

It is this dimension of our trade policy which contravenes our public policy on collective bargaining that this committee should also give serious attention. However, let me reiterate that our problem in the steel industry exists whether we are engaged in negotiations or not. The negotiation period is only an occasion in which the increased levels of imports become more noticeable in that they reach these levels more rapidly. It is certainly erroneous to leave the impression, as some earlier testimony did, that the upsurge in steel imports is a result of strike or the negotiation of this union.

Moreover, it is maintained that one of the reasons for a greater flow of trade is to restrain price increase. But, after reading some of the recent extreme statements by import trade associations, I wonder whether the real objective is to restrain legitimate wage increases. At what level of market penetration will this be a reality in the steel industry? And when it reaches that level, how many workers will be penalized by losing their jobs in order to control the pricing policy of the various corporations?

Until such time as we can have international price competition in which labor is not a commodity and there are international fair labor standards, then I suggest that American workers not bear the full brunt of a national pricing policy.

I submit, therefore, that we are not talking about extremes—a total free trade policy or the protectionism of Smoot-Hawley, as envisioned by the massive retaliation arguments. Our position as a union lies within the framework of an expansionary trade policy—but one which is balanced. Our concern is not over a freer trade relationship. We are committed to that. Nor is it one of being unduly aroused over fairer trade. Certainly, we seek equitable antidumping laws and the reciprocal elimination of nontariff barriers. But for an industry that is primarily domestic, our attention is directed at a more orderly and balanced penetration of our market. Even GATT regulations recognize the chaotic conditions arising from “market disruption.”

We are advocating, therefore, that these quota restrictions be enacted and enforced until such time as world overcapacity is moderated. Once there is a more proper relationship between world demand and world capacity, then, injurious competition will be abated. We are not opposed to steel trade—even at competitive prices—but, we are convinced that the competition should arise from lower cost factors and not from the compulsion of excess facilities. Hence, we view the fact of overcapacity as the crucial malady in the world steel trade picture and not necessarily other competitive factors, like wage costs.

I might also mention that the principle of trade adjustment assistance to a limited number of workers displaced by foreign trade is most necessary, but highly unsatisfactory as a solution to massive displacement. I am aware that there are a number of proposals before Congress which would liberalize that section of the Trade Expansion Act dealing with assistance to workers adversely affected by foreign trade. I hope that Congress will react favorably to these proposals. It is my understanding that, as of now, not one single case has been acted upon favorably by the Federal Tariff Commission. However, it is one thing to provide assistance for a small group of workers, who will be adversely affected, in the interest of a broader trade policy, which provides greater demonstrable economic growth for the economy and