become chaotic, their economic effects dangerous." [51] The segment of opinion which acknowledged some legitimate function for negotiated pensions in the total social security system was concerned lest the movement go beyond the "stopgap" role which would cease as the public system approached a standard of adequacy. The major peril which most views of this kind focused on was the prospect that the private system might be "considered as long-range plans designed to do the major part of providing retirement protection." [52] From another critical standpoint the possibility was advanced that responsibility for pensions might convert the union leader into acceptance "of the code of the businessman," without, however, necessarily implying a "moral conclusion." [53]

William M. Leiserson was one of the very few outside of the labor community who allowed himself a mildly optimistic outlook:

> The soundness of those plans is not of primary importance. Some plans I know say, "When there isn't enough money, we will just reduce it in proportion," or something like that. They are all experiments. Of course, it is wise for the union and the employers and their advisers to work out as sound a plan as they can, as they see it. But there is no use in somebody coming up and saying, "This is the only sound plan and the only way in which we can do it." It has to be handled on a problem basis. What have we here? How do the people feel about it? What do they want in the way of control over it?
>
> After all, the soundness will really have to be left to actuaries and various kinds of experts, who disagree just as employers and unions disagree.[54]

"Every shortcoming of private [pension] systems was stated by union spokesmen," Walter Reuther said early in 1950, "long before the same points were raised by others who, for 14 years, did little or nothing about bringing the Federal system up to a minimum level of decency." [55] Every union viewpoint in this period stressed the primacy of OASI and the supplementary function of negotiated pension. "Protection must be more stable, continuous and broader in scope than can be achieved in private and isolated plans." [56] As evidence of the prior place accorded OASI in its strategy the UAW noted "that employer support for improvements in the public program is a direct result of the collective bargaining pressure for workers' security programs." [57] Given the limited increment the union option for "maximum retirement security for the greatest number of older workers who will be eligible for retirement within the period for which the plan was originally negotiated" meant that it was "forgoing for the present" such desirable features as permanent and total disability benefits, vesting and "other provisions directed to the special needs of younger work-

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[51] Clark Kerr, "Social and Economic Implications of Private Pension Plans," *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, Dec. 1, 1949, in reprint No. 16, University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations, Berkeley, 1949, pp. 4, 8.

[52] Robert M. Ball, "Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining: An Evaluation of Their Social Utility," *IRRA Proceedings*, 1949, p. 131.

[53] William Goldner, "Trade Union Structure and Private Pension Plans," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, October 1951, p. 67.

[54] William M. Leiserson, "Introduction," *Pensions and Health and Welfare Plans in Collective Bargaining*, University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations, Berkeley, 1950, p. 6

[55] U.S. Senate, *Social Security Revision, op. cit.*, pt. 3, p. 1840.

[56] Becker, "Labor's Approach to the Retirement Problem," *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 119.