

cult or important issues are involved.⁹⁹ Bilateral negotiations on such nontariff barriers may be impracticable when there is no basis for reciprocity. For example, the United States is interested in Austrian action on automobile road taxes, but Austria has no particular interest in any U.S. nontariff restrictions. Consequently, a multilateral package to which all countries contribute might be the best way to negotiate on such miscellaneous nontariff barriers. But even a multilateral package would be unbalanced for certain countries and, therefore, would not be reciprocal. Such a package would most easily be concluded within the framework of a general tariff reduction, such as the Kennedy Round, so that deficiencies in some countries' contributions could be made up by tariff concessions.¹⁰⁰ Short of a general trade negotiation, both tariff and nontariff barriers affecting trade in a particular industry might be negotiated. In chemicals, for example, an effort has been made in the Kennedy Round to exchange tariff concessions for elimination of the American selling price basis of customs valuation.

The misuse of standards and similar measures designed to regulate trade can best be treated within various international organizations dealing with these matters. The International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission are ideally suited for this purpose with respect to industrial products. The *Codex Alimentarius*, which is being developed under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, is designed to cope with problems relating to agricultural products. The *Codex Alimentarius* will not only include health standards for food but also the standardization of can and other container sizes.

As indicated in the introductory section, this discussion

⁹⁹ For example, a U.S. complaint on European road taxes was considered by the OECD Trade Committee in 1963, but no changes in these countries' tax measures resulted.

¹⁰⁰ It might be possible to negotiate satisfactorily on recorded TV programs in connection with the OECD Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, part of which relates to liberalizing international transactions in motion picture films and recorded TV programs. However, neither the OECD code nor the GATT, which contains somewhat similar provisions, applies specifically to TV screen quotas, and their applicability to such quotas is a matter of contention that has not been resolved.