OBJECTIONS TO ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS

It is necessary to present the above background information as a prelude to our objections to the administration proposals.

Many times, the plight of our industry was explained with charts and other factual data before members of the special advisory team to the President on GATT Negotiations. As a result of our efforts, our industry won some well-deserved concessions from the across-the-board 50% tariff reductions at the Kennedy Round.

World trade is valuable and essential, but it must not be permitted to sacrifice American jobs and domestic industries. Our industry objects to the extension for two years of the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with the authority to reduce rates by as much as 50% which he did no use by the close of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations.

If our industry is any example of the few others that escaped the across-the-board slash, we believe that those few exceptions from further tariff concessions were very deservedly exempted after full and complete consideration by our negotiators. To place it within the power of the President to bargain and trade tariff concessions without reference to the affect on industries creates, in our opinion, a severe threat to industries already vitally affected by imports. We do not believe that the provision for adjustment assistance to firms and workers is the answer.

CONCLUSIONS

The very serious current domestic problems involving the lack of new employment opportunities in industries and the balance of payment crisis can very rapidly worsen as a result of increased tariff concessions and uncontrolled free trade.

Regulations and guidelines must be implemented to establish positive formulas for the determination of the impact of imports on any given segment of domestic industries. Our domestic manufacturers must not be placed in the untenable position of being put out of business on the basis of an individual discretionary decision, or by virtue of vague and unenforceable relief and adjustment or escape clause hearings.

As an industry that was told in 1954, after a 740% increase in imports and again in 1958 after a 1500% increase, that the domestic manufacturers had not been injured, we must go on record as begin firmly opposed to any further tariff concessions, or even the possibility thereof, that might have further detrimental effect on our industry.

EXHIBIT A

HARDWOOD PLYWOOD: U.S. MARKET SHIPMENTS, IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND CONSUMPTION, 1950–67

[In thousand square feet, surface measure]

Year	Market shipments	Imports	Exports	Apparent U.S. consumption	Ratio of imports to U.S. — Shipments (percent)	Ratio of imports to U.S. — Consumption (percent)
1950	[1] 752,908	57,835	365	810,378	8	7
1951	[1] 805,249	66,761	553	[1] 871,457	8	8
1952	[1] 794,857	84,931	260	[1] 879,528	11	10
1953	819,017	218,862	463	1,037,506	27	21
1954	755,464	426,064	431	1,181,097	56	36
1955	933,948	617,936	325	1,551,559	66	40
1956	886,640	695,515	496	1,581,659	78	44
1957	791,431	840,962	393	1,632,000	106	52
1958	803,572	907,165	1,129	1,709,608	113	53
1959	976,717	1,318,035	1,951	2,292,801	135	57
1960	944,028	1,014,853	1,845	1,957,036	108	52
1961	1,088,561	1,097,445	1,556	2,184,450	101	50
1962	1,230,502	1,438,964	2,707	2,666,759	117	54
1963	1,414,260	1,620,158	3,640	3,030,778	115	53
1964	1,598,007	1,946,697	3,156	3,541,548	122	55
1965	2,200,900	2,130,794	5,634	4,326,060	97	49
1966	2,164,200	2,553,764	7,423	4,710,541	118	54
1967	[1] 2,100,000	2,530,491	6,656	4,623,835	120	55

[1] Estimated.