

Mr. TUCK. I want to make it just as tight as we can make it under the law.

Mr. LIEBLING. We do, in fact, do it now.

Mr. TUCK. I have no sympathy for anybody that would destroy the Government of the United States or give out the defense secrets against our interests.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Liebling, how many facilities and how many screened individuals would be involved if the proposed legislation were enacted in substantially its present form and if executive authorities administered personnel screening procedures to the maximum extent authorized by the pending legislation? Do you still find it impossible to make a judgment?

Mr. LIEBLING. Yes, I would have to reiterate my previous answer.

Mr. CULVER. What categories of facilities that produce goods anywhere in the Nation could *not* be subjected to the personnel screening requirements to be authorized by the pending legislation?

Mr. LIEBLING. Most U.S. plants would not be so covered. I would say those that would be involved are initially in direct support of industrial facilities that are producing military arms such as, let's presume, the water, power, and dam close by to the facility that would require generation, power units, and so forth, a rather critical item which would require the outside assistance of the particular facility that we are discussing under the program. This would be a critical area. In other words, you could not perform without this water power or generation for your electrical facilities in the area although they might be completely separate. So as I am saying, it is direct support for production of a military arm as such.

Mr. CULVER. As I recall, you made a recommendation in your initial statement to broaden the general categorization of the facilities affected. And I was wondering whether or not it is not true that if we employ the term "national interest purpose" that virtually every product today could be thought to have some "national interest purpose."

Mr. LIEBLING. In regard to broadening the "standard" for making security decisions my answer is "no." If you remember I also indicated that we would obviously use some pretty good sensible judgment in this proposed broadening in the criteria now in play where we define what particular type of facilities we would cover so that we would not use that. Legally, possibly, the Secretary of Defense would have the authority to broaden in these areas that you are alluding to, but it would be completely unlikely.

Mr. CULVER. It might be unlikely, but that is rather broad authority that he is being provided; is it not? Isn't that true?

Mr. LIEBLING. It is broad, but we have got to exercise some judgment.

Mr. CULVER. That is right. I agree. We have to exercise judgment, both in the enactment of legislation as well as its administration. Under the proposed legislation would the personnel screening requirements apply to all, some, only a few, employees of the facilities that had been designated, not because of current operations at such facilities, but because at some time in the future such facilities could become engaged in activities that would have the requisite relationship to the national security?

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.)