

UNITED STATES *v.* ROBEL.

Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality . . . to perform its function. . . ." *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U. S. 388, 421; *Currin v. Wallace*, 306 U. S. 1, 15. It is generally enough that, in conferring power upon an appropriate authority, Congress indicate its general policy, and act in terms or within a context which limits the power conferred. See, *e. g.*, *Arizona v. California*, 373 U. S. 546, 584-585; *FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.*, 346 U. S. 86; *Lichter v. United States*, 334 U. S. 742; *Yakus v. United States*, *supra*, 321 U. S., at 424; *Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court*, 284 U. S. 8; *FTC v. Gratz*, 253 U. S. 421; *Buttfield v. Stranahan*, 192 U. S. 470. Given such a situation, it is possible for affected persons, within the procedural structure usually established for the purpose, to be heard by the implementing agency and to secure meaningful review of its action in the courts, and for Congress itself to review its agent's action to correct significant departures from Congress' intention.

The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the regulation invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights, as does § 5 (a)(1)(D). See *Barenblatt v. United States*, 360 U. S. 109, 140, n. 7 (dissenting opinion, BLACK, J.). This is because the numerous deficiencies connected with vague legislative directives, whether to a legislative committee, *United States v. Rumely*, 345 U. S. 41, to an executive officer, *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U. S. 388, to a judge and jury, *Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.*, 274 U. S. 445, 465, or to private persons, *Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U. S. 58, see *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U. S. 495, are far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake. See also *Gojack v. United States*, 384 U. S. 702; *Kunz v. New York*, 340 U. S. 290;