supply after 1952. The case against fiscal restraint is certainly not proven—nor is the case for exclusive dependence on monetary restraint—by artful averaging that obscures the significant turning points in economic pressures.

It seems to me that this editorial is another example of the extent to which zealous protagonists of a cause permit themselves to be blinded to any other explanation of events. Friedman just can't see interest rates; Segal just can't see fiscal policy. Neither the state of economic welfare nor the state of the economic art is being advanced by this sort of "tunnel vision." And it unfortunately tends to engender strident and unbalanced argument on the other side.

For example, we're having drummed into us, ad nauseam, that wise economic policies have enabled the economy to enjoy 7 consecutive years of expansion. This stretches the facts some, of course, since growth in real GNP did halt, briefly, in the first quarter of last year. But a more fundamental objection to this sort of overstatement is that it extends, by implication, more credit to the profession of economics than is warranted. I don't really see much for our craft to boast about in the record of the first 5 years of this period. It shouldn't have taken the combined wisdom of our profession 5 years to figure out how to reduce the unemployment rate from 7 percent to 4 percent. We apparently didn't learn much from the lessons of the thirties and forties, to have taken so long to achieve full employment. Or if we learned the lesson professionally, we certainly failed in learning how to persaude policymakers. Neither do we deserve any gold stars for having maintained reasonable price stability in the early 1960's, not with the unemployment prevalent then.

These past 2 years, when we have been operating at relatively high use of resources for most of the time, provide a better testing of the economist's capability. Does the record show that we know how to manage a full-employment economy, once we achieve one? If I may be permitted to continue to act like Professor Samuelson and award grades to policymakers, I'm not disposed to grant a gold star for this period either. After all, the Employment Act of 1946, which established the objectives of Government economic policy, stipulates multiple goals of "maximum employment, production and purchasing power." We seem to have done pretty well by the employment criterion, but have failed pretty miserably on the price score, with potentially serious consequences for sustainability of domestic expansion and international financial stability.

Must we, then, abandon hope for making any contribution to balanced economic expansion? Must we despairingly fall back to the nihilism underlying Professor Friedman's policy prescriptions? You know, of course, that his recommendations for an unswerving increase in the money supply—month by month, day by day—is based not so much on his faith in the efficacy of a stable expansion in the money supply as on his lack of faith in economists. He stated, to a congressional committee:

> I am saying that in the present state of our knowledge—my knowledge, your knowledge, the knowledge that economists in general have—we simply do not know enough to be able to know what way the wind is going to blow next year sufficiently to be able to adjust it.