

Mr. HART. I was just going to say, Congressman, I do not think they would come back and tell you that they do not know what they are doing, but if they did, I think I would feel a lot happier if you had a broader set of parameters than just this money-supply concept.

Where do you fit CD's into the picture? I do not know. I have often wondered. I would rather see a broader set, including reserve changes, a system that gives a broader purview of the whole credit market. Otherwise, I doubt if their reports are going to mean very much to you.

Representative REUSS. I am with you. I wrestled with the angel through the night myself on this one, and if I could have done better, I would.

Let me at this point ask, and I will only assign this task to those who volunteer it, would any of you gentlemen be willing to take a crack at evolving a set of parameter type guideposts that we could keep in our pocket here until such time as the Fed came back to use with its proposal?

I do feel, very frankly, that the essay I attempted a couple of months ago could usefully be edited and expanded to include specifically more reference to total credit than it does.

Would anybody be willing to try another essay, just speaking for himself?

Mr. GAINES. I think I speak for all of us when I say that staff limitations, if nothing else, would make it presumptuous for us to try to summarize the work that has been done within the Federal Reserve. More properly, this should come from the Federal Reserve.

I am not trying to beg off on it.

Representative REUSS. Perhaps we could come back at you three after we have received a response from the Fed.

Mr. GAINES. Yes.

Representative REUSS. Because there is no doubt they are doing some of the pioneering work, particularly in conjunction with MIT.

Mr. HART. That is right.

Representative REUSS. Let me now raise a subject that is of interest to all you three gentlemen. In saying that the Fed's open-market policy minutes are oftentimes delphic, and give the people in the market like yourselves quite a task of interpretation, you have touched on another important aspect of Federal Reserve communication.

What is there to be said, if anything, for the apologia you sometimes hear from the Fed, mostly unofficially, which runs something like this:

"We have to be cryptic and delphic, or we will help speculators, and counterproductive movements will be set in train."

I have never really understood or believed in that apologia. It seems to me that if the Fed agreed on and published some rather clear parameter-type guideposts, you people who operate in the money market or near the money market could, of course, have a better idea of what the Fed is doing, but that your resulting actions would not necessarily be counter to the public interest.

I do not exactly see the Fed's point. Would somebody comment on that?

Mr. NOYES. I have not said anything for a while. I might as well get into the act.