

Mr. JERRE WILLIAMS. As an experiment, that is right.

Mr. KASS. When Senator Long introduced S. 1195, he made the statement that we have selected the four agencies, Bureau of Prisons, VA, and the others because, and I quote the Senator, "the great bulk of citizens' complaints arise in connection with the above-mentioned agencies."

When the Department of the Treasury responded to the bill in their letter, they made the comment that if any agency at the national level is to be made the subject of an innovative experiment, the agency selected should be such as serves or deals with a relatively small number of persons and administers a law that is not overly complex or frequently changed, referring obviously to the Internal Revenue procedure. Do you have any comments on this suggestion?

Mr. JERRE WILLIAMS. Yes, Mr. Kass. It seems to me that you can get the restricted scope in any one of several directions. One of them is to limit it to certain agencies, and not try to cover the entire Federal Government. Another one would be to limit it to agencies where there would not be many complaints. It could be done either way.

It certainly seems to me that there can be substantial justification for considering the innovative experiment in an area, such as these four agencies, that most commonly involves what we might call relatively small citizen complaints. They are not the complaints of large industries or anything like that, but they are the individual dealing with his government, and this is a way to restrict it and try it out.

Of course, I don't think we can anticipate just how many complaints will come in on that basis, but it is an innovative experiment and we could see. But you could restrict it either way.

Mr. KASS. Of course, the Swedish expert who testified that the petty complaints of the citizens bother them more than anything else.

Mr. JERRE WILLIAMS. They are the complaints of the citizens, and the danger is we may sit back and take a look and say, "we can't be bothered with those things."

Mr. KASS. And we may find that 80 to 90 percent of the complaints in the United States are unfounded as the Swedish ombudsman and many other ombudsmen have found.

Mr. JERRE WILLIAMS. We don't know. I would emphasize again at this point the value of ombudsmen experiments at the State and local level such as we are getting around the country, for this very purpose.

Mr. KASS. Now, in our S. 1195, section 3 of the bill puts the administrative ombudsman under the control and direction of yourself as Chairman of the Administrative Conference. Is this a workable procedure, do you think?

Mr. JERRE WILLIAMS. I think there are some difficult problems here. Certainly it doesn't follow the patterns which we have seen elsewhere in the world—to have an ombudsman in one sense under the supervision of somebody else.

Now, I recall that Kenneth Culp Davis, in his analysis of the ombudsman concept, indicated he thought there could be a bifurcated Administrative Conference, one side of it being the Conference concept, and the other side being the ombudsman concept. This it seems to me, is simply a detail. The function is the important thing. I would say in summary that I have some reservations about the precise way