purchase and the price advantages from group purchase." He speculates that "the automatic character, convenience, and security of a company program are attractive features to persons on hourly pay." [174]

There are only a few instances where the unions have polled their membership on its preferences as between wage increases or pensions. More commonly choices are reflected less perfectly in votes on contract demands and ratifications and on strike calls and strike terminations, where the pension question is only one of the issues, albeit often an important one. The voice of the membership is probably plainer on pensions at the first adoption of the plan and in major revisions. Afterward the pension question along with other issues is up for continuous discussion at conventions, wage policy conferences and union meetings. The present movement for special early retirement reflects as we have seen strong pressure from younger workers for jobs. Sometimes the voice of the membership seems plainer than it actually is because it is represented by a Reuther or a Lewis. When the members take the supporting action to back up the words of the leaders the evidence is that they are aware of the substantial costs which they are likely to incur in the form of lost wages due to strikes.

The few general attitude surveys which ask specific questions on pensions rank this benefit high on workers' priorities.[175] One survey conducted in the course of Cagan's study of the effect of pensions on saving showed an "apparent confusion over the amounts of * * * benefits attributable to the employer's contribution." [176] This confusion has apparently been used to question whether members really look upon employer contributions as deferred compensation or whether they know how much the employer contributes.[177] The survey population constituted a predominantly white-collar group drawn from a consumers union membership list. But perhaps one reason that members were confused over the amount of deferred compensation attributable to pensions is that as Cagan says, "in most plans * * * employer contributions are not specified: even if there were, no particular part could be allocated to specific employees." [178] There is also a likelihood that the Cagan study has only very limited application to negotiated plans because of the predominantly upper white collar—and hence likely nonunion—composition of the survey group.[179]

Beyond polls, there is evidence on pensions as an historical movement. The historical record of almost a century attests to the unmistakable and persisting concern by workers with the insecurities of old age, and to the innumerable experiments carried on by unions, employers, and governments in response to these concerns. Later the "tragic" inadequacy of OASI brought the unions to negotiated pensions, and developments since then have continued to reflect the constantly enlarging interest in retirement in union and public policies.

The question of individual freedom arises in connection with whether pension administration is structured to deal with the needs

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[174] Richard A. Lester, "Benefits as a Preferred Form of Compensation," *The Southern Economic Journal*, April 1967, p. 490, *passim*.

[175] Ludwig A. Wagner and Theodore Bakerman, "Wage Earners' Opinions of Insurance Fringe Benefits," *Journal of Insurance*, June 1960, p. 27; Stanley M. Nealey, "Pay and Benefit Preference," *Industrial Relations*, October 1963.

[176] Phillip Cagan, *The Effect of Pensions on Aggregate Savings*, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1965, p. 71.

[177] McClung in Joint Economic Committee, *Old Age Income Assurance, etc., op. cit.*, p. 21.

[178] Cagan, *The Effect of Pensions, etc., op. cit.*, p. 73.

[179] *Ibid.*, table E, p. 94.