The chart on the following page demonstrates the failure of the United States delegation in Geneva to obtain tariff concessions on malt beverages in any way commensurate with even the existing United States rates, and much less with the rate concession granted by this country. While the chart lists only a few countries, the "No Concession" response was typical of the great majority of the GATT negotiators, and instances of concessions were the rare exceptions to the general rule.

Country	Basic duty before Kennedy Round	Duty after Kennedy Round
Australia	$1.37 per imperial gallon	No concession.
Canada	53 cents per imperial gallon (including 38 cents per gallon excise tax).	15 cents per imperial gallon (excluding 38 cents per gallon excise tax) effectively, no concession.
Dominican Republic	80 cents per gallon plus import tax of $2,80 per gallon plus additional tax of 50 percent of f.o.b. value plus custom surcharge of 3 percent of import duties and taxes.	No concession.
Germany	26 percent ad valorem plus 10 percent import equalization tax.	On July 1, 1968, the German rate will move to the European Economic Community external rate of 30 percent to which will be applied the first Kennedy round cut so that the rate will then be lowered over a 5-year period to 24 percent by Jan. 1, 1972.
Haiti	72 cents per gallon	No concession.
Hong Kong	32 cents per gallon, plus 0.05 percent ad valorem.	Do.
Japan	35 percent ad valorem on c.i.f. value	Reduced to 20 percent.
Netherland Antilles	$2.51 per gallon	No concession.
United Kingdom	58 cents per gallon	Do.

Many excuses have been advanced by the proponents of high foreign malt beverage tariffs and foreign protectionist policies in support of the alleged necessity of these tariffs and policies for the particular country or countries involved. It is interesting to note, however, that each of these arguments could be as readily advanced in support of the adoption of similar positions by the United States Government concerning the importation of foreign malt beverages into the United States.

For example, some of the foreign countries which impose unrealistically high duties or other impediments in the way of the importation of United States beer have argued the local foreign breweries can more than supply the country's demands. Were this argument valid, it could be as readily applied to the capacity of the United States to supply the demands of its inhabitants.

Next, and perhaps intertwined with the foregoing, is the contention that the local foreign brewing industry needs protection. A quick glance at the rate of attrition sustained by United States breweries over the past several decades substantiates the fact that a significant percentage of the individually owned, local breweries of the United States have been, and still are, in need of the same type of protection.

It has also been contended by some foreign countries that the taste of United States brew is not acceptable to individuals in the foreign country. If this were the case, the foreign country would have no need for restrictive tariff and non-tariff barriers, but competition and consumer taste preferences would effectively inhibit the importation of the United States product. The same argument could be advanced by the United States interests in view of the vast disproportion between the consumption of United States brews and imported brews. The only way to determine the desires of the consumer is to afford him an opportunity to consume—as the United States Government has done for the foreign product.

There is little doubt that all of these more common reasons advanced for preventing United States beer imports are makeshift rationalizations and have little, if any, validity; and that to the extent that validity exists, the arguments could be advanced as readily to support protectionist policies by the United States.

The inability of the United States brewing industry to export its product to foreign countries is the result of three factors, each of which is significant, and the cumulative effect of all three of which is inhibitive—and in many cases prohibitive—of exportation by domestic United States brewers.