Beyond this, in the words of the Honorable William S. Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, "there were nontariff barriers that were not touched in the Kennedy round." Mr. Roth included such devices as state trading, border taxes, arbitrary customs valuation, "buy national" laws and practices, and discriminatory internal taxes, and remarked that there were a host of others.[5]

And, indeed, there were a host of other nontariff barriers utilized by other nations against exports from the United States, and from other countries. In addition to the ones listed by Mr. Roth, there are quotas, import licenses, import certificates, gate price systems, health restrictions, outright import prohibitions, minimum price controls, and others.

These barriers have been a major cause of discrimination against our exports, resulting in nonreciprocal treatment for U.S. livestock and mean industry, regardless of paper concessions spelled out in officially negotiated agreements.

Can the EEC still utilize its system of variable levies? The answer is "Yes." Can foreign nations still impede, or completely wall out, U.S. exports by using a multitude of nontariff barriers? The answer is obviously "Yes," again.

A study of the reports setting forth the results of the Kennedy round, with respect to agriculture, bears out the fact that other countries are still free to exercise all of the above-named trade restrictions against U.S. agricultural exports.

How can there be any realistic conclusions drawn on the value of concessions when foreign nations are still in a position to change their "ground rules" of trade whenever it suits their interests? The United States is simply not guaranteed access to many markets, regardless of "paper" tariff concessions.

U.S. officials fail to paint the true picture for the Congress and the public. Nearly every other country in the world, through some kind of control on imports, takes only those products, and in the volume, that they want and/or need. They do not feel any obligation to throw their borders open to take any product in whatever volume some other country wishes to ship to its ports of entry. The United States is practically the only country which builds and carries out its trade policy on such an ivory tower, impractical foundation. Other nations handle foreign trade on a strictly business-like basis, not in the framework of good will gestures, or in an attempt to set an example that hopefully the rest of the world will follow.

We continue to be warned by Government officials that moves to depart from these good will gestures in order to reasonably protect domestic industry will provoke extensive retaliation by foreign nations. Contrary to impressions left of automatic mass retaliation, any move to retaliate must come on an individual country-by-country basis (except for group action by the EEC, for example). Furthermore, other countries are already providing a very high and effective degree of protection for their domestic agriculture and industries; and they obviously do not give much second thought to retaliation on the part of the United States when putting their protective measures into practice or in maintaining them.

---

[5] Report of agricultural trade negotiations of Kennedy Round, FAS–M–193, FAS, USDA, September 1967.