Now, during this same period the U.S. mill consumption of all fibers, cotton decreased 4½ percent, wool decreased 16 percent, but man-made fibers went up 6 percent.

The capacity of the United States to produce manmade fibers from 1958 to 1960 increased in the United States from 1958–60 to 1968 by 236 percent and in Japan by only 175 percent, so that the margin that started some 8 years ago has been extended even further to the advantage of the American industry.

Finally, I have some statistics here and I would like to point out that in terms of broad woven fabrics, which is one of the indications of the prosperity of the textile industry, manmade fibers has taken over and is rapidly taking up 50 percent of the entire fiber used in textiles. This we think is an indication again just as there are fibers within the textile industry that do better than other fibers, so there are plants and little different kinds of productions within this giant industry that do better than the others, and we think that in a country such as ours we ought to do our best to upgrade competitiveness of individual workers and of industries rather than trying to subsidize and permit sheltering of the weak and inefficient.

This morning a great question was raised about possible retaliation and the opinion of the witness from the domestic industry was there would be no retaliation.

May I refer you to the testimony of Secretary of Agriculture Freeman last week? As I recall he specifically stated that he heard from Japanese and other sources that if America had to impose these import restrictions Japan and other countries would not necessarily retaliate because they wanted to, but because they would be forced to.

Let's take, for example, Japanese purchases of soybeans, $207 million, raw cotton $118 million, wheat $141 million, tobacco $28 million, skins and hides over $200 million, then industrial machinery which she buys from the United States $413 million, home and other appliances and apparatus $130 million, aircraft and other transport $39 million, iron and steel scrap $174 million, petroleum products $78 million, coal and coke $131 million, chemicals $227 million. I could go down the list.

In other words, if Japan is unable with the use of textiles which don't compete across the board to generate money with which to buy these goods, and every one of the goods that I mentioned is available to Japan from other sources and in some instances at a cheaper rate than they can buy from the United States and yet Japan continues to buy such large amounts from America in part because she is grateful for the opportunity to be able to sell her—thus in terms of international relations this is a two-way street.

Some comment has been made about the long-term textile arrangement and whether this was a proper way to extend in the future. We don't think so. Why? Because under the long-term textile arrangement a structuring of the various products that can come into this country was done in such a way that for 11 years, for example, in only one out of 11 years was Japan able to fill her fabrics quota and only three out of 11 years was Japan able to reach her made-up goods quota.

Yet we say that this is a wonderful arrangement. Japan at one time enjoyed 70 percent of the import market for textile in the United States. Today she enjoys less than 17 percent.

Yet Japan was a country that voluntarily started this because she felt that she was going to help the United States out of a temporary