

Mr. BROOKS. You can do that for the record in the interest of time.

Secretary BOYD. I think with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I might tell you that Mr. Lang testified along with some of the other members of his office before a Senate appropriations subcommittee last week on this very point, and it might be worthwhile to submit the transcript of that testimony in the record here. I think it will cover all of the questions you asked.

Mr. BROOKS. Does it also cover the difficulties of deadheading that train into Washington? The public story was that they were going to start one of their turbine-powered fast trains, and apparently it did not work at all. They did not even drive it down here. You might cover that, if you would.

Secretary BOYD. That is the turbo train?

Mr. BROOKS. It was not the turbo train. It was another new design that they had.

Mr. LANG. These are the so-called Metroliners which are designed to operate on the Penn Central between Washington and New York in electrified territory.

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, and also cover, if you would, at what speed you figure this should have seat belts and what efforts you have made in your research in the way of easily accessible emergency exits, inflammable material, retardation and things of that nature. If you will give us that in the same analysis, we would be grateful.

Mr. LANG. We would be glad to do so.

(The information requested follows:)

HIGH-SPEED RAIL TRANSPORTATION RUNNING BEHIND ANTICIPATED SCHEDULE

(On p. 123 of the transcript, Secretary Boyd suggested that it might be worthwhile to submit the report on the Washington-New York rail passenger service demonstration project which is dated May 31, 1968. A copy of this report follows:)

GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE WASHINGTON-NEW YORK RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

FOREWORD

At the request of the Secretary of Transportation, and with the concurrence of the senior managements of the Penn Central, Budd, Westinghouse Electric, and General Electric Cos., a Government-industry task force was formed on April 17, 1968, to identify those problems delaying the initiation of the Northeast corridor Washington-New York rail passenger demonstration service, to order these problems as to importance measured against the various objectives of the demonstration, and to report the proposed solutions of these problems within 30 days.

The following individuals comprised the task force: J. J. Wright and G. R. Weaver (with C. E. Ingersoll as alternate) of the Penn Central; J. A. Miller and N. W. Fesmire of the Budd Co.; B. W. Wyman (with J. C. Dwyer as alternate) and C. B. Lewis of the General Electric Co.; W. P. Bollinger and F. B. Gunter of Westinghouse Electric; and, representing the Department of Transportation, K. L. Lawson and L. A. Goldmuntz, with J. S. Jordan serving as the administrative assistant to the task force.

The task force was organized into various groups, as indicated in figure 1. These groups were staffed and assisted by Government and industry personnel.

We wish to thank officials of the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for making available the services of Neal A. Blake, Colin G. Simpson, Henry V. Hermansen, Henry J. Buck, Harry Runyan, and David Stephens. Many industry consultants were particularly helpful, such as Jack Irvin, Bruce Erlichman, and Edmundas Vambutas. Kenneth B. Ullman of the Office of High Speed Ground Transportation also participated.