For reasons that have never been satisfactorily explained to me, the American negotiating team at Geneva saw fit to go beyond the authorization granted by the Congress and agreed to seek the elimination of ASP and to tariff reductions considerably in excess of 50 percent.

In return for this unwarranted and unauthorized concession, the American negotiators could not achieve anything better than a promise from our principal trading partners abroad that they would return to us the other 30 percent of their reduction owed us from the Kennedy round which had been withheld as a "hostage."

This patently unreciprocal exchange has come to be known as the separate package because it overstepped the bounds of congressional authority and now requires explicit approval by the Congress if it is, indeed, to become effective.

In the meantime, it has come to my attention and to the attention of many other Members of the Congress that many of our trading partners abroad have already increased their border taxes to levels that more than offset the tariff reductions which they agreed to make at Geneva, so that the net effect, once again, is all give on our part and all take on their part. Their cost of entering the U.S. market is substantially reduced, but our cost of entering their market remains approximately the same.

This tampering with border taxes cannot be ignored because it poses a serious threat to our already troublesome balance of payments and negates even the pretense of reciprocity in the Geneva agreements.

One cannot help but wonder why the U.S. negotiating team—which did not hesitate to put ASP on the sacrificial bargaining block although it lacked authority to do so—did not affirmatively deal with these border taxes by insisting that they be eliminated.

Border taxes knock the Geneva agreements for a loop—the strangulating loop of a giant question mark and the one-sided, unreciprocal increases in these border taxes place the entire results of the negotiations under a cloud of ominous doubts.

Yet long before the border tax began to attract attention and spread the seeds of suspicion, many of us who were closely watching the progress of the talks at Geneva were concerned over the willingness of our negotiators to sacrifice ASP, regardless of the benefits promised by our trading partners by way of exchange.

The New Jersey congressional delegation joined, and remains united, in a rare, bipartisan, unanimous declaration urging the retention of ASP.

On June 30, 1967, the entire congressional delegation—nine Democrats and six Republican Members of the House and our two Senators, one a Republican and the other a Democrat—wrote to Ambassador William M. Roth, the President's special trade representative who has already appeared before your committee.

We requested Ambassador Roth to release the Tariff Commission's findings and conclusions on the economic impact of abandoning ASP and reducing the converted rates by 50 percent.

As of this day, we still do not know the extent of injury that had been projected by the Tariff Commission, although we have reason to believe even on the basis of a 50-percent reduction in converted