

ducing a settlement in Ford even if for the moment it failed to produce one in steel. A UAW spokesman outlined the "six major issues" that the union considered important in the 1949-50 negotiations:

1. Joint union-management responsibility for administration of retirement and health security programs.
2. Fixed employer commitment for a specified allocation of money stated in terms of cents per hour.
3. Employer-financed, noncontributory programs.
4. Standard of benefits that together with Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, or future Federal programs for benefits not now existing, will constitute a modest, but adequate, budget.
5. Integration with the Federal program in such a manner that private plans are, in real effect, supplementation of the floor of protection assured by Government.
6. Actuarial soundness.⁴⁸

The settlement included a noncontributory \$100 monthly normal pension (integrated with social security) at 65 or older after 30 years of credited service, automatic retirement at age 68, expiration of pension agreement on March 1, 1955, although other provisions would run until April 1, 1952, prorated benefits for employees 65 years or older with less than 30 years service with reduced benefits and a total and permanent disability benefit for employees between 55-65 with 30 years' service. The company had the authority to appoint the bank trustee for the pension fund and would be solely responsible for determining the funding of past service. A joint board of administration was established to oversee the plan's benefit structure.⁴⁹

The concluding phase of industrial union breakout into pension bargaining was marked by the UAW's Chrysler strike of 1950 which lasted 104 days. As Reuther said later:

It was not about the size of the pension. It was about whether the pension would be based on pay-as-you-go or whether it would be a funded plan. And, the Chrysler workers, about 90,000 of them, walked the bricks for 104 days on that principle alone, because we felt that we should not start down the road of a pension program except as we funded the pension and backed up the benefits with an actuarially sound fund.⁵⁰

The climate of informed opinion including commentators normally sympathetic to the unions ranged from open criticism to grudging caution. For the most part only the union leaders had good things to say about negotiated pension programs. Clark Kerr, at the time director of the University of California's Industrial Relations Center, based his vigorous disapproval on the unsuitability of negotiations to deal with the "unusually complicated" subject matter, the "unfortunate social consequences," the potentiality for interunion rivalry and the need for a "more overall approach." The 1949 report of the House Ways and Means Committee "saw the demands for security by segments of the population threaten[ing] to result in unbalanced, overlapping, and competing programs. The financing of such plans may

⁴⁸ Harry Becker, "Labor's Approach to the Retirement Problem," *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.

⁴⁹ This account based largely on Selekman, Selekman, and Fuller, *Problems in Labor Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-420. See also U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Wage Chronology, Ford Motor Co., 1941-64*, Rept. No. 99, 1965.

⁵⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, *Federal Reinsurance of Private Pension Plans*, hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 15, 1966, p. 48.