngé~*a. And, ur~Iike anto manufacturers, he has already sold it, promising purchasers a prc~fltab1e~r4tnge, speed and payload. The FAA~ meanWhile, fights a holding ~tction~, tr~ng with relatively few tech- nicians (there are tFOiñ the `Western~regioñ) t ifi~ect and t~t as much of the whole airplaneas time and manpower permit.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ By way * of comparison; several acres of ~i~1ri~rs and draftsmen sit side by side in one of Boeing's Washington State factôries~ TJ4 through the engitieers ranks rose J. E. Steiner, becoming chjef project êngiiie~r for the incredibly sue- cessful 727 fri-jet, then Boeing vice president In dhai~ge Ôi~ ~i~&hict development. Stein~r emphasizes another facet of the certiflthition process-the one Boeing pursues independently, as if FAA didn't exist. ~ * . "We set criteria for every ~ystem in every airplane, and al1no~t always ours are tougher than those required by the FAA~~be saldin an intei~v1ew. "A group within our Service Department (wiiich `ha~' *o~ld*M~ repres~ntation) investi- gates every accident Involvinga B~ing ~oduct, ~éediñg bach analyses into the Design D~pái~t~ent." ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ TESTING TO DES1~flTOPIO~ ~ Usually, Steiner says, Boeing telegraphs precautionary instructions to its customers before FAA can issue an Airworthiness Directive, and the customers comply. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "Although FAA doesn't reqttire it,V he said,: "we're testing to destruction one 737 (sale price $3 million), two 727s (sale price $11 million) and two 74Th (sale price $44 million)." For such tests, Boeing mounts a 737 fuse~~ge~ in a hangar, wiring it with hun- dreds of stress gauges. i~iien the company ap~Jies pres~ure. Huge hydraulic jacks bear down on the wings or the tail or the landing gear, simulating the loads to be imposed by turbulence, G forces or hard touchdowns. / PAGENO="0387" 383 Hidden computers balance the forces : a downward force on one wing is offset by an upward force on the other. Qradually, the pressure is stepped up as the jet absorbs energy like a woundup clock spring. Then comes the explosion as some primary structure gives way, releasing the stored power. Now Boeing knows precisely the toughness and resilience of its product. Consider two other 737 tests that stopped short of outright destruction: The 737's tall vertical tail fin is most sensitive to side loads-the kind that might be imposed on landing in a vicious, gusty crosswind. FAA requires that the fin withstand a 50-foot per second gust imposed at normal cruising speed. In FAA's opinion, if the 737 can endure such a blast, its passengers will be adequately protected. But Boeing upped the force level 50 per cent. The 737's skin aged instantly under the impact, wrinklipg and cracking. Its fuselage twisted and bent. Sig- nificantly, however, nothing failed or yielded In a way that would have endangered passengers. THE BURSTING POINT As with all pressurized transports, the higher the 737 flies, the greater the dif- ference in air density between its interior and the air outside. The question naturally arises : How great can that difference get before the fuselage bursts like an overfilled balloon? To find out, Boeing mounted huge fans in the 737's doorways and began pump- ing air into its cabin. Not until the pressure reached 17.3 pounds per square inch did the company turn off the fans. That pressure was 225 per cent greater than the differential the plane would ever encounter at maximum flight altitude. As 737s begin amassing flight time in airline service, bugs Inside the jet doubtless will be discovered, as they have in every U.S. transport. But the odds are extremely high that the problems will be identified and corrected, either by the manufacturer or the FAA, before they down an airplane. It is for this reason that airliners generally grow safer even as they age. Mr. Fiw~EL. This concludes this series of safety hearings. We are all concerned with maintaining and improving safety. In the very near future, I believe that the announced date is April 1, 1968, the Secretary of Transportation is to send up a broad legislative proposal concerning airports and airways. I feel that these hearings and the studies and in-plant visits which many of us have made will serve as a useful and current background for any new legislative recommendations. The meeting stands adjourned. (Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.) .0 PAGENO="0388" PAGENO="0389" PAGENO="0390" I! PAGENO="0391" PAGENO="0392" DATE DUE 0 GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S. A.