

which I have suggested be added to the wilderness may well be classified as "commercial timberland," they are also highly qualified to be classed as "commercial wilderness" in the sense I have suggested. Road building and timber cutting operations undertaken on the erroneous assumption that all "commercial timberlands" should be harvested must not be allowed to bind the Congress as it now undertakes to make this wilderness area self-sufficient. The roads and the timbered areas will revert—if slowly—to natural vegetation. Over the long-run they will be reclaimed by the surrounding wilderness. They should not be permitted to prejudice the superior value of these lands as wilderness and their absolute necessity as wilderness to buffer the higher lands to the east. To simply assume uncritically that previous timber operations preclude any wilderness designation would bar the Congress from perfecting this wilderness designation and would, instead, give a seal of approval to past timber management decisions which have not been based on an adequate analysis of all resource values.

Nor, taken in a regional perspective, will the placement of this additional land in the wilderness area be a significant detriment to the output of lumber. If local mills have mistakenly assumed that "commercial timberland" will all automatically be available for harvest, they have done so on a serious misjudgement of the purpose of public lands held in national ownership as a resource of all of the people.

In this vein the Forest Service proposal document states that the timber potential of these lands "* * * is needed by the economy of the adjacent communities. Present demands exceeds the supply available in the North Santiam River drainage." * The "demand" term used here surely does not refer to the requirements of local communities for lumber products, but rather to the capacity of the sawmills within economical hauling distance of this area. Here, surely, is a classic example of machines riding society, rather than society riding machines. Again, if the local mills have over-gauged their production capacity on the mistaken assumption that they, more than the rest of the nation's people, are entitled to the resources of these public lands, they have misjudged. Their allocations—and apparently those of the Forest Service as well—have been based on a lopsided balance of various resource values, and this is the opportunity for the Congress to correct the situation.

But the situation is really not so "either/or." For, in fact, it is doubtful that the reduction of the allowable cut which would result from adding these lands to the wilderness would have any serious impact. In the regional perspective of the entire Douglas-fir region, the inclusion of this additional commercial timberland in wilderness will have no significant long-term impact. But, destruction of the area which remains *de facto* wilderness would indeed have an impact. It is demonstrable that in the case of wilderness, too, "Present demand exceeds the supply available in the North Santiam drainage," to use the Forest Service's terms.

The Forest Service, in its exhaustive timber trends study already referred to, concludes, on the basis of a thorough economic analysis, that the reservation of an additional million acres of timberland in the Douglas-fir subregion would "* * * in the long run amount to about 270 million board feet of output per year [less than otherwise], or 2 percent of the total." * This, the report concludes, "* * * would not alter significantly the estimate of long-range timber output in the region." 10

Now, according to the Forest Service proposal document, the addition of some 26,000 acres in the west side areas I have listed would reduce the annual allowable cut on the Willamette National Forest by 10.9 million board feet. Compared with the 270 million board foot reduction which the Forest Service has termed insignificant, it is evident that this 10.9 million board feet of reduced timber output would be infinitesimal. Using the same perspective as the timber trends study cited, and the Forest Service data, this reduction would amount to approximately eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) reduction in annual output. 11

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁹ Timber Trends, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, n. v (emphasis added).

¹¹ The Timber Trends study cited indicates that "loss of a million acres * * * would in the long run amount to about 270 million board feet of output per year, or 2 percent of the total.

The total annual output in the long run for the Douglas-fir subregion is thus put at approximately 13.1 billion board feet. (13,000 MM b.f. where .02x=270 MM b.f.).

If this is taken as the total regional annual output and if it is assumed that the 10.9 MM b.f. figure given in the Mt. Jefferson proposal as the "loss" in allowable cut on the Willamette National Forest is a reasonably comparable figure, then it is seen that the 10.9