purchase and did not make cash, they had to sign a blank wage assignment. This is illegal, and we are presently proceeding toward prosecuting them for this violation.

But the development of this situation over a period of 17 years that we knew of was very disturbing.

The assignments were made at the discretion of the juice man, Mr. Marvin Browning—he would serve these assignments upon the employer, the owner of the glue factory, and each week 15 percent of their salaries was withdrawn, and paid to the clothing store. One of the employees had been the subject of wage assignments for the past 19 years, which coincided exactly with the full length of his employment with this firm, which employment we have verified.

Among the group of five men was one who had a minimum period of juice, being on juice to Marvin Browning, of 10 years.

As I have said, we intend to prosecute Mr. Browning and two of his associates, one of whom is his brother-in-law, Guido and Emil Smania.

We are also looking into the aspect of consumer fraud, and illegal operation of a tavern.

Adjoining the clothing store these men also owned a tavern. They were using both establishments as a base of operation for the juice racket.

In my experience, we have come to appreciate that the juice racket, up until World War II, was a relatively insignificant operation. Only disreputable thugs, petty pickpockets, and those at the very bottom of the underworld ladder would even stoop to becoming Shylocks.

Since World War II, through our investigations, through exchange of correspondence with authorities in other States, particularly in New York State, we have determined that during the post-World War II period they realized there were tremendous profits to be made from loan sharking. Because of the huge economic potential, the former attitude of disdain for lowly juice men now changed, and it became elevated to an important position, acquiring the image of a good, profitable underworld racket.

Today gangland leaders finance juice operators, loaning as much as $50,000 and upward. These are the men at the top. They only charge 1 percent to 5 percent. They want their principal returned plus the interest within a very short period of time, a few weeks. These are the financiers. They work on a heavy volume and a fast turnover.

These loans, large loans, from the top, when they are given to people, let us say at the second echelon, maybe some also at the first echelon, only supplements the large bankrolls which already prevail with any one particular juice gang.

One gang, for example, five men, in 1 year invested $200,000—yet during this year they were able to grant loans in excess of $350,000 to a total of 150 persons. At the end of the year this gang earned almost that amount in weekly interest payments and return of principal.

At the end of that year, it still had a balance of unpaid, unreturned principal, of $200,000. They were obviously using the juice money to further expand their wealth in granting more loans.

The structure of this one juice fashion and the way it works is typical of many others in the greater Chicago area.