I think sometimes System officials put too much weight on this point. Of course, again you can go to extremes, clearly you do not want the room bugged and have three people in the financial community listening to the bug and not the others. This would create just the problem you suggest.

As long as you do not push disclosure too far, secrecy does not make much sense.

There is a problem though that I wanted to comment on as you were speaking. I am acutely conscious of it because of my long period inside the Federal Reserve.

You do have to remember that you are talking about 12 people, when you ask, "What does the Fed think?" It's just as if you were talking about the much larger number in Congress, and ask, "Why did the Congress do something?" You get into great difficulty summarizing it. The Congress has not refused to act on taxes for any one reason. Each Congressman had his own views and his own reasons for not acting.

I have participated in many Federal Reserve meetings, an honest summary of which might go something like this:

One man would say, "I think we ought to have a higher rate of monetary expansion because I am concerned about what is happening in the housing industry, and I think this is a good and sufficient reason. With all of the problems we have in our cities, going to 6 percent monetary expansion instead of 5 in this period is justified on housing grounds alone."

And somebody else would say, "Well, I think we ought to go to 6 percent too, but I am not a bit worried about housing. The thing that concerns me is that if we hold it at 5, we will have disorderly conditions in the money market."

You come to the next fellow and he says, "I am a farmer and interest rates are already 7 percent and I think any time they are over 6 percent, money is too tight and we ought to ease up so I am for a higher rate of expansion too."

Finally you come to still another one, and he says, "Well, I happen to think that I have unusually good foresight, and that the lagged effect of the present policy is going to hit right in the middle of a recession, which I see 6 months ahead. So I am also going to vote for a higher rate."

Then you look to the poor secretary down at the end of the table and say, "Now summarize in a few clear, specific words why it was that we went to a 6-percent rate of monetary expansion instead of a 5-percent."

Each fellow had his own reasons. It is awfully hard to make a nonmonolithic group talk with a single clear voice.

Representative REUSS. My point was not to kill the piano player, or to fire the secretary. He does the best he can, poor fellow—or poor girl.

But my difficulty is the lack of any overall philosophical framework in which the money managers in their triweekly meetings seem to move. Maybe they have one, and it is not revealed, but I certainly do not know.

Mr. NOYES. What I am saying is that much of the time they do not have a single clear specific reason for their action that they all agree upon. When he was a member of the Open Market Committee, Mr. Malcolm Bryan, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, used to have a measure of total reserve growth, which he spoke about