described above was, therefore, accomplished by deflating the voluntary separation rates of one academic rank of faculty by another in each IHE in the sample. The resulting figure is meaningless in itself but it does give a corrected measure of relative separation rates.

The third group of factors—that relating to the income of faculty—warrants further discussion. Income differentials between IHE whether they take the form of differences in income levels or income increments, may be a major cause of voluntary separations. Faculty income can be defined as consisting of cash and noncash income; the latter is comprised of a varied package of benefits ranging from employer contributions to insurance plans to subsidized housing. The noncash income received by faculty may be a large fraction of total income. It is convenient in this study to distingiush between cash and noncash income because the value of fringe benefits (with the exception of pensions and tuition for faculty children) does not generally vary with faculty rank. Thus, the value of fringe benefits in a given institution is reducd to unity by the deflation process. There can, therefore, be no effect on relative (vested versus nonvested) mobility because of absolute fringe benefit differentials between IHE. Salary income, however, clearly varies with rank, but systematically with higher average salaries in the higher ranks. If, in fact, a systematic salary relationship exists between ranks, that is, if high (or low) salaried IHE pay high (or low) salaries to all ranks, then the deflation procedure will yield constant ratios of salaries or salary changes between vested and nonvested IHE, and the impact of salary differentials as a factor affecting voluntary separation rates between vested and nonvested IHE will again be minimized. The effectiveness of the deflation procedure on salaries is discussed in the text (pp. 231–232).

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