

Mr. DADDARIO. Isn't it precisely because there are so few people with competence in this area that the management situation becomes more important?

Dr. MORSE. I agree. You have to use them more effectively; certainly.

I find on the outside in setting up a committee when you start looking who is on the committee you pull out the same names in the file down there the last 10 years. These people are all busy—the good ones. I think we have to address ourselves more effectively to management problems, and as you and I have discussed before, I am particularly concerned about a better use of our scientific and engineering resources in areas such as this as to the problems in the air and on the earth's surface.

One of the other items which we reviewed was the lack of innovation and perhaps lack of underevaluating of the innovation process within the auto industry.

I must say also that the more we studied the automobile industry problem, the more we realized that the industry also had problems which perhaps the Government people didn't appropriately appreciate. The time factor of getting into mass production, questions of antitrust, and the economic problems, for example.

On the other hand, innovative ideas have not come forth from Detroit at a startling rate. We recognized this and said so.

I think we should realize that the California smog from a scientific point of view, was at least understood, in the very early 1950's; that is a long time ago. It is also fair to say that without the relatively prompt action on the part of the State of California, we wouldn't have the air pollution situation even under control as much as we do today with respect to standards for automobiles.

The Federal Government has been considerably behind California. On the other hand, we must again recognize a very difficult problem, presented to us by many people: Why should somebody in let's say northeast Maine, pay something more for an automobile because California people need to have an antismog device? This is a practical problem evolving production costs, the use of cars in interstate travel and so forth. You can't have three or four different production lines in Detroit.

We were faced with many of these kinds of decisions during our deliberations, and in many cases we just had to make a judgment. I think by having a committee with a high level of competence, and more particularly with diverse backgrounds of experience, our judgments had some merit.

Again, on the technical side, the question, when you came to discuss the organization was: What should you do about a standard, let's say, for a product that you really didn't have good health data on? It was then a matter of judgment and it was tough.

In general our subpanel technical reports suggested more rigorous positions, but when the panel as a whole looked at the subpanel recommendations, we tried to develop a broader viewpoint.

Mr. DADDARIO. What does your experience lead you to tell us about health? What do or don't we know about it? What judgment should we come to? How do we reconcile these problems as we deal with