proceedings in the Organization for Economic Development (OECD), that long-term solutions to basic trade restrictions and imbalances will be worked out. Our underlying commitment to liberalized reciprocal trade depends for its success in large measure on multi-lateral negotiations under the procedural safeguards of the GATT. The record of the past 20 years shows that GATT is the appropriate forum in which negotiations can be had to improve the basic rules of international trade and commerce that go far to bind the trading nations to fair trade and competitive equity.

In fact, the two non-tariff barriers we have cited in this statement are under consideration in the GATT right now. We have been so advised by U.S. trade officials; and in his testimony of June 4 before the Ways and Means Committee, Ambassador Roth said:

"We have also made a good start (in the GATT) toward reaching an agreed solution to the problem of the rules governing border taxes and are working in a special GATT group on the many problems that remain in other non tariff barriers."

The momentum of the Kennedy Round should be exploited to proceed now to this next and more difficult stage of negotiations on the real barriers to trade. U.S. trade policy, and the legislative base on which it rests, must accept the U.S. commitment to international negotiations to accomplish these ends. Accordingly, General Electric urges the Congress to give the Executive the legislative support needed to go forward in the GATT. And beyond this, we believe that the Congress should make clear its legislative intent that U.S. trade policy, in the GATT and all related international proceedings, must be conducted in such a way as to create genuine two-way streets and insure competitive equity for American industry.

Second, U.S. trade policy must have at hand and effectively employ an array of self-help remedies and legal recourse with which to discipline unfair competition in international trade. Our ability to negotiate successfully in the GATT and other international forums and to maintain a strong bargaining position depends in large part on the statutory authority of U.S. government and U.S. business to retaliate against trade discrimination and restrictive practices. This is particularly important with respect to short-term solutions for specific trade abuses, because international negotiations are necessarily long in their resolution and general in the agreements they reach.

It is appropriate, we believe, in the course of the Committee's consideration of H.R. 17551 that existing statutory remedies be reviewed carefully to determine if they are accomplishing the purpose intended and, if not, whether new legislation or new statements of Congressional intent are necessary. In his June testimony, Ambassador Roth said the following:

"I agree that the practices of other countries are not always what we would like them to be. Where I do not agree is that we are helpless before them. Both under our international commitments and our domestic law, we have remedies for many of them. We have the power to impose antidumping duties and countervailing duties to offset unfair pricing practices and subsidies. And we have authority to protect domestic producers seriously injured by imports even where foreign practices are perfectly fair. This includes the authority to increase tariffs under the escape clause and to impose quotas to protect domestically supported farm prices."

We suggest, however, that despite Ambassador Roth's statement, the existing array of apparently applicable self-help remedies now on the books is inadequate, either as written or as interpreted and implemented by Executive Departments and administrative regulations. We recommend that Congress review existing remedies in the light of unfair foreign competition; that is, those governmental and commercial policies and practices that give an artifical trade advantage to industries in competition with U.S. industry, whether in the U.S., their own home country or third country markets. In particular, we believe that the following three U.S. laws as they have been interpreted and executed should be re-examined in terms of their reach to prevent unfair methods of competition:

1. The Antidumping Act of 1921 (19 USC 160)
2. Countervailing Duties—Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC 303)
3. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Section 252 (19 USC 1882)

The Antidumping Act is not intended to reach unfair competition itself, but only the injurious consequences of such dumping. As such, it is not a relevant statutory remedy for an industry, or a company, which cannot meet the tests of material injury, as laid down by regulation and previous Tariff Commission