Actually, the the preferable way would have been to have had that as part of your statement and then I could have raised questions on it.

Certainly I would like to have a response at this time if you care to make it but I am more anxious to get a rather complete memorandum from your industry on your evaluation of the Kennedy round.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Curtis, I would like to comment if I may at this time and get it on the record now rather than awaiting a written memorandum because there are some substantive, questions that I would like to spread before you for your consideration.

First, I think that most of us could quickly agree that it is really too early to evaluate the Kennedy round in terms of its overall impact and that anything that we offered in writing today would merely lay us open to speculation on the part of those who might not share our view as to the future impact.

The United States has in fact made its first cuts January 1. The EEC, for example, still has yet to make its first reductions, so that this is too early in the game to talk about that.

Mr. CURTIS. Could I interrupt there on just one point. One of the things that I have hoped was going to come was the opening up of European markets for example to Japanese textiles which might remove some of the pressure on our market. You could comment on that; could you not?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, sir; I would be delighted to.

Mr. CURTIS. This is the kind of thing that I want. I appreciate that in many areas you would be reluctant to comment for the reasons you gave—that it is too early and we are dealing in expectations. But to the extent that you can give us the benefit of your views; will you do so?

Mr. DARMAN. I think this is a most appropriate body before which to raise what is to us a very substantive question having to do with the future of international trade as it affects the United States.

This bears on the Kennedy round but I would be raising the same question if the Kennedy round had never occurred.

Since the Kennedy round negotiations were concluded, we have seen a devaluation in the United Kingdom. The pound was reduced officially from $2.80 to $2.40.

I suspect without knowing that this was not taken into consideration in toto by the parties at the time that they attempted to set up some equilibrium in the world.

However, at the time that devaluation occurred, in theory at least the British had a further 14-percent advantage in international trade with their currency having been reduced. This advantage was at least potentially real because the rest of the major industrialized countries of the world agreed to stand by and not take any similar action.

Since that time, the pound has not shown any strength. On the contrary, speaking as the head of a company that imports a substantial amount of wool which is traded in British pence, I know from personal experience that as recently as last week my company could buy the pound for forward delivery 12 months at $2.28 a pound as against the present official rate of $2.40.

This is a farther reduction, Mr. Curtis, of 5 percent.